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COMMENT
This working paper is the manuscript for a book titled
Decision Analysis with Multiple Conflicting Objectives:
Preferences and Value Tradeoffs being published by John Wiley
and Sons, New York. It is being distributed now in very
limited number prior to formal publication both (1) to
facilitate the use of these results within the IIASA projects,
and (2) to elicit comments on their content.
The work reported here began over five years ago when
Ralph L. Keeney was affiliated with the Massachusetts Institute
of Technology and Howard Raiffa was at Harvard University.
The finalization of this work has taken place at IIASA where
our interactions with various members of the applied projects
has helped to make the presentation more useful to potential
practitioners.
Efforts are now beginning to utilize the theories and
procedures outlined in this book on the problems being addressed
by the applied projects of IIASA. We plan to report on these
developments in the various IIASA publications in the near
future.

PREFACE
If we wanted our title solely to convey the subject
matter of our book, it would be some horrendously complicated
concoction like: "On Cardinal Utility Analysis with Multiple
Conflicting Objectives: The Case of Individual Decision Making
Under Uncertainty from the Prescriptive Point of View--with
Special Emphasis on Applications but with a Little Theory
Thrown-In for Spice."
Our present title, Decision Analysis with Multiple
Conflicting Objectives: Preferences and Value Tradeoffs is
longer than we think a title should ideally be, but it un-
fortunately is too short to prevent unjustified sales. Even
in such a simple case, it is not so easy to balance among the
conflicting objectives: convey the subject matter, minimize
the length, and promote justified sales but prevent unjustified
ones.
To an ever-growing circle of people "Decision Analysis"
has carved out for itself a niche in the literature of opera-
tions research, systems analysis, management sciences, decision
and control, cybernetics, and so on. Decision analysis looks
at the paradigm in which an individual decision maker (or
decision unit) contemplates a choice of action in an uncertain
environment. The approach employs systematic analysis, with
some number pushing, which is designed to help the decision
maker clarify in his own mind which course of action he should
choose. In this sense, the approach is not descriptive,
because most people do not attempt to think systematically
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about hard choices under uncertainty. It is also not normative
since it is not an idealized theory designed for the super-
rational being with an all powering intellect. It is rather
a prescriptive approach designed for normally intelligent people
who want to think hard and systematically about some important
real problems.
The theory of Decision Analysis is designed to help the
individual make a choice amongst a set of prespecified alterna-
tives. Of course, decision analysts do admit that an insightful
generation of alternatives is of paramount importance and they
also take note of the often overlooked fact that good analysis
of a set of existing alternatives may be suggestive of ways to
augment the set of alternatives. But this is a sidepoint that
is not suitable for development in a preface. What is of im-
portance here is that the usual analysis (after suitable model-
ling has been done) involves two distinctive features: an
uncertainty analysis and a preference (or value or utility)
analysis. There has been a great deal that has been written on
the uncertainty phase: on statistical validation of a model, on
uses of historical and experimental data for inference, on the
codification of judgmental estimates by the decision maker and by
expert groups, etc. In comparison with this voluminous ｬ ｩ ｴ ･ ｲ ｡ ｴ ｵ ｾ ･
on the uncertainty side rather little has been written about the
value or preference side of the picture. The ensuing 000 pages
are designed to help improve the balance.
At present, this gross imbalance is also unfortunately
very much in evidence in applications. Several person-years
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of effort will be utilized developing, modifying, and verifying
an elaborate simulation model which outputs the possible levels
of several indicators of interest resulting from any particular
policy. Perhaps the output is synthesized in terms of a few
graphs or tables and a summary report is written for the decision
maker. This decision maker then struggles for perhaps a week
with the implications of the alternatives and then chooses an
alternative. The score: person-years on the modelling and un-
certainty side of the problem, a week on the preference side.
We feel the shifting of a little effort--perhaps only a few
person-months--to the preference aspects could lead to sig-
nificantly improved decision making in many situations. In
this book, we suggest how one might constructively use more
effort on the preference aspects of analysis.
An illustrative example can help set the stage. A decision
making unit must make a policy choice in a complicated environ-
ment. Imagine that the problem is so complicated, that a
computer-based simulation model is designed such that for each
policy choice under review, a scenario can be generated which
indicates how the future might unfold in time. Now suppose
that the analyst effectively summarizes the relative desirabil-
ity of any future scenario not by a single number but, let us
say, by a dozen well-chosen numbers: some reflecting costs,
others reflecting benefits. Since these output performance
numbers may simultaneously deal with economic, environmental,
social, and health concerns, these summarizing indices will,
in general, be in incommensurable units. To complicate matters,
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let us suppose that stochastic elements are involved in the
simulation so that for a single policy choice being investigated
repeated simulation runs result in different sets of summary
performance measures. The joint probability distribution of
these performance measures as made manifest through repeated
realizations of the simulation will, in general, indicate that
these 12 measures are probabilistically dependent. Now assume
you are the poor decision maker sitting in front of an output
display device deluged with a mountain of conflicting informa-
tion. You are confused. What should you do? How can you sort
out the issues and start thinking systematically about your
choice problem: which policy should you adopt in the real
setting? Well, you might want to pause for a time and read
this book. We believe we are addressing your problem and have
something constructive to say about it that is not merely
platitudinous.
Of one thing we are convinced: the decision maker cannot
simply plug these incommensurate output performance measures
into an objective formula that someone has proposed ex ante
without any reference to the real-world me2ning of the various
measures. Rather, our prescriptions lead us in an opposite
direction: we advocate that the responsible decision maker force
himself to think hard about various value tradeoffs and about
his attitudes towards risky choices and we suggest ways that
this process can be systematically examined by dividing his
complicated choice problem into a host of simpler choice problems.
'I
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The methodology will in a step-by-step fashion force the
cooperating decision maker to articulate a rank ordering of
all potential outcome vectors--in the illustrative example,
an ordering of all 12-tuples. This rank ordering can be thought
of as constituting a set of indifference curves plus an orienta-
tion in 12-space. But this is not enough since repeated simu-
lations of the same policy will produce, because of stochastic
elements, different 12-tuples. Our problem is a familiar one
by now, and the utility theory of von Neumann-Morgenstern comes
to the rescue. This theory tells us that in order to satisfy
certain compelling behavioral desiderata, the decision maker
must assign to each 12-tuple a single number, referred to as
the utility of that 12-tuple, and this assignment must be such
that:
a) the more preferred the 12-tuple the higher the
associated utility and
b) these utilities must be scaled in a way that justifies
the maximization of expected utilities.
This means that in order to evaluate the relative desirability
of a given policy alternative one must (i) generate for each
simulation run a set of output 12-tuples, (ii) associate to
each 12-tuple a utility, and (iii) average the sequence of
utilities generated by repeated runs for the same policy.
Finally, one should choose the policy which maximizes the
expected utility. Built into the assignment of utilities are
all the aspects of risk aversion or proneness that one should
be entitled to include. That this can be done and how it is
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done is the subject matter of Utility Theory which we review
in Chapter 4.
Having stated our general approach, can it actually be
done in practice? We argue Yes and we substantiate our case
by citing many examples illustrating how it has already been
done in practice. It's not easy to do; but what are the
alternatives?
Outline of the Book
For conceptual purposes, the material presented can be
partitioned into four main categories: (1) the structuring
of multiple-objective problems: chapters 1 and 2; (2) the
theory of quantifying preferences over multiple obiectives:
chapters 3 through 6; (3) the applications of that theory:
chapters 7 and 8; and (4) special topics: chapters 9 and 10.
Let us only briefly elaborate here since a more detailed out-
line is found in section 1.6.
Chapter 1 introduces the subject matter of concern more
systematically than has been done above. Our basic problem
is phrased in terms of the analysis of decision trees rather
than in terms of a stochastic simulation model, but the dis-
tinction for our purposes does not matter. In chapter 2, we
acknowledge that in a given context the set of objectives and
attributes are not given for a problem. Some suggestions are
made for generating and structuring appropriate sets of
objectives.
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The theory, chapters 3 through 6, presents techniques for
quantifying preferences over multiple objectives. In order to
obtain a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function in such cases,
one must address two separate issues: value tradeoffs among
objectives and attitudes toward risk. Chapter 3 looks at value
tradeoffs under conditions of certainty. Chapter 4 restricts
itself to a single objective and introduces concepts and
techniques that are needed in quantifying and assessing risk
attitudes. This chapter essentially reviews single-attribute
(i.e. unidimensional) utility theory. Chapters 5 and 6 consider
both of these issues simultaneously; they present multiattribute
(i.e. multidimensional) utility theory. Due to its length we
have arbitrarily divided this material into two segments:
two attributes (chapter 5) and more than two attributes
(chapter 6).
Multiattribute utility is already sufficiently
developed to make worthwhile contributions to some important
complex problems. Chapters 7 and 8 dealing with applications
present support for this claim; many problems are discussed
where preferences have been quantified using multiattribute
utility. These include: structuring corporate objectives,
examining operational policies of fire departments, allocating
school-system funds, evaluating time-sharing systems, siting
nuclear power facilities, treating such medical problems as
cleft lip and palate, and so forth. In each case, we describe
the problem context in which the preference assessments took
place. We want to communicate some of the art as well as the
theory and procedures of using multiattribute utility analysis.
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Chapter 8 uses the theory and procedures developed in earlier
chapters in a major case study: the development of airport
facilities for Mexico City.
Chapters 9 and 10 on special topics examine respectively
preferences over time and aggregation of individual pref-
erences. Each of these important ｾ ｲ ｯ ｢ ｬ ･ ｭ ｳ can be cast and
naturally studied in a multiattribute framework. As shown,
many of the results of chapters 3 through 6 are relevant to
the time and group problems. These two problems are often
added complicating features in multiple-objective problems.
Our Intended Audience
Decision making is of such a pervasive interest that it
is hard for us to exclude any group. Certainly this book
should be of relevance to all sorts of analysts, policy makers,
policy advisors, economists, designers, engineers, and managers.
Meaningful and important applications can be found in business,
in public policy, in engineering design, in resource management,
in public health and medicine, in educational management, and
on and on.
It's a big book and not all of it has to be read. There
are parts, especially chapter 6 and the latter part of 9, where
the mathematics will be discouragingly complicated except for
the mathematical pros. It would be helpful if the non-mathema-
tical reader were already familiar with the rudiments of
decision analysis as explicated by Raiffa [1968J or by books
at a similar level such as Schlaifer [1969J and Brown et al.
[1974J .
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Depending on interests, the reader may wish to read only
a selection of the chapters. Chapters 1 and 2 on structuring
the multiple-objective problem can be read with no prerequisite.
Similarly, if one is willing to accept the abstract formulation
of the problem, the theory chapters 3 through 6 are essentially
self-contained. Even within this group, the reader with some
mathematical background could begin with either value tradeoffs
(chapter 3), unidimensional utility theory (chapter 4), or
multiattribute utility theory (chapters 5 and 6). For a full
understanding of the applications in chapters 7 and 8, a
knowledge of the main theoretical results of the book is re-
quired. However, a reader interested in the domain of applica-
bility of multiattribute utility and a feeling for how one uses
it in a specific context could pick them up reading only
chapters 7 and 8. Before reading chapters 9 or 10, it would
be advisable in most cases to at least glance through chapters
3 through 6. However, a reader who feels at ease with the
level of mathematics (not that it is so high) in these chapters
could begin with either 9 or 10 and only refer back to the
basic theory chapters when back references indicate it may be
worthwhile.
To our knowledge, there are no other books which overlap
much in content with this one. However, most of the theoretical
results have appeared in professional journals. Many of these
are due to researchers other than ourselves. We have attempted
to appropriately reference the original contributions so that
a reader can easily trace the development of any particular
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topic. A large bibliography of these works is included
following chapter 10.
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CHAPTER 1
THE PROBLEH
In an uncertain world the responsible decision maker
must balance judgments about uncertainties with his or
her preferences for possible consequences or outcomes.
It's not an easy task to do and even though we all have
a lot of practice, we are not very very good at it. In
this book we suggest formal techniques that we think can
be of assistance in this decision process. We will con-
centrate on formalizing the preference or value side of
the problem rather than developing procedures for the
assessments of uncertainties. This is not to be interpreted
that we do not think modeling of the uncertainties is a
critically important task. However, we feel that many
capable scholars have and continue to address the modeling
aspects of the class of problems we have in mind: Our
efforts on the ｶ ｡ ｬ ｵ ｾ side of the problem are meant to
complement these. So, let us assume that the assessments
of uncertainties are given, and let's worry about how we,
as decision makers, can make sense out of our conflicting
values, objectives, or goals, and arrive at a wise decision.
As one of our associates likes to put it, "the aim of
the analysis is to get your head straightened out!"
We will be concerned with suggesting - -or ｲ Ｉ ｹ ｾ ｳ Ｚ Ｚ ｲ ｩ ｢ ｩ ｮ ｧ
if you will--how a decision maker (perhaps ｹ Ｇ Ｎ Ｎ ｃ ＿ ｾ Ｉ should
i
think systematically about identifying and structuring
his or her objectives, about making vexing value ｴ ｲ ｡ ､ ･ ｾ
offs, and about balancing various risks. A few thumbnail
sketches of problems will set the stage.
1.1 SKETCHES OF MOTIVATING EXAHPLES
«
*'1.1.1 Electrical Power vs. Air Quality
A mayor must decide whether he or she should approve
a major new electric power generating station. There is
a perceived need for more electricity but the addition
would lead to a worsening of the city's air quality,
particularly in terms of the air pollutants: sulfur di-
oxide, particulates, and nitrogen oxides. The mayor should
be concerned with the consequences his actions will have
on
a. health effects of residents (on morbidity as well
as mortality) ,
b. economic effects on residents,
c. psychological effects on residents,
d. economic effects to the city, to the state,
e. effects on businesses,
f. political implications.
Each of these broad categories, and others as well, must
be clarified and made more operationally meaningful before
*This example is discussed in detail in Section 7.1. That
discussion makes use of the theoretical concepts intro-
duced in the intervening chapters,
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measurements and evaluations can be made and ｢ ｾ ｦ ｯ ｲ ･ a
delicate balancing of the possible impacts can be ｳ ｹ ｳ ｴ ･ ｾ
matically undertaken. Even if the consequences of each
possible action of the mayor could be foreseen with
｣ ･ ｲ ｴ ｡ ｩ ｮ ｴ ｹ ｾ ｾ ｷ ｨ ｩ ｣ ｨ is far from the true state of ｡ ｦ ｦ ｡ ｩ ｲ ｳ ｾ Ｍ
he would be faced with a complex value problem.
1 .1 .2 .. Location of An Airnort*
1 + •
What should Secretary Bracamontes, head of the Ministry
of Public Works, recommend to President Echeverria re-
garding the development of future airport facilities in
Mexico City? Should Mexico modernize its present facilities
at Texcoco or build a new airport at Zumpango, north of
the city? The decision is not a static one (Texcoco or
Zumpango now!) but rather a dynamic one which considers
phased developments over a number of years. There are
numerous uncertainties, including the possibilities of
technological breakthroughs (e,g" noise suppressants,
new construction methods for building runways on shallow
lakes or marshlands, increased maneuverability of commercial
aircraft); of changes in demand for international travel;
of future safety reQuirements imposed by international
carriers; and so on. But even if Secretary Bracamontes
had his own reliable clairvoyant, his choice problem is
still a complex one. He must balance such objectives as
*Chapter 8 is devoted entirely to this example,
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a. minimize the ｾ ｾ ｾ ｴ ｾ to the Federal Government,
b. raise the capacitr of airport facilities,
c. improve the ｾ ｾ Ａ ｾ ｾ ｙ of the system,
d. reduce noise levels,
•
e. reduce access time to users,
f. minimize displacement of people for expansion,
g. improve regional development (roads, etc.),
h. achieve political aims.
These objectives are too vague at this stage to be
operational. However, in making them more specific, the
analyst must be careful not to distort inadvertently the
sense of the whole.
1.1.3 Treatment of Heroin Addiction
Heroin addiction has reached pandemic proportions
in New York City and something simply must be done about
it. But what? The problem has been studied and restudied
but yet the experts differ widely in their proposed ｳ ｴ ｲ ｡ ｾ
tegies. The reason is in part that the problem is so
complex that experts have honest differences about the
implications of any specific treatment modality. In more
technical parlance they differ in their assertions of what
a reasonable model of the phenomena should include, and on
what reasonable rates of flow from one category to another
within the model should be. Therefore their probabilistic
predictions of the future vary widely. Once again, if these
experts all had crystal balls, disagreements about un-
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certainties would disappear, but the controversy would
still rage. Now however, it would be focused on values
only rather than also on uncertainties. The Mayor of
New York would like to
a. reduce the size of the addict pool--this is
more complicated than it sounds since there
are different types of addicts and one must
make tradeoffs between sizes of these categories,
b. reduce costs to the city and to its residents,
c. reduce crimes against property and persons,
d. improve the "quality of life"--whatever that
may mean--of addicts, including morbidity
and mortality considerations,
e. improve the quality of life of non-addicts,
make NYC a more pleasant place to live; reverse
the disastrous trends of in-and out migration
of families and businesses,
f. discombobulate organized crime,
g. live up to high ideals of civil rights and
civil liberties,
h. decrease alienation of youth,
z. get elected to higher poli tical office ( ... perhaps
the Presidency?).
Sure, the problem is too complicated, but still one
s
must act and one must informally, if not formally, combine
assessments of uncertainties with'value preferences*. In
this book we shall concentrate on the value side of this
type of problem.
1.1.4 Medical Diagnostics and Treatment
Doctor William SChwartz**, Chief of Medicine at Tufts
Medical School, makes the rounds of the wards with his
student advisees and he drives them mad because he insists
on sharing his thought processes with them:"Well, for Z
we can do this or this or this, and we must worry about
the implications of our actions if she has disease state
A or B or C. I think the chances are 0.2 that she has A,
0.4 that ...• If we do this and that happens, then we'll
learn so and so, which will revise my probabilities of
A, B, C by ...• But if that happens we must weigh the
information we get with the possibility of side effects,
discomfort, and costs to Z." And on and on. Very few
doctors articulate their thought processes with such
clarity. However, they all must, to some extent, constantly
combine probabilities with value judgments. And some of
these value judgments are not easy to think about. Not
*See Moore (1973) for a formal attempt to examine various
policy options concerning heroin use in New York City.
**See Schwartz, Gorry, Kassirer,and Essig [1973].
only are there the usual costs to the patient; cost to the
insurance carriers; payments to the doctor; utilization of
scarce resources such as doctors, nurses, surgical faci-
lities, and hospital beds, etc., but also one must worry
about pain, suffering, anxiety, duration of incapacitation
to the patient, ... and, yes, even death. Then there are
societal externalities that get mixed up in the value
problem: contagion effects, the information gained from
one patient that can be of use in the treatment of other
patients, development of resistent bacterial strains,
and so on. These societal considerations often pose a
conflict for the doctor: what's right for his particular
patient may not be right for the society. All of this has
to get sorted out somehow and decisions have to be made.
Can the value side of the problem be systematically
addressed? We'll argue affirmatively in this book, but
this is not to say that there is an "objectively correct
solution". Subjective values will have to be inserted.
Our aim will be to develop a framework for assessing and
quantifying these subjective values and systematically
including them in the decision making process.
1.1.5 Business Problems
Most routine business problems do not involve compli-
cated value issues. Profit, or better yet, the net present
value of a profit stream, may be the index to maximize.
True, one might have some difficulties clarifying what
1
is fixed cost and what is marginal, but by-and-Iarge these
details are conceptually simple. However, top management
does not get personally involved in most routine problems.
The problems that do filter up to the top often defy a
simple dollar-and-cents solution. Ethics, tradition,
identity, aesthetics, and personal values in contrast to
corporate values, are not uncommon factors to be considered.
The more one studies problems of top management, the more
one realizes that these so-called uncommon problems are
not so uncommon, and the slogan Ｇ Ｑ ｾ Ｎ Ｑ ｡ ｸ ｩ ｭ ｩ ｺ ･ profits!" has
its operational limitations. We will see, however, that in
business contexts it is often natural to try to scale non-
monetary intangibles into dollar values. Our concern will
be: When is it legitimate to do this and how can it be
done?
As top management is all too aware, many of its strate-
gic decisions involve multiple conflicting objectives and,
hence, it is simply not true that "qualitatively speaking,
business decisions are simple because the objective function
is crystal clear".
1.2 PARADIGM OF DECISION ANALYSIS
The simple paradigm of decision analysis* that we will
*See for example any of Brown, Kahr, Peterson [1974],
Howard [1968], Raiffa [1968], Schlaifer (1969], Tribus
(1969], or Winkler (1972].
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employ in this book can be decomposed into a five-step
process.
Pre-Analysis: We assume that there is a unitary decision
maker who is undecided about what course of action he or
she should take in a given choice problem. The problem
has been identified and the viable action action alterna-
tives are given.
Structural Analysis: The decision maker structures the
qualitative anatomy of his problem. What action choices
can he take now? What choices can be deferred to later?
How can later choices be made conditional on information
learned along the way? What experiments could be performed?
What information can be gathered purposefully and what
can be learned willy-nilly? This melange is put into an
orderly package by means of a decision tree as shown In
Fig. 1.1. The decision tree has certain nodes where the
choice of a branch is under the control of the decision
maker (i.e., the nodes depicted with squares in Fig. 1.1)
and other nodes which are not under his full control
(i.e., the nodes depicted with circles in Fig. 1.1). We
shall refer to these two types as decision nodes and
chance nodes.
Uncertainty Analysis: The decision maker assigns proba-
bilities to the branches emanating from chance nodes.
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Figure 1.1
These assignments are made using an artful mixture of
various techniques and procedures based on past empirical
data, on assumptions fed into and results taken from
various stochastic, dynamic models, on expert testimony
(duly calibrated, hopefully, to take into account per-
sonal idiosyncracies and biases resulting from conflict
of interest positions), and on the subjective judgments
of the decision maker. The assignments should be policed
for internal consistencies.
Lest there be some confusion resulting from the
special schematic decision tree of Fig. 1.1, we note here
that we do include the possibility that certain chance
nodes can have a set of outcomes represented by a conti-
nuum in a singular or higher dimensional space.
Utility or Value Analysis: The decision maker assigns
utility values to consequences associated with paths
through the tree. In Fig. 1.1 one possible path (from
Start to the point labeled C) is shown. In a concrete
problem, associated with this path would be various
economic and psychological costs and benefits to the
decision maker as well as to others whom the decision
maker wishes to consider in the characterization of his
decision problem. The gestalt is conceptually captured
by associating with each path of the tree a consequence
which completely describes the implications of that path.
The decision maker is then required in this phase of the
10
analysis to register his f:likings" for all the possible
consequences in terms of cardinal utility numbers*. This
measureQent reflects not only the decision maker's ordinal
rankings for different consequences (e.g., C' is preferred
to CII which is preferred to C'" ) but it must also in-
dicate his relative preferences for lotteries over these
consequences. For example, in Fig. 1.2, we consider a
choice problem between act a' and a" which gets trans-
lated into a choice between lottery £f and £". The decision
maker must assign numbers to consequences (such as u. to
1
, " "C. and u. to C.) in such a manner that he feels that
1 J J
\I
(a' m ｾ n" "is preferred to ｡ Ｂ Ｉ ｾ ( I p-.- u. > L: p.u.)
i=1 1 1 j=1 J J
In other words the assignment of utility numbers to con-
sequences must ; e such that the maximization of expected
utility becomes, tautologically, the appropriate criterion
for the decision maker's optimal action.
Optimization Analysis: After the decision maker structures
his problem, assigns probabilities, and assigns utilities,
he calculates his optimal strategy--that strategy which
maximizes expected utility. This strategy indicates what
he should do at the start of the decision tree and what
*Throughout this book, we assume that the reader has some
familiarity with cardinal utility theory. However, in
Chapter 4, we do review aspects of the theory which will
be needed.
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Figure 1.2
choice he should take at every decision node he can possibly
get to along the way. There are various techniques an
analyst can employ to obtain this optimal strategy but the
simplest is the usual dynamic programming algorithm of
averaging-out-and-folding-back, with which we assume the
reader is already familiar*.
1.3 COMMENTS ABOUT THE PARADIGM
Now is this a reasonable paradigm for the class of
problems we sketched at the outset: problems of air-
quality control, of location of an airport, of treatment
modalities for heroin addiction, of medical diagnostics
and treatment, of strategic business problems?
1.3.1 Unitary vs. Group Decision Makina
First of all throughout most of this book - all but
Chapter 10 - we assume that there is a unitary decision
maker. Should we not be more concerned with group decision
making? Aren't most public decisions and many business
decisions an intricate composite of different choices
made by many individuals? Let's take an example.
New York City is concerned with the poor quality of
air being breathed by its residents. Should the city
government impose more stringent limits on the sulfur
*See for example, Raiffa [1968], pages 21-27 and 71-74.
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content of fuels burned in the city for space heating and
power generation? Lots of people are involved in settling
this problem: the mayor, city council, Environmental
Protection Agency, lobbyists for power companies, political
parties, the citizenry, and so on. Any after-the-fact
description purporting to explain what has happened in
any past period certainly must involve many individuals:
Descriptively it is a group, interactive, decision problem.
But wait! What we are trying to do here is not to
describe what has been done but to prescribe what should
fI:be done. Let's first clarify for whom we are prescribing.
Who is the client for our proposed analysis? Well suppose
it is the head of some appropriate agency. He alone surely
does not dictate what will eventually happen but he might
be called upon to make a proposal to the mayor, for in-
stance. Suppose he's confused about whether he should
offer proposal A or B or C. Well the agency head has a
decision problem, has he not? He might want to analyze
systematically what he should do. He must consider what
other actors in this "game" might do and perhaps he might
want to view the actions of the mayor and the city council
as part of the uncertainties confronting him. One in-
dividual's decisions may be another individual's uncertain-
ties.
The point that we wish to emphasize is that decisions,
*Clearly there is much overlap of interest between the pre-
ｳ ｾ ｲ ｩ ｰ ｴ ｩ ｶ ･ and descriptive viewpoints. Over the past twenty-
f1ve years, the contributions of many people addressing
ｾ ･ ｳ ｣ ｲ ｩ ｰ ｴ ｩ ｶ ･ aspects of decision making has had a significant
1mpact on prescriptive decision analysis. Four excellent
ｲ ｾ ｶ ｩ ･ ｷ ｳ of. this work are Edwards [1954, 1961J, Slovic and
L1chtenste1n [1971J, and Fischer and Edwards [1973J.
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as we use the term, do not have to be grandiose end-de-
terminations. There are more modest decisions: should an
individual vote for passage of a bill, propose an
amendment, apply political pressure, and so on. If such
an individual has choices to make, we can view him as the
decision maker. It is in this sense that we can assert
that there are many decision problems in the public sector
where the decision maker can be viewed as a well-speci-
ｾ Leu, identifiable, unitary entity. Now some of these
decision makers, some of the time, might want to analyze
Lneir pilrticular problem in a systematic manner. In this
book we're concerned with effectively adapting the de-
cision paradigm outlined in the preceding section to help
such a decision maker.
1.3.2 Personal Conviction, Advocacy, and Reconciliation
Throughout this book we approach problems from the
point of view of an as-yet-undecided decision maker who
wants to decide and convince himself of the appropriate
course of action he should take. He recognizes that some
of his snap judgments may turn out to be wrong in the
sense that he might change his mind after deeper reflection.
He also recognizes that when a problem is decomposed in-
to parts, he might initially give answers to a series of
questions that turn out to be internally inconsistent.
When this occurs we shall assume that the decision maker
will want to scrutinize his answers carefully and perhaps
change some of his earlier responses so that the total
pattern of modified responses is consistent and seems
14
reasonable to him. Only if he can structure his prelimi-
nary responses in a coherent fashion, will we be able to
use deductive analysis to carry him to the next step of
commitment. The spirit is one of Socratic discovery, of
unfolding what one really believes, of convincing onself
and deciding.
We authors have found that in many of our consulting
contacts, decision makers embark on formal decision analyses
with their minds already made up at the start. You can
view the formal analysis as just a sort of window dressing.
We don't want to preach against such activities; rather
we merely want to emphasize that in this book we want to
address that class of problem situations where the unitary
decision maker has not as-yet "made up" his mind. But, in
passing, let us also remark that there is often a legiti-
mate purpose for doing careful analyses even if the de-
cision maker has already decided what to do prior to the
analysis. First, there is the problem of psychological
comfort: he might want the security of having a formal
analysis to corroborate his unaided intuition. Secondly,
he might want to use the formal analysis to help the
communication process. Thirdly, there is the question of
advocacy: he might have to justify his conclusions to
others or to convince others of the reasonableness of
his proposed action. In addition, there is always the
possibility that these post-decision analyses will un-
cover new insights that result in a change of the chosen
IS
alternative, one which is perceived as better from the
decision maker's viewpoint.
Indeed an analysis done solely to convince oneself
might be quite different from one done for advocacy
purposes. A personal analysis might very well incorporate
very sensitive information, such as assessments of potential
future actions of political associates, an economic value
placed on the life of a human being, value tradeoffs
between the benefits to various identifia.ble groups, and
so on. On the other hand, an advocacy document must
often be intentionally vague on such issues.When an
analysis is put on public display one can hardly expect
one's adversaries to give up without a fight. They will
carefully scrutinize the reasoning and seek out the soft
spots. This unfortunately means that it is often impo-
litic to base a decision on a formal analysis which in-
cludes subjective feelings if the analysis will be dis-
closed to a critical public audience. This is not the
place for us to get involved in questions about moral
obligation on the part of government officials to be
open and honest or to share their real analyses with
other government officials, agencies, and concerned
citizenry. To repeat once again, we are primarily con-
cerned in this book with techniques to help a confused
decision maker make up his mind.
There is yet another reason why one might do a
formal analysis of a decision problem even though one's
lb
mind is already made up. Although what we have in mind
might be considered a variation of an advocacy role we
prefer to look at it more constructively in terms of a
reconciliation process. As an example, suppose a mayor
must decide what to do and two agencies strongly recommend
that he do different things. The rhetoric is sharp and
divisive; the protagonists, eloquent and able; and the
situation suitably complex so that there is apparant
merit on each side. How can the decision maker weigh the
arguments and make a responsible decision?
A formal analysis which attempts to decompose the
overall problem into component parts can often help this
reconciliation process. Perhaps the parties can agree on
what they agree about and what they disagree about.
Perhaps they can further decompose areas of disagreement
in a manner to highlight fundamental sources of differences
of opinion. Would the collection of more information help
to sort out the merits of the two positions? Could they
agree on what additional objective (or even subjective)
evidence could help them decide? Or is it not a matter of
assessment of uncertainties but of differing value
judgments? Perhaps here is the place where the mayor could
exert his own overriding value structure.
We don't want to appear excessively naive by implying
that formal analysis which decomposes a complex problem
into smaller more manageable component parts is the key
to the reconciliation process. We are well aware that, in
\1
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some circumstances, the more confusion that abounds the
easier it will be to establish a compromise. But still,
in principle at least, we think that in some circumstances
(how's that for a hedge?), familiarization could facilitate
reconciliation. And furthermore, we shall report in
Chapter 8 an example of just such an undertaking in which
bothdfus were involved as consultants. We were only
partially successful.
1.3.3 Pre-Analysis and the Iterative Nature of an Analysis
As we indicated previously, we assume that the de-
cision maker's problem has already been identified and
viable action alternatives are prespecified. This is not
to say that, in practice, the preliminaries are not crucially
important. By some creative insight, one must not only re-
cognize that a problem exists, but one must have an intuition
about what types of problems are worth attempting to ana-
lyze in a systematic, scientific manner.
Complex problems, especially in societal contexts,
tend to have spillover effects in all directions. Thus,
bounding a problem is critically important. We all know
the dangers of sub-optimzation but if problems are not
bounded in some way, they remain hopelessly intractable.
The process of identifying and bounding a problem area
is intimately connected with the generation of alternative
decision choices to be considered. When we make the assumption,
as we do in this book, that the alternative decision strategies
are prespecified, we seriously misrepresent the art of
formal analysis. In practice, the process is an iterative
one. The analyst might bound his problem one way only to
find that he's posed an impossible morass; so he backs
up and redefines his problem area: he bounds it different-
ly and generates new restricted alternatives to consider.
Or in the course of analysis, he recognizes that the con-
clusions he draws are sensitive to one given facet of
the problem that has not been delicately enough modeled;
If this happens, he may redesign the structure of the
model. It has also been our experience that a careful
analysis of the posed problem often helps to trigger a
line of thought that generates action alternatives which
might have been overlooked otherwise. Yes, we do re-
cognize the iterative nature of the overall process of
analysis but for our purposes, with all due apologies,
we will assume henceforth that the pre-analysis stage
has been completed.
It is our impression that even experienced analysts
often fail to exploit sufficiently the usage of adaptive
and process-oriented action alternatives. It is not only
important for the analyst to know what must be done now
and what he can defer to the future, but also it is
critically important that he recognizes the possibility
that future actions could be made dependent on information
learned along the way. A dynamic strategy for action
should be adaptive and exploit the gradual, time-dependent
unfolding of uncertainties. The decision-tree framework
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of analysis is especially suitable to promote thinking
about adaptive, time-dependent, action alternatives.
However, it does not help us in thinking about process
alternatives. Let us explain.
"You analysts want to decide on everything,"- a
nameless voice exhorts. "Why decide at all? Let the
contending factors address the issues in an open, de-
mocratic process." Well often that advice is right.
Establishing a process may be that creative new alter-
native we alluded to earlier. Still someone might be in
a position where he must decide whether decision stra-
tegy A or B or decision process C or D should be adopted.
And that is a decision problem. Furthermore, if say
process C is selected then amongst the host of decision
makers who will influence the actual denouement, there
may be one confused, analytically-minded soul who wants
to get his mind straightened out by means of the decision
framework we are espousing.
We do not deny the point that it is often de$irable
to institute an advocacy process for resolving complex
issues in the public domain. However, we do not think
that this assertion necessarily diminishes the usefulness
of the decision analytic framework. It may, of course,
influence the nature of the problems to be analysed or
the identity of the decision maker who employs these tools.
As a last point on the subject of process, we remark that
the decision analytic framework can in some applications
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be employed to help structure the process of debate and
action.
1.3.4 Subjective Values and Formal Analyses*
It is almost a categorical truism that decision prob-
lems in the public, societal domain are complex--too
complex. They almost universally involve multiple con-
flicting objectives, involve nebulous types of non-re-
peatable uncertainties, involve costs and benefits
accruing to various individuals, businesses, groups, and
other organizations--some of these being nonidentifiable
at the time of the decision--and involve effects which
linger over time and reverberate throughout the whole
societal super-structure. It would be nice if somehow we
could pour this whole mess into a giant computer system
and program the superintellect to generate an "objectively
correct" response. It just can't be done! You can only go
so far without the introduction of subjective attitudes--
no matter how hard one squeezes the available objective
data it won't come close to providing courses of action
for complex problems. Indeed, a purely 'objective' analysis
might fall so far short of providing guidelines for de-
cision making that the output of the analysis may not
*This and the following subsection liberally adapt material
from Keeney and Raiffa [1972].
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pass the threshold of relevancy. It is ouropinion that
complex societal problems--and for that matter, complex
business problems also--demand the consideration of sub-
jective values and tradeoffs. The question, as we see it,
is not whether subjective elements should be considered,
but rather whether they should be articulated andincorpo-
rated into a formal, systematic analysis. The choice is
between formal analysis and informal synthesis and this
metadilemma does not have an obvious solution.
How often we have heard the general expression that
formal analysis is inappropriate for complex problems,
since these problems require subjective evaluations. Of
course they do, but the fact is that formal decision
analysis stands ready to receive such subjective evaluations
as inputs for the decision algorithm. The trouble with
formal analysis is not that subjective evaluations can-
not be accommodated into the framework, but rather that
there is a demand for too many subjective inputs; and
although decision makers argue for inclusion of subjective
evaluations they tend to be most reluctant to put these
evaluations down in black and white on paper.
There is a widely held feeling that one should be-
ware of those analysts that try to quantify the unquanti-
fiable. But let us remember that it is also a grievous
sin for us not to learn how to quantify the quantifiable.
The question is: What is quantifiable? An art expert
might be hard pushed to give an objective formula for
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ranking the quality of paintings, nevertheless he might
be able to rank-order these paintings, saying in effect
that if given a choice between two paintings he would
prefer the one that has a higher place in his ordering.
And where we have rank-orders, numbers can't be far behind.
Our artist might even be willing to put a price tag on
each painting; thereby quantifying one aspect of his
subjective judgment. This sort of quantification is not
done by means of an objective formula but by subjective
introspection. Is it legitimate to work with such numbers?
We do it all the time. As analysts we must learn how to
incorporate soft, squishy considerations (such as
aesthetics, psychic factors, and just plain fun) into our
analyses. If we don't learn how to do this, the hard will
drive out the soft and efficiency--very narrowly inter-
preted--will prevail.
On the other hand, the quantification of these sub-
jective factors cannot be done frivolously. They should
be generated by making the best use of the accumulated
experience and expertise available. And on problems of
public concern, such as power plant siting, this quanti-
fication should undergo the scrutiny of independent 'experts'
as well as the concerned citizenry.
1.3.5 Strategic vs. Repetitive Decisions
There is a feeling that formal analysis is appropriate
for repetitive operational decisions--like: "where should
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we send the sanitation trucks today?" or "what procedures
should be used for operating airport runways in order to
minimize travel delays?" or "what should we charge for
breakfast cereal WOW?". But the feeling goes that analysis
is nigh-on impossible for those one-of-a-kind, strategic
decisions, like: "Should we dispense methadone to heroin
addicts?" or "Should we spend 200 million dollars for
research on nuclear breeder reactors?" or "Should the
Mexican Government build a new airport miles from Mexico
City or modernize the old?" or "Should Corporation X inter-
nationalize its marketing operations?". No one claims it
is easy to analyze complicated strategic problems, but
we believe that many of these strategic policy-type questions
are amenable to systematic attack.
1.3.6 Implementation, ｐ ｯ ｳ ｴ Ｍ ａ ｮ ｡ ｬ ｹ ｳ ｩ ｳ Ｌ ｡ ｮ ｾ Other Considerations
Other than the very few brief remarks we are about
to make in this paragraph, we will say nothing about an-
other critical aspect of an integrated analysis--the
implementation phase. By the implementation phase we mean
to include all those indispensable activities that go on
in order to execute the chosen strategy which results from
a given analysis. This includes the communication of in-
structions, the delineating of responsibilities, the
establishment of incentives and rewards, the punishment
of willful deviations, the monitoring of the system, the
, systematic collection of data, the creation or adaption
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of a management information system, the dissemination of
reports, the further refinement of the model, identification
of new key variables, creation of new alternatives that
were overlooked, and so on. In practice, it is artificial
to completely divorce the identification and analysis of
a problem from the problems of implementation. Clearly
what's called for, once again, is the ability to iterate.
If a suggested solution cannot be realistically implemented,
then the analysis must be redone with some attention paid
to constraints imposed by the implementation phase.
As long as we are still talking about things we are
not going to do, let us also mention a few other questions
we are not going to address: How do good analyses get
done? How can you choose good analysts? Should you use
outside consultants or an inside group? Where in the
organization hierarchy should an analytical capability be
created? How does the introduction of an analytical team
shake-up an existing bureaucracy? On all of this our con-
tribution is Silence--except for the gratuitous platitude:
The decision of whether or not to do formal analysis can-
not be divorced from the question of organizational
structure, of the personal incentives of the people in-
volved, and of the quality of the analysts.
We hope that our ｮ ｯ ｮ ｾ ･ ｸ ｩ ｳ ｴ ･ ｮ ｴ treatment of the crucial
considerations of the analytical process raised in this
section is not interpreted as belittling their importance.
Indeed we won't be insulted if readers claim that we have
2S
only scrutinzed a part of the entire problem because we
are doing this with some awareness.
1.4 COMPLEX VALUE PROBLEMS
1.4.1 Simple versus Complex Value Problems
Consider a decision maker who has already decided on
the identification and bounding of his problem and has ge-
nerated the set of alternative actions he wishes to con-
sider. Let's assume that he has structured his problem
in the form of a decision tree, and by one device or an-
other has assigned probabilities to all the branches of
chance nodes. We enter into the phase of the problem
where he is contemplating the encoding of his preferences
for consequences. Let's turn back to Fig. 1.1 and look
at one path through such a tree and consider its con-
sequence C, depicted at the terminus of the path. In some
problem,it is possible in a purely objective manner to
assign a single number to each consequence C that ad-
equately describes the full implications of that path.
For example, in a business problem the single numerical
value might be a monetary value which fully reflects all
the financial considerations of the problem and there
may be no other considerations to worry about. In a
medical context, a possible single summary number might
be a cure rate for a given disease. In such problems con-
sequences are adequately described in terms of an ob-
jective, single numerically scaled attribute--"numeraire",
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for short. Let's suppose the value associated with con-
sequence C' is X(C') = x' and with C" is X(C") = x".
Here x' and x" are real numbers. Also assume that pre-
ferences are such that C' is preferred to C" when and
only when x' > x". (This last assumption is made for
convenience and can be trivially generalized.) Problems
of this genus will be called simple value problems in
contrast to complex value problems. In complex value
problems, consequences at ｴ ｨ ｾ ends of the tree can not
be adequately described in objective terms by means of
a single numeraire (e.g., money). Our main concern in
this book is with complex value problems.
Simple value problems would be conceptually trivial
to solve if there were no uncertainties involved--if there
were no chance moves in the tree. This would then boil
down to a straightforward maximization problem with a
well specified payoff function. There is another way of
saying all this might be helpful. Imagine a decision
problem abstracted in the form of a decision tree. If a
decision maker had the services of a perfect predictor
(i.e., a clairvoyant, or as a colleague of ours, John Lintner,
puts it, "if he had a phone line to the Lord"), would his
problem be conceptually simple? It would be, if every con-
sequence were already described in terms of a single
numeraire. He would just choose that strategy leading to
the highest x-payoff.
In Fig. 1.3. we schematically show a section of a
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When the decision maker contemplates taking action a'
in Fig. 1.3, he is led to consider the lottery ｾ Ｇ which,
,
with probability p., results in a consequence described
1
" ,by an n-tuple ｾ ｩ = (x i1 , ... , x in), where the i-subscript
ranges over the number of branches of the chance node.
In slightly more technical parlance, lottery ｾ ｾ can be
interpreted as a discrete probability distribution with
outcomes in an n-dimensional space. The decision maker
must clarify in his own mind which one of these n-dimensional
distributions he would rather choose. No easy task, this.
How can he think in a systematic manner about this?
Notice that if the decision maker has a clairvoyant
his problem would not become trivially simple. It would be
easier to be sure, since there would be no uncertainties,
but he still would be faced with a complex value problem
of the type: given possible ending consequences C1 ' CZ, ... ,
Cq where C1· is described in terms of x· = (x' 1 , ... ,x. ),-1 1 ln
which consequence should he prefer? This choice problem
involves complex value tradeoffs.
Let's return to the uncertainty case as depicted in
Fig. 1.3. In purely formal terms, the problem can be
answered by the introduction of a utility function u which
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would associate to each n-tuple a single real number. Let
" ,
u(x· 1 , ... ,x. ) be denoted by u .• In this case the relativeI In I
, ,
desirability of lottery t' would be given by Ei Piui'
the expected utility of lottery t". In terms of expected
utilities we can now work backwards through the tree in
order to pick out the optimal strategy. Pretty easy.
The rub is, of course, it isn't so easy to find an
appropriate utility function u. Some would say it's
impossible to do this in a reSponsible manner. Our task
in this book is to indicate techniques that one might
employ in helping oneself discover an appropriate u function.
We will discuss in the sequel some basic principles for
decomposing the overall complex value problem into more
manageable and "thinkable" component parts. Some of these
decomposition principles we feel are so basic that they
might profitably be employed by some to partially structure
their value problem even though they might be reluctant
to go the whole hog--to go all the way to the determination
of an overall utility function. How far one should go in
formalizing one's value problem depends on so many factors:
on its importance, on the need to convince others, on one's
training, ••. , and on the availability of techniques that can
be employed in the thought process.
1.4.2 Is Utility Analysis Necessary?
Those who have worked on problems in decision analysis
can readily testify that it's hard enough to get responsible
utility functions for a single numerically scaled attri-
bute, like assets, and one must admit furthermore that
such techniques are only rarely used in practice. Should
anybody take seriously, then, an endeavor which tries to
do the same thing for higher dimensional space? If you
haven't completely succeeded in one-dimensional space
why go to 10-space? Let's leave aside the response that
there are lots of nice mathematical theorems to prove
and it's a fertile field of new theoretical development.
Can the theory to be developed have any practical value?
We think so, and let us say why.
First consider the unidimensional case. Suppose
that the decision maker must decide between actions A
and B which result in the probabilistic, monetary payoff
distributions shown in Fig. 1.4. It's not immediately
clear which distribution should be chosen and"a formal
analysis could be made by introducing a utility function u
and then comparing
UA = f u(x)fA(x)dx and uB = f u(x)fB(x)dx.
But in practice this bit of formality is usually sidestepped.
Instead the decision maker looks at the distributions fA
and f B, which, in the unidimensional case, as contrasted
to the multidimensional case, can be visually interpreted.
He then subjectively reacts to the whole distribution and
comes to a choice unaided by formal utility analysis. We,
the authors, personally would prefer to introduce the
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formality of a utility function if we were personally
responsible for the decision, because we have trained
ourselves to think hard about what we want our utility
function to be and thus we would feel more comfortable
with the derived results than we would be if we reacted
directly. But experience has also shown us that our
attitude is not commonly shared, even amongst business
executives who have been adequately exposed to the con-
cepts of utility analysis. In the unidimensional case
they can circumvent the formal approach by acting in-
tuitively to easily comprehended alternatives.
Now let's contrast the above unidimensional case
with a choice involving many attributes. Actions A and B
lead to complicated distributions not over a single x but
over n-tuples eX1 , ••• ,x
n
). No longer is it possible to
draw the distributions in a simple manner and the mind
boggles at the complexity. No wonder that in practice
decision makers introduce pragmatic simplifications, such
as "Let's just look at the most important attribute and
,
forget the others," or, "Let's not worry about uncertain-
ties but take some value of central tendency for each
attribute and set up aspiration levels on each of these
attributes." Decisions get made on the basis of ad hoc,
heuristic simplifcations. We authors believe that many,
though not necessarily all, of these decision makers would
be better served if they systematically probed their value
structure and created for themselves a derived utility
function. How this can be done, will be the subject matter
of this book.
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1.4.3 The Use of Hypothetical Questions in Assessments
A fundamental principle of decision analysis is to
separate the preference inputs from the modeling and pro-
babilistic inputs that enter the decision analysis. There-
fore, we must ask hypothetical questions to obtain the pre-
ferences of the decision maker. The approach is to ask
simple questions involving simple probability distributions
which are intended to focus on the basic preferential atti-
tudes of the decision maker. Then, the answers to these
simple hypothetical questions are consistently put together
to provide (hopefully) the information necessary to arrive
at a specific utility function. Our feeling is that it is
easier for the decision maker to understand his own pre-
ferences and articulate them in a form useful for constructing
his utility function by answering questions in these simple
contexts rather than in complex situations. In checking the
consistency of any such utility function, we would suggest
a comparison of the implications of the utility function
with the decision maker's responses to "more realistic"
probability distributions as a first step toward ascertaining
whether the use of hypothetical questions contributed to
a systematic error in the utility function.
Critics of decision. analysis often attack the use of
hypothetical questions in the assessment procedure. However,
for any problem, every question concerning preferences
32
addressed to the decision maker other than "Which of your
real options do you prefer?" is by definition hypothetical.
It appears that if it is desired to have any analysis what-
soever of the problem, hypothetical questions will necessa-
rily have to be asked concerning parameters in any model,
probabilities of various outcomes, preferences, etc. Thus,
if analysis is deemed worthwhile, an important point is the
degree of hypothetical questioning and not whether any hypo-
thetical questions should be used.*
Of course, the particular phraseology of the hypothetical
questions should be in a vernacular that's comfortable to
the decision maker. (See, for example, Grayson [1960] ). The
trick is to be as realistic as possible but still to pose
hypothetical questions that are easily understood and precise.
Compromises, of course, have to be made and an analyst often
*It has been suggested that by observing how a decision maker
does make decisions, his preference structure can be derived.
If these 'revealed preferences' are to be used for normative
purposes one must assume the decision maker has made 'optimal'
decisions in the past. Another assumption is that one can
separate the decision maker's perceptions (i.e., probabili-
ties) in previous problems from his preferences (utilities).
It seems to us that these two assumptions lead one to con-
clude the 'revealed preferences' alone simply do not provide
enough information to specify a decision maker's preference
structure, especially when interdependent uncertainties and
multiple objectives are both involved.
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has to go to artful extremes when his respondent has a low
threshold for hypotheticality. For some problems one might
begin with more complex, more realistic questions involving
many of the critical issues of the problem and work toward
simpler questions focusing on single critical issues. In the
process, it may be possible to sensitize the decision maker
to these individual issues and, hence, increase his respective-
ness to thinking hard about the 'hypothetical' questions
involving them. This in turn might help clarify his thinking.
1.5 CLASSES OF EXAMPLES AND METHODOLOGICAL NIGHTMARES
We have a two-fold purpose in this section. First we
would like to cite a few broad categories of methodological
problems that fall in our domain of concern. In contrast
to the motivating examples we have already mentioned (like
air pollution, power generation, heroin addiction, airport
location, and so on), we now look at categories of problems
that are organized by methodological type--problems such as
cost-benefit and cost-effectiveness analysis, analyses in-
volving time-streams of payoffs (e.g., discounting), and
analyses of awesome consequences such as deaths. Our second
purpose is to mention briefly a host of issues that we feel
are crucially important and relevant to our domain of dis-
course but which we do not do justice to in this book. We
refer to some of these as methodological nightmares.
As our point of departure for this section, let us
consider an abstraction of a real problem that results in
a decision tree where each consequence C is described in
terms of n attributes X1 , ... ,Xn .
1.5.1 Private Decisions or Individual Cost-Benefit Analyses
Mr. Smith is the decision maker and his actions will
only affect himself and not others. When he totes·up the
ledger resulting from any action he might take, he might
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X1 -
X2 -
X3 -
X4 -
be concerned with various costs and obligations that will
accrue to him (assume that for the time being that these
costs and obligations are immediate) and with various be-
nefits in terms of money, prestige, power, sense of
community responsibility, and so on. In a particular
example of this type we might have the following identi-
fications:
out-of-pocket costs to Smith
measurement of time commitment
monetary rewards
combined index of psychological satisfaction
(other than financial).
Now there are a lot of questions that will immediately
come to your mind that we do not want to address until the
next chapter. Some of them are: How should one generate
these objectives? What about overlaps? What about measure-
ment problems (e.g., with X4)? What about completeness?
What about uniqueness of the set of attributes? What could
be done with the evaluations if they were made? And so on.
You might want to anticipate some of the discussions
in the next chapter by thinking of various categories of
individual choice problems. What would be a reasonable
set of attributes to consider in the choice of (1) a job,
(2) a house, (3) a car, (4) a spouse, (5) a birth-control
technique (if any), (6) a college (see Hammond [1965]),
(7) a summer vacation?
1.5.2 The Case of the Altruistic Dictator - A Social
Welfare Problem
In contrast to the preceding example, let's imagine
that Ms. Tate must decide what she, as an agency head,
should do. In this case she is concerned with the way in
which her actions will affect the costs and benefits to
diverse individuals, business firms, and other identi-
fiable organizations. She is also not completely altruistic
because she must worry about the implications to her agency
and to herself in particular. Her decision might be com-
plicated by the fact that she might not know how a segment
of the concerned citizenry really feels about a given
societal modification. True, she (or others) can ask them
(or a sample of them) but it's not always easy to do.
In one small part of his doctoral dissertation,
Jan Acton [1970] conducted a door-to-door sample survey
in which he asked heads of households what they would be
willing to pay for an emergency coronary care unit in their
community. Well, there were all kinds of problems with this.
Most people just weren't willing to take time to try to
understand what the issues were. Even if they took the
time, it's not clear they knew how to think in a reasonable
manner about such a complex issue. But even if they took
the time, and could think straight about their own interests,
then what about honesty. After all, why is this guy asking
me this question?
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Then there is also the problem of present-versus-
future tastes. Our benevolent despot might be of the firm
conviction that hersubjects really don't know what's good
for themselves. Those poor souls don't know that if they
only listened long enough to classical music they'd
eventually like it. Sure those misguided dupes voted
against the bond issue for improved schools, but if they
only knew what a good school system is really like, then
they would have voted for the bond issue. The populace is
not interested in pollution now since they are more
interested in the wherewithal for daily survival, but in
time things will improve and they will be concerned with
air quality.
The methodological issues these points raise are
devilish to work with. Still, decisions must be made.
1.5.3 Cost-Effectiveness and Cost-Benefit Analyses
Consider a given decision problem where one possible
consequence resulting from a given action (or strategy)
can be adequately described in terms of a cost C, and
r benefit measures Bl , BZ' ... ' Br . In this case it will
be easier to think of the description In the form (c, b l ,
... , b r ) where a small letter designates a specific amount
of the respective measure rather than in the less suggestive
but more neutral notation (xl' ... ,x r + 1). It is important
to understand that these benefit measures may be in
different units of measurements so that one cannot simply
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add them up. For example, B3 may be in man-hours of work
saved and B7 may be measured in the architectural quality
of a given building.
Leaving aside uncertainty for a moment, we can imagine
that any agency head has a specified amount c* that he may
spend on projects. His objective, in loose terms, is to
accept all those projects which, in totality, do not ex-
ceed his cost constraint c* and, subject to that, will
yield a desirable portfolio of joint benefits. This problem
is difficult to make more precise since the various benefits
are in incommensurable units and not much can be done
with coalescing these various separate entities.
In cost-effectiveness analysis no attempt is made to
combine the various benefit measures into one single, com-
posite, benefit measure. In a cost-effectiveness analysis,
one might investigate a problem of the form, "Characterize
various sets of projects which yield at least ｢ ｾ Ｌ b;, ... ,
｢ｾ on the respective benefit measures." Here the so-called
aspiration levels ｢ ｾ Ｌ ... , ｢ｾ are usually preassigned.
Are there feasible sets of projects that will meet these
combined aspirations? If not, one changes some of the ｢ ｾ Ｇ ｓ Ｇ
If yes, one investigates whether he can squeeze out a bit
more by raising some of the aspiration levels. Of course,
this leaves out of the formal analysis two important re-
levant considerations:
1) How should one select the aspiration levels in
the first place? What should the tradeoffs be
39
amongst them?
Z) How can all this be generalized to bring in the
everpresent problem of uncertainties?
In cost-benefit analysis, in contrast to cost-effective-
ness analysis, one takes the heroic step of collapsing
the benefits B" ... , Br into a single composite measure,
BO say. One usual technique is to introduce a set of con-
version factors w" wz' ... ,wr and then one defines
Of course the units of measurement of the wi's are such
that the individual summands w,b" wZb Z' ... , wrb r are
all in commensurable units. The trick, in practice, is
to find suitable conversion factors. Often this is done
by some objective market mechanism or one subjectively
imputes dollar prices of monetary worth to various measures
(e.g., a dollar value of $ 500 to keep each child off
the street during the summer months).
If we go to cost-benefit analysis, and if, once again,
we leave aside uncertainties for a moment, then the kth
project can be evaluated by the pair (c(k), bgk)) where
c(k) and b (k) represent the cost and the compositeo
benefit measures.
One can imagine having a list of possible projects
with cost and composite benefit measures for each. Now if
the problem is "Select a subset of projects to maximize
the sum of benefits subject to the constraint that the
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total cost does not exceed a preassigned c*," then the
analysis calls for the ranking of the projects according
to benefit-cost ratios Rk (i.e., b6
k)/c(k) for the kth
project) and accepting projects in order until the cut-
off c* is reached. Let's ignore the problem of indivi-
sibilities, what to do with a fractional project.
It is much easier to come to definitive answers
using cost-benefit analyses than cost-effectiveness
analyses. And therefore, it is not surprising that many
studies go this route. Of course, one must be careful
to observe the legitimacy and the reasonableness of the
transformations that collapse b1 , ... ,b r into bO and
then collapse c and bO into R. All too often, in practice,
important benefits are not included in the listing be-
cause it is not clear how a market mechanism can be con-
jured up to "price out" this particular benefit. We're
thinking here of such benefits as aesthetics, psycholo-
gical well-being, security, and so on.
From our point of view there are several difficul-
ties with both cost-effectiveness and cost-benefit studies.
Both suffer from an inability to cope with uncertainties
in an operationally reasonable or theoretically sound
manner. That's not to say that ingenious efforts have
not been made. But, by and large, we believe the utility
approach we take in this book is a more systematic way of
handling uncertainties. Admittedly we have to pay the
price of increased complexity. Also, as we will emphasize
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in the sequel (see Section 3.8), it is not always appro-
priate to collapse an r-tuple of benefits (b 1 , ... ,b r )
by means of a simple linear weighting rule
w1b1 + ••• + wi bi + ••• + Wr b r '
or even by a generalized-linear rule
w1g1 (b 1) + ••• + w.g.(b.) + ••• + w g (b)·11 1 r r r
using suitably chosen non-l inear functions (transforma tions)
gl' ... ,gr· The legitimacy of these procedures will be
systematically analyzed throughout this book.
1.5.4 Temporal Considerations: Present vs. Future
Our society is often accused of selling its future
generations short. In an attempt to ameliorate our imme-
diate woes we often act in a manner that exacerbates our
future problems. Analysts must constantly make tradeoffs
between what is right for the present generation and
what is right for future generations. Some think that
we're worse off today than we were in the past and that
this trend is likely to continue in the future. Others
feel that future generations are going to be better off
than we are today and it's reasonable to borrow from the
future to improve the present. What obligations do we
have to future generations? Should the future be given
more weight just because there will be more people in
the future than in the present? It seems that as our
time perspective unfolds, our spatial concerns grow too:
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today and tomorrow, it's our family; in the decades ahead,
it's our country; in the centuries ahead, it's the world's
population; and in the millenia, it's the planet Earth.
On a more mundane level, government agencies are
concerned with finding an appropriate rate of discount.
Should we do research on the development of a new nuclear
breeder reactor? Well, a lot depends on whether we use
a 5%, 10%, or 15% rate of discount. Or is any discount
rate appropriate? Let's look at what these problems in-
volve.
Consider a given decision problem where one possible
consequence resulting from a given action can be (just
adequately) described in terms of a stream of costs c 1 '
cz, ... , c t ' "', one for each time period t, and of
r different streams of benefits:
Benefit stream of type 1: b11,b1Z, ... ,b1t''''
Benefit stream of type i: bi1,biZ, ... ,bit''''
Benefit s t ream 0 f t ype r: br 1 ' b r Z' . . . , b r t ' . .. .
We are not complicating things here needlessly. This is
the prototypical problem found in most cost-effective-
ness and cost-benefit analyses of societal problems.
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In order to make the mass of numbers
c 1 , Cz , ·.. , c t ,
b 11 ' b1Z' • • if , b1t ,
b r1 ' brZ' · .. , brt ,
associated with any consequence more manageable, and
therefore more "thinkable", various reduction procedures
are employed. For example, in cost-benefit analyses it
is customary, as we indicated in the previous subsection,
to combine benefits of various types into a composite
benefit. In this more complicated example, one would
then proceed this way for each period. Thus we can let
BO be the combined benefit of the column of benefits
• 1
in the first period, ｂ ｾ ｺ for the second period, and so
ｯ ｮ ｾ Ｎ This reduction leads to a simpler summary of the
consequence, namely
[C: . Cz , ... , c t , ...]
0 0
b . 1 ' b. Z' .. . , b. t , ...
In this display we merely have time streams of costs and
of composite benefits. The usual procedure at this point
*In the notation BO think of the zero as an aggregating or
.'t
collapsing indicator and the subscript as indicating that in
this case the collapsing is done over types of benefits for
otime period t. Shortly we'll meet the notation B..
1.
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is to coalesce each of the time streams into so-called
present value. Since costs in the future are less painful
than costs in the present (e.g., we could put money today
in the bank and get back more in the future), discounting
is usually employed and the present value of the cost-
stream is
L: c t
t (1 + A)t
where A is the effective period-to-period interest rate.
Many government agencies use a A value of .10 and argue
that it has something to do with the time-value of ca-
pital funds in the private sector. In a similar manner
one can also discount the composite-benefit stream.
Another alternative would be for each project to
collapse, for each i, the benefit stream of type i:
oBi l' ... , Bit' ... , to get a present value Bi . of the
ith stream. One would then compare the present value
of the cost stream with the r values (b o1 , ... ,b? , ..• 1 •
.. ,bO ). And this reduced form now presents us with ar.
problem of the type discussed in Section 1.5.3.
Are these reduction procedures reasonable? Are
there alternatives? If discounting is used how should
one think of a reasonable discount level to use? Should
the discount factors be constant from period to period?
What about uncertainties? Should one discount expected
values? Is it reasonable to raise the discount rate
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to account for uncertainties? Should one discount streams
of physical quantities (as is commonly done with money
values) or should one first transform these physical
measurements into psychological values or utilities
before the discounting takes place?
We are not going to answer all of these questions
because many answers will be of the type, "It depends,
... ," but we will in this book provide a conceptual
framework that can be applied equally well to value
problems of temporal tradeoffs.
1.5.5 The Value of A Life
There are a number of problems, in surprisingly
different contexts, where descriptions of consequences
may involve dire happenings, like human deaths and
suffering. It's not very comfortable thinking about such
problems, and therefore we often act in such matters
without sufficient reflection. Who likes to play God?
Well, if we all abdicate our responsibilities to think
hard about such matters as "the value of a life" and
allow decisions to be made by happenstance, then we may
inadvertently contribute to the lot of human anguish.
The problems we cite at the beginning of this
chapter (e.g., electrical power generation vs. pollution,
location of an airport, treatment of heroin addiction,
medical diagnostics) all involve in one way or another
considerations that involve life- and-death matters.
There are other classes of problems, more complicated
from an ethical point of view, that we have decided to
ignore; problems such as abortion, population control,
euthanasia, genetic engineering. Not that these problems
cannot be thought about in the framework we will develop,
but we haven't sorted out our thoughts on these topics
clearly enough to subject them to the perusal of an
audience in today's highly, emotionally charged arena.
Let's simplify our discussion a bit and consider
just the case where a decision maker must choose among
several life-saving programs. For a cost of so-and-so
he can achieve a certain probability distribution of
saved lives. In a public setting it's important to think
of alternative uses of funds. If we save lives by spending
more money to keep people alive on kidney machines, are
the alternatives "more milk for the malnourished" or
"better dental care for the needy" or "more money for
military research?"
We have a cherished symbolism about the S'aneti ty of
a Single Life. But perhaps our morality has gone astray
when it comes to numbers. Emotionally we get choked up
about a little girl getting ｫ ｩ ｬ ｬ ･ ､ Ｍ ｾ ･ ｳ ｰ ･ ｣ ｩ ｡ ｬ ｬ ｹ if we can
see her picture--but we do not feel emotionally touched
by thousands of people being wiped out by a tidal wave
or an earthquake. Somehow we need to learn that our grief
should rise monotonically with the magni tude of a catast ro-
phe. Numbers are important.
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Charles Fried [1970) has pointed out that as a
society, we are romantic sentimentalists. We're willing
to spend a lot more money on rescue than on prevention,
more to save trapped miners and marooned astronauts than
to save many more statistical anonymous lives. If we con-
jure up a face, we can emphathize with the victim.
If a public official acts to save lives, he gets
more kudos if he can point to ten specific identifiable
persons who have been saved, than if he can prove con-
clusively that one thousand lives have been saved but
he can't identify who these people are.
The problem of identifiability and partial identi-
fiability comes up all the time in circumstances less
dramatic than in matters of life-or-death. In counting
up the benefits of Program A it's really helpful to know
that John Smith and Mary Doe have been helped. If Program B
benefits many more people than Program A, but if these
people can't be brought together or identified easily,
then, descriptively speaking, Program A will beat out
Program B in a competition for survival. As a society we
have to learn how to respect such numbers more.
1.5.6 Group Decisions
In many situations, it is not an individual, but
rather a group of individuals who collectively have the
responsibility for making a choice among alternatives.
Such a characterization is referred to as a group decision
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problem. With each group decision, there is the crucial
metadecision of selecting a process-oriented strategy
by which the group decision is to be made. A general
strategy for this may be first to obtain each individual's
preferences for the alternatives, and then to combine
these in some reasonable manner to achieve the group's
preferences. With this framework, the essence of the
group metadecision is how to integrate the individual's
preferences.
It should be clear by now that we authors feel that
often the methodology and procedures discussed in this
book would be helpful to the separate individuals in
specifying their preferences, whether ordinal or cardinal,
for the alternatives. We also believe that in some cases,
the procedures of multiattribute preference theory dis-
cussed here might be useful in providing a process by
which group decision can be responsibly made. Thus, the
implications of the concepts and methodology for use in
group decision processes and suggestions for implementation
are included in the book.
1.6 ORGANIZATION OF REMAINING CHAPTERS
To help explain the organization of this book we can
consider the following abstraction. Assume that associated
with each action of the (unitary) decision maker--the in-
dividual who really wants to make up his mind--there will
be a resulting consequence. We shall partition this class
of problem by means of the following double dichotomy:
a) First, is it a problem under certainty or ｾ ﾭ
certainty? If it falls in the uncertainty category, then
we shall assume that to each action there is a well-
specified probability distribution over the possible re-
sulting consequences. To the subjectivist--often referred
to as a "Bayesian"--this is not any loss of generality
for he, if called upon, can always generate (at least
conceptually) such a probability distribution. For the
objectivist, the existence of a well-specified probabi-
lity distribution does, admittedly, restrict the ge-
nerality of our abstraction.
b) Second, is it a single or multiple attribute
problem? That is, can the typical consequence be ad-
equately described, in terms of a single attribute
(e.g., money, degree of pain, or number of lives saved),
or is more than one descriptor needed?
The most general case we will consider--and the case
that is of primary interest to us--is when the conse-
quence of an action is both uncertain and multidimensional.
Let's label it x where the superscript tilde (:) represents
uncertainty--some might prefer to view the tilde as the
sign for random variable--and the underscore Ｈ ｾ Ｉ represents
a vector in contrast to a scalar.
We shall distinguish four cases as exhibited in
Fig. 1.5. When the consequence 'is both certain and uni-
dimensional the analysis is clear--at least conceptually:
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one merely chooses that feasible alternative that maxi-
mizes the given single objective measure. Of course, in
practice, if the alternatives are numerous and constraints
are given in terms of a set of mathematical restrictions,
one might be hard pressed to find the optimum. The entire
arsenal of mathematical programming techniques might have
to be employed. But still, the problem is conceptually
straightforward, and, as such, we will not deal with that
case in this book.
Chapter 3--we'll come back to Chapter 2 shortly--
deals with the case of certainty when there is more than
one descriptor. This can be thought of as complex value
analysis under certainty. Much of the flavor of this book
comes through in this analysis. Basically the problem
boils down to the following: how can one systematically
think about ranking a set of consequences when each con-
sequence is described in terms of performance values on
many attributes. The problem of subjective tradeoffs must
be met in earnest in these discussions. We don't suggest
a magic objective formula to grapple with these tradeoffs
but rather we suggest several concrete procedures that
one might employ to help probe and articulate one's basic
values or tastes.
In Chapter 4 we generalize to the uncertainty case
but at the same time specialize to the case where there
is only one descriptor. The uncertain consequence asso-
ciated with an action can now be labeled by x rather than
Sf
by x. In this chapter we present a general review of what
is now known as the theory of risky choice, or cardinal
utility theory, orvon Neumann-Morgenstern utility theory.
An elementary version of this material can be found in
Chapter 4 of Raiffa (1968], but the discussion in the
present book is more analytic and surveys some of the con-
siderable progress that has been made in the last few years.
In order to describe succinctly the problem examined in
this chapter, suppose that to each action there is a
probability distribution of an as-yet-unknown monetary
reward. You, as decision maker, are called upon to rank
order such probability distributions and, as such, you
must implicitly characterize your attitudes towards
gambling situations. What kind of a risk taker are you?
In Chapter 5 and 6 the consequences are both un-
certain and multidimensional, and the techniques de-
veloped in the two preceding chapters for the two special
cases (certainty-complex and uncertainty-simple) come
into play here but collectively they do not quite satisfy
our needs. Additional techniques are developed to handle
the difficulties introduced by the interactions between
uncertainty and multidimensionality. We have, a bit
arbitrarily, divided the subject matter into two chapters
because of the overall length. Chapter 5 deals primarily
with utility functions over two attributes whereas
Chapter 6 copes with more complicated multiple attribute
structures.
Now let us back up and briefly describe the contents
of Chapter 2. This chapter starts by establishing some
basic vocabulary: goals, objectives, attributes, evalu-
ators, measures of performance, subjective scales, and
so on. Some of these terms will be part of our technical
vocabulary and we must establish a common understanding
of their meanings--at least as we shall use the terms.
We then turn our attention to perhaps the most creative
part of our subject matter but, unfortunately, a part
that is difficult to describe systematically, namely:
how should one generate the objectives and attributes
in concrete problems. After all, these objectives are
not in practice delivered to the decision maker on the
proverbial platter but he or she must, literally, create
them. The best way we know how to deal with this phase
of our subject matter is to describe some concrete cases
and illustrate how one might have thought about pertinent
objectives. We would like the set of objectives to be
complete but yet we do not want to encumber ourselves
with a lot of trivial considerations that do not mount
up to anything significant as far as the making of de-
cisions is concerned. You will see that the generation
of a suitable set of attributes is not unique and as
such one must understand what considerations should be
involved in a choice between alternatives. But one can't
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decide on what constitutes a desirable set of objectives
without understanding what could be done with these ob-
jectives after they have been thought up. This involves
some understanding of how various attributes can be
evaluated , of how redundancies can be handled, of how
parts of the problem can be isolated from other parts,
of how values get intertwined with probabilistic assess-
ments, of how inconsistencies of measurement inputs can
be detected, of how such inconsistencies may be recti-
fied, and of how calculations can be made in order to
select a wise course of action. In short, when choosing
a set of attributes to consider, one must worry about
what comes next, and therefore one must have some
appreciation of the contents of Chapter 3 to 6. But yet
in Chapter 3 to 6 we assume for the most part that a set
of attributes has already been determined. It is not until
Chapters 7 and 8 that the separate parts get integrated.
In Chapter 7 we look at a series of concrete problems
and discuss how one might generate suitable sets of attri-
butes describing the possible consequences, but now, un-
like Chapter 2, we can also discuss whether these attri-
bute sets can be manipulated in a tractable fashion. In
particular we shall consider such problems as
(1) Should New York City lower the legal limit on
the sulfur content of fuel oils burned wi thin
the city,
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(2) How should budget allocations be made among
diverse activities of an educational program,
(3) Which response strategies available to an urban
fire department result in the best overall
deployment of service,
(4) How can one evaluate the quality of service of
a computer system,
(5) Can the process of siting and licensing of nuclear
power facilities be significantly improved,
(6) What is the best procedure for a team of medical
doctors to treat a patient who has a serious
medical problem,
(7) What policies should management adopt to 'best'
achieve the objectives of a corporation.
The emphasis of Chapter 7 is to indicate how the
ideas of previous chapters have been used on various aspects
of some complex problems and to suggest the relevance of
these same concepts and techniques to other strategic
issues.
It is in Chapter 8 that we discuss a case from start
to finish. The problem concerns selecting a strategy for
developing the major airport facilities of Mexico City
over the period to the year 2000. This study serves two
purposes. First, it further illustrates the applicability
of many of the techniques and procedures developed in
earlier chapters to a very important "typical" problem -
typical of those one-of-a-kind strategic problems with
so many atypical features. Secondly, the Mexico City
Airport study indicates the integration of ｡ ｾ inter-
connections among different aspects of the analyses: de-
fining and structuring the problem, modelling possible
impacts of variant alternatives, specifying the value
judgments of the Mexican Ministry of Public Works, etc.
The larger setting within which the analysis occurred is
also discussed.
Chapter 9 and 10 contain two very important metho-
dological problems which can be naturally cast and studied
within a multiattribute framework. These are respectively
'preferences over time' and 'group preferences and the
social welfare problem', both of which were outlined in
Section 1.5. The analytical results of Chapters 3 through
6 are relevant to either situation if the appropriate
assumptions are satisfied. Thus, concerning temporal
preferences, we may obtain a utility function for con-
sequences of the form (x 1 , x z, ... ), where xi indicates
the consequence in time period i. In the group interpre-
tation, it would be desirable to measure overall group
preferences for consequences (u 1 ,u Z, ... , un)' where u j
indicates the preference of group number j ,j=1 ,Z, ... ,no
In both chapters 9 and 10, we present brief surveys of
previous work on the respective problems, an ｩ ｮ ｴ ･ ｲ ｾ
pretation of multiattribute utility in the contexts of
concern, and a discussion of procedures for implementing
the multiattribute results within these contexts.
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CHAPTER 2
THE STRUCTURING OF OBJECTIVES
Let us start with the decision paradigm mentioned in
the previous chapter, where we abstract a decision problem
into the form of a decision tree as shown in Fig. 2.1. At
each tip of the tree there is some consequence, C, that
characterizes the full cognitive impact of that position
point in time and space. The decision maker is called upon
not only to rank the consequences at the tips of the tree
but also to evaluate the strengths of his preferences and
his attitudes towards risk in terms of a utility function
defined on these consequences. This is not an easy task.
As a step in this evaluation procedure we imagine that the
decision maker first describes each consequence C in terms
of an ordered set of, say r, numerical (or some simple
generalization thereof) evaluators or descriptors. These
r evaluators are designed presumably to make the abstract
consequence C a bit more concrete. Instead of making a
paired comparison between C and C' in the abstract.
be easier to think of the comparison between
it may
and X1 (C'), ... ,X.(C'), ... ,X (C')1 r
where Xi Cc) refers, for example, to the "level" (to be defined
.
.
--11
l-----... C (typical
consequence)
..
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Schematic Decision Tree
Figure 2.1
more accura te 1y, later) of the consequence C as ev alua ted
by x.. If this is a worthwhile step to take, these r
1
evaluators must in some sense be an adequate representation
of the consequences they purport to describe.
2.1 OBJECTIVES AND ATTRIBUTES
There are no universal definitions of the terms objective,
goal, attribute, measure of effectiveness, standard, etc.,
so we will begin this section by indicating in an informal
manner how these terms will be used in this book. Our approach
will be to illustrate our terminology in problems similar to
the motivating examples in Chapter 1.
2.1.1 Some Illustrations
A. Air Pollution: Because of excessive levels of pollution
in a given city, the authorities might be interested in--
or have an area of concern in-- "the threatened well-being
of the residents of the city." A broad overall objective
corresponding to this area of concern is to "improve the
well-being of the residents." Such a broad objective pro-
vides little if any insight into which of a number of alter-
native programs may be best or even worthwhile to pursue.
It does, however, provide a useful starting point for
specifying detailed objectives in more operational terms.
For example, two more detailed objectives, or lower-
level objectives as we will refer to them in this area of
concern, might be "reduce the emissions of pollutants from
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sources within the city" and "improve the citizen's attitude
toward their air quality." The first of these subobjectives
might further be broken into three lower-level objectives:
"reduce sulfur dioxide emissions," "reduce emission of
nitrogen oxides," and "reduce the particulate emissions."
For each of these lowest level objectives we might want to
associate an attribute which will be used to indicate the
degree to which alternative policies meet this objective.
Achievement in terms of reducing sulfur dioxide emissions
might be indicated in terms of the attribute, "tons of sulfur
dioxide emitted per year." This attribute is measured with
a scalar quantity, and thus is referred to as a scalar
attribute. Similarly, scalar attributes for our other two
lower-level emission objectives might be in "tons of nitrogen
oxides emitted per year" and "tons of particulate emitted
per year." Together these three scalar quantities could be
represented as a vector measuring the degree to which the
next level objective, "reduce the emissions of pollutants
from sources within the city" is met. Thus, the composite
of the three scalar attributes is referred to as a vector
attribute.
The objective "improve the citizen's attitude toward
their air quality" may be measured by an attribute "percent
of residents alarmed by the city's air pollution." In each
of these cases, the attribute provides a scale for measuring
the degree to which its respective objective is met.
B. The Postal Service: Suppose the overall objective
of the Postal Service is "to provide efficient, dependable
service to the users of the system and to the government."
There are many possibilities for subobjectives, or lower-
level objectives. These include "minimize total transit
times for parcels and letters," "maximize the percentage
of mail delivered (i.e., avoid losses) ," "minimize the total
cost of handling the mail," and "provide services to the
government." The cost objective may be broken into "minimize
direct mailing costs to users," and "minimize the cost to
government," the government being ultimately responsible
for all postal service expenses.
For the first objective--minimize total transit time
for parcels and letters--a rather obvious attribute is "the
time in days from sender to receiver." However, it may be
more appropriate to decompose "mail" into categories where
the kth category refers to a particular destination at a
particular time of year. Let us denote by Xk the attribute
"the time in days that a randomly selected letter of category
k is in transit from sender to receiver." For a given alter-
native this attribute will have a frequency distribution.
In some examples we might want to summarize this distribution
in terms of a single summary number (e.g., the mean, or an
adjusted mean, or some other more sophisticated index which
reflects the nature of the tails of the distribution). If
we follow this tack, the kth category will be summarized
by some single number xk ' and if the categories k range from
1 to K, then the objective "minimize transit time for parcels
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and letters" will be evaluated by the vector attribute
(x" ... ,xk '··· ,xK).
The problem of finding an attribute, most likely a
vector attribute, to indicate the degree to which alternatives
meet the objective "provide service to government" may be
very difficult. Aspects of this include facilitating
communication among all citizens, informing citizens of
their government's activities, and providing employment
for thousands of people. Even if we do effectively spell
out a set of lower-level objectives in this case, it will
be difficult to identify useful attributes for each. Such
problems are addressed throughout this chapter.
2.'.2 Terminology: Objectives, Attributes, Goals, etc.
It is very likely that objectives, as we have chosen
to use the term, will conflict with each other in the sense
that the improved achievement in terms of one objective can
only be accomplished at the expense of achievement of another
objective. For example, must businesses and public services
have objectives like "minimize cost" and "optimize the
quality of service." Since better service can often only be
attained for a price, these objectives conflict. It may be
possible in some cases to simultaneously increase achievement
on both objectives relative to the current situation. That
is, a better strategy--in terms of all objectives--may exist.
However, at some point one will be faced with the proposition
that further achievement on one objective can only be
accomplished at the expense of achievement on the other.
In general, although not necessarily always, an ob-
jective indicates the 'direction' in which one should strive
to do better. Recall the Postal Service objective Ｇ ｾ ｩ ｮ ｩ ｭ ｩ ｺ ･
total transit time for a given category of mail," which
was measured in terms of the attribute 'days'. Since it
is unlikely that transit times would be reduced to zero,
one could always strive to do better. Let us contrast this
objective and its associated attribute with a so-called
goal. For this problem, a goal may be "deliver at least
ninety percent of the parcels and letters within two days."
A goal is different from an objective in that it is either
achieved or not.
Goals are useful for clearly identifying a level of
achievement to strive toward. President Kennedy's stated
goal in 1961 was to reach the moon by 1970. This goal would
either be achieved or not. It is much easier to inspire
people, including oneself, to climb a mountain when it has
a summit than when there is none. However, for our subject
matter we feel that objectives are more relevant than goals
for evaluating alternatives in strategic decision problems.
This is not to say that the use of goals is not a useful
tactical device for implementing an action program. In the
sequel we shall confine our language to objectives and
attributes and minimize the usage of the term "goal."
2.2 GENERATION OF OBJECTIVES AND ATTRIBUTES
In practice there is considerable interplay in the
creative process of generating objectives and selecting
attributes for these objectives. Before pursuing the inter-
relationships in depth, it is necessary to first consider
objectives and attributes separately.
2.2.1 Some Techniques for Generating Objectives
Let us suggest some guidelines that may be helpful in
generating objectives for a specific problem. As a starting
point, assume one objective has been specified, such as
the overall objective "improve the well-being of the resi-
dents" in the air-pollution problem. Clearly, in this case
it would be desirable to be more specific about such a broad
objective. Answering the question, "What is meant by "well-
being of the residents"? would better specify the objectives.
For instance, one might include health and economic conditions
as part of well-being. Each of these may in turn be broken
down further.
MacCrimmon [1969] suggests the following approaches for
generating objectives: (a) examination of the relevant
literature (b) analytical study and (c) casual empiricism.
"Examination of the literature l1 should be clear. If others
have faced problems similar to yours, they perhaps have
documented some objectives which are relevant to your problem.
"Analytical study" suggests that by building a model of the
system under consideration and iJelltifying relevant input
and output variables, suitable objectives will become ob-
vious. This might be useful for picking up objectives which
were originally omitted either by oversight or intention.
Some objectives originally regarded as insignificant might
seem important after considering the results of various
studies with the model. The third suggestion, "casual
empiricism," includes observing people to see how in fact
they are presently making decisions relevant to the problem.
How do they rationalize their actions? What do they talk
about? For instance, in selecting objectives for choosing
among alternate housing developments, one might observe
how people choose among currently available options. This
may provide some indication of relevant objectives.
Surveys may be useful in selecting objectives for public
decision making. Individuals, who will be affected by a
certain decision, can be asked what objectives should be
included in a study. Such a process might generate many
"low-level" objectives. In such a case, we would want to
utilize these lower-level objectives to specify broader
objectives. For instance, if one objective were "to not
feel nauseated by the smog," this might be translated into
a broader objective by answering the question "Why is it
important that one not feel nauseated?" Feeling nauseated
indicated some adversity effecting people's health, so a
broader objective might be to "improve the health of the
specified popluation."
In many instances, it may be useful to have a group
of knowledgeable experts identify the objectives in a prob-
lem area. The board of directors in business firms often
plays this role of setting objectives. In recent years,
especially in technological and scientific problem areas,
both government and private industry have begun to' use the
"panel of experts," a group of people with expertise in the
area of interest, to generate the objectives.
2.2.2 Illustrations*
A. Scientific Objectives of NASA
An ingenious approach was utilized in specifying ob-
jectives for the National Aeronautics and Space Administration
to use in evaluating the scientific merit of alternative
plans for space exploration. The scientific objectives were
first grouped into five main sub-areas: (1) Earth and its
environment; (2) Extraterrestrial Life; (3) The Solar System;
(4) The Universe; and (5) Space as a Laboratory. Then lists
of what were called action phrases, target features, and
target subjects were developed. The idea can best be explained
by referring to Table 2.1 which 1S reprinted from Dole, et al.
[1968a]. One would try each of the combinations of an
*Precisely speaking, the two studies briefly described in
this section do not specify objectives as we have chosen
to define them. In our terms they identified areas of concern
from which one could generate objectives. For this section,
we have retained the terminology of the cited works.
Table 2.1
Generating Scientific Objectives for a Space Program
Action Phrase Target Feature Target Subject
Characteristic circulation
patterns in
Measure tidal deformations of
Establish the structure of
Measure relativistic time
dilations in
the photosphere of the sun
the surface of the moon
the interior of Jupiter
the space
environment
(Action Phrase, Target Feature, Target Subject) and then
ask, "Is this one of the scientific objectives of a space
program?" If the grouped words were an objective, it was
included in the list. If the words were meaningless, clearly
they were omitted. Thus, for instance, "Establish the
structure of the interior of the sun" was an objective,
whereas "Measure tidal deformations of the space environ-
ment" was not an objective. This procedure generated one
thousand and thirty lower-level objectives. The complete
results are in Dole, et al. [1968b].
B. The Louisville Study*
In Louisville, Kentucky, a group of citizens repre-
senting diverse segments of the community, who worked closely
*For details, see Schimpeler et al. [1969J.
with the mayor, identified areas of concern and selected
objectives for public policy. This Mayor's Citizens Ad-
visory Committee identified ten major areas of concern
which were further specified into thirty-five lower-level
aims representing interests of the city of Louisville.
These "goals" are indicated in Table 2.2.
Table 2.2
Areas of Concern to Residents of Louisville, Kentucky
LOWER-LEVEL OBJECTIVES
Insure safe public facilities
Provide for adequate public
safety regulations and their
enforcement
Provide for the removal of
contaminants
Minimize maintenance costs of
public utilities
Insure maximum effectiveness
of public utilities by design
and locational consideration
Develop a balanced, effective
and integrated transportation
system which provides for the
accessibility requirements of
each land use..
MAJOR OBJECTIVES*
A. Public Safety Program 1.
Development 2 •
3 .
B. Public Utility and 1 .
Transportation Development
2 •
3 .
C. Economic Development
Programs
*Or more precisely:
Areas of Concern
1. Develop public improvement
programs within available
financial resources
2. Maintain highest equitable
property values
3. Insure effective utilization
of mineral, vegetation, air
and water resources
4. Establish strong economic base
through commerce that will bring
money into the community
G. Welfare Program Develop- 1.
ment
D. Cultural Development
E. Health Program Develop-
ment
F. Education Program De-
velopment
H. Recreation Program De-
velopment
J. Political Framework
s. Establish trade development
that provides maximum convenience
to consumers
6. Insure the optimal utilization of
all land
7. Achieve increased disposable
income for all people
1. Preserve historic sites and areas
of natural beauty
2. Promote adequate public libraries,
museums and cultural activities
3. Protect meaningful local tradition
and encourage civic pride
Establish the mechanism for ad-
equate preventive and remedial
health programs and facilities
Develop education facilities and
opportunities for citizens at every
level
Eliminate injustice based on dis-
crimination
2. Develop needed public welfare programs
3. Encourage development of religious
opportunities
4. Develop an aesthetically pleasing
environment
1. Establish open space programs
2. Provide adequate recreational
facilities utilizing parks, rivers
and lakes
1. Improve the framework (channels,
systematic use) for citizens
participation in government functions
2. Establish equitable taxation
policies (bases, mixes, rates)
3. Achieve efficient governmental ad-
ministration representative of all
citizens
4. Develop adequate government staffs
and personnel programs (high job
standards, reasonable salary ranges,
effective delegation of authority)
5. Establish sound governmental fiscal
programs
6. Develop an effective, long-range,
metropolitan-wide planning process
7. Establish effective control
mechanisms
K. Housing Development 1. Encourage rehabilitation and
conservation neighborhood programs
2. Provide adequate low-cost housing
3. Develop neighborhood units
4. Promote a wide variety of housing
as required within the community
Table 2.2 provides an excellent point to further arti-
cuI ate objectives. Consider area of concern C6, "Insure the
optimal utilization of all land." This identifies land uti-
lization as important, and almost by definition, everyone
would want optimal utilization. However, this likely means
very different things to different people. What exactly is
meant by optimal utilization? This difficult problem should
perhaps be addressed by the Mayor's Citizens Advisory
Committee or another such group with the assistance of the
City's property tax authorities. The identification of such
open problems is one of the contributions made by a formal
specification of objectives.
Once a "first-cut" list of objectjves is published,
it also can be used by all interested parties and indi-
viduals as a base for constructive criticism and improve-
ment. This type of iteration should help generate more ob-
jectives for a given problem but equally important, it has
the beneficial effect of getting concerned individuals to
think actively about a complex problem of relevance to
themselves.
2.2.3 Specification of ａ ｴ ｴ ｲ ｩ ｢ ｾ ｴ ｣ ｾ
To describe completely the consequences of any of the
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possible courses of action in a complex decision problem
would require volumes. In the air quality example a con-
sequence would explain who got sick when; how badly they
felt; when they recovered; the economic impact on each
individual due to pollution; and all related psychological,
physical, and economic impacts. This would certainly be
complete. However, information in this form is not useful
for decision making purposes. What is needed are summary
statistics to reduce this morass to a useful, manageable
form.
To be useful to the decision maker, an attribute
should be both comprehensive and measurable. An attribute
is comprehensive if, by knowing the level of an attribute
in a particular situation, the decision maker has a clear
understanding of the degree to which the associated ob-
jective is achieved. An attribute IS ｭ ･ ｡ ｳ ｵ ｲ ｾ ｢ ｬ ｾ if for
each alternative it is reasonable both (a) to obtain a
probability distribution over the possible levels of the
attribute--or in extreme cases to assign a point value--
and (b) to assess the decision maker's preferences for
different possible levels of the attribute--for example,
in terms of a utility function or in some circumstances
a rank ordering*. Furthermore we would like both these
*We are implicitly assuming that all other attributes are
held fixed at some specified levels. It could happen that
preferences for different levels of all attribute might shift
when the other attribute levels are changes. This is discussed
fUlly in later chapters.
tasks to be accomplishable without taking an inordinate
amount of time, cost, or effort. So, to some extent, com-
prehensiveness refers to the appropriateness of the
attribute on theoretical grounds--i.e., does it give us
the information we would like to have, regardless of
whether we can get it--and measurability refers to the
practical considerations--i.e., can we get the necessary
assessments?
A comprehensive attribute should be relevant to the
particular alternative courses of action under consideration
and not subject to other extraneous considerations. For
instance, suppose one objective of a proposed law to re-
quire the wearing of seat belts by all travelers in all
vehicles at all times is to reduce vehicle casualties. In
this case, the attribute "number of casualties in automo-
biles per year" would not be comprehensive, because it is
difficult to differentiate the effects on the level of
this attribute due to wearing seat belts from the effects
due to other factors, such as the number of accidents.
As another example, suppose the overall objective
of a government "stop smoking campaign" is "to improve
the health of the nation." Then the attribute "number of
deaths due to smoking" is not comprehensive in that it
offers no information about those who are sick or dis-
abled by the pollution. Whenever one considers attributes
involving numbers of sick, injured, etc., the problem of
precision must be addressed. For example, in a transpor-
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tation problem where one objective is to decrease injuries,
the attribute "number of injuries" is not precise because
the definition of injury is not clear. This is aside from
the question of whether all injuries, using any specified
definition, should be considered as equally important. Be-
cause of the imprecision, different people might assign
different levels to the "number of injuries" even though
they had access to the same information.
In many cases, the choice of an attribute will not be
difficult given that the objective is clear. If a business-
man's objective is to maximize profits, then profits
measured in dollars would be a logical choice of an attri-
bute. Knowing the profits for a particular endeavor would
indicate the degree to which the objective "maximize profits"
is achieved. If a freight shipping firm wanted to deliver
all shipments on time, a reasonable attribute might be the
delay time ln the arrival of the shipment. In a medical
context, a major objective might be to keep a patient
alive in which case the attribute "probability of death"
would be appropriate. One could assign a number to the de-
lay time of shipments, to profits, and to the probability
of death; whereas the respective objectives, per se, cannot
be quantified.
2.2.4 Subjective Attribute Scales
Many of the attributes one intuitively thinks of using
are objective (as opposed to subjective) in nature.* By this,
* use footnole. on fo\\ow'ln<j pa9e.
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we mean there already exists a commonly understood scale
for that attribute and its levels are objectively measurable.
However, there are objectives for which no objective index
exists, and in such cases, a subjective index must be con-
structed. The scale for the subjective index is specific
to the problem at hand.
Consider the businessman who wishes to "maximize profits"
and "increase prestige." As mentioned previously, an obvious
attribute for the first objective is the objective index:
"profits, measured in dollars." However, since there is
no objective scale for prestige, one is obliged to establish
a subjective index for this objective. A first step could
establish a ten point ordered scale going from, say, "de-
sultory low" to the "pinnacle of world-renowned esteem."
One would then subjectively assign consequences--ranked
from worst to best--to several identification points along
this scale. In some circumstances one might have to assess
probability distributions and establish a cardinal utility
measure over this scale. The literature in psychometrics
is replete with examples which establish such scales but
the motivation for that literature is quite distinct from
ours. Nevertheless, in this book we can, and do, build up
*Note that we use the terms objective and subjective to
describe two types of attributes, both of which are used
to indicate the degree to which QQlectives are met. How-
ever, we shall not facetiously define a "subjective," or
worry about achieving it.
from that methodological base.
We cite here only one example of a subjectively
assessed scale. Huber, Sahrey, and Ford [1969] asked a
number of experienced, professional personnel of a large
hospital to subjectively evaluate twelve hypothetical
hospital wards on a scale from zero to one hundred. They
asserted that their results strongly indicate that pro-
fessionals can develop and reliably use subjective evaluation
models. In our work if we were to use such a scale in con-
junction with other scales in a multiattribute problem,
we would be obliged to structure this scale internally
in such a manner that it would mesh externally with other
scales. This leads to the problem of conjoint measurement
which we will address in Chapter 3.
There are, of course, difficulties in uSlng subjectively
defined attribute scales and depending on context it may
be important to go to creative, fanciful extremes in order
to get an objective base. In Section 2.5, we discuss the
notion of proxy attributes which alleviates some of these
difficulties.
2.3 THE HIERARCHICAL NATURE OF OBJECTIVES
Suppose one has thought hard about the objectives in
a given problem and has produced a list which encompasses
all the areas of concern. No doubt the different objectives
will vary widely in their scope, explicitness and detail,
and be inconsistent. The question is, "How can one bring
,4
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some structure to this list of objectives?" Often these
objectives can be structured in a meaningful way by the
use of a hierarchy. Almost everyone who has seriously
thought about the objectives in a complex problem such
as, for example Manheim and Hall [19671, MacCrimmon [1969],
Raiffa [19691, Miller [1970J, Gearing et al. (1974], the
NASA study (Dole et al.[ Ｑ Ｙ Ｖ Ｘ ｡ ｝ ｾ the Mayor's Citizens
Advisory Committee of Louisville (Schimpeler, et al. t1969]),
has come up with some sort of hierarchy of objectives.
2.3.1 Constructing the Hierarchy
From an original list of objectives, how does one con-
struct a hierarchy? And how does one recognize if, in fact,
"holes" are present in suc}) a hierarchy? The concepts of
specification and means-ends discussed by Manheim and Hall
[1967] help here. Specification means subdividing an ob-
jective into lower-level objectives of more detail, thus
clarifying the intended meaning of the more general ob-
jective. These lower-level objectives can also be thought
of as the means to the end--the end being the higher-level
objective. Thus, by identifying the ends to very precise
objectives (the means), we can build the hierarchy up to
higher levels.
When one goes up the hierarchy, there is the natural
stopping point at the all-inclusive objective. This ob-
jective is extremely broad and indicates the reason for
being interested in the problem, but it is often too vague
for any operational purpose. For example, as seen in
Figure 2.2, the overall objective used by Manheim and
Hall for evaluating passenger transportation facilities
for serving the Northeast Corridor in 1980 was "the good
life." However, when we go down a hierarchy, there is
no obvious point where one stops specifying the objectives.
One's judgment must be used to decide where to stop the
formalization by considering the advantages and disad-
vantages of further specification. If this were not done
and the hierarchy were carried to absurd lengths, one
would end up with an astronomical set of objectives. In
planning passenger transportation in the Northeast Corridor,
one could carry things to the point where each affected
individual (maybe fifty million of them) had a sub-
hierarchy representing only themselves in the overall
hierarchy of system objectives. Of course, no one would
advocate such an approach, but the point of all this is
that one must be pragmatic about the level of detail or
specification one is prepared to assess.
2.3.2 How Far to Formalize?
How far should one extend the objectives hierarchy?
The answer depends a great deal on what will be done
next with the hierarchy. Are we going to identify attri-
butes for each of the objectives? This is related to the
qualitative versus quantitative growth of the hierarchy
soon to be discllssed and to the notion of direct pre-
ference measurements. Are we willing to use subjective
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Figure 2.2. A heirarchy of objectives for evaluating passenger
transportation facilities for the northeast corridor in 1980.
indices of effectiveness or do we prefer objective ones?
This question depends partially on who the decision maker
is and on who is performing the analysis and for what pur-
pose.
When dividing an objective into subobjectives, at any
level, care must be taken to insure that all facets of the
higher objective are accounted for in one of the subob-
jectives. However, one must guard against a proliferation
of the hierarchy in the lateral direction as well as the
vertical. For instance, if we ended up with hundreds of
lower-level objectives, which are specifiers of a higher-
level objective, some of these might be so insignificant
relative to others that they could be excluded from the
formal analysis without leading the decision maker astray.
Still care must be exerted in discarding objectives lest
the remainder become seriously non-comprehensive.
Ellis (1970] introduces a "test of importance" to
deal with this problem. Before any objective is included
in the hierarchy, the decision maker is asked whether he
feels the best course of action could be altered if that
objective were excluded. An affirmative response would ob-
viously imply that the objective should be included. A
negative response would be taken as sufficient reason for
exclusion. Naturally, one must avoid excluding a large set
of attributes each of which fails the "test of importance"
but which collectively is important. As the analysis pro-
ceeds and the decision maker gains further insight into his
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problem it is worthwhile to repeat the test of importance
with the excluded objectives. If the decision maker has a
change in mind, then some objectives and their associated
attributes must be added to the problem and certain parts
of the analysis repeated.
2.3.3 Qualitative Proliferation of the Objectives Hierarchy
In this book our ultimate aim in a specific applied
context is not merely to generate a good objectives hie-
rarchy for the problem. We are concerned with using this
hierarchy as a step along the way in a decision analytical
framework. In the next chapter, we shall begin to talk about
preference tradeoffs between attributes and quantifying our
preferences. Numbers will loom large in the ensuing analysis.
Let us consider for example, the abstracted schematic version
of the hierarchy shown in Fig. 2.3. In this hierarchy there
are 13 lower-level objectives and let their associated
attributes be Z ,Z , ... ,Z . Thus a given consequence of
1 2 1 3
the decision problem could be described by a 13-tuple (z ,
1
Z , •.• ,z ). One might choose to formalize a utility function
2 1 3
in this 13-dimensional space and thus assign values such
as u(z ,z , ... ,z ). But this is not necessary in order to
1 2 1 3
proceed. As an alternative, one might quantify preferences
at a much higher level of aggregation. For example, it may
be better to work directly with the attributes X and X
1 2
where X is subjectively assessed composite of Z to Z
1 1 5
and X of Z to Z (see Fig. 2.3). Instead of engaging
2 6 1 3
the utility analysis at the level of (z ,z , ... ,z ),
1 2 1 3
Xl X2
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utility assignments for entities of the form (x 1 ,x Z) could
be used. Of course, in this case for a given consequence C,
the values of X(C) = x and
1 1
subjectively assessed.
XfC) = x
2
might have to be
We can use the hierarchy in a manner that is convenient
to ourselves and embark upon a further analysis by intro-
ducing utility assignments at various levels of the hierarchy.
Howe ve r l if we were go ing to quantify our preferencesat
the X ,X level, why proliferate the hierarchy down to the
1 2
Z to Z level? The answer simply is that the qualitative
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structuring of the objectives associated with X and X
1 2
might help us to think more clearly about X and X . In
1 2
other words t the vertical depth of the proliferation of
the hierarchy does not necessarily force us to quantify
our preferences down to this level of detail. The hierarchy
after a given level may merely serve as a qualitative
check list for things to consider.
Extending the hierarchy for qualitative purposes
can be illustrated using one of the major objectives of
the air pollution problem cited in Chapter 7. For the ob-
jective "achieve the best political SOlution," it was de-
cided to use a subjective index to indicate the degree
of achievement. However t to stimulate thinking about the
assessment of this subjective index, it may be desirable
to specify the major objective further. For instance, one
could identify some subobjectives of this major objective
such as to "improve relations with the City Council," to
"gain the support of certain political groups," to "maintain
good terms with the landlords" who must buy fuel to heat
their buildings, and to "transmit the notion that the
City Administration is concerned about the welfare of its
residents and the environment of the area." If we were to
assess utilities directly for the major objective, prefe-
rences and likelihoods relating directly to the lower-level
objectives need not be assessed, and therefore we do not
need to identify measures of effectiveness for them. Thus,
many of the considerations one might think about in ex-
tending an objectives hierarchy for quantitative reasons
are not relevant to the case where certain parts of the
hierarchy are to be used for qualitative reasons only.
2.3.4 Subjective vs. Objective Measures Revisited
The further one sub-divides an objectives hierarchy,
the easier it usually will be to identify attribute scales
which can be objectively assessed. When the hierarchy is
less expanded, one often has to resort to subjective
measures of effectiveness. To illustrate this point, con-
sider another one of the objectives in the air pollution
problem of Chapter 7, specifically, "to improve the physi-
cal health of the New York City residents." Other than a
subjective index, no single measure could be found to in-
dicate the degree to which this objective is met. The
difficulty was that both mortality effects and morbidity
effects of various kinds were important. Thus, the sub-
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objectives "decrease mortality" and "decrease morbidity"
were specified, and objective clinical measures of effective-
ness were identified for each.
As a second example consider the design of a new
transportation system and let us concentrate on one ob-
jective within the hierarchy "maximize passenger comfort."
There is no readily available engineering index which can
capture the essence of this feature. But if one were to
specify comfort in terms of types of comfort (e.g., smooth-
ness or ride, quality of light, maneuverable space, back-
ground noise, etc.) one could assign engineering, physical
measurements to most of the subobjectives which were intro-
duced to give specificity to the objective "passenger com-
fort."
2.3.5 Who is the Decision Maker? The Need to Convince
Others. Reconciliation of Viewpoints
Let us again suppose that a qualitative objectives
hierarchy is as shown in Fig. 2.3. If the decision maker
is his own analyst and he does not have to convince any-
one of the correctness of his action, it may be convenient
for him to assign subjectively assessed values for the
X and X attributes and to synthesize in his mind, in
1 2
a purely informal manner, the consideration of any further
detail (such as the further specification of the Z's).
However, when the single decision maker and his ana-
lyst work farther from each other, the problem becomes
more involved. In this situation, the analyst will pre-
sumably need to present his results and recommendations
to the decision maker who will then choose an alternative
course of action. Thus to better support his work, the
analyst will likely need to specify formally the objectives
hierarchy in greater detail. He will want to use objective
indices rather than subjective indices whenever possible
in the interest of "objectivism." He might be forced
down to the Z-level rather than remain at the subjective
X-level.
If the single decision maker has to convince others
of the correctness of his decision as well as to get his
own mind straightened out, he may be well advised to go
as far as he can with jointly held objective conceptions
and this may force him to push the hierarchical analysis
down to the objective Z-attributes. But this also cuts
another way. The more involved the analysis, the harder
it may be to explain it to others and therefore it may
be easier to work at the X-level than the Z-level.
Let's now look at the problem from the point of view
of an analyst serving multiple clients. He might develop
the hierarchy down to the Z-level and obtain objective,
engineering measurements for t-he Z-attributes--measure-
ments that might be accepted by all his clients. Of course,
the trouble will come at the next stage of the analysis
when the various attribute n-tuples--in this case (z ,z ,
1 2
... ,z )--have to be rank ordered and scaled (perhaps
1 3
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with utilities) by the various decision makers. But at least
the analyst could postpone that consideration while he tries
to synthesize the commonly held objective features of the
problem.
Suppose now that two or more decision makers project
the hierarchy down to the X-level and suppose that they dis-
agree on their overall rankings (or utilities) for conse-
quences. In a reconciliation process it may be desirable
to understand why they disagree. One way of proceeding is
to decompose the problem further--in this case to further
specify the meanings of the X-attributes in terms of the
Z-levels. Then, for example one could probe the contending
values of Z say, holding the other Z-values fixed. In the
2
sequel we shall introduce various qualitative independence
assumptions concerning preferences for multiple attributes
and the individuals might conceivably hold qualitatively
similar viewpoints that could help probe their differences.
Of course, in some circumstances reconciliation could not
be achieved by such rational decompositions. Indeed there
are lots of cases where reconciliation is only achieved
by creative obfuscation. We like to think that the com-
plementary set of circumstances is not a null set. In
Chapter 8 we shall discuss these issues further in terms
of a concrete case.
ｾＴ
2.3.6 Non-Uniqueness of the Objectives ｈ ｩ ･ ｲ ｡ ｲ ｣ ｾ
As alluded to earlier, the objectives hierarchy for
a particular problem is not unique. It can be varied simply
by changing the degree to which the hierarchy is formalized.
However, even if the degree of formalization remains un-
changed--in the sense that the number of lowest-level ob-
jectives is the same--the objectives hierarchy can be
significantly varied. Whether one arrangement is better
than another is mainly a matter of the particular points
the decision maker and the analyst wish to make. Two alter-
native analyses of employment possibilities, which are re-
viewed in Section 7.7, provide a fascinating example of
such considerations. With different hierarchies, different
tradeoffs facing the decision maker can be more easily
identified and illustrated.
There is another case where the specific display of
the hierarchy may be exploited. This involves cases where
some of the lower levels of the hierarchy can be pruned
off for consideration of certain alternative courses of
action because the further distinction does not matter.
As an example, one could imagine that for a heroin problem
like the one outlined in the first chapter, one might at
times wish to distinguish between the effects on different
sexes and age groups. If the lowest level makes the
differentiation between effects on males and females. and
if for particular alternative-; the decision maker is not
concerned about these separate effects, the two attributes
associated with these objectives can effectively be coalesced
into one.
2.3.7 An Illustrative Example: Choice of a Transportation
System
To illustrate some of the ideas discussed in this
section, reconsider the objectives hierarchy for the North-
east Corridor transportation system given in Fig. 2.2.
As can be seen, the overall objective is to acquire
"the good life." Clearly we would not expect to find a
single attribute for this overall objective. This was di-
vided into four objectives: "provide maximum convenience,"
"provide maximum safety," "provide an aesthetically pleasing
transportation system," and "minimize system costs and
promote regional economic development." For completeness,
these four objectives should include all the aspirations
of the individuals responsible for the decision which must
be made.
The next step involves applying the test of importance
to each of these to determine if in fact they need to be
included in the formal analysis. Since, in this case, it
is fairly obvious that each of these objectives should be
kept in the analysis, we won't emphasize the approach at
this point.
Let us now take the objective "provide maximum con-
venience" and attempt to find an attribute which expresses
the degree to which this objective is met. Convenience
implies that service should be fast, dependable, and
economical, at the very least, and no apparent single
attribute satisfying the criteria of Section 2.2 includes
all of these facets of convenience. Hence, we might choose
to subdivide this objective further.
Now that we have made the decision to specify "con-
venience" to a greater degree, it becomes necessary to
consider what might be a suitable set of subobjectives.
In this case, one might come up with the following:
1 • minimize travel time,
2 . minimize departure delays,
3 . minimize arrival delays,
4 . minimize fare costs,
5. provide easy access to the system.
Since it is desirable to have as few as possible final
attributes, we try to generate the minimum number of sub-
objectives each time this process is carried out. Of course,
care must be taken to insure that the list includes all re-
levant considerations. In this situation, let us consider
the possibility of combining some of the five objectives
listed above. We might reasonahly think that easy access
to the system means we can getto the system quickly, and
then combine objective 1 and 5 into minimize door-to-door
travel time. Whether this would be appropriate in a speci-
fic problem would depend on the situation at hand. The point
is that one should look for ways of combining objectives
in this manner. For argument's sake, let us agree that ob-
jectives 1 and 5 are so combined.
Let us agree also that no other combinations are
apparent, and so the next step is to apply the test of
importance to each of the remaining four subobjectives.
Take "minimize door-to-door travel .time." We essentially
ask "Is this objective important enough to possibly in-
fluence the final decision?" It seems entirely reasonable
that this objective would be important. Hence, it should
be kept in the hierarchy of objectives. The same conclusion
can be reached for "minimize fare costs."
The story with "minimize departure delays" and
"minimize arrival delays" may be different. For example,
one could reason that leaving on schedule and arriving on
schedule is not much different from leaving an hour late
and arriving on scheuule. This 1S not to say that it is
not inconvenient to wait for late departures, but that
departure delays might not be particularly serious in them-
selves. Much of the importance of delayed departure results
from its causal effect on total travel time, and total
travel time is already included in our analysis. Finally,
we consider the question of whether arrival delays--in
addition to their impact on total travel time--are important
enough to have an influence on the alternative courses of
action chosen. A negative response means this attribute
has failed to make the test of importance, and it need
not be considered explicitly in any ensuing analysis of
this problem.
So, as a result of this, we have ended up with two
rather than five subobjectives of "convenience":
1. minimize door-to-door travel time,
2. minimize fare costs.
Now we try to find a meaningful attribute for each of
these. In this case, the attributes "door-to-door travel
time in minutes" and "fare cost in dollars" would be likely
candidates. Of course, this brings up the problem of to
whom and from where do these times and costs apply.
Unfortunately, even when we have resolved the problems
just mentioned, the process isn't complete. The procedure
we have just been through must be repeated for the three
remaining lowest-level objectives--those concerning safety,
aesthetics, and economic and regional impact.
2.4 SETS OF OBJECTIVES AND ATTRIBUTES
The previous two sections concerned building the ob-
jectives hierarchy and selecting an attribute for each of
the lowest-level objectives. These two topics were con-
sidered in isolation. Now we must ask ourselves the broader
question: Is the set of objectives and their associated
attributes appropriate for the problem? In this regard,
we shall define five propertjes--or should we say "ob-
jectives"--that are desirable for selecting a set of attri-
butes.
2.4.1 Desirable Properties of a Set of Attributes
It is important in any decision problem that the set
of attributes is complete, so that it covers all the
important aspects of the problem; operational , so that
it can be meaningfully used in the analysis; decomposable,
so that aspects of the evaluation process can be simplified
by breaking it down into parts; non-redundant, so that
double counting of impacts can be avoided; and minimal,
so that the dimensionality of the problem is kept as
small as possible. Let us be specific about these pro-
perties.
a. ｃ ｯ ｭ ｰ ｬ ･ ｴ ･ ｮ ･ ｾ Ｚ A set of attributes is complete
if it is adequate for indicating the degree to which the
overall objective is met. This condition should be satis-
fied when the lowest-level objectives in a hierarchy in-
clude all areas of concern in the problem at hand and when
the individual attributes associated with each of the lowest-
level objectives in this hierarchy satisfy the compre-
hensiveness criterion specified in Section 2.2.
There is another way to view the property of complete-
ness. We have associated with each lowest-level objective,
a single scalar attribute which takes on real values.
Suppose an overall objective in the hierarchy has been sub-
divided into two subobjectives and scalar attribute X has
1
been associated with the first of these and scalar attribute X
2
with the second. We can think of measuring the overall ob-
jective with some vector attribute Y, which is some composite
of attributes Xl and Xz. A specific value of attribute Y
will be a two-tuple (x ,x ), where x. is a specified value
12 1
of Xi. Now, to say the set of attributes Xl and X
z
is com-
plete is equivalent to saying that the vector attribute Y
is comprehensive. Generalizing, a set of n attributes IS
conlplete if by knowing the value of the n-dimensional vector
attribute associated with the overall objective, the decision
maker has a clear picture about the extent to which the
overall objective is met.
An illuminating example of a "good decision analysis
gone astry" because the attribute set was not complete was
written for one of us as an undergraduate thesis a few years
back. The problem concerned the alternative course of actions
to be followed after graduation: these included joining the
military service, going to graduate school, or accepting a
civilian position with a firm. The attributes included
financial aspects, future flexibility, etc., but the author
did not feel comfortable with the implication of his own
formal study. The fault was that the analysis contained no
considerations for the romantic life of the individual, and
this far tor was important enough to change the overall
implications. lIe did not deem it suitable at first to bring
sex into his attribute hierarc]Jy. Clearly, with many people
such aspects should be considered before signing up for work
on the North Slope of Alaska or in a nuclear submarine for
'-)\
a five-year stay. But in subsequent iterations he learned
how to become more honest himself and he finally reached
a point where the formal analysis felt right to him and
ｾ ｾ ｴ ･ ､ accordingly. He referred to this experience as a
cheap and orderly way to psychoanalyze oneself.
b. Operational: A set of attributes must he
operational. This implies many different things depending
somewhat on the intended use of the analysis. Basically,
since the idea of decision analysis is to help a decision
maker or decision makers choose a best course of action,
the attributes must he useful for the purpose. The attri-
butffimust be meaningful to the decision maker, so that he
can understand the implications of the alternatives. They
should also facilitate explanations to others--especially
in those cases where the main purpose of the study is to
make and advocate a particular position. Consider the
Mayor of a large city, who is appraising alternatives for
handling solid wastes. It may not be possible for him in
a publicly discussed study, to include an attribute like
"annual number of tons of untreated solid waste dumped
into the ocean" even though this amount might be extremely
important. Given the analysis were to be released, inclusion
of the attribute might make the Hayor too politically
vulnerable. The analyst and decision maker must be aware
of the many nontechnical problems which may render a set
of attributes as nonoperational. Some of these issues are
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discussed in Keeney and Raiffa [1972].
c. Decomposable: A formal decision analysis re-
quires that one quantify both the decision maker's pre-
ferences for consequences and his judgments about uncertain
events. For a problem with n attributes, this means assessing
an n-attribute utility function as well as joint probability
distributions for the relevant uncertainties. Because of
the complexity involved, these tasks will be extremely
difficult, if not impossible, for decision problems in which
the dimensionality n is even modestly high like five or so--
unless the set of attributes is decomposable. By this we
mean that the aforementioned tasks can be broken down into
parts of smaller dimensionability. For instance, if the
problem involves five attributes, it might be possible to
break the assessments into two parts, one involving two
attributes and one involving three. This idea, in the case
of preferences, is one of the central themes of this book
and is discussed in detail in chapters three through SIX.
d. Non-Redundancy: We do not want redundancies in
our final set of attributes. The attributes should be defined
to avoid double counting of consequences. For example, if
one were evaluating a portfolio with investments in com-
panies A and B, the attributes "income from company A" and
"income from investments" are clearly redundant since income
from company A is counted in both attributes. One should use
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just "income from investments" or "income from company A"
and "income from company B" to avoid the redundancy. A more
subtle example is discussed in McKean [1958] in conjunction
with the allocation of water resources. Two attributes
he considered were "increase in farm income" and "increase
in livestock yield." These may be redundant in that the
latter may be important only by virtue of its impact on the
former.
This second illustration points out a common way that
redundancies creep into a set of attributes. The problem
is that the means-ends relationships of the objectives
are not clearly indicated and attributes are included which
are associated with both means and ends objectives.
Another way redundancies enter sets of attributes IS
by having some attributes represent variables which are
inputs to a system and others represent variables which are
outputs. An example of suc}] a problem concerns the evaluation
of space vehicles. An input might be "weigth" and an output
might be "thrust" required to break out of the earth's
gravitational field. Again, the former may only be important
because of its implications on the latter.
e. Minimum Size: Subject to the four criteria for
sets of attributes just discussed, it is desirable to keep
the set as small as possible. Each time an objective is sub-
divided, possibilities for excluding important concerns occur.
In addition, the difficulties in obtaining joint probability
')4
distributions and quantifying ｭ ｾ ｬ ｴ ｩ ｡ ｴ ｴ ｲ ｩ ｢ ｵ ｴ ･ preferences
Increase greatly as the number of attributes increases.
In some problems, it may be possible to combine attri-
butes and hence reduce the dimensionality. For example, in
the two company portfolio problem, the decision maker may
not be concerned with whether his income comes from com-
pany A or company B in which case the single attribute
"income from investments" would be appropriate.
The minimum size of a set of attributes is obviously
one. One grandiose objective, suitably chosen, could be
complete, and if we did not require that the set of attri-
butes be operational, we could always pick such an objective*.
However, as should be clear, in most complex decision prob-
lems this would not make the problem more tractable. Here,
as in most problems of the real-world, we often want to
fulfill conflicting objectives and since this is an ideal
we cannot achieve, we must engage in vexing tradeoffs--
which incidentally is the theme of this book.
2.4.2 Non-Uniqueness of a Set of Attributes
A set of attributes is not unique for a specific problem
*In Section 4.11 we discuss an example where a single attribute
is both comprehensive and objectively measurable but neverthe-
less the attribute had to be partitioned into several lower
level attributes in order for these to become operationally
meaningful to tile decision maker.
nor is it unique even for a specific objectives hierarchy.
To illustrate this, consider the objective of an airline
"to provide frequent service between Los Angeles and
San Francisco." To measure this objective, one might use
the number of flights per day, the maximum time between
scheduled flights, or the average time between scheduled
flights. In fact, the first and third suggested
attributes are deterministically related. If n is the number
of flights in a day and t is the average time in hours
between flights,then t = 24/n.
As a second example, suppose X represents the crimes
solved in one area and Y represents the crimes solved in
another area. Then, if we were interested in the impact
on crime in both of these areas, we could include X and Y
in our total set of attributes. However, the average number
of crimes solved, eX + Y)/2, and the difference in crime
solved in the two areas, X - Y, could be used equally well.
It should be clear that a knowledge of the effects of a
program on these two attributes is equivalent to a know-
ledge of the effects on X and Y. The choice of which is a
better set to use depends on the future uses of the analysis,
and in particular on assessments of probabilities and uti-
lities.
2.4.3 An Illustrative Example: Medical Treatment
IJere we \vill try to tie together many of the properties
discussed in the preceding subsections. These properties
are intertwined in many ways as we hope to show. Also, quite
naturally it turns out that the 'degree to which a certain
set of attributes meets one meta-objective might only be
improved at the expense of the degree to which it meets
other meta-objectives.
Consider a simplification of the medical problem
sketched out in the first chapter. A doctor about to per-
form a critical operation on a patient may have the over-
all objective to "do the best for the patient-" We will
avoid the question here about whose objective, the doctor's
or the patient's, for the time being. Anyway, suppose this
objective is divided into "minimize costs" and "avoid death."
Then, as we have discussed, the attributes of total cost
in dollars and the probability of death might be used for
these objectives respectively. So if we define the overall
objective as Y and costs in dollars as X and probability
1
of dea th as X •
ｾ
we have Y = X x X . The question is whether
1 2
Y is complete. Since we have considered at length the de-
sirable properties of attributes for lowest-level objectives,
let us assume the attributes X and X satisfy these cri-
1 2
teria. The question of whether Y is complete now reduces
to whether or not the objectives "minimize costs" and "avoid
death" cover all important aspects of the problem. As indi-
cated in the beginning of Section 2.2, whether one concludes
that all important aspects of a problem are included in a
set of objectives is mainly a matter of resourcefulness in
selecting additional objectives and judgment.
In our example, after some thought, it might be con-
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cluded that amount of pain and suffering that the patient
might undergo would be important enough to influence de-
cisions and hence should be represented by some objective.
This might be formalized by including an objective to "mi-
nimize pain." With this, we would have three subobjectives
under the overall objective. The original two were not
complete.
A next step would be to assign a measure of effective-
ness to the objective "minimize pain." As suggested earlier,
this would likely be very difficult due to our inability to
measure pain. It might be possible though to set up a sub-
jective index appropriate for this purpose*. However, care
must be taken to insure that this index is meaningful to
the patient and/or the doctor. Otherwise, it would not be
operational.
As a consequence, we may be forced to search for another
attribute to indicate the degree of pain which is operational
and possesses the other desired properties to the degrees
possible. In this case, the "number of days which the
patient must stay in bed" might be useful as such an attri-
bute.While this clearly does not directly indicate the degree
of pain, it is related in some manner to the amount of pain
*An interesting effort in this same spirit is the development
of a severity of burn index by Gustafson, Feller, Crane,
and Halloway (1971]. The work is briefly described in
Kneppreth et.al. [1974J.
suffered by the patient. Such attributes, which are called
proxy attributes, are discussed in detail in the next section.
Suppose the patient and the doctor could meaningfully
use a subjective index for "minimize pain" and suppose this,
along with days in bed, cost, and probability of death, were
suggested as a set of four attributes for the problem. In
such a case, you might argue that days in bed may be elimi-
nated from the list because it is redundant with the pain
index. This would also reduce the number of attributes by
one, which is desirable of course. Someone else may suggest
eliminating the pain index in favor of number of days in
bed for the same reason. Which of these suggestions is
better would have to be weighed by the decision maker, and
his choice should depend on the degree to which the remaining
three attributes satisfy the various desirable properties
for a set of attributes.
Going a bit further, one might decide that the parti-
cular circumstances of this problem make it such that the
total cost is very closely related to the number of days
in bed. This may also be directly related to the pain. So,
it might be possible to eliminate both cost and the sub-
jective pain index from the original list of four attri-
butes and still end up with a complete, operational set
of attributes--a set of two, namely 'the number of days
in bed' and 'the probability of death'. This would have
no redundancies anJ have the property th;:tt it is of mini-
mal reasonable size.
The discussion of the preceding few paragraphs should
clearly bring out the point that sets of attributes are
not unique. We have suggested several combinations which
might serve for a particular medical problem.
2.5 PROXY ATTRIBUTES AND DIRECT PREFERENCE MEASUREMENTS
In this section we are concerned with the age-old prob-
lem confronting analysts which one might raise with a state-
ment like II ••• but what if we have specified an adequate ob-
jectives hierarchy and we just cannot find reasonable attri-
butes for some of the lower-level objectives? We cannot go
on subdividing objectives forever as you might suggest. And
if we did this long enough, each of the objectives would
fail to satisfy the test of importance; consequently they
would be eliminated in further analysis, and we would have
no attributes for some aspects of the hierarchy."
After reading this chapter to here, the question raised
above may represent the thoughts of many. It is a very
important question and invariably comes into play in complex
decision problems. What can be done if no attributes rea-
sonably meet the criteria discussed in Section 2.2? In many
cases, one can use proxy attributes and direct preference
measurements. These two concepts provide us with methods
for surmounting the difficulties just raised. Their use,
however, opens up additional ways that flaws can enter the
analysis; but without them we ｣ｾｮ often only continue working
on "half a problem." Let us discuss what we mean by these
9')
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two concepts and when and how they should be used.
2.5.1 What are Proxy Attributes?
A proxy attribute is an attribute that reflects the
degree to which an associated objective is met, but it does
not directly measure this. Thus, the proxy attributes can
be thought of as indirectly measuring the achievement on a
stated objective. One could argue that essentially all attri-
butes are proxy attributes because nothing can be absolutely
measured. There are just varying degrees to which an ob-
jective is directly measured. Rather than get into a philo-
sophical discussion which would not be very fruitful, let
us illustrate some points with an example.
Some mathematical symbolism might help here. Suppose
that in a given context we have a rather natural set of
lower-level objectives measured by attributes X , ... ,X.,
1 1
... ,Xn' Let us further assume that it would be relatively
easy for the decision maker to state his preferences for
attribute evaluations of the form x = (x , ... ,x ). But now
1 n
Ｇｬｾｴ us assume that it is impossible because of measurement
reasons to use the set of X-attributes. For example, in a
decision concerning environmental standards one might be
concerned with a set X of health attributes associated
with different levels of pollution. One might simply not
know very much about the linkage between a constellation
of pollution levels--Iet us call these l = (y , ... ,y., ..• ,y )
1 J r
where y. might, for example, be the annual tonnage of par-
J
ticulate matter that is injected into the air over New York
City--and the ultimate health levels x = (xi' ... ,x ). Now,
- n
conceptually speaking, for each r one could assign a pro-
bability distribution for the uncertain ｾ associated with
that r. If uX(!) designated the utility for the composite
health levels !' then one could calculate an induced utility
function uy over r levels by taking
where the operator Exlr expects out the uncertain quantity x
(a random variable) using the conditional probability dis-
tribution over i given r. In schematic form this is depicted
in Fig. 2.4. The branch r leads to a chance fork of !-possi-
bilities--really a continuum of ! possibilities in n-space.
One then assigns a utility value uX(!) for each end position
and averages these utilities over the ｾ Ｍ ｦ ｡ ｮ using the con-
ditonal probability distribution for ｾ given r.At position B
in Fig. 2.4 one then obtains the induced utility value uy(r).
This is repeated for each r. Now one can proceed in the usual
way, backwards, by putting a probability distribution over
r and averaging-out back to position A, and so on.
A situation where this procedure may be particularly
desirable is when decisions are made to "improve life" in
terms of the X attributes, but where the entire impact of
the decision can be specified by its impact on the y attri-
butes. Use of the induced utility function uycould then
greatly reduce the total effort involved, since one major
Proxy Variables Ultimate Variables
.. I
x
Probability measure
for <R Iy)
Figure 2.4
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part of the model--once it has been done--can be neglected
except for prudent periodical reviews.
In the case where there are several X attributes and only
one Y attribute, we are effectively evaluating a multiattribute
problem with the much simpler unidimensional framework. An
air quality example where Y designates a single variable in-
fluenced by the decision alternatives is one plausible si-
tuation where this may occur.
But now let us suppose that we cannot responsibly
assign a distribution to the chance fork B. In this case
we can then subjectively assess directly our preferences or
utilities for y-configurationL Thus in using proxy variables
y instead of the "ultimate"variables x we suppress, in
Fig. 2.4, the chance fork emanating from B and use our
mind as an informal synthesizer for directly assessing the
uy ( .) fun c t ion.
Different decision makers using the same proxy variables
l might differ in their uy assignments because they might
differ on (a) the ux assignments, (b) the probability
distribution of Ｈ ｾ ｉ ｹ Ｉ Ｌ or (c) discrepancies arising from
the informal synthesis of utilities and probabilities.
2.5.2 Example: Emergency Ambulance Service
The overall objective of an emergency ambulance system
might be stated as "deliver patients to the hospital in the
best possible conditions given the circumstances."
Since there is no obvious attribute for this objective,
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suppose it is subdivided into "minimize the likelihood of
death on arrival at the hospital" and "minimize the likeli-
hood of arrival in critical condition." The proportion of
patients' dead on arrival and the proportion arriving in cri-
tical condition might be reasonable attributes for these
objectives. However, the question of what is a critical
condition would be difficult. Furthermore, a patient might
receive the best care and treatment possible and still die
enroute to the hospital. In such a case, the result should
not be attributed to the competency of the ambulance service.
But how would one differentiate this case from another
where poor service contributed to the death of the patient?
The point is that it might not be possible to identify
suitable attributes which directly indicate the extent to
which the objectives are achieved.
Faced with the problem of analyzing emergency ambulance
systems, both Savas [1969J and Stevenson [1972J have chosen
to use the proxy attribute "response time." This was defined
as the time between receipt of a call for an ambulance and
arrival of an ambulance at the scene. The "delivery time,"
the time between receipt of the call and arrival of the
patient, is another important proxy attribute used in ambulance
studies. The premise is that shorter response times and
shorter delivery times will contribute to achieving the
overall objective of an emergency ambulance system. And,
because of this relationship, they may be used as attributes
which reflect the degree to which this objective is
achieved.*
2.5.3 The Mind as an Informal Synthesizer
When we use proxy attributes, the decision maker must
process some additional information in his mind in choosing
the best alternative. He must informally decide on the degree
to which the objectives are met by the different levels of
achievement as indicated by the proxy attributes.
The point is clarified by expanding on the ambulance
example. Consider Fig. 2.5 which represents a simplified
model of an emergency ambulance system. Our input variables
are
N ｾｴｨ･ number of ambulances,
K ｾｴｨ･ location of ambulances, and
M ｾｱｵ｡ｬｩｴｹ and quantity of personnel in
the system.
*Response time has been used as a proxy attribute in ana-
lyzing other emergency services. For example, Larson
[1972] uses police response time in evaluating various
allocation strategies in urban police departments, and
Carter and Ingall (1970] use the response times of the
various pieces of equipment answering calls for service in
comparing operational policies available to the New York
City Fire Department. See Section 7.3 for an attempt to
aggregate the response times of these various pieces of
equipment into an overall index of the quality of response
to fires.
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Although this may be vague, we would only complicate the
discussion by being more specific. What we would like to do
is measure the extent to which the objectives are met in
terms of attributes X and Y, which represent the proportion
of the patients arriving at the hospital dead and in critical
condition, respectively. These can be thought of as the out-
put of the system. The decisions control the inputs, and
achievement is measured by the outputs.
However, we just argued that it might not be practical
to use X and Y for evaluating the decisions, and as an alter-
native, we suggested using response time R and delivery
time T for this evaluation. If our model gave us everything
we wanted, we could get probability density functions for
X and Y conditional on each possible decision. But it does
not give us this, so we must settle for probability density
functions over Rand T. Now X and Y have some probabilistic
relationship to Rand T which we will designate* by
and
x
y
= f (r,t,e )1 3
fz.(r,t,e
4
)
where the e i represent causal factors,other than response
time and delivery time,and random disturbances. Our model
does not indicate what f and f are and this is the reason
1 2
*Small letters will represent specific amounts of variables
and attributes. That is, a specific value of response time
R will be r.
we cannot get the probability aensity functions for X and
Y. Actually both Rand T are functions of N, K, and M and
the model gives us
I' = g (k,m,n,e )
1 1
and
t = g (k,m,n,e )
z z
where gl and gz are those functions.
So what does one lose by using Rand T rather than X and
Y to evaluate the various courses of action? Presumably,
when we ask the decision maker to express his preferences
for different amounts of Rand T, he does this by considering
the effects Rand T have on X and Y. But this requires an
understanding of f (r,t,e ) and f (r,t,e ) or at least an
1. 3 Z '+
understanding of how different values of Rand T contribute
to the overall objective of getting patients to the hospital
in the best possible condition considering the circumstances.
So essentially, the introduction of proxy attributes requires
that some of the modelling of the system be done in the de-
cision maker's head. Often, this is what we would like to
avoid, because there is too much information in complex
problems to handle effectively this way. However, when it
is unavoidable, careful thinking may permit the decision
maker to express a useful set of relationships between
proxy attributes and the original objectives. It is probably
safe to say that, in general, when a smaller part of the
model must be implicitly considered by the decision maker,
i c <c
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the quantified preferences more accurately reflect his
true preferences for the basic objectives. For this reason,
Hatry [1970] cautions against the excessive use of proxy
attributes even though they might be easier to handle
analytically or might be easily accessible.
It should be mentioned that Rand T might still be
useful even if the set X, Y is not complete. For example,
suppose that a third attribute Z representing "annual cost
of the ambulance system" is needed. There may again be
problems with using X and Y on a practical problem, but
Z itself may be adequate for cost considerations. In such
a case, Rand T might again be collectively proxy for X
and Y, the service considerations, and the set R, T, and
Z may reasonably satisfy our criteria for a set of attributes.
Suppose that in the ambulance problem, we could not
build an analytical or simulation model of any sort; that
is, we could not relate the inputs to the outputs or to
any sets of proxy attributes which we felt might be appro-
priate for the problem. In this case, the decision maker
might have to implicitly consider the entire model in his
head by relating the possible levels of inputs to achieving
the stated objective. This means that the decision maker
must assess his preferences over various levels of K,M,
and N by considering their effect on X and Y. And so, these
three variables can be thought of as another set of proxy
attributes which one might need to "fall back on" in our
analysis. This indicates two points. First, there is no
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unique set of proxy attributes, and secondly, the proxy
attributes can corne in degrees. That is, some sets of proxy
attributes are more closely related to the basic objectives
than other sets.
2.5.4 Common Proxy Attributes
Earlier in this section, we remarked that all attributes
might be proxy attributes because nothing measures completely
and precisely all that we are interested in. But clearly some
are "less proxy" than others. Here we would like to point
out a couple of attributes which are so conventionally used
that often one does not think of them as proxy attributes.
The best examples of this are attributes total wealth,
income, or profits which are associated with the very commonly
stated objective "maximize profits." However, is the basic
objective to accumulate dollars for their own sake, or for
other things such as consumer goods, the power to implement
ideas, etc., which dollars help one to achieve? Probably,
in many cases, the latter are more important, so profits
can be thought of as a proxy attribute.
Another similar example concerns the "share of the
market" which many large firms use in evaluating their
relative position. But this might often be a proxy attri-
bute for such intangibles as prestige and power. Or "share
of the market" may be a proxy for future profits which in
turn may be a proxy for other morc basic attributes.
The fact is that for many problems, it is imperative
to introduce proxy attributes in order to handle operatio-
nally some very messy difficulties.
2.5.5 Direct Preference Measurements
With both proxy attributes and subjective indices, one
needs to obtain, for each alternative, a probability dis-
tribution for the various possible levels of the attribute,
to assess a utility function over these le.rels, and finally
to calculate the expected utility over the attribute for
each course of action. The result would be a single number
(expected utility over attribute Y) for each course of action
indicating the preferences for that course of action relative
to the others as far as that particular objective was con-
cerned. In some instances, it may be virtually impossible
to assess these probability distributions and the condi-
tional utility function. When this is the case, the decision
maker may prefer, or perhaps he forced for lack of alter-
natives, to directly asslgn a utility index of performance
on a particular attribute for each of the various courses
of action under consideration.
To illustrate the idea with a simple example, let us
take a business with two objectives: "maximize profit" and
"maximize goodwill." We will let X and Y designate the
respective attributes for these objectives. For X, the
measure "profits in dollars" may be chosen, but there
appears to he no clear ohjective index for Y. Three options
for handling this are a subjective index, a proxy attri-
,'0
bute , or direct preference measurements. With a subjective
index, the procedure should now be reasonably clear. We attempt
to establish a scale of goodwill meaningful in the context of
our problem at hand. Then, for each alternative,probability
distributions are assessed to describe the possible impact
in terms of Y, and a utility function is assessed over the
Y attribute. Expected conditional utilities--conditional on
the X attribute being held constant--can then be calculated
for each alternative and used in the ensuing ｡ ｮ ｡ ｬ ｹ ｳ ｩ ｳ Ｎ ｾ With
a proxy attribute, the process still involves assessing pro-
bability distributions over Y--now a proxy attribute--for
each alternative and a conditional utility function. Then
again, conditional expected utilities are calculated for each
alternative. With direct preference measures, the story is
different. The decision maker must directly assign the con-
ditional expected utilities for achieving the objective
"maximize goodwill." This avoids the formalism of specifying
an attribute for goodwill; of assessing conditional probability
distributions, and of assessing the conditional utility function.
However, it clearly requires hard and thoughtful input on the
part of the decision maker.
Some direct preference measurements are used by Miller
*Throughout this subsection, we are implicitly assuming the
X attribute is held fixed. In Chapter S, concepts are intro-
ducedwhich indicate when it is reasonable to conditionally
calculate expected utility over one attribute while the other
attributes are fixed at convenient levels.
, I I
[1969] in structuring the decision process for choosing among
various employment opportunities. He used three attributes
to describe continuing aspects of the jobs which would make
them desirable. These were personal interest in the techni-
cal content of the job, degree of variety implicit in the
job, and the amount of training in management skills realizable
from the job. Preferences for four different jobs were
assessed directly along each of these three attributes.
Another use of direct preference measurements is discussed
in the dynamic analysis of the Mexico City airport study,
described in Chapter 8.
2.5.6 Some Comments on Proxy Attributes and Direct
Preference Measurement
When one finds it necessary to use proxy attributes,
or direct preference measurement, it is important to find
attributes with which the decision maker is familiar. For
instance, fire department officials are accustomed to thinking
in terms of response times. When we then ask such a person
his preferences, he will presumably be able to relate the
response times to achievement of the basic objectives In
a meaningful way. Similarly, one might expect a politician
to directly assign preferences for alternatives in terms
of the attribute "political effects." Essentially, in both
cases, we are asking the decision maker to distill his
years of experience in providing these preferences. The
more accustomed the decision maker is to thinking in terms
I 1'2.
of the attribute, the more easily he will be able to express
preferences and the more likely he will understand the complex
relationships between the attribute, the alternatives, and
the basic objectives.
A second point is probably very obvious to most readers.
That is, for every proxy attribute we suggest, we can easily
find an associated "proxy objective." For instance, the ob-
jective "minimize the emergency ambulance response time" is
a proxy objective. We point this out because confusion on
this matter can easily result in a redundant set of attrib-
butes for a problem. If one builds an objectives hierarchy
for the ambulance problem with "minimize response time,"
"minimize the proportion of arrivals dead at the hospital,"
and "minimize the proportion of arrivals in critical con-
dition," etc., one is likely to end up with redundancies
in the final set of attributes.
Finally, note that in most of our examples, improving
performance in terms of the proxy attributes, contributes to
meeting the basic objectives. For instance, a lower response
time contributes to "getting the patient to the hospital in
the best possible condition." In some problems, it may be
more convenient to look at performance on proxy attributes
which is improved Q1. meeting the basic objectives. For in-
stance, one objective of a municipal sanitation service
might be stated "to keep the streets clean." An attribute
which might directly measure this would be "pounds of dirt
and garbage per hundred yards of street." Proxy attributes
like "number of garbage pickups per week" and "time between
street cleanings" indicate performance which contribute to
accomplishing the basic objective. On the other hand, a proxy
attribute like "the number of citizen complaints about dirty
streets per week" also indirectly indicates the level of
service provided. In this case, however, presumably better
service in terms of the basic objective causes better per-
formance as measured by the proxy attribute.
2.6 SUMMARY AND PERSPECTIVE ON THE PRACTICAL ASPECTS OF
SPECIFYING OBJECTIVES AND ATTRIBUTES
To attempt any formal analysis of a complex decision
problem requires an articulation of the decision maker's ob-
jectives and an identification of attributes useful for indi-
cating the degree to which these objectives are achieved.
Unfortunately these objectives and attributes are not simply
handed to us in an envelope at the beginning of an analysis.
The intertwined processes of articulating objectives and
identifying attributes are basically creative in nature.
Hence, it is not possible to establish a step-by-step pro-
cedure which leads ore in the end to a meaningful set of ob-
jectives and attributes.
What we have attempted to accomplish in this chapter is
to set down some guidelines which may be useful in carrying
out the necessary thought processes. At one end of the
spectrum--the input side--some suggestions were included
to help the decision maker and/or analyst probe his mind
1\3
when facing the problems of ｯ ｢ ｾ ｡ ｩ ｮ ｩ ｮ ｧ objectives. At the
other end of the spectrum, a set of criteria were suggested
for the quality of the output of the objective and attribute
generation processes. This output--namely the set of attri-
butes--is crucial in the ensuing analysis. Since it is not
usually the case that nice objective attributes are avail-
able to measure all the objectives in a complex problem,
three specific procedures for handling such problems, sub-
jective indices, proxy attributes, and direct preference
measurements, were introduced and illustrated.
Before concluding this chapter, it seems appropriate
to try to put some of the ideas we have discussed into
proper perspective. Perhaps the biggest shortcoming of
going through many examples such as we have done in the
chapter is that inevitably, the overall feeling for what
you are trying to do does not come through as well as
some specific points used for illustrations, although the
former is more important than the latter. This is mainly
due to the fact that much realism is lost in reducing the
problem at hand into written form and again in trying to
distill that to bring out specific points. Without this
reduction of scope, our ideas would probably be lost in the
multitudes of words necessary to adequately describe all
the relevant aspects of the problem. In establishing a
meaningful objectives hierarchy and associated set of attri-
butes for a complex problem, one can bring to bear many
factors we have not explicitly considered here. The process
of specifying the objectives is not done in a vacuum. At
the same time, one may have relevant information about what
data is accessible, the quality and quantity of other avail-
able resources (e.g., computers), various types of constraints
which are in force, (e.g., time, political), the range of
alternative courses of action, etc. All of these might
significantly affect the ｯ ｢ ｪ ･ ｣ ｴ ｩ ｶ ･ ｳ ｨ ｩ ｾ ｡ ｲ ｣ ｨ ｹ and choice of
attributes.
The message should be clear. Although we have offered
some guidelines which will hopefully facilitate the selection
of an objectives hierarchy and associated attributes, we
view our work as far from complete. It would be erroneous
to assume any of our suggestions can replace serious thinking
and resourcefulness.
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CHAPTER 3
TRADEOFFS UNDER CERTAINTY
Many complex decision problems involve multiple con-
flicting objectives. It is often the situation that no do-
minant alternative will exist which is better than all other
alternatives in terms of all of these objectives. Perhaps
some of the original alternatives can be eliminated from
further consideration because they are dominated, but in
general you simply cannot maximize several objectives
simultaneously. You cannot maximize benefits and at the
same time minimize costs; you cannot necessarily maximize
yield and minimize risk; nor can you share a pie by giving
the maximum amount to each child. The literature is replete
with high sounding rhetoric where an advocate cries out
for doing "best" for everybody, in every possible way, in
the shortest time, with the least inconvenience, and with
the maximum security for all. Ah, for the simplicity of
the romanticist's dream world!
3.1 THE MULTIATTRIBUTE VALUE PROBLEM
Our problem is one of value tradeoffs. In this chapter
we will see what can be done about systematically structuring
such tradeoffs. In essence, the decision maker is faced
with a problem of trading-off achievement in terms of one
objective against achievement in terms of another objective.
ｉ ｉ ｾ
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If there is no uncertainty in the problem, in the sense
that the multiattribute consequence of each alternative
is known, the essence of the issue is "How much achievement
on objective 1 is the decision maker willing to give up in
order to improve achievement on objective 2 by some fixed
"amount? If there is uncertainty in the problem, the trade-
off issue remains, but difficulties are compounded because
it is not clear what the consequences of each of the alter-
natives will be.
The tradeoff issue often boils down to a personal value
question, and, in those cases, it requires the subjective
judgement of the decision maker. There may be no right or
wrong answers to these value questions, and naturally enough,
different individuals may have very different value structures.
If the tradeoff issue requires deep reflection--and we be-
lieve it often does in complex problems--there are two possi-
bilities for resolving the issue: the decision maker can in-
formally weigh the tradeoffs in his mind or he can formalize
explicitly his value structure and use this to evaluate
the contending alternatives. Of course, there are a mixture
of intermediary possibilities between these two extremes.
In this chapter, we shall discuss some techniques to help
a confused decision maker formalize his or her own value
structure. These provide a framework of thought which can
be used by the decision maker to assist him in articulating
his preferences.
3.1.1 Statement of the Problem
Let a designate a feasible alternative and denote the
set of all feasible alternatives by A. To each act ｾ in A we
will associate n indices of value: X1 ＨｾＩ , ... Ｌ ｘ ｮ Ｈ ｾ Ｉ Ｎ We can
think of the n evaluators x1 , ... 'Xn as mapping each a in A
into a point in an n-dimensional consequence space, as shown
ln Figure 3.1.
Often we shall talk about some attribute x, such as
the aesthetic appeal of a design, and about an evaluator X
of this attribute. We unashamedly will use the same symbol X
for the attribute in question and the evaluator of that attri-
buteo The context will make it clear what we are talking
about and sometimes it is just plain convenient not to draw
distinctions between these two notions.
In this chapter, we take the point of view that the n
attributes are given. But, of course, one has to keep in mind
that in practice, we have to design and create these attri-
butes that purport to describe the consequences of actions.
The ideas of Chapter Z may be useful for this task.
Observe that ii (x 1 ,x Z' ... ,xn) is a point in the con-
sequence space, we will never compare the magnitudes of x.
1
and x., for i ｾＮ since in most situations this would beJ r J,
meaningless because attributes x. and x. may be measured in
1 J
totally different units.
Roughly--and this is really "roughly"--the decision
maker's problem is to choose ｾ in A so that he will be
happiest with the payoff X1 ＨｾＩ , ... Ｌ ｘ ｮ Ｈ ｾ Ｉ Ｎ Thus we need an
II ｾ
Act Space
Figure 3.1
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index that combines ｘ Ｑ Ｈ ｾ Ｉ , ... Ｌ ｘ ｮ Ｈ ｾ Ｉ into a scalar index of
preferability or value. Alternatively stated, it would be
satisfactory to specify a scalar-valued function v defined
on the consequence space with the property that
v (x 1 ,x 2 ' . . . , xn) ｾ v (x1,x2' . . . ,x ｾ Ｉｾ (x 1 ,x 2 ' . . . , xn Ｉｾ (x1'x2' . . . ,x ｾ Ｉ ,
where the symbol ｾ reads "preferred or indifferent to". We
refer to the function v as a value function. The same con-
struct has many other names in the literature such as ordinal
utility function, preference function, worth function, or
utility function. Given v, the decision maker's problem
can now be stated to choose a in A such that v is maximized.
The value function v serves to compare various levels of the
different attributes indirectly, through the effects the
mangitudes x i ,i=1 , ... ,n, have on v.
3.1.2 Organization and Perspective of the Chapter
Our main considpration is how to structure and assess
a value function v. It would be nice if we could find some
function, call it f, with a simple form such that
where v. designates a value function over the single attri-
1
bute Xi' Some of the constructions of v in this chapter do
exactly this.
However, before delving deeply into this problem, we
shall first discuss some concepts which do not require com-
plete formalization of the preference structure. In some
cases, this may prove to give us enough information for a
responsible decision. Then we respectively consider the
structure of value functions where there are two, three,
and more than three attributes. This is followed by a rather
detailed illustration of the assessment of multiattribute
value function.
It is important to point out that much of this chapter
is expository in nature. Many of the concepts and results
discussed are due to other individuals including Debreu
[1960], Gorman [1968a,1968b], Krantz et al. [1971],
Leontief [1947a,1947b], Luce and Tukey [1964], Pruzan and
Jackson [1963] and Ting [1971]. When important results
are stated, they will be designated as theorems for easy
reference, but in many cases the formal proofs will be
omitted since the proofs are accessible in the original
works. We will, however, try to capture the ideas of these
theorems with several 'informal proofs'. One price we
pay for this is that assumptions such as continuity,
differentiability, essentiality, and solvability, which
are often utilized in the formal proofs, are sometimes
ignored in our informal ones. Essentially we assume with-
out much ado in this chapter exactly what is necessary to
make our reasoning work and we concentrate on only the
simplest nonpathological cases. In later chapters, where
our work becomes less expository, we become a bit more
formal and careful.
Section 3.9 attempts to provide the reader with a
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brief guide to the literature on multiattribute value
functions.
In summary then, this chapter will look at the certain-
ty case--the case where associated to each alternative there
is a certain known consequence in n-space. In ensuing
chapters we will look at the probabilistic case--the case
where we only know the associated payoff in the consequence
space in probabilistic terms. Techniques developed for the
certainty case will prove useful also for the probabilistic
case.
3.2 CHOICE PROCEDURES WHICH DO NOT FORMALIZE PREFERENCE
STRUCTURES
Let acts a l and a" have consequences
121
where
x l = (x I I I) d II - ( II II X ")1 ,···,x., ... ,x an x - x1 ,··.,x., ...1 n - 1 n
X. (a l ) =Xl and X. (a") =: x'.'
1 - ill for i = 1, ... , n.
Furthermore, let us assume throughout this section that pre-
f * . . h Xerences lncrease ln eac ..
1
3 • 2 • 1 Dominance
We shall say that Xl dominates x" whenever
*More formally, in terms of vernacular to be introduced
later, we assume that each X. is preferentially independent
1
of the complementary set of attributes (see Section 3.5),
and that preferences increase in each X..
1
a. x! > X'.'
1 1
and
b. x! > X'.'1 1
all i
for some i
"
(3.1)
(3.2)
is a noncontender
\22
for "best", since a' is at least as good as a" for every
evaluator (given by (3.1)), and strictly better for at least
one (given by (3.2)).
In the case n = 2, we can plot the points x' and X'I as
in Fig. 3.2 and we see that x' dominates x" if and only if
x' is "northeast" of x".
Observe that the notion of dominance exploits only the
ordinal character of the numbers in the consequence space
(i.e., given two numbers x! = 6 and ｸ ｾ = 3 we are interested
1 1
in the relationship that x! > x'.') and not the cardinal
1 1
character of these numbers (i.e., the fact that the dif-
ference between 10 and 6 is greater than the distance from
6 to 3 or that 6 is twice 3). Also observe that dominance
does not require comp,arisons between x ｾ and x',' for i ｾ j.
ｾ J
3.2.2 The Efficient Frontier
For any (feasible) act sEA there is an associated con-
sequence! in n-space (i.e., the evaluation space) where
x. = X.(a), all i. Let R be the set of consequences in
1 1
n-space which are associated with acts in A--the set R
is the so-called range-set of the vector X of evaluators X1 ,
... ,X which are defined on the domain A.
n
//
/.
/
/
/
Figure 3;2.
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Direction of increasing
preferences
The. l.lnsnade.d area ｲ ･ Ｎ ｰ ｲ ･ Ｎ ｾ Ｇ Ｒ Ｔ 1"te
set of x which dominate x"
Fig. 3.3 depicts various range-sets, R, when n= 2.
We shall have occasion in the sequel to discuss these
qualitatively different cases.*
The set of consequences of R that are not dominated
will be called the efficient frontier of R. It is also
known as the "Pareto optimal set." In Fig. 3.3A., B, and
C, the efficient frontiers are darkened. Thus in Fig. 3.3A
the choice of X" can be ruled out because there is the con-
sequence ｾ Ｇ in the efficient frontier which dominates x".
In Fig. 3.3C the consequence ｾ Ｈ Ｓ Ｉ ｩ ｳ efficient (i.e., lies
on the efficient frontier) even though it lies in a local
valley, so to speak. In Fig. 3.3D the set R consists of
discrete consequences and the efficient points are marked
with an overlaying •. The cases depicted in Fig. 3.3A and B
are the easiest to handle analytically, since the sets of
consequences are convex and the efficient frontiers con-
tinuous. Notice, however, that the concept of convexity
ｩ ｮ ｴ ｲ ｯ ､ ｵ ｣ ｾ ｣ ｡ ｲ ､ ｩ ｮ ｡ ｬ (as opposed to ordinal) notions.
ｾ ｗ ･ don't want to be too fussy about mathematical details
but somehow we must rule out pathological cases or else we
will get into trouble. We shall assume that the region R
is bounded and that it contains all of its boundary points.
That is, we definitely want to rule out the case where there
. (1) (2) (m) .is a sequence of pOlnts ｾ Ｌ ｾ , ... Ｌ ｾ , ... ln R such
that each point in the sequence dominates the preceding
consequence, and where the sequence approaches some point ｸ ｾ
say, which does not belong to R.
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In some cases where the efficient set can be drawn
it might be pretty obvious which x should be chosen. For
example, in Fig. 3.3B the point"!t naturally suggests itself
because one has to sacrifice so much of one attribute to
gain so little of another attribute when moving slightly
from x*. Admittedly, we are implicitly using cardinal con-
cepts in making this last remark, but the natural units
for the Xl and X2 evaluators might make such cardinal
tradeoffs manifestly clear. We are not saying this is ne-
cessarily so; just that it might, on occasion, be so.
For values of n > 3 we cannot picture R and its
efficient frontier. The next two sections describe two
ways the decision maker can "move around" on an efficient
frontier in order to locate a point that seems reasonably
good. Later sect ions will descr ibe procedures a dec is ion
maker can use to formally structure his preferences for
points in the evaluation space. But meanwhile let's look
at what can be done without completely specifying such a
preference structure.
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3.2.3 Exploring the Efficient Frontier: Use of Artificial
C . *onstralnts
The decision maker is faced with the following problem.
*Some references covering topics briefly discussed in this
subsection are Dyer (1974; Geoffrion, Dyer, and Feinberg
[1972]; Kornbluth [1973]; Roy [1971]; and Schroeder [1974].
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He must select an act a£A so that he will be "satisfied"
with the resulting n-dimensional payoff: X1 ＨｾＩＬ ｘＲＨｾＩ , ... ,
ｘｮＨｾＩＮ One procedure he might employ is to think of some
" . t· I I" 0 0 0 f th tt· b t dasplra Ion eve s x 1 ,x 2 ' ... 'Xn or e n a rl u es an
pose the well-defined, mathematical problem: Is there an
a£A such that
Xi Ｈ ｾ Ｉ .:. xi ' for i c: 1, ... ,n ? (3.3)
Is it possible to satisfy these joint aspirations? If no,
then the decision maker can change his joint aspirations to
some point x"x2, ... Ｌ ｸ ｾ Ｎ If yes--i.e., if an acttexists
that satisfies (3.3)--then although we know that
+ 0X.(a) > x.
1 - - 1
for i = 1, ••• ,n ,
we still don't know that the point
is efficient. It may be dominated. We might continue our
probing procedure by setting up another aspiration level
(x, , ... Ｌ ｸ ｾ Ｉ where
x! =X.(a t ) + b.. , i= 1, ... ,n
1 1 1
and where the increment b.. is chosen in an ad hoc, intuitive
1
manner that is a combination of wishful thinking and realism.
Thus in an iterative manner the decision maker can investigate
the frontier or "almost-frontier" of R. By informally keeping
his preference in mind, he can choose a succession of
aspiration levels which can move him around the region R
r2(o
until he reaches the limits of his patience, or until he
figures that the expected gain of continuing the probing
procedure is not worth the effort in time and cost of analysis.
Perhaps a more satisfactory variation of this procedure
consists of setting aspirational levels for all attributes,
save one. For example, suppose the decision maker selects
aspiration levels ｸ ｾ Ｌ ｸ ｾ Ｌ ... Ｌ ｸ ｾ and seeks an aEA which satis-
fies the imposed constraints
X.(a) > ｸｾ , for i = 2,3, ... , n
1 - - 1
(3.4)
and maximizes X1 ＨｾＩＮ
This maximization problem is in the form of the "standard
optimization problem" of Section 3.1.1. If there is no
feasible solution (i.e., no ｾ ｅ ａ which satisfies (3.4)), then
obviously the set of aspirations ｸ ｾ Ｌ ... Ｌ ｸ ｾ has to be changed.
But even if a feasible solution exists, the decision maker
may be surprised at the maximum value of X1 (2). If it is
either too small or too large (as compared to what he "ex-
pected") he might want to change the original aspiration
levels ｸ ｾ Ｌ ... Ｌ ｸ ｾ and iterate the procedure.
Let the maximum of X1 ＨｾＩ subject to constraints aEA
and (3.4) be denoted by ( 0 0 The notation empha-M1 x 2 ' ... ,xn ) .
Sizes the point that the maximum depends on the aspiration
levels x;, ... Ｌ ｸ ｾ Ｎ It is often the case that as a by-product
of the solution procedure of the standard optimization
problem, we get the local rate of change of M1 as each of
the constraints is released (all others remaining fixed).
, 21-
In mathematical terms we obtain the partial derivatives
for j = 2, ... ,no Now the decision maker has a lot of information
at his disposal. He chooses xZ,... Ｌｸｾ and then as a result
of the analysis he obtains
and for j = 2, ... , n
He now has to decide either to remain satisfied with what he
has or to probe further. If he decides to continue his search
for a "satisfactory" solution he might wish to single out
some index, say j, and investigate the behavior of
as a function of x j . That is, he might choose to keep intact
all the previous constraints, other than xj, and to systemati-
cally observe what happens to M1 as x j moves over some given
range. He does this even though he already knows the value
of M1 at xj and the derivative at this point, because this
additional information may be useful, and the cost of the
additional analysis may be quite small. Fig. 3.4 shows one
possible result of such an analysis.
The above investigative, probing procedure is ad hoc.
It is not precisely programmed. It requires a series of
creative judgments from the decision maker. He has to decide
on aspiration levels, on special investigations of the
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sensitivity of payoffs (like M1) to his arbitrarily imposed
constraints, on setting new aspiration levels, and so on;
and finally,he must decide when to be "satisfied" and stop.
This probing procedure involves a continuing interaction be-
tween analyzing what is achievable and what is desirable.
It proceeds incrementally, where the choice of each step
is decided upon by the decision maker who must constantly
weigh informally in his mind what he would like to get and
what he thinks he might be able to get. Interactive computer
programs have been written to help make this iterative
probing operational. In the next subsection we shall discuss
one more way of exploring the efficient frontier in n-space.
3.2.4 Exploring the Efficient Frontier: Use of Variable,
Linear Weighted Averages*
In this section we shall pose an auxiliary mathematical
problem, the solution of which will result in the identifi-
cation of some point on the efficient frontier. By modifying
the auxiliary problem, the decision maker can move along
Ｑ Ｒ ｾ
the efficient frontier until he is satisfied with the result.
For any ｾ ﾣ ａ we assume, as before, there is the payoff
be any n-tuple for which
A. > 0 all i
1 '
(3.Sa)
(3.Sb)
*For procedures which generate the entire efficient frontier
using linear programming, see Zeleny [1974].
IlC)
and
n
E A. = 1 •
. 1 11=
(3. 5c)
Define the auxiliary problem as follows: Choose aEA to
maximize
n
E AoX.(a) •
i=l 1 1 - (3.6)
We can also state the problem in an equivalent fashion as
follows:Choose xER to maximize
n
E
i=l
A .x. .
1 1 (3.7)
This auxiliary problem is in the form of a standard
optimization problem. Let xG = (xo1 ,'" ,xo) be a solution to- n
this auxiliary problem. We now assert that ｾ ｏ ｭ ｵ ｳ ｴ lie on the
efficient frontier. For, suppose it did not; then there would
°be an !' belonging to R which would dominate x. But this
cannot be, since in that case
n n
E A.X! > E ａＮｘｾ
i=l 1 1 i=l 1 1
and therefore xOwould not be a maximizer of E A.X ..
1 1
Hence corresponding to an n-tuple ｾ satisfying (3.5), the
maximizer of E Aix i (for ｾ in R), results in a point !which
lies on the efficient frontier.
The geometry of this analysis is shown in Fig. 3.5
for n c 2, when ｾ ｾ {.8,.2). The point xOis a maximizer of
.8x 1 + .2x 2 .
.7X1 + .3x2 = constant
== k
maximizer of
.8x1 + ＮＲｾ for x € R
Figure 3.5
ｅ Ｉ Ｈ ｰ ｜ ｯ ｖ Ｂ Ｇ Ｂ Ｌ ｾ the. Ef{ \'L\czYlT Frc..Y\\IC2r ｜Ｉｳ［ｾｮ＼ｪ Llne.o..r ｗｾｾｃｪｾ｜ｴ｜Ｇｮｪ
The line through XO of the form
.8x 1 + .Zx Z = k
(for a suitably chosen k) must be tangent to R at Ａ ｾ since
this line obviously contains t and no point of R can be to
the right of this line (otherwise, xOwould not be a maximizer
of .8x 1 + .Zx Z).
Now the decision maker can query his psyche and ask
himself whether he wants to settle for xo= Ｈ ｸ Ｑ Ｇ ｸ ｾ Ｉ or to
explore the efficient frontier further. He knows that at XO
he can move along the frontier of R trading off ｾ units of
X1 for approximately Ｔ ｾ units of XZ. That tradeoff is only
precisely true in a limiting sense but for practical pur-
poses we can think of 1 to 4 as the (local) marginal rate
of substitution of X1 for Xz at the frontier point Ａ ｾ Suppose
the decision maker, upon reflection, feels that the value
of x zo is too low in comparison with xt (Le., he would be
willing to give up some of X1 to get more of XZ). He can
then resolve the auxiliary problem by looking for a maximizer
of, say
.7x 1 + .3x Z
for XER. If Xl = (x, ,x Z) is such a maximizer, then Xl will
also be on the efficient frontier of R and Xl will lie north-
west of xOas seen in Fig. 3.5. At Xl the (local) marginal
rate of substitution will be ｾ units of X1 for Ｗ ｾ Ｏ Ｓ units
of XZ. And so the process goes.
Of course, if n = Z, the efficient frontier can be
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ｾ｣ｴｵｲ･､Ｎ The real power of the technique can best be
appreciated for higher values of n where the geometry can
only be imagined but not drawn. For example, if the choice
of A ｾＨａＱ , ... , An) gives rise to the associated maximizer
o _ ( 0 0) d·fOb . b I Ix - x1 , ... ,x ,an 1 x. appears to e unsulta yow,- n 1
then the auxiliary maximization problem can be recycled
with an increased value of Ai. This will result in an in-
crease--to be precise, it will not result in a decrease--
in the optimal level xi in the new maximization problem.
The decision maker by looking at the points he has already
obtained on the efficient frontier must decide when to be
satisfied. By manipulating the A.'s he can always move to
1
different points on the efficient frontier. Once again he
is asked informally to balance what he would like to get
with what he thinks he can achieve. If the efficient frontier
is convex, with no local dips or valleys, the procedure which
manipulates the A.'s can generate any point on the frontier.
1
In the non-convex case, special techniques can be employed
to map out these dips, but since this procedure is not in
the main stream of our concern, we will not explore these
variations.
It is possible to proceed further. One might want to
formalize some variation of the above iterative procedure
and prove convergence to an optimum. Of course, if one pro-
ceeds along these lines, one would have to imagine that
lurking in the background there is a complete ordering of
13i
the points in n-space which is called upon at each step
of the iteration in order to guide the choice of each in-
cremental adjustment. Since this line of approach does not
generalize readily to the probabilistic case, which is after
all our main orientation, we shall not pursue the numerous
analytical points emanating from the discussion in this
subsection.
3.3. STRUCTURING OF PREFERENCES AND VALUE FUNCTIONS
We now turn our attention to a new tack--one which
formalizes the decision maker's preferences for points in
the consequence space. As is commonly done in economics,
we initially forget about the set of achievable points in
n-space (i.e., the set R in the Section 3.2) and discuss
the decision maker's preferences for consequences in n-
space, whether they actually belong to R or not. Only
after formalizing these preferences, do we then investi-
gate the problem of finding a point in R that will yield
his greatest preference.
3.3.1 Lexicographical Ordering
As our first illustration we shall examine an approach
which we believe is more widely adopted in practice than
it deserves to be. However, it has the merit of simplicity
and it can be easily administered. Our objection is that
it is naively simple. It is called lexicographical ordering.
A lexicographical ordering is like the ordering found
13l
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in a lexicon or dictionary: a' >- a" if and only if:
a. X1 (a'»X1 (a")
or
b. Xi(a') = Xi(a") for i = 1, ... ,k, and Xk+ 1(a'»Xk+ 1(a"),
for some k = 1, ... ,n-
In other words we assume that the evaluators X1 , ... ,Xn
are ordered according to importance. Act a' is preferred
to a" if it merely has a higher score on X1--regardless
of how well or poorly it does on other evaluators. Only
if there is a tie on X1 , does evaluator Xz come into con-
sideration.Only if there is a tie on X1 and XZ' does
evaluator X3 come into consideration. And so on. Naturally,
we can generalize this formulation by permuting the pro-
minence of the evaluators. We can, for example, make X3
most important, followed by X1 ' followed by ...
Notice that if x' and x" are distinct points in an
evaluation space,then they cannot be indifferent with a
lexicographical ordering.
A lexicographical ordering is easy to understand
and, in some (very rare!) cases, it might reflect the
"true" beliefs of the decision-making unit. However,it
is our belief that--Ieaving aside "administrative ease"--
it is rarely appropriate. But, of course, "administrative
ease," is an important meta-evaluator in its own right,
and cannot be ignored. Hence, we do observe cases where
lexicographical orderings are employed.
A variant of lexicographical ordering with aspiration levels,
Suppose we order the evaluators in importance and for con-
venience let us use the natural ordering 1, 2, ••.• For
h Od .eac evaluator X. set an aspiration level x. an POSlt
1 1
the following rules: a' ); a" whenever
a. X1 (a') > X1 (a") and X1 (a") < x1
(i.e., X1 overrides all else as long as X1 aspirations
are not met), or
b. X1 (a') ｾ x 01
Xl Ｈ｡ＢＩｾ x 01
X2 (a'» X2 (a") and X2(a") < x 02
(i.e., if X1 aspirations are met, then X2 overrides all
else as long as X2 aspirations are not met).
An so forth. If all aspiration levels are met, then
one may be willing to give up some of X1 for a suitably
large increase in X2 , and so on. In this ordering system
two distinct points ｾ Ｇ and ｾ Ｇ ｉ might be indifferent pro-
°d d h '> 0 d" g f 11 0v 1 etat x. x. an x 0 > x 0, 0 raJ .
J J J J
Again we feel that such an ordering procedure, if care-
fully scrutinized, will rarely pass a test of "reasonable-
ness," but for administrative purposes such an ordering
might indeed be imposed.
In the sequel we shall only deal with preference
structures that are less dogmatic in the sense that:
if x' is an interior point of R, then for a suitably small
decrease in x! there will be a suitably large compensating
1
increase in x!. In two-space, this means that every point
J
x lies on some indifference curve.
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3.3. 2 Indifference Curves
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Fig. 3.6. depicts an example of how a decision maker
might structure his preferences for points in a two-di-
mensional evaluation space. This example assumes that the
decision maker is indifferent between achieving x' or
x" and this is portrayed by having both x' and x" on the
same indifference curve. The point ｾ Ｇ Ｂ is preferred to
ｾ Ｇ (by the decision maker) and hence ｾ Ｇ Ｂ lies on a higher
(or more preferred) indifference curve.
We imagine that through any point ｾ in an n-dimensional
consequence space there is an indifference surface connecting
all points that are indifferent to ｾ Ｎ These indifference
surfaces will be curves for n=2. We shall assume through-
out, that in the opinion of the decision maker, any two
points ｾ Ｈ ｬ Ｉ and ｾ Ｈ Ｒ Ｉ are comparable in the sense that one,
and only one, of the following holds:
(1 ) * to x(2) ｾ Ｈ Ｑ Ｉ Ｂ Ｌ ｸ Ｈ Ｒ Ｉ Ｌa. x is indifferent (written:
-
b. (1) is preferred to (2 ) (written: (1» (2))x x ｾ ｾ ,
-
(1) is less preferred than (2 ) (written: (1)< (2))c. x x x x .
-
- - -
We write (1) )a ｾＨＲＩ to mean "not x (1)
-< x (2) " and assumex
-1
all the relations Ｂ Ｌ Ｌ ＾ Ｌ ｾ to be transitive.
We shall say that a EEeference structure is defined on
the consequence space if any two points are comparable and
no intransitivities exist. We assume, also, that the de-
*Less elliptically, and more grammatically, we could say,
"The decision maker is indifferent between x(l) and x(2)."
ＭＭＭｩｲＭＭＭＭＭＭＭＭＭＭＭＭＭｾｸ
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cision maker believes that in a specified decision con-
text there is some particular preference structure that
is appropriate for him.
Once the decision maker has specified his preference
structure he can proceed to formalize his problem, namely:
Find I£A such that
where
! (a) :: (X 1 (a) , XZ(a) , . . . , Xn (a))
Or, alternatively stated: Find x\R such that
oｾ ｾ ｾ , for all xER .
Fig. 3.7 depicts the geometry of this maximization
problem.
Ｑ Ｓ ｾ
3.3.3 Value Functions
A function v, which associates a real number ｶ Ｈ ｾ Ｉ to
each point ｾ in an evaluation space, is said to be a value
function representing the decision maker's preference
structure provided that
x '_ ｾ Ｂ ｾ ｶ Ｈ ｾ Ｇ Ｉ = ｶＨｾＢＩ
and
ｾ Ｇ ＾ ｾ Ｂ Ｃ ｶ Ｈ ｾ Ｇ Ｉ > ｶＨｾＢＩ .
(3.8a)
(3.8b)
Some typical examples of value functions for n = Z are;
ｶ Ｈ ｾ Ｉ = c 1x, + cZx Z where c 1> 0, c Z> 0
ｶＨｾＩ = xex.xS where ex. > 0, S > 0, Z
ｶＨｾＩ = c,x 1 + cZx Z + c 3 (x 1 - b )ex. (x Z bz)S1
Direction of
Increasing
Preference
} Indifference cutves
-----
Figure 3.7
If v is a value function reflecting the decision
maker's preferences, then his prohlem can he put into
the format of the standard optimization problem:
Find ｾ ｅ ａ to maximize ｶ ｛ Ａ Ｈ ｾ Ｉ ｝ .
We shall see later, that there is a subtle interplay
between formulating a preference structure and finding
a corresponding value function. Indeed, we may employ
value functions to help a decision maker articulate his
preferences.
I ?,7
3.3.4 Indifference Curves and Value Functions
Given a value function v, any two points ｾ Ｇ and x"
such that ｶ Ｈ ｾ Ｇ Ｉ = ｶＨｾＢＩ must be indifferent to each other
and must lie on the same indifference surface. Hence we
see that given v it is possihle, in principle, to find
the indifference surfaces. More generally we see that a
knowledge of v uniquely specifies an entire preference
structure. The converse, however, is not true: a pre-
ference structure does no! ｾ ｮ ｩ ｧ ｵ ｾ ｬ ｬ specify a value
function. Suppose v 1 is a value function consistent with
a given preference structure.Then if T(o) is any strictly
monotonically increasing real-valued function (of a real
variable), as depicted in Fig. 3.8 and if we now define
ｶ ｚ Ｈ ｾ Ｉ :: T[V 1 ＨｾＩｊＬ then it is immaterial whether we choose
ｾ ｣ ａ to maximize v 1 or v Z.
Definition. Given T as defined, we shall say that the value
functions v 1 and V z ::: 'f(v I ) are :'i_t:rategicalll equivalent
l'
v = 'l'(v )2 1
.!-
- .
.1. Y\ t.." ｾ Ｎ os \I. 'j
)
1370..
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for decision making purposes and write this as ｶ ｬ ｾ v Z-
If, for example, all x. are positive and
1
ｉｾ
then
ｶ ｬ Ｈ ｾ Ｉ = ｾ k.x.
ill
k.> 0, all i
1
and
= ｩｾｫＮｸＮ
.11
1
ｶＳＨｾＩ = log Ｈ ｾ ｫ ｩ ｸ ｩ Ｉ
1
Would be strategically equivalent to v l _ All three functions
are representations of the same preference structure. In-
deed, for operational purposes, given v we will want to
choose T such that the value function T(v) is easy to ma-
nipulate mathematically.
3.4 PREFERENCE STRUCTURES AND VALUE FUNCTIONS FOR TWO
ATTRIBUTES
For notational convenience we shall label the two attri-
butes by X and Y instead of Xl and XZ' We repeat that X and
Y shall each be assumed to be positively oriented: the more
of any component the better for any fixed level of the
other component_
3.4.1 The Marginal Rate of Substitution
Suppose you are given a concrete problem where X and
Yare specified desirable attributes and suppose you are
asked: If Y is increased hy 6 units, how much does X have
to decrease in order for you to remain indifferent?
Clearly in many instances YOllr answer depends on the levels
x of X and y of Y. If at the point (x, ,y,) you are will ing
to give up A6 units of X for /I. units of Y, then we will
say that the Ａ ｅ ｾ Ｎ Ａ Ｚ ｧ ｩ ｮ ｡ ｾ ｲ ｡ ｴ ｾ ｟ Ｈ Ｉ ｦ ｟ ｾ ｾ ｾ Ａ Ｉ ｟ ｳ ｴ ｩ ｴ ｵ Ａ Ｎ ｩ ｯ ｾ of X for Y at
(x, ,y,) is A. Tn other words, ,\ is roughly the amount of
of X you are just will ing to "pay" for a unit of Y, given
that you presently have x, of X and y, of Y. Figure 3.9
depicts this case. Strictly speaking we should take the
limit as 6 approaches O. Throughout we assume that we
are in a well-behaved world where all functions have smooth
second derivatives.
The marginal rate of substitution at (x, ,y, )--as we
are using it--is the negative reciprocal of the slope of
the indifference curve at (X,IY,). Thus, if we have indifference
curves, then we can calculate local substitution rates.*
In this section we will develop some methods for doing
the reverse: that is, we will think about how marginal
rates of substitution can help us construct indifference
'*Mathematical Digression: If the indifference curve through
following formula:
v'(x"y,)
= ｾＭＭＭＭＭＭ
ｖｾＨｸｬＧｙｬＩ
(x, ,y,) is given by
v(x,y) = c ,
then the marginal rate of substitution A at (x, ,y,) can be
obtained from the
where v' and v' are the partial derivatives of v with respect
x y
to the first and second arguments respectively.
Fieure J. C)
..
curves .
3.4.2 The General Case
We shall now investigate how marginal rates of sub-
stitution might depend on the levels of X and Y, that is,
on (x 1 'Y1). A straightforward procedure is first to hold
x 1 fixed and look at the substitution rates as a function
of Y1' and second to hold Y1 fixed and look at the sub-
stitution rates as a function of x 1 .
A typical case would be the following. Suppose the
substitution rate at (x 1 'Y1)' the point ｾ in Figure 3.10
iSA
a
. If we hold x 1 fixed, we might find that the sub-
stitution rates increase with a decrease in Y and decrease
with an increase in Y. This is illustrated at points band
c in Figure 3.10. The changes in the substitution rates
mean that the more of Y we have, the less of X we would
be willing to give up to gain a given additional amount
of Y. In Figure 3.10 we can see that for the same increase
in Y, the sacrifice of X is less at c than at b.
Similarly, if we hold Y1 fixed, we might find that
the substitution rates decrease with decreasing X and
increase with increasing X. This is illustrated at points
*MacCrimmon and Toda [1969] introduce a procedure for deter-
mining indifference curves and present experimental results.
An interactive computer program for utilizing the procedure
and related experience with its use are found in MacCrimmon
and Siu [1974J. See also Toda [1974].
yA < A < \
c a
c
Ad <A <Aa e
y
1 d e
[l1y is identical at
points a, b, c, d, and e.J
b
Figure 3.10 . ._
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d and e in Figure 3.10. The interpretation is that
additional units of X become le§ important relative to Y
the higher the x value, and that we are therefore willing
to substitute more X per additional unit of Y. This be-
havior is consistent with indifference curves of the shape
given in Figure 3.6.
In many applications it is convenient to let X stand
for monetary consequences. Now in this case, if (x',y') -
(x",y"), then we can say that the decision maker is just
willing ｴ ｯ ｾ an amount x" - x' for a change of Y from
y' to y", when the monetary change taken place from the
base of x'. If h is some positive amount it definitely does
not follow that, in general,
[(x' ,y') _(x",y")] implies [(x' + h,y') .-(x" + h,y")]
That is, the amount the decision maker is just-willing-
to-pay for a change from y' to y" will depend on the
monetary base he is starting from. It generally is not
possible to "price-out" a change from y' to yll without
specifying the absolute level of X. The next two subsections
consider those special cases where changes in Y can be
"priced-out" independently of the X starting position.
A more general discussion of "willingness-to-pay"
arguments is found in Section 3.8.
14 ,
3 . 4.3 Constant Substitution: Case of Linear Indifference
Curves
An extreme special case of substitution rates occurs
when the substitution rate at (x, ,Y,) does not depend on
the values x, and y,. That is, the marginal substitution
rate is also the global suhstitution rate, applicable at
any point and to substitutions in any amounts. In this
case, the indifference curves are of the form
x + Ay = constant , (3.9)
and a suitable value function for this preference structure
is
v(x,y) = x + Ay . (3.'0)
Since in this case the local substitution rate is the
global substitution rate, when assessing A, the analyst
does not have to ask localized questions involving small
changes in x and y. The decision maker can base his assess-
ment of A on sizable, psychologically meaningful changes
in x and y.
Sometimes a decision maker may be of the opinion that
for his problem the substitution rates should be constant,
but he may have difficulty assigning a value to A. In
practice it may not be necessary to determine A exactly.
For example, in a problem involving the choice of one of
several actions, the decision maker might calculate
A-intervals, such that action a, is best if
A .::. A,
action a Z is best if
A,< A .::. AZ '
and so on. Figure 3.11 illustrates such intervals.
a1 ｾＱＭＴ a2 ＧＭｉｾ a 7 ｾｉＭＧＢ a4 +-1-) ac: >.) .:J AAl '2 A3 \
Figure 3.11
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In some problem, it may be clear that, although the
exact value of A is unknown, A falls in the interval
(A Z ,A 3) and thus a3 is best. If A is close to AZ it may not
be clear whether A is greater than or less than A Z' and thus
whether a Z or a 3 should be chosen. But in this case, a2
and a 3 are almost at a standoff, so it may not be necessary
to worry too much about which one is chosen and certainly
a 1 ,a4 ,and as can be eliminated from consideration.
3.4.4 Constant Substitution Rates with a Transformed Variable
Suppose that the marginal rate of substitution A
at (x 1 'Yl) depends on Yl but not on xl' That is, suppose
that the amount the decision maker is willing to pay in
X units for additional Y units depends on the level of Y
but not on the level of X. ｾｶ･ｮ if this supposition does
not hold exactly, it may hold approximately for x-values
in a given range of concern and a convenient "lie" may not
be inappropriate.) Four typical substitution rates for
this case are illustrated in Figure 3.1Z.
An example of the kind of composite value function
that produces this pattern of local substitution rates is
v(x,y) = x + vy(Y) , (3 .1 1 )
where we use the symbol v y(') to indicate a function of
single variable y.
A major question is the following. If a decision maker
feels that substitution rates depend on y but not on x, how
yy2
I I
I I
----Ja----J c--
I I
- --ｾ ｢ Ｍ --- - ｾｾｾｾｌＭＭ
I 1
I I
I I
x.J.. Xz
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can this qualitative requirement help in the assessment
of an appropriate v function? We now show in this case
that v may be expressed as in (3.11).
If you are at (xl ,y1), how much should you be willing
to pay in X-units to increase Y from Yl to YZ? To answer
this question, let the marginal rate of substitution (x,y)
be denoted by A(Y), which shows the dependence of A on Y
but not on x. As a first order approximation, for a small
ｾ increment in Y, you should be just willing to spend A(y).
ｾ in X-units. Hence to go from Yl to YZ you should be just
willing to pay in X units the amount
fYz A(Y) dy
Yl
Let Yo be the minimum value of Y that is of concern
in our problem. Define the function
y'
vy(y') = J A(y) dy .
Yo
(3.1Z)
The function v y can be thought of as the global substitution
function between Y and X. In terms of the vy function, the
decision maker is indifferent between
This is to say that an jncrease from Yl to Yz is worth
vy(YZ) - v Y(Yl) in X units.
We have just informally argued an important result.
Theorem 3.1. The marginal rate of substitution between X
and Y depends on y and not on x if and only if there is
a value function v of the form
145
v(x,y) = x + vy(y) , (3.13)
where vy is a value function over attribute Y.
Pruzan and Jackson (1963) offer a slightly different
presentation of this same result.
Assessment of vy : The measurement problem associated with
(3.13) boils down to an appropriate assessment of Vy. It is
usually difficult for subjects to give meaningful quanti-
tative responses for small changes in attribute levels.
Thus, in most circumstances, the analyst should not assess
vy by first assessing A(y) and then using (3.1Z). Rather
he should get at v y another way, and if he then wants to
find X(y), he can invert (3.1Z) to calculate
dA(y) = dy v y ( y) . (3.14)
Onc way to obtain v y is as follows: Arbitrarily set
vY(Yo) = O. With this choice of origin we can now interpret
vy(y) as the amount (in X units) the decision maker is just-
willing-to-pay to go from y to y. Thus the analyst can, in
o
principle, obtain direct assessments of Vy at selected
points Y1 ,yZ'" and "fair in" a curve. The analyst might
be well-advised, however, first to attempt to learn more
about the qualitative structure of Vy before getting in-
volved in quantitative details. For example, it will
often be the case that the decision maker would be willing
to pay less and less for a positive, fixed change of 6 units
14to
in Y as the value of y increases. In other words he might
feel that
Vy(Y+ll) - v¥(y) < vy(y) - vy(y-ll) all y,ll > 0; (3.15)
it is worth less to go from y to y + II than from y -ll to
y, regardless of the value of y orll (positive). A qualita-
tive determination of the appropriateness of (3.15) implies
that vy is strictly concave--i.e., it exhibits, in the
vernacular of classical economics--a decreasing marginal
evaluation. (Notice that we shun the expression decreasing marginal
"utility" because we choose to use the term "utility" in
a more precise fashion. See Section 4.4.) If the analyst
learns that an appropriate shape for vy is con-
cave, as is shown in Figure 3.13, then he can draw vy
reasonably accurately if he ascertains numerical values
for just a few points.
In order not to leave the impression that vy is
necessarily concave, let us consider another common type
of qualitative structure for vy • Imagine that the decision
maker feels that there is some small interval about a
level Y1' say, where things go "critical." Going from
Y1 - II to Y1 + II might be much more important than going
from y1 + II to y 1 + 3 II or going from y1 - 3 II to y 1 - II
By qualitative probing the analyst might ascertain that
this decision maker's vy curve is shaped somewhat like
that depicted in Figure 3.14.
Vy(Y)
Y1
Figure 3.13
Y
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Change of scale for linearization. If the marginal rate
of substitution depends on y but not on x, then the in-
difference curves will be horizontal translates of each
other. One indifference curve can generate the other just
by sliding it horizontally as shown in Figure 3.15A. The
indifference curves can be "straightened out" by change
of the Y-variable to a z-variahle by means of the
function vy . Thus, if we define
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(3.16)
then the point (x,y) in Fig. 3.15A becomes (x,z) in
Fig. 3.15B where z and yare related by (3.16). The in-
difference curve C in Fig. 3.15A gets transformed into the
straight line L with slope -1 in Figure 3.158.
In the transformed coordinates x and z, the indiffe-
rence curves are parallel straight lines. There is not
a constant substitution rate between X and Y but there is
a constant substitution rate (of 1) between X and Z where
z = vy(y). In the (x,z) evaluation space an appropriate
value function is
v (x, z) = x + z . (3.17)
3.4.5 The Corresponding Tradeoffs Condition: An Additive
Value Function
In general the marginal rate of substitution at
(x 1 'Yl) depends on the level of xl and on the level of Yl'
It may be, however, that we can transform the x-scale into
y(A)
x
Figure 3.15
z
(B)
x
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a ｷｾｳ｣｡ｬ･ and the Y-scale into a z-scale such that the
substitution rate at (w 1 ,zl) would not depend on the
level of w1 or zl' Then we would have the constant sub-
stitution rate case discussed in subsection 3.4.3.
An Additive Value Function. Consider four points A:(x 1 ,
Y1), B: (xl ,yZ)' C:(x Z'Yl)' and D:(xZ'YZ) as shown in
Fig. 3. 16 . Suppose the following holds:
1. At (x 1 'Yl) an increase of h in y is worth a payment of a in X·-- ,
Z. At (xl ,YZ) an increase of c in y is worth a payment of a in X·
-
,
3. At (x Z'Yl) an increase of b in y is worth a payment of d in X.
The question is: at (xZ'YZ) an increase of c in Y is worth
what payment in X? If the answer is that it is worth a payment
of d in X--that is, in Figure 3.16 the question mark (?) is
answered "d", and if this holds regardless of the values
of xl ,x Z'Yl 'Yz,a,b,c, and d, then we will say that the
Corresponding ｔ ｲ ｡ ､ ･ ｯ ｦ ｾ ｟ ｃ ｾ Ｎ Ａ Ｑ ､ ｩ ｴ ｩ ｾ ｮ is satisfied. This test
provides us with necessary and sufficient conditions for
an important result. But first let us define the concept of
additivity which will simplify the statement of the next result.
Definition: A preference structure is additive if there
exists some value function reflecting that preference
structure that can be expressed by
y
. I I｟｣ｾｩ ｾ｟ｾｾｂ l?l ,0
i I｟｢ｾ __ ｾ
i1 lA cl Ie
1.------"---------------1"X
ｸｾ
Figure 3.16
If a given preference structure, for example, has
a value function
62(y - 6 1 )
then that preference function would be additive since
then
log v 1 (x,y) = Ct 2 log (x -Ct 1 ) +6 2 log (y -( 1)
and an addi t i ve v can be def ined as log v1 .
Theorem 3.2 A preference structure is additive and there-
fore has an associated value function of the form
(3.18)
where V
x
and vy are value functions if and only if the
Corresponding Tradeoffs Condition is satisfied.
Clearly, given the addi'live value function (3.18), the
Corresponding Tradeoffs Condition is met. However, the con-
verse, proven by Luce and Tukey [1964], is much more diffi-
cult to show. In the next subsection, the conjoint scaling
procedure used to illustrate the assessment of the addi-
tive value function also demonstrates informally the
validity of Theorem 3.2. A formal proof is not given here.
3.4.6 Conjoint Scaling: The Lock-Step Procedure
Suppose that the Corresponding Tradeoffs Condition
IS met implying the existence of Vx and vy . How might we
go about finding them? One procedure we might adopt is
the following.
Let Xo and Yo be the lowest values of X and Y under
consideration.
,so
1. Define
v(xo'Yo) = vx(xo) = vY(Yo) = 0 .
This sets up the origin of measurement.
(3.19)
z. Choose"x 1> Xo and arbitrarily set vX (x 1) = 1.
This sets up the unit of measurement.
3. Ask the decision maker to give a value of Y, say Y1'
such that
where,.., stands for "is indifferent to". Define
4. Ask the decision maker to give a value of X, say xz'
and a value of Y, say yZ' such that
(xZ'Yo)'" (x 1 'Y1)'" (xo'YZ)
Define
5. A necessary condition for this scaling procedure to
work is that
But as is easily seen from Fig. 3.17 this condition
holds if the Corresponding Tradeoffs Condition works.
Compare Fig. 3.17 with Fig. 3.16 and identify points
labelled A,B,C, and D in each. In Fig. 3.17, the
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Corresponding Tradeoffs Condition implies that the
distance in X-units from B to C must be d and hence
points C and E are indifferent.
6. Assuming step 5 is passed, ask the decision maker
to choose (x 3 'Y3) such that
(x 3 'Yo) ... (x Z,Y,) -- (x, 'YZ) -- (xo 'Y3)
Define
v
x
(x 3) = v Y(Y3) = 3 .
7. As in step 5 above, a necessary condition for this
scaling procedure to work is that
(x 3 ,y,),J (x Z,YZ) -- (x, 'Y3)
You might want to check that the above is implied
by the Corresponding Tradeoffs Condition.
8. Continue in the same manner as above.
9. Plot these few points, as in Figure Ｓ Ｎ ｾ Ｌ fair in
smooth V x and v y curves and agree tentatively to
let
v(x,y) = vx(x) + vy(y) .
'0. As a precautionary measure check a few pairs of
points for "reasonableness." To this end let us
define xk and Yk such that
vX(x k) = v y( Yk) :: k .
Now we can check, for example, if
I 5 I
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If not, you might alter the points (x.S,O.S) and
(y.S'O.S) on the Vx and vy curves.
Notice how the Vx and vy functions are intrinsically
interwined. We cannot interpret completely one without
the other.
The above method of generating Vx and vy constitutes
a constructive heuristic (almost) proof showing that the
validity of the Corresponding Tradeoffs Condition implies
the existence of an additive preference structure. The con-
struction was only demonstrated on a grid of points and
one would need to subdivide the intervals (say by a
"halving technique") and sprinkle in some continuity somc-
where to complete the proof. Note also the implicit use
of a "solvability condition" which is not formally stated:
We selected, for example, x ,y , and xl and then glibly
o 0
assumed the existence of Yl that solved the indifference
equation
Similarly we obtained Xz and yZ as solutions to indifference
equations.
15'2..
3.4. 7 An Alternative Conjoint Scaling Procedure:
The Mid-Value Splitting Technioue
Two preliminary definitions will facilitate the pre-
sentation of an alternate procedure for assessing Vx and
Vy. Assume the Corresponding Tradeoffs Condition is valid.
15"3
Definition: The pair (xa'xb) is said to be differentially
value-equivalent to the pair (xc,xd)--where x
a
< xb and
Xc < xd--if whenever one is just willing to go from xb to
X for a given increase of Y, then one would be just willinga
to go from x d to X for the same increase in Y. Or statedc
in another manner, if at any point y' of Y one is willing
to "pay" the same amount of Y for the increase of X from
Xa to xb as for the increase from Xc to xd ' then (xa'xb)
is differentially value-equivalent to (xc'xd).
Definition: For any interval [xa'xb] of X its mid-value
point Xc is such that the pairs (xa'xc ) and (xc'xb ) are
differentially value-equivalent.
Observe two things about this definition. First: in
order to define a mid-point X of [x ,xb] we exploitedc a
the existence of a second attribute Y. Second: if the
decision maker, starting at y' is willing to give up in Y
the same amount to go from xa to Xc as from Xc to x b '
then the same condi t ion (c= c' in Fi9" 3.19) must prevai 1 start ing
at any other level y" J2.!ovidcd the Corresponding Tradeoffs
Condition holds. The argument can be seen readily from
Fig. 3.19. We label points A,B,C,D to help the reader make
the necessary correspondences with Fig. 3.16.
Let the range of X be Xo < x ｾ xl' of Y be Yo ｾ y ｾ Y1'
and assume that the Corresponding Tradeoffs Condition is
passed*'. We now seek a value function v that can be expressed
*In this subsection the subscripts on the symbols x and y
are used differently than they were used in the previous
subsection. We also now assume that v is bounded.
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where
*" (x ) 0 and *" (x 1) (3.21a)a. Vx = Vx =a
b. * (Yo) 0 and * (Y1) (3.21b)vy = vy =
c. A1 > 0, A2 > 0, and A 1 + A 2 = 1 . (3.21c)
The assessment procedure is as follows:
Procedure:
a. Obtain ｶ ｾ as follows: (1) Find the mid-value point
of [x O ,x1J; call it x. 5 and let ｶ ｾ Ｈ ｸ Ｎ Ｕ Ｉ = .5.
(2) Find the mid-value point, x. 75 ' of [x. 5 ,x 1] and
*let vX(x. 75 ) = .75. (3) Find the mid-value point x. 25
of ｛ ｸ ｯ Ｇ ｸ Ｎ ｾ and let ｶ ｾ (x. 25 ) = .25. (4) As a con-
sistency check, ascertain that x. 5 is the ｭ ｩ ､ ｾ ｶ ｡ ｬ ｵ ･
point of [x. 25 ,X. 75 J ; if not, juggle the entries
to get consistency. (5) Fair in the ｶ ｾ curve passing
through points (xk,k) for k = 0,1, .5, .75, .25 and
perhaps additional points obtained by a mid-value
splitting technique.
b. Repeat the same process for vy *".
c. Finding the scale factors A1 and A2 : Choose any two
(x,y) pairs that are indifferent, say (x' ,y') and
(x",y"). We then have
v(x' ,y') == v(x" ,y")
or
* *" *" *A v (x') + A v (y') =A v (x") +A 2V y (y") .1 X 2 Y 1 X
*" *" *" *Since Vx (x'), vy (y'), Vx (x") and Vy(yll) are now
known numbers and since 11. 1 + A 2 = 1 we can solve for A 1
and 11. 2 .
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3.4.8 A Hypothetical Illustrated Assessment
In order to demonstrate the interaction process between
an analyst and decision maker, we present below an imagined
dialogue between an interrogator and a very cooperative
repondent.
In the natural units of attributes X and Y, assume
that X(a) ranges over the interval 7 to 92 and Yea) ranges
over the interval -9 to 8. So, for convenience let us
choose Xo = 0, x 1 = 100, Yo = -10, Y1 = 10, which are
consistent with ,the scaling conventions of (3.21).
Question
1- Suppose Y is at a and X at
20. If Y were decreased by
unit how much more X would
you need to just offset it?
Don't be exact, give a rough
answer.
2. Keep Y at a and let X be at
60. How much would 1 unit of
Hypothesized Answer
I would want to move to
x = 25.
Say x = 70.
Y buy of X at this point? Again,
all I want is a rough answer.
Question
3. All right. At y = 0 it would
cost roughly 1 unit of Y to
push you from x ｾ 20 to 25
and from 60 to 70. Is that
right?
4. O.K. Now think hard about this
one. At another value of Y, say'
at y = 5 would you pay the same
. amount to go from x = 20 to 25
as from 60 to 70?
5. Sure. That's reasonable.
15<0
Hypothesized Answer
Yes, roughly.
What's hard about that? I
already said I would pay
the same for the change
20 to 25 as for the change
60 to 70. But the absolute
amount of Y I would pay
would depend on the level
of Y I'm at.I might pay
unit of Y at y = 0 and
3 units of Y at y = 5. Is
that O.K.?
(A t this po int in the conversation, the interrog ator might
presume that the Corresponding Tradeoffs Condition is satis-
fied even though, strictly speaking, he must be sure that
the same type of response would be forthcoming for more
general values of X and Y.Also at this point of the dialogue
the interrogator might query the respondent about concavity
or convexity of the functions Vx and vy' This is omitted
for the sake of of brevity. The interrogator next proceeds
to describe the mid-value point of any interval.)
Question
6. Suppose you're at y = O. Would
you pay more of Y to change X
from a to 50 or 50 to lOa?
7. More to go from a to 10 or 10
to lOa?
8. Give me a value, x' say, such
that you would give up the
same in Y to go from a to x'
as from x' to 100.
9. In our vernacular then, 20 is
the mid-value point between 0
and 100. We label 20 by x. 5 '
What is your mid-value point ｢ ･ ｾ
tween 20 and lOa?
10. In that case x. 75 = 45. What is
your mid-value point between 0
and 20?
11. Fine. This means that x. 25 = 7.
Does 20 seem like a good mid-
value between 7 and 45?
12. Now let's turn to the Y value.
What is the mid-value point be-
tween -10 and 10.
13. The mid-value between -2 and 10.
\'57
Hypothesized Answer
I would pay more to go
from a to 50.
More to go from 10 to 100.
About x' = 20.
Let's say 45. I'd pay the
same to go from 20 to 45
as 45 to 100.
Oh, about 7.
Sure.
Say, -2.
Say, 3.
Question
14. The mid-value between -10
and -2.
Hypothesized Answer
-7.
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(The analyst now plots these few points as shown in Figure 3.20
and fairs in Vx and vy curves.)
15. I have to trouble you for a
couple of more questions.
Which (x,y) pair would you
pre fer (0, 10) 0 r (1 00 , -1 0) ?
In other words if you were at
(0,-10) would you rather push
Y up to its limit of 10 or X
up to its limit of 100?
(This answer impl ies that A 1 > A 2.)
16. O.K. then. Give me a value x
such that you are indifferent
between (x,-10) and (0,10). In
other words, I'm asking you to
consider the following. Imagine
that you're at (0,-10). How
much would you have to push X
up to be equivalent to Y going
from -10 to 10.
The X ｾ｡ｲ｡ｩ｢ｬ･ is more
critical. I would rather
have (100,-10) than (0,10).
I don't know. I would say
about 60. But I feel awfully
woozy about that.
(The analyst draws the Figure 3.21)
If we assume that (60,-10) is indifferent to (0,10) then we
have
v(60,-10) = v(0,10)
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or
Since
*vx
this implies
(60) ::: .85, *(-10) = v (0) =)( *0, and vy (10) ::: 1,
and since
85 A 1
A =2
A =1
::::I A .
2 '
1 - A l' we have
1/1 . 85 ::::I • 54 and 1. 2 = .46 •
Or perhaps we should say:" A 1 is a woozy .54."
We could think of this procedure as a first approximation
to a suitable value function v. One should now look at a few
pairs that have the same v-values and ask the decision maker
if he would consider these pairs to be roughly indifferent.
In other words we still might want to do a "fine-tuning" of
* *the Vx and vy curves and of the A 1 ' A 2 values. Furthermore,
if the 1. 1 value (remember 1. 2 = 1 - 1. 1) were deemed the "weakest
link of the chain", then it might be appropriate to do sensi-
tivity or breakeven analyses with respect to the A 1 values.
It is important to reflect that it would not be possible to
run such sensitivity studies on A without the preliminary
structuring of the problem. This is often the case: in order
to run sensitivity studies for certain critical variables,
one often has to structure the less sensitive part of the
problem in a precise manner.
3 . 4 .9. Some Words of Advice
If the decision maker has hard-formed judgments, it may
often be the case in practice that a value function cannot
be found of the form
Nonetheless, such a value function may hold approximately.
In other cases, it may be important for ease of analysis
of explanation to concoct a value function of this form.
The decision maker may begin the conjoint-scaling procedure
and see along the way if the checking conditions are plausible.
3.5 THE CASE OF THREE ATTRIBUTES
We can straightforwardly generalize the results we obtained
in Section 3.4 to the case of three evaluating criteria. Instead
of the two evaluators X and Y we will consider the three
evaluators X,Y, and Z. The evaluators map any act ｾ in the
action space into a point [x(a), Yea), ｚ Ｈ ｡ ｾ in the three-
dimensional consequence space.
3.5.1 Conditional Preferences
-
We will begin by considering a conditional preference
structure in the (x,y) space given an assumed value of Z, say z'.
Definition: Consequence (x' ,y') is conditionally preferred to
(x",y") given z' if and only if (x',y',z') is preferred to
(x",y",z').
Conditional indifference is defined analogously and thus we
can talk about conditional indifference curves in the (x,y)
space given z'.
In general, the conditional preference structure for
attributes X and Y given the value of tne Z attribute is z'
will depend on the value z'. For example, the marginal rate of
substitution at some point (x 1 'Y1) might depend on z'. In some
cases, however, the conditional preference structure in the
(x,y) space given z' may not depend on z'. We are thus led
to the following definition:
Defintion: The pair of attributes X and Y is preferentially
independent of Z if the conditional preferences in the (x,y)
space given z' do not depend on z'.
Notice that if the pair {X,Y} is preferentially inde-
pendent of Z, then the substitution rate between X and Y at
the point (x 1 'Y1) given z' does not depend on z', for all
x 1 'Y1' and z'. Thus, the set of indifference curves in X,
Y space does not depend on z'. Furthermore, because of the
preferential independence condition, these curves have the
same preference ordering.
Suppose that the pair {X,Y} is ｰ ｲ ･ ｦ ｾ ･ ｾ ｩ ｡ ｬ ｬ ｹ independent
of Z. In this case we can say that if
(x 1 'Y1 ,z')? (xz,yz,z') ,
where the symbol> is read: "is preferred or indifferent to",
then
I<0 I
, for all z .
The following two examples indicate some cases ｯ ｾ possible
preferential independence.
Suppose the three attributes of a proposed construction
project are
Q = quality,
T = ｴｩｭ･Ｍｴｯｾ｣ｯｭｰｬ･ｴｩｯｮ (negatively oriented) ,
C ｾ cost (negatively oriented) .
In some circumstances the value tradeoffs between quality
and time-to-completion may not depend on the cost of the
project. In this case {Q,T} would be preferentially inde-
pendent of C. Also,we might find that given a quality level
q', the preference structure in the (timc, cost) subspace
does not depend on the particular level of q'; in other
words {T,C} may be preferentially independent of Q. Similarly,
{a,c} may be preferentially independent of T. Whether
or not anyone of these prefercntial independent assertions
would, in fact, be valid depends on the particular setting
of the problem.
A second example concerns a proposed program with attri-
butes
B1 = benefit of type
BZ = benefit of type Z
C ｾ cost (negatively oriented)
If the two types of benefits must be kept in balance, then
{B 1 ,C} would not be preferentially independent of BZ and
{B Z,C} would not be preferentially independent of B1 . How-
ever, it might be plausible to expect that {B1 ,B Z} would be
preferentially independent of C.
3.5. Z Reduction of Dimensionality
How can we exploit, in our measurement ｴ ･ ｣ ｨ ｮ ｩ ｱ ｵ ･ ｾ the
fact that a particular decision maker may feel that {X,Y}
is preferentially independent of Z? In the next section
we shall develop special techniques for the case where
each pair of attributes is preferentially independent of the
remaining attribute. But now let us assume that all we can
justify is that {X,Y} is prefemntially independent of Z.
Here is one way we might proceed.
Consider the conditional preference structure for X and
Y, given some value z'. Observe that the particular value z'
is really immaterial because of our hypothesis of prefer-
ential independence. We shall only consider the special
case where each of the conditional indifference curves in
the (x,y) space intersects some line y = y' for a suitably
chosen y'. We shall refer to y' as a base value for Y. (If
no such y' exists, then the procedure we are about to de-
scribe will have to be modified a bit.) Now the indifference
curve through a typical point (x,y) will intersect the line
y = y' at some value (x' ,y') as shown in Fig. 3.22. Ob-
serve that x' depends on the choice of y' and on the point
(x,y). In order to emphasize this observation we write
x' = T(x,y;y') (3.22)
Also notice that in terms of three space, we have
(x,y,z) - (x' ,y' ,z) , for all z . (3.23)
Hence the preferential comparison of any two triplets
(xl 'Yl ,zl) versus (x 2'Y2,z2)
can be transformed into the preferential comparison of
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Thus our overall measurement task now reduces formally
to a consideration of our conditional preference structure
for {X,Z} given the level of Y is y'. Instead of comparing
in three-space, we now must make the conditional comparison
of
given y'. We have essentially used our hypothesis to re-
duce one three-dimensional comparison to two-dimensional
comparisons.
Some Words about the Transformation T. Let the set of
acts be labelled A:= {a 1 , ... ,a o , •••,a}. Once again assume1 n
that {X,Y} is preferentially independent of Z. If n is small.
then for each a. it may not be outlandish to ask the de-
l
cision maker directly for a value X'(a.) such that he is
1
conditionally indifferent between
[ X(a. ) , Y(a . )] and [ X' (a . ) ,y' ]
1 1 1
Answers to these n questions may be a lot easier to obtain
then to get the full conditional preference structure in
the (x,y)-plane.
If n is very large, this procedure is not operational.
If, however, in the (x,y)-plane we can justify a value
function v of the form
v(x,y) = vx(x) + vy(y)
(see subsection 3.4.5), then x' = T(x,y;y') will be such that
and this may be a feasihle operation to implement.
If n is large and no simple v function can be assumed,
then we're in trouble; but still life is not hopeless. One
might, for example, choose a reasonable number of points
(x 1 ' Y1) , • • ., ( x j , y j ) , . . .,( x rn ' ym)' for say m = 10 0 r so, and
by direct questioning get for each j a value x. when
J
(x'.,y') _ (x.,y.)
J J J
or equivalently where
ｸ ｾ = T(x.,y.;y')
J J J
By carefully investigating the dependence of xj on x j and
y.(remember y' is fixed for all j), one might concoct a
J
reasonable, simple compromise function T that fits the data
reasonably well and can be used to extrapolate an x' value
for any other (x,y) pair. We shall not even begin to enumerate
the myriad of techniques that can be employed for this type
of data-fitting procedure.
Of course, if {X,Y} is preferentially independent of Z,
then instead of bringing each y to a base position y' and
defining x' by (3.22) and (3.23), we could bring x to a
base position x', say, and define y' to be such that
( X Y z) ( x , , y' , z )" - for all z
This reduction would then be followed by a conditional pre-
ference analysis of Y and Z given x = x'. One must be
HDl,
imaginative in choosing the most convenient reduction pro-
cedure. There are still other possibilities. For example,
suppose in a given context it is natural to expect y to be
approximately a multiple h of x. In this case for any (x,y)
pair we might choose a value x' such that
(x , y , z) - (x I , hx ' ,z) for all z
This reduction would then be followed by a conditional pre-
ference analysis of X and Z given the understanding that y
is not free but is always an h-multiple of x.
3.5.3 Mutual Preferential Independence and the Existence
ｾ ｦ an Additive Value Function*
If preferences for (x,y,z) triplets are consistent with
a v-function of the additive form
v(x,y,z) = vX(x) + vy(y) + vZCz)
"then clearly
a.
b.
c.
{X, y}
{ X, Z}
{ Y , Z}
is preferentially independent of Z
is preferentially independent of Y ,
is preferentially independent of X .
What is much more important, however, and quite surprising,
is that the converse is true.
Theorem 3.3. A value function v may be expressed in an addi-
tive form
ｾ ｉ ｴ is assumed throughout this section that all three evaluators
are essentially relevant--i.e., that the preference structure
cannot be full described in terms of only two of the three
evaluators.
1<07
(3.24)
where ｶ ｘ ｾ ｙ Ｇ and Vz are single attribute value functions,
if and only if {X ,Y} is preferentially independent of ｾ Ｌ
{X,Z} is preferentially independent of Y, and {Y,Z ｽｩｾ pre-
ferentially independent*of X.
This result was first proven by Dehreu [1960]. A sightly
more general proof is found in Krantz et al. [1971]. Since
formal proofs do appear in the literature, our discussion
will avoid formalities and attempt merely to illustrate
the plausibility of the result. Before proceeding, we should
define an important term.
Definition. If each pair of attributes is preferentially
independent of its complement, the attributes are pairwise
preferentially independent.
Hence, in shorthand vernecular, Theorem 3.3 says that addi-
tivi ty coimplies pairwise prefereIiltial independence.
Something is truly remarkable about Theorem 3.3. Remember
that in order to get an additive representation for two
evaluators X and Y we had to impose the stringent Corresponding
Tradeoffs Condition. Nothing of that sort is required here.
If all we know is that {X,Y} is preferentially independent
*The condition that each pair of attributes must be pre-
ferentially independent of the remaining attribute will
be weakened in the next subsection. Roughly, any two of
the three preferential independence assumptions will be
shown to imply the third.
of Z, then we cannot say that conditional preferences for
X and Y will satisfy the Corresponding Tradeoffs Condition.
But once we assume pairwise preferential independence, then
the conditional preference strucutre for any pair of evaluators,
given any level of the remaining evaluator, clears the
Corresponding Tradeoffs hurdle. Without giving a formal
proof of these assertions, let's see how these assertions
can be made plausible.
Recall how we constructed the vx and vy functions using
the conjoint scaling technique for two evaluators. (See sub-
section 3.4.6) We first arbitrarily chose values xo,yo,and x 1 .
Then in succession we used the decision maker's preferences
to successively generate Y1'x Z' and yZ. Up to that point no
requirement was made of the Corresponding Tradeoffs Condition.
The first place that this condition had to be invoked was to
justify the indifference of (x 1 ,yZ) and (x Z'Y1). Now how does
bringing in Z and imposing pairwise preferential independence
avoid this condition? Well let's back up a bit and start
the measurement process from the beginning for three evaluators.
1. First choose x ,y ,and z and let
o 0 0
v(xo'yo'zo) = vX(x o) = vy(Yo) = vZ(zo) = 0 .
Z. Next arbitrarily choose x 1 and define Y1 and z1 such
that
(x 1 ,yo,zo)-(xo 'Y1,zo)-(xo ,yo,z1) .
Le,t
3. Notice now, how mutual preferential independence
works to allow us to conclude that
For example, from step 2 we know that (x 1 ,yo) and
(x 'Y1) are conditionally indifferent given z . Hence
o 0
they must be conditionally indifferent given z1' or
(x 1 'yo,z1) .... (x o 'y1'z1) .
Similarly from step 2 we know that (x 1 ,zo) .... (x o ,z1)
given Yo' and hence from the preferential independence
of {X,Z} from Y, it is true also given Y1. But this
implies (x1'y1'zo) ..... (xo'y1'z1) .
4. Next define x 2 'Y2' and z2 such that
(x 2 ,yo 'zo) - (x o 'Y2'zo) ...,(xo 'Yo ,z2)"" (x 1 'Y1 ,zo) .
Now we are ready to discuss the crucial point which we
referred to earlier: How do we know without a Corresponding
Tradeoffs Condition that
The trick is to show that
and
and by transitivity of indifference we're home.We know that
and since {X,Z} is preferentially independent of Y, we can
freely change Yo to y, for the above jndifference relation.
This shows
(xZ,y, ,zo) - (x, ,y, ,z,)
One completes the demonstration by showing in an analogous
manner that
(x, 'YZ ,zo)'" (x, ,y, ,z,)
While the above argument is far from being a proof it
should make the theorem seem much less mysterious-- even
transparent. But, of course, there is a big gap between
heuristic plausibility and a formal proof.
\,0
3.5.4 Weakening the Additivity Assumptions
Our interest in results such as Theorem 3.3 is mainly to
take a set of fundamental assumptions--in this case the pre-
ferential independence assumptions--about a decision maker's
preferences and from these, ascertain a specific convenient
mathematical expression consistent with these preferences. In
any problem, we first try to check for the appropriateness of
the conditions and then assess subjectively the decision
maker's value function. Thus, it is important to reduce, if
possible, the number of conditions implying a particular
functional form for one's preferences.
This subsection discusses the following operationally
useful result.
Theorem 3.4 If
a. { X,Y} is preferentially independent of Z ,
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b. {Y,Z} is preferentially independent of X ,
then
c. {X,Z} is preferentially independent of Y .
A formal proof of Theorem 3.4 is found in Gorman [1968al.
Here, let us try to provide some intuitive insights into
this result.
In Fig. 3.23 let the points A and B have a common
y-coordinate and assume A ..... B. To show that {X,Z} is pre-
ferentially independent of Y, we must show that if we modi-
fy the y-coordinate of A and B (keeping the y-coordinates
equal) then the modified points remain indifferent. First
choose a point C which has an x-coordinate in common with
A, a z-coordinate in common wi th B and such that C ｾ A'" B.
Now since A .... C and {Y,Z} is preferentially independent of
X, it follows that D-E. Also since B- C and {X,Y} is pre-
ferentially independent of Z, it follows that D- F. Hence,
by transitivity, we have E-F. Now we started with A-B
and have shown that if we change the common y-coordinate
by an amount 6 the resulting points F and E are indifferent.
This does not prove our resul t since the distance 6 is chosen
in a special way and is not arbitrary. But now we can re-
peat the process on E and F. And so on. In order to gain
another degree of flexibility we also could have started
the process with a point such as G where G-A ..... B. Thus we
see that if we simultaneously slide the points A and B to
anyone of several specified y-Ievels, the resulting points
•.. ['u r "-<-i lL
1.7 I a..
will remain indifferent. We can repeat the argument using
other points on the indifference curve through A and Band
spread them out in such a way that one obtains additional
points on the indifference curve through points E and F. Now
one might reasonably suspect that with a sprinkling of con-
tinuity and differentiability thrown in, the result we want
should follow. It does.
3.6 THE CASE OF MORE THAN THREE ATTRIBUTES
Let
a into a
X1 , ••• ,X. , ... ,X be n-evaluators that map any act1 n
point [X 1 (a) ," . ,X. (a) , ... ,X (a)] = X(a) in an n-1 n - -
dimensional consequence space. We shall continue to assume
that for any two points x' and ｾ Ｂ in the consequence space
that ･ ｩ ｴ ｨ ･ ｲ ｾ Ｇ ｾ x" or ｾ Ｂ ｾ ｾ Ｇ Ｍ Ｍ ｩ ｦ both hold then we say that
A'-2S." and if [not ｾ Ｌ ｾ ｾ Ｌ Ｌ ｝ holds, we shall say that ｾ Ｂ Ｇ ＾ Ｚ Ａ Ｇ Ｍ ﾭ
and that the preference relation ｾ is transitive.
We shall have occasion in the sequel to examine a point
ｾ by concentrating on a designated suhset of its attributes
as an entity and on the complementary set of attributes as
an entity. For example, if n = 5 then we might want to partition
If we let
and
Y... ::> (x, ,x 3 ,x 4)
z = (x Z ,x S)
then we can think of x as displayed as the pair Ｈ ｙ Ｎ Ｎ Ｎ Ｌ ｾ Ｉ where
y... involves attributes 1,3, and 4 and z involves attributes
Z and S. More generally we shall talk about
FiCj\A.n:!.. 3.2.3. A Gftctph,ca\ ａ ｲ Ｇ Ｚ ｬ ｵ ｗ ｬ ｾ ｉ Ｂ Ｇ ｴ Ｎ te:. ｉ｜｜｜ＮｉＮｳｬｙＢｯＮｩｾ
0. 'Rdo.\ \a'(\sh;p ArY\On5 ＿ｦＧｾＭｴｾｲｾｩＮ Ie.. \
.Lno..Q p ｑＮｴｲ｜､ＮｾＯｉＧ｜Ｈ I(... C'..C'Y'd \t \Ons
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where y represents those components of ｾ on a previously
specified subset of the indices {1 , ... ,nl and ｾ represents
! on the complementary set of indices. Without any loss of
generality we can always permute the indices so that we
can think of y as representing ｾ on the first s indices
and z as representing x on the last n-s indices so that
In a natural manner we shall also extend this convention to
talk about partitioning the attributes into two sets
and
Definition: We shall say that y' is conditionally preferred
or indifferent to X" given
Cy' Ｌｾ , ) ｾ Cr" ＬｾＧＩ .
z'
-
if and only if
Thus, we can talk about the conditional preference
structure amongst attributes ! given that the complementary
attributes are held fixed at z'.
3 • 6 • 1 Preferential Independence
Definition: The set of attributes! will be said to prefer-
entially independent of the complementary set ｾ if and only
if the conditional preference structure in the I space given
Zl does not depend on ｾ Ｇ Ｎ More symbolically, Y is preferentially
independent of ｾ if and only if for some ｾ Ｇ Ｌ
[Cr' Ｌ ｾ Ｇ Ｉ ｾ ｃ ｲ Ｂ Ｌ ｾ Ｇ Ｉ J .. "/- [Cr' Ｌ ｟ ｾ Ｉ ｾ ｃ ｲ Ｂ Ｌ ｾ Ｉ ] ,all z,r' ,y" .
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As an example, there may be several benefit attributes
and several cost attributes, and it may happen (this will
not necessarily be the case!) that the conditional prefe-
rencesamongst various packages of benefit levels may not
depend on the particular costs involved. If the benefit
vector l' is deemed better than the benefit vector l" at
cost ｾ Ｇ Ｌ the same may hold at any other cost, ｾ Ｇ In this
case we would say elliptically that "benefits are pre-
ferentially independent of costs."
If the decision maker feels that the set of attri-
butes Y is preferentially independent of the set of comple-
mentary attributes ｾ Ｇ then he can concentrate his efforts
on structuring his preferences amongst lIs holding z'
fixed, knowing full well that this effort does not have to
be repeated for different levels of ｾ Ｇ In this case it is
meaningful for the decision maker to structure a value
function vy defined on lIs without having to specify a
particular ｾ Ｇ Ｎ In particular vy ' to be a valid value function,
must be such that
(3.25)
If Y is preferentially independent of Z we shall write
l' ｾ ｹ Ｂ to mean (l' Ｌ ｾ Ｇ Ｉ ｾ Ｈ ｬ Ｂ Ｌ ｾ Ｇ Ｉ for all ｾ Ｇ Ｎ Similarly, the
notation y'- y" means (l' Ｌ ｾ Ｇ Ｉ Ｍ Ｈ ｬ Ｂ Ｌ ｾ Ｇ Ｉ Ｇ
If Yis preferentially independent of Z it does not
necessarily follow that Z is preferentially independent
of y. However, the following holds.
Theorem 3.5 If Y is preferentially independent of ｾ Ｇ then
,-, -+
[(y' Ｌ ｾ Ｇ Ｉ >(y' Ｌ ｾ Ｂ Ｉ ] ｾｻＨｹＬｾｉＩ ｾ ＨｹＬｾｉｬＩ｝
for all y_y'.
The result follows from the following string of relations
which follow from the hypotheses and the meaning of pre-
ferential independence:
Ｈ ｹ Ｌ ｾ Ｇ Ｉ ｟ (y' Ｌ ｾ Ｇ Ｉ ｾ (y' Ｌ ｾ Ｂ Ｉ ..... ＨｬＮＬｾＢＩ
The above theorem says that if r is preferentially
independent of ｾ Ｇ then the conditional preference structure
in the ｾ Ｍ ｳ ｰ ｡ ｣ ･ given y depends on y only through its in-
difference surface. If v is an appropriate value function
of argument Ｈ ｹ Ｌ ｾ Ｉ then the above theorem also says that:
if r is preferentially independent of ｾ Ｌ then ｶ Ｈ ｬ Ｌ ｾ Ｉ de-
pends on y via its value function vy(y).
If r is preferentially independent of Z and if also
Z is preferentially independent of r, then the preference
structures in the y and z spaces can be considered sepa-
rately. In particular, in this case, if v, vy,and Vz are
appropriate value functions of arguments Ｈ ｬ Ｌ ｾ Ｉ Ｌ y, and
z respectively, then we have
v ＨｹＬｾＩ = f [vy (y) ,v Z ＨｾＩ ]
Operationally, this means that the decision maker can
structure his preferences for liS, without worrying about ｾ Ｇ ｳ Ｌ
and for ｾ ｉ ｓ Ｌ without worrying about y's. Then he must worry ab0ut
tradeoffs between vy(y) and v Z(!) ,which is a problem we
analyzed earlier in Section 3.4 where we considered the
case of two evaluators. We are thus led to the following
question: If vy(l) = v; and ｶ ｺ Ｈ ｾ Ｉ = v;, how much are you
(the decision maker) willing to give up in vy-units to in-
crease V
z
from v; to vi? The trouble with this question is
that the value functions vy and Vz are not necessarily in-
tuitively meaningful--they are only meaningful up to mo-
notone transformations. Well, what can be done? One
suggestion is the following: Suppose that
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and
y - { Xl' X2 ' ••• ,Xs }
Z :: { Xs + 1 ,X s + 2 ' • • • ,Xn }
Ch t · 1 1 () 0 cOd . doose ypIca va ues x 2 ' ... ,x ,x 2' ... 'x an conSI ers s+ n
the conditional preference structure in the (x l ,x s +l )-space
given ｸ ｾ Ｌ ... Ｌ ｸ ｾ Ｌ ｸ ｾ Ｋ Ｒ Ｇ ... Ｇ ｸ ｾ Ｎ This is a "thinkable" task.
If, for example, in this subspace
(x, Ｌ ｸ ｾ Ｋ Ｑ Ｉ .- (x;' Ｌ ｸ ｾ Ｋ ｬ Ｉ
. 0 0 0 g h h' Id h· hgIven x2' ••• ｾ ｘ Ｕ Ｂ Ｉ Ｈ ｓ Ｋ ｚ Ｌ ••• ,xn' t en t IS wou mean t at In t e
Vy,V
z
space we would have
( ( ' 0 0) (' 0 0)vy xl ,x 2 '··· ,xs ,vz x s +l ,xs +2 '··· ,xn ) ｾ
Roughly, we can help structure indifference curves in the
vy'v Z space by examining tradeoffs between a pair of com-
ponents, one from the r set and one from the Z set, holding
all other components fixed.
3.6.2 Mutual Preferential Independence and the Existence
of an Additive Value Function
Definition: The attributes Xl' ... ,X
n
will be said to be
mutually preferentially independent if every subset! of
these attributes is preferentially independent of its
complementary set of evaluators.
Recall from the previous section concerning the three
attribute case that mutual preferential independence implied
the existence of an additive value function*. The result is
also valid for cases with more than three attributes.The
general result is
Theorem 3.6 Give attributes Xl' ... ,Xn,n > 3, an additive
value function
17("
n
• L.: 1 v. (x. )1= 1 1 (3.26)
where v. is a value function over X., exists if and only
1 1
if the attributes are mutually preferentially independent.
Formal proofs of this theorem are found in Debreu
[1960), Fishburn (1970J, and Krantz et al. [1971]. Pruzan
and Jackson [1963] also state this result. Since we have
already informally argued through the three attribute
case, we will avoid repeating the essential arguments here.
Furthermore, the argument for n > 3 can be made to de-
pend on the argument for n ｾ 3 by partitioning Xl ' ... 'X n
into three vector variables and using the additivity re-
suIts for the three dimensional case.
In the next section, we assess in some detail a four
'*In the next subsection, it is shown that, for three or more
attributes, pairwise preferential independence is equivalent
to mutual preferential independence.
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attribute value function in a hypothetical setting. This
will again bring out some of the flavor of the relationship
between preferential independence conditions and additive
value functions.
3.6.3 Weakening the Additivity ａ ｳ ｳ ｵ ｾ ｰ ｴ ｩ ｯ ｮ ｳ
Theorem 3.6 is very useful in the sense that the addi-
tive value function is about as simple as one can find.
However, as it is now written, the number of preferential
independence conditions which we would need to verify get
astronomically large as n gets even modestly large--say 10.
Clearly, for a general n, there are n(n-l)/2 pairs of attri-
butes which must be preferentially independent of their
respective complements, and this says nothing about the
triples of attributes, etc. Fortunately, results in Leontief
[1947a,1947b] and in Gorman [1968a,1968b] save us much
potential work. Let US first state this result and then
discuss its use.
Theorem 3.7 Let Y and Z be subsets of the attribute
set S ={X1 ,X 2 , ... ,Xn } such that Y -and Z overlap, but neither
is contained in the other, and such that the union YUZ is
not identical to S. If Y and Z are each preferentially in-
dependent of their respective complements, then the following
sets of attributes:
(i) YUZ,
(ii) YnZ,
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(iii) Y - Z and Z - Y,
(iv) (Y - Z) U (Z - Y),
a re each preferent ia lly independent of the i r respec tive complemll.ni:'S.
The reader can consult Gorman's ｛ ｬ Ｙ Ｖ Ｘ ｾ paper for a formal
*proof of this result ..
To gain some insight into the meaning of Theorem 3.7,
let us assume that S :: { Xl ,Xz ,X3 ,X4} , Y :: { Xl ,Xz} , and
Z :: { X
z
,X3 }. The theorem says that if { Xl ,Xz} and { Xz ,X3 }
are preferen tiall y independent of { X3 ,X4} and { Xl ,X4}
respectively, then
(i) the union YU Z, namely { Xl ,X z ,X 3 } , is preferentially
independent of X4 ,
(ii) the intersection Yn Z, which is Xz' is preferentially
independent of its complement { Xl ,X3 ,X4} ,
(iii) Xl as Y-Z and X3 as Z-Y arc preferentially inJe-
pendent of their respective complements, and
(iv) {X l ,X3} is preferentially independent of {X Z,X4}.
The two most important parts of Theorem 3.7--at least
from an application's viewpoint--are (i) and (iv). These
two results permit us to reduce the number of requisite pre-
*"Given that each of Yl ,Y Z' ... 'Ym is a subset of S= {Xl ,X Z' ..
.. ,X } and is preferentially independent of its complement,
n
one can repeatedly use Theorem 3.7 to obtain all the implied
preferential independence conditions and hence, to simplify
the resulting value function as much as possible. A general result
in this spirit is proven in Section 6.9 using the 'utility
independence' analog to Theorem 3.7.
ferential independence conditions necessary to invoke the
additive value function of Theorem 3.6 to n-l, where n is
the number of attributes.
The informal proof of Theorem 3.4 in subsection 3.5.4
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lends some insight into why part (iv) of Theorem 3.7 is true.
However, let us try to offer the concept of why part (i)
is valid.
The essence of the proof can be shown from considering
the special case where we let
x = (xl' x 2 ' x3 ' ｾＮＴ )
and consider the case where
If both Y and Z are preferentialJy independent of their com-
plementary sets, we shall now show that
YU Z = {Xl' X2 ' X3 }
is also preferentially independent of its complementary set.
We must show
all ｾ Ｔ Ｎ (3.27)
That is if (x 1,x Z,x3) ｾＨｸ［ＧＬｸＲＬｸＳＩ given ｾ ｾ Ｌ it is also true
given any ｾ Ｔ Ｇ Let ｸ ｾ Ｇ be such that
(x"' x") (x' x')l' 2"" l' 2 (3.28)
and note that this assertion makes sense since { Xl ,X Z} is
*'preferentially independent of its complementary set .
ifHere we assume that ｸ ｾ and ｸ ｾ were chosen such that a ｸｾＧ
satisfying (3.28) exists. The solvability and continuity
assumed throughout this chapter (see Section 3.1) imply this
existence.
From the hypothesis of (3.27) and (3.28) we have
(3.29)
But since {X 1 ,X3} is preferentially independent of {X 2 '!4} ,
(3.29) implies, for any ｾ Ｔ Ｇ that
(3.30)
By (3.28) together with the hypothesis that {X 1 ,X 2} is pre-
ferentially independent of its complement, we find
( 'x' x' x) ("' II r )xl' 2' 3' -4 - xl' x 2 ' x 3 ＧｾＴ (3.31)
From (3.31), (3.30), and transitivity we get the right hand
side of (3.27). This proves our assertion. As a consequence
of this result, we have the important
Corollary. If every pair of attdbutes is preferentially
independent of its complementary set, then the attributes
are mutually preferentially independent.
The argument generalizes and can be formalized by
mathematical induction. ｾ ｦ it's true for any subset of k
attributes (k ｾ 2) it can be shown to be true for k+l
evaluators. The details are omitted.
3.6.4 Selecting Preferentially-Independent Sets of
Attributes
Note that as a result of Theorem 3.7, there are numerous
possible ｣ ｯ ｾ ｢ ｩ ｮ ｡ ｴ ｩ ｯ ｮ ｳ of preferentially independent sets of
attributes which imply mutual preferential independence anlong
the members of { Xl ,X 2 ,· .. ,Xn } . A simple combination is that
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{X i ,X i + 1 } be preferentially independent of its complement
for i = 1 ,Z, ... ,n-1.
In order to see how this works, let n = 5 and assume
that each of the sets
has the preferential independence (P.I.) property--that is,
each is preferentially independent of its complement. We then
conclude from Theorem 3.7 part (iv) that
also have the P.I. property. Repeating, we next get that
{X1 ,X4 } and {XZ,XS}
have the P.I. property. Finally, we see that {Xl ,X S} also
has the P.I. property. Thus we see that each pair has the
P.I. property and we know from the previous corollary that
therefore every triplet must have the P.I. property. And
so on.
Another set of n-l assumptions which implies mutual
preferential independence among {Xl ,X Z, ... ,Xn } is that the
pairs {Xl ,Xi} , i = Z,3, ... ,n, are each preferentially in-
dependent of its complement. The reasoning is similar to
that above.
ａ ｾ a more involved example, suppose there are five
attributes { Xl ,X Z, ... ,XS} and that the following sets are
preferentially independent of their complements:
(a) {X1 ,XZ} ,
(b) {XZ ,X3 } ,
(c) {X1 'X Z 'X 3 'X4 } , and
(d) {X Z'X3 'X 4 'XS} .
It is a simple matter to show that (a) to (d) imply mutual
preferential independence. Together (a) and (b) imply
{X1 'X Z 'X3 } is preferentially independent of {X4 ,XS} ,
which when combined with (d) implies by part (iii) of
Theorem 3.7 that {X4 ,XS} is preferentially independent of
its complement. By the same reasoning, (a) and (d) imply
{X3 ,X4 ,XS} is preferentially independent of {X1 ,X Z} , which
together with (c) implies that {X3 'X4} is prefcrcntially
independent of {X1 ,Xz,X S} . Hence we have that {X i 'X i +1} ,
i = 1 ,Z,3,4, are preferentially independent of their
respective complements from which mutual prefercntial inde-
pendence among the X. directly follows.
1
Clearly, in practicc, it would not be reasonable to
check directly for all possible preferential independence
conditions. A little judgment on which are most likely to
yield useful results could facilitate the assessment process
considerably. Ting [1971] suggests a few guidelines which
may help in this. An important one is to look for natural
attribute groups. For instance, in an example dcaling with
siting of a nuclear power plant, the first level of dis-
aggregation in the objectives hierarchy may specify the
overall objective in terms of consideration for monetary
costs, environmental impact, human health, and political
factors. Each of these may be further specified and involves
multiple attributes. However, it may be natural at this
first level to have the decision maker ascertain that his
preferences for attributes in various combinations of these
groups do not depend on the other groups levels. Perhaps at
this point, one could conclude that an additive value function
existed defined over these four major attribute groups giving
us something like
v(m,e,h,p) = vM(m) + vE(e) + vH(h) + vp(p) ,
where M,E,H, and P represent monetary, environmental, health,
and political considerations respectively. One could then try
to utilize the preferential independence concept on the attri-
butes within each grouping and hopefully further specify
the decision maker's value structure.
In Section 3.8, we discuss the technique of pricing-out
nonmonetary variables. For certain problems, this approach,
which involves separately considering each nonmonetary attri-
bute paired with a monetary attribute, may be reasonably
natural for identifying preferential independence conditions.
More details on the actual verification procedures for pre-
ferential ｩ ｮ ､ ･ ｾ ･ ｮ ､ ･ ｮ ｣ ･ are given in the assessment Section
6.6 for multiattribute utility functions.
3.6.5 Value Functions With Partial Additivity
Before concluding this section, we should indicate that
even when mutual preferential independence does not hold,
the existence of any preferential independence properties
that do hold may help considerably in structuring the value
function.
Theorem 3.8 Given {Xl 'X2 'X3 'X4} , if {Xl ,X2 } and
{X Z,X3} are preferentially independent of their respective
complements, a value function v exists of the form
1'84
(3.3Z)
where y ｾ v 1 (x 1) + vZ(x Z) + v 3 (x 3) and f is increasing in
its first variable.
A proof of this result is in Gorman [1968a].
Note that v 1 (x 1) + vZ(x Z) + v 3 (x 3) can be thought of
as a conditional additive value function over attributes
X1 ,X Z' and X3 given that X4 is fixed at some convenient
level. This level does not matter since by the conditions
of Theorem 3.8, it follows from Theorem 3.7 that {X 1 ,X Z,X3}
is preferentially independent of X4 .
Since the X. in Theorem 3.8 can designate vector attri-
1
butes, the theorem represents a general attribute case. It
is important to realize that this result can be used several
times--perhaps corresponding to different levels in the ob-
jectives hierarchy--in structuring the same value function.
3.6.6 Using the Additive Value Function
As illustrated in earlier two attribute assessments of
the additive value function, rather than using the form
n
v(x 1 ,x Z""'x) = L: v·ex.) ("3.33)n . 1 1 11=
directly, when v is bounded, it may be more convenient to
scale v and each of the single attribute value functions
from zero to one. Thus, we will have the additive value
function of the form
n
I
i=l
;\ . v. (x.)
1 1 ] (3.34)
ｷ ｨ ･ ｲ ｾ v and v., i=l ,Z, ... ,n, in (3.34) are scaled from
1
zero to one and
n
I ;\. ::0 1 ,
i=l 1
;\. > 0
1
(3.35)
Equations (3.33) anJ (3.34) are hath additive value functions
and given consistent scaling, they are equivalent. The assess-
ment of (3.34) is illustrated in the next section.
3.7 ASSESSMENT OF AN ADDITIVE VALUE FUNCTION:
AN ABSTRACT HYPOTHETICAL EXAMPLE*
In this section we shall illustrate by means of an
example how a decision maker might assess an additive value
function over four attributes.
Suppose that you, the decisjon maker, have to choose
amongst 75 (say) alternative acts and that each act can be
evaluated in terms of four attrihutes. Table 3.1 summarizes
these evaluations. For example, act A1 has a score of 7.5
on attribute Xl' a score of 344 on attribute XZ' a score
*In Section 7.Z, the work of James Roche in utilizing the
procedures illustrated here for evaluating alternative in-
structional programs in a public school system is discussed.
of 0.47 on X3 , and 12.15 on X4 . For act Ai' the recorded
scores are xli,x2i,x3i' and x 4i on attributes Xl to X4
respectively. Let us assume that attributes X1 ,X 2 , and X3
are positively oriented in the sense that you would pre-
fer higher scores on each of these attributes, but assume
that attribute X4 is negatively oriented in the sense that
./
'*you would prefer lower scores .
Your problem is: Given performance evaluation of these
75 acts on these four attributes, which act should you single
out as being best for you? That is, how can you systemati-
cally probe your feelings about these attributes so that you
could force yourself to articulate your underlying preference
structure?
For the time being observe, however, that A75 cannot
be a serious contender for "best" since A1 is better than
A75 on each of the four ｡ ｴ ｴ ｲ ｩ ｢ ｵ ｴ ･ ｳ Ｍ Ｍ ｲ ･ ｭ ･ ｭ ｢ ｾ ｲ that for the
4th attribute 12.15 is better than 12.92. In technical
jargon A75 is dominated hy A1 .
*This assertion implicitly assumes that each attribute,
taken individually is preferentially independent of its
complement.
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TABLE 3.1
Performance Measures of Alternative Acts
on Pour Attributes
Attributes
Act Xl (--") X2 C----"') X3 (.-/') ｘ Ｔ Ｈ ｾ Ｉ
/A1 7 . 5 344 .47 12. 15A2 3.7 268 .79 12.20
1Note that
act A1
dominates
act /\.75
A. Xli x 2 . x3i X4i1 1
Lowest (rounded)
Highest (rounded)
6.7
2.0
9--.0
250
200
400
.24
. 15
.90
12.92
12.00
13.50
Performance Profile of A1 ; (7.5,344, .47,12.15)
On the bottom of Table 3.1 note that the 75 entries under
attribute Xl lie within the interval from 2.0 to 9.0. The
entries under ｡ ｴ ｴ ｲ ｩ ｢ ｵ ｾ ･ X2 lie in the interval 200 to 400.
Similarly the ranges for attributes X3 and X4 are recorded .
... 10 rOLjQ...
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Observe, once again that for attribute X4 no act is better
than 12.00 or worse than 13.50.
The four numbers xli,x2i,x3i' and x 4i associated with
act A. can be thought of as the profile of A. and the pro-
1 1
files of acts A1 and A2 are shown in Fig. 3.24.
3 • 7 • 1 Legitimacy of the Additive Value Function
Now let us suppose that you, the decision maker, feel
that any pair of attributes is preferentially independent
of the others. Thus for example, suppose that the tradeoffs
for attributes X2 and X3 say, keeping ｴ ｨ ｾ levels of attri-
butes Xl and X4 fixed, do not depend on the particular values
of these fixed levels. And so on for each pair of attributes.
Now as we indicated in Section 3.6, your preferences, if
they are to be fully articulated in a manner consistent
with the above preferential independence assumptions, must
be in a form that can be characterized as consistent with
a value function v of the fonn
4
vCx 1 ,x 2 ,x 3 ,x 4) = . L Aj v J' (x].)J=l
where
a. v.Cworst x.) = 0
J J
v.Chest x.) = 1, j = 1, ... ,4;
J J
b.O<A.<l
J
4
c. LA. = 1
j=l J
j = 1, ... ,4;
We can think of the function v. defined over the attri-
J
bute score x j as the j-th compone Il..! value function and the
-" 10 rOCj'"
18b
'6,b.
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Figure 3.24-
Aj as the weight associated with attribute Xj' For our
illustrative example, we note from Table 3.1 that the worst
xl score is 2.0 and the best is 9.0. It will turn out later
that the determination of the A.-weights are intimately re-
J
lated to the ranges of the scales.
The problem you now face is to determine appropriate v.
J
functions and A. weights. By so doing you will have articu-
J
lated your underlying preference structure for ｾ Ｍ ｰ ｲ ｯ ｦ ｩ ｬ ･ ｳ Ｎ
3. 7 • Z Assessment of Component Value Functions.
One procedure for determining the v 1 ,v 2 ,v3 .and v 4 functions
IS described and illustrated in subsection 3.4.7. Let us merely
illustrate in sketchy form how one might assess v 1 .
First we normalize v 1 by letting v 1 (2.0) = 0 and
v 1 (9.0) = 1. We then seek the subjective mid-point, let us
call it m. S say, of the interval Z.O to 9.0. That is we want
to find the value m. S for which v 1(m. S) = .5. We ask for
that knife-edge point where the intervals (Z.O,m. S) and
(m. S ,9.0) are differentially value equivalent. The value m. S
is such that if
(Z.O,b,c,d) '" (m.s,b' ,c' ,d')
then
(m.S,b,c,d)""" (9.0,b' ,c' ,d')
If one gives up a certain amount of attributes XZ,X3 and X4--
i.e. by going from (b,c,d) to (b' ,c' ,d')--to go from 2.0
to ｭ Ｎ ｓ ｾ then one should be willing to give up exactly the
same amount to go from m. S to 9.0.
ＱｾＹ
Well let's say the mid-value of 2.0 to 9.0 is 4.0.
we then go through the same procedure for determininq
the mid-point of the interval 2.0 to 4.0. Let's say it is
2.8 so that v 1 (2.8) = .25. Similarly let the mid-point of
the range 4.0 to 9.0 be 5.7 so that v 1 (5.7) = .75. These
points can now be plotted as shown in Fig. 3.25 and a curve
v 1 can be faired through these five points. Or alternatively
more mid-points could be determined hefore fairing in the
curve. It depends on how much accuracy is needed. We re-
iterate the point we have made several times earlier: it
may be desirable to run consistency checks (e.g. finding
the mid-point of 2.8 to 5.7) and to police the inconsistencies
so that a coherent set of compatible responses is obtained.
In addition, one may wish initially, before specific numbers
are chosen, to check in a qualitative way whether v 1 is
concave, convex, or is perhaps more complicated in shape.
3.7.3 Assessment of Scaling Constants.
Some special notation shoulJ help our discussion of the
AJ·'S. For the j-th attribute let w. represent the worst valueJ -
for positively oriented scalesand b. the best value. Then
J
we would have w. < x. < b .. Let I be the complete set of
J - J J
attribute indices; In our example I = {1 ,2,3,4}. Let T be a
subset of I and T be the complementary set to T, or f = I - T.
Let xT be that profile where all
equal to b. for JET and equal to
J
example if T = {2,3} , then
the component x.'s are
J
w. for JET. Thus, for
J
1.00
.75
.50
.25
.00
2.0 2.8 4.0 5.7
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Since v.(w.) 0 and v.(b.) = 1
J J J J
T
v(?S. ) = L A.
JET J
, we know that
so when T = {2,3}
Also define
A (T) -
T
, then v Ｈｾ｟ ) =A 2 + A 3
A .
J
Notice that when T consists of the single element set {j}
we have
A. = A({j} )
J
Our task is to suggest techniques for the determination
of the A.'s. One suggestion is to start off by ranking the
. J {1} {4}
prOflles! , ... ,! . Suppose, for example, that you
feel that
This would imply that for you
A > A > A
4
> A213
Next, you could try to get more refined inequalities by
comparing say
{ 2}If in this paired comparison x were preferred then we
could infer that A2 > .5 . T SObserve that when you are asked to compare x to x
you are essentially asked the following question: "Suppose
the !-profile were at the worst case, (w 1 ,wZ,w3 ,w4), and you
had the option of improving some of the w.'s from the worst
J
to the best position. Would you rather improve the levels
of the attributes in the subset T or subset S?"
This method of analysis usually only provides inequal-
ities for the A. 'so In some special cases precise numerical
J
values can be deduced if there are indifferences. For example,
if x{T} and xiI} are indifferent, then A(T) = .5. But this
is not the usual case.
Let us continue with the special case where
Now compare the two profiles,
｡ ｴ ｾ ｭ ｡ ｮ ｩ ｰ ｵ ｬ ｡ ｴ ･ the level of x z until indifference is reached.
Suppose this occurs at Xz = 350; that is, suppose
( Z• 0 , 3 50 , • 15 , 13 . 50) - (9. 0 , ZOO, • 1 5 , 13 . 50) •
Then we have
v(2.0,350,.15,13.50) = v(9.0,200,.15 , 13.50)
or
and since it is assumed the component Vz function has al-
ready been asselsed,we can find v Z(350). Suppose it is
v Z(350) :: .6
so that
In a similar fashion we can determine the proportional
relationships between A 4 and A Z' and between A 3 and A Z·
Assume in particular that
( Z •a, z40, • 1 5 , 1 3 . 50) -- (Z •a, ZOO, • 1 5 , 1 2 • 00)
and
v (240) = .4
2
so that
(3.37)
also assume that
( Z . a , 21 a , .1 5 , 1 3 . 50) '" (2. a, 200 , • 9a ,1 3 • 50)
and
v 2 (Z10) = .1
so that
(3.38)
From ･ｱｵ｡ｴｩｯｮｾ (3.36), (3.37), (3.38) and
we conclude that
A1 = .286 AZ = .476 A =. 048 ,3
We repeat, as we have so often in the past, that it
may be desirable to ask additional questions thereby getting
an over determinate system of equations, fully expecting that
the set of responses would in practice be inconsistent. These
inconsistencies can be used by the analyst to "force" the
decision maker to rethink through his preferences. Hope-
fully, reasons for the original inconsistencies can be
found, and from this, a consistent set of preferences
established.
3. 7.4 Additional Comments on the ｾ Ｍ ｆ ｵ ｮ ｣ ｴ ｩ ｯ ｮ Ｎ
The ｾ Ｍ ｦ ｵ ｮ ｣ ｴ ｩ ｯ ｮ defined on subsets of I satisfies the
usual rules of a probability measure:
a. ｾ Ｈ ｔ Ｉ > 0 , for Tel;
b. ｾ Ｈ ｉ Ｉ =
c. if Sand T are disjoint,
. ｾＨｓｕｔＩ = ｾ (s) + ｾ (T)
Thus finding the ｾ Ｍ ｦ ｵ ｮ ｣ ｴ ｩ ｯ ｮ is not unrelated to the problem
of finding suitable probability assignments over a finite
sample space. Very often in assigning the weighting measure
ｾ Ｌ just like in assigning a probability measure, it is not
natural to initially assign weights at the atomic level--
i.e., to assign numbers for ｾ Ｑ Ｇ ｾ Ｒ Ｂ Ｂ . Rather it may be
more appropriate to make initial assignments to subsets
(e.g. to assign values to ｾ Ｈ ｔ Ｉ for special subsets) and to
make conditional assignments. Let us illustrate. Suppose,
for example, we consiJer a ten-attribute case with the
hierarchical structure shown in Figure 3.26. In this case
let
I = {1,2, ... ,10}
A = {1}, B ｾ {l,3,4} C = {S,6} D = {7,8,9,10},
(5) (6)
"---v--J
C
'"....._---
I , 1
(1) (2) (3) (II)
'- ""'v"
../
ｾＮ B _/V"
\... E
1930...
.
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E = AU B F = CUD
In such a hierarchical example, it might be natural to
compare
A(E) vs A(F)
A(A) vs A(B)
A(C) vs A(D)
Taking our cue from probability theory, it might also
be appropriate to define conditional weighting functions,
such as A(BIE) which could be defined as
for BeEA(BIE) = A (B)
A(E)
where A(UIE) gIves the "weighting importance" of attribute
set B within the subset ｾ Ｌ or the conditional weighting of
B within E.
In hierarchical attribute sets with many attributes
it is critically important to isolate components of the
problem and to make conditional assessments. In Figure 3.27,
we haye concocted some hypothetical conditional assignments.
For example, we have let
A(E) = .6 and A(F) = . 4
A(AIE) = . 5 and A(BIE) = . 5
A({2}1 B) = . 5 A({3}!B) = . 3 and A({4}1 R) = . 2, ,
A(CIF) = .8 and A(D IF) = .2
and so on.
To find 1. 3 ' say, we have
I(.5)
(1.0)
E F
(.6) (.4)
A B C D
(.5) (.8) (.2)
(.5) (.3) (.2) (.6) (.4) Ｈ Ｎ Ｔ Ｉ ｾ Ｎ Ｒ Ｉ (.1)
[.30] [.15] [ .. 09] [.06] {.192] [.1281 [.032](.024] [.016] (.0081
{4} {6} {7} {8} {9} flO}
Figure 3.27
ｴ ｴ Ｉ Ｇ ｰ ｯ Ｑ ｮ ｾ ｬ ｩ ＼ Ｎ Ｎ ｾ \ 5<:"(\\""'5 ｃｃＭＨｬｩｬｃ＼Ｎｾｔ＼［Ｎ 'In c.. ｾ｜ｩ･Ｎ ... ｯＮｲ｣ｨｾ｣Ｎ＼Ａ｜ ｳＮｩＭｾＢＬｃＱｕＮＮＧＨ･ＮＮ
== • 3 x . 5 x . 6 = • 09
In a similar manner we get all the individual Aj'S, which are
displayed in the second row from the bottom in Fig. 3.27.
In a problem such as this it might be clear, for
example, how to assign conditional weights within subsets
E and F but one might he hard pressed to apportion weights
between E and F. But an ability to structure part of the
problem might make it possible to run meaningful sensitivity
analyses on those critical assessments which are the hardest
to make. The ahove remark about sensitivity analysis--and
remarks similar to it which we have already made and will
make numerous times in the sequel--are especially important
if more than one decision maker is involved in the decision
process.
1'1$
3.8. WILLINGNESS-lO-PAY
Consider an attrihute structure with a monetary attri-
bute M, measured in monetary units ill, and other attributes
are X, ,X 2"., ,Xu' Paired comparisons are then of the form
, 1 ,
(m ,xl"" ,xu) versus
or more compactly
2 2 ,.,
(m ,xl"" Ｌ ｸ ｾ Ｉ
2 2
versus Ｈ ｭ Ｌ ｾ Ｉ
3 .8 . 1 Pricing Out.
In many contexts--but we insist not all!-- it is natural
to proceed by llcosting out" or "pricing out ll the ｾ Ｍ ｣ ｯ ｭ ｰ ｯ Ｍ
nents. For example, we might single out some particular
ｾ Ｍ ｰ ｲ ｯ ｦ ｩ ｬ ･ Ｌ let us call it x* and ask such a question:
"Starting from the profile Ｈ ｭ ｯ Ｌ ｾ ｯ Ｉ how much would you
just be willing-to-pay to alter ｾ ｯ to the base case x*?ll
We are asking the decision maker in essence to find the
value m in the indifference equation
* 0 0(m, ｾ ) tV (m Ｌｾ )
The willingness-to-pay would then be m - om .
If one had to evaluate a limited number of alterna-
tives Ｈ ｭ ｩ Ｌ ｾ ｩ Ｉ for i = 1 to N, and if one determined for
each i a value ｭ ｾ such that
1
* * i i(m.,x ) tV (m ,x )
1 - -
i = 1, ... ,N,
then one could rank the N alternatives in terms of the
* *numbers m1 to mN .
This procedure becomes even more attractive under
some special structure. For example, in the indifference
equation
* 0 0ＨｭＬｾ ) tV em Ｌｾ )
the willingness-to-pay for changing x O to ｾ Ｊ might (in a
o
special case) not depend on the level m . This simplifies
things. However, if this is not the case, and if the number
oN of alternatives is large, then the dependence of m - m
on m
O becomes a particularly bothersome complication.
If the dimensionality of ｾ is large, it is helpful
to price-out the transformation of x O to x* in stages.
For example, we might want first to consider the component
x. and modify it to the base ｸ ｾ . We are then led to the
J J
indifference equation
o 0 * 0 000(m,x 1 ,···,x. 1'x.,x. 1'···'x )"'(m Ｌ ｾ ＩJ- J J+ n
In general without special assumptions the willingness-to-
*"x. but also on
J
however, theIf,
and
X., taken as a pair,
J
are preferentially independent of the complementary set
o 0pay m - m will depend not only on x.
J
o 000 0
m, and on x 1 , ... ,x. 1'x. 1""'x .J - J + n
monetary attribute M and attribute
of attributes, then we can'price out'the change from
ｸ ｾ to ｸ ｾ without worrying about the levels of the other
J J
attributes. We still, of course, have to worry about the
oinitial monetary levels m .
If the pair (M,X) is preferentially independent of
the complementary set for each j, then we can price out
the attributes in sequence. For example, suppose
(mo A 1 *" 0 0 ) '" (0 0 0 0 )+ u ,x 1 ,x Z,x 3 '... m ,x 1 ,x Z,x 3 ' ...
so that 8,1 is what we "pay" for the transformation of ｸ ｾ
to xii in general 8,1 will depend on mO (but not on ｸ ｾ Ｌ ｸ ｾ Ｌ ... ).
Next suppose that
so that 8,2 is the price we "pay" for transforming ｸ ｾ to xi
and this will depend, with the assumptions we've made,
010
on m + 8, , on x 2 and on xi but not on the other XiS.
unless of course we explicitly assume otherwise.
*" .to x. ,It
J
+ 8,j-1
,
oAnd so on. When we price out the transformation of x j
o 1
will unfortunately depend on m + 8, + •••
If, in general, the pair {M,X} is preferentially
independent of the complementary set of attributes for
all j and if the quantity 8, j in the indifference equation
does not
j 0 0 0 000
+Ll ,X1, ... Ｌ ｘ ｊ Ｍ Ｑ Ｌ ｸ ｪ Ｌ ｘ ｪ Ｋ ｬ Ｌ Ｎ ﾷ ﾷ Ｌ ｘ ｮ Ｉ Ｇ ｜ ［ Ｈ ｭ Ｌ ｾ Ｉ
odepend on m , for each j, then life becomes
especially attractive. Then we can price out the trans-
formation of ｸ ｾ to ｸ ｾ without first determining in a
J J
1 2 . -1
sequential order the values of A ,6 , ... ,6 J •
In some circumstances it may not be possible to
assume that {M,X.}, j = 1,2, ... ,n, is ｰ ｡ ｩ ｲ ｷ ｩ ｾ ･ prefer-
J
entially independent of the complementary set of attri-
butes. One might, however, in some contexts be able to
partition the X attributes into two subsets, Y and Z, so
that in a suggestive notational fashion we can express
If the attribute set {M,Y} is preferentially independent
o
of Z, one can price out a transformation say of y to
y* and in doing so we would not have to worry about the
zO-levels.
The willingness-to-pay procedure has its virtues.It
is easy to explain and that in itself should not be under-
estimated. Unfortunately, it is often applied in a manner
that can only be justified under certain assumptions when
indeed these assumptions cannot be fully justified. We're
referring here to the assumptions:
i. the money attribute taken together with any other
single attribute is preferentially independent of
the others, and
ii. the marginal rate of substitution between money
and any other attrihute docs not functionally
depend on the monetary level.
It should also be pointed out that even if the above
assumptions make sense in a given context it does not
necessarily follow that the willingness-to-pay procedure
should be followed. In many cases it may be too painful
and too unnatural to try to price out a transformation
a * aof x to x or even of x.
J
it may be more natural to
*to x .. Tn some circumstancesJ
directly attempt to specify the
preference structure as discussed in Sections3.3 to 3.7.
For some interesting examples where willingness-to-
pay arguments are used in a multiattribute context, see
several of the publications of the Decision Analysis Group
of Stanford Research Institute: Matheson and Roths (1967),
Stanford Research Institute [1968], Boyd et al. [1971J,
and Howard, Matheson,and North [1972].
3.8.2 Dominance and Extended Dominance
There are loads of tricks one can use for processing
preferences short of estahlishing a full value function
and it is hopeless here to try to be very systematic
about describing many of the tricks of the trade. But one
point that has been exploited by us in practice bears
some emphasis. It is not easy to make the kinds of trade-
offs that we have been glibly describing. If one could
avoid making some of these vexing tradeoffs, then this
1.00
should be exploited. One obvious device is to exploit
the concept of dominance jntroduced in Section 3.2. If
we compare
Xl = (xi, ... , ｸｾＩ and
"
ｾＢ = (x" x")1 ' ••• , n
and if x! is preferred to x. for all j (or preferred or
J J
indifferent for all j and strictly preferred for some j)
then x" can be eliminated as a contender if Xl is avail-
able. Getting rid of dominances may solve the problem.
Fine, if this is the case!
Now suppose that we try the above reduction by dominance
and the decision problem is not resolved ... the usual situation.
Furthermore suppose that we can partition ｾ into Ｈ ｲ Ｌ ｾ Ｉ
and let us suppose that we can "price out" rls·in terms
of the z I s by transforming each r to· some base--r*", say.
That is, for the i-th alternative (v. ,z.), we solve the in-LI -1
difference equation
* *"(v.,z.)rv (v ,z.)
LI -1 L-I
*for z .. Let us assume this is repeated for i = 1, ... ,N.
-1
Now once again one can investigate dominance relations
h .. f·l *" *" Ofamongst t e restrIctIve pro 1 es, ｾ Ｑ Ｇ ﾷ ﾷ ﾷ Ｇ ｾ ｎ Ｎ - course,
this latter type of ｾ ｸ ｴ ･ ｮ ､ ･ ､ dominance does incorporate
'* *"the subjective reduction of Ｈ ｲ ｩ Ｇ ｾ ｩ Ｉ to (r ' ｾｩＩ for
1 = 1, ..• ,N.
If the processes of dominance and extended dominance
help to isolate a best act, then this would be a welcome
bonus. More generally, however, the elimination of alter-
ＬＮｾｯ i
natives have other beneficial effects: it is usually help-
ful to have fewer real alternatives to consider, since with
a reduction in the number of alternatives one must consider
there is likely to be a diminution in the size of the inter-
val that is necessary for each of the scalar attribute
scales. And this restriction of the intervals for each
attribute, in turn, makes it more palatable to adopt various
assumptions like preferential independence (and other
variations to be introduced later). To illustrate this
last point suppose we consider the case of three attributes
and are contemplating whether or not it is legitimate to
assume that attributes 1 and 2 are preferentially inde-
pendent of attribute 3. This might be a reasonable assumption
to investigate (a palatable lie) provided that the range of
values of attribute 3 is sufficiently narrow. We might not
be able to make this convenient assumption if the third
attribute varies widely. And here is where some prelimi-
nary work on dominance and especially extended dominance
may have a significant impact.
3.9 BRIEF SQMMARY AND GUIDE TO SOME RELEVANT LITERATURE
The basic objective of this chapter was to present
techniques for assessing multiattribute value functions.
Once the decision maker articulates a value function, which
implies a preference ordering over all multidimensional
evaluations, the subsequent analysis must then examine
the set of technologically achievable evaluations and
choose a best evaluation in this set. The two processes,
determination of achievability and articulation of a pre-
ference structure can be kept separate and fused at the
very end of the analysis. Indeed In this book we concentrate
almost exclusively on the latter of these two processes.
However, at the beginning of this c}lapter we did describe
a very informal mechanism for intertwining these two pro-
cesses: Olle first finds a point on the efficient frontier
of achievable evaluations and then one moves around this
frontier in a manner that improves one's preferences at
each step. This is done in a rather ad hoc manner that does
not require a full specification of one's preference structure.
While this procedure may sometimes be effective in some
special, highly structured prohlems (e.g., in linear pro-
gramming problems with more than a single linear ob-
jective function), in most of the applied problems dealt
with in this hook this informal J interactive, search pro-
cedure is not very useful--especially when probabilistic
concerns are introduced. We therefore concentrate our
attention on the aspect of the decision prohlem dealing
with the articulation of preferences. We do it also in a
manner that will enable us later on to bring in probabilistic
considerations.
Sections 3.4 to 3.6 provide a number of representation
theorems which break down the assessments of the value function
into component parts. '[he key concept in all these reduction
techniques is that of Freferential independence. Because
there is considerable POWCl" in the implications of over-
lapping sets of attributes heing prefercntially independent
of their complements, the two-attribute case cannot be dealt
with nearly so nicely as cases with three or more attributes.
Most of the important representation theorems provided con-
ditions for expressing the value function v in the additive
form
v" (x. )
1 1
v(x 1 ,x Z,·,· ,x n)
n
L
i=l
where the v. are consistently scaled single-attribute value
1
functions. A complete example illustrating the assessment
of such a function is given in Section 3.7.
A cornman practice of many analysts is to 'price out'--
that is, bring down to some standard lcvel--all the non-mone-
tary attributes into some (single) monetary attribute. A
comparison of alternatives is then made only in terms of
the 'adjusted' levels of the monetary attribute. The re-
quisite assumptions necessary for such an approach to be
valid are strong. These arc discussed in Section 3.8.
Most of this chapter is expository in nature, since
as indicated throughout, the fundamental results are due to
others. Our approach has been to state an important result
and then to informally argue through the reasoning to obtain
it. Formal proc1fs of the thea rems have been referenced to
the original articles and the technical literature.
We would like now to present a cursory review of the
literature. The purpose is merely to suggest some sources
;l.C 4·
where an interested reader may search for more depth than
provided here. We will, however, try to mention some classic
works that are directly relevant.
Leontief [1947a,1947b] investigated properties of
functions of several variables which provided for separa-
bility, breaking the original function into a function de-
fined as functions over distinct subsets of the original
va ria b I e s. II i s resu 1 t s we rei 0 ca lin natu r era the r than
global. Dehreu (1960] provided the first axiomatization
implying the existence of an additive value function for
three or more attributes. Ilis elegant proof was topological
in nature. An alternative algehraic proof of additivity was
given by Luce and Tukey [1964] in their paper introducing
'conjoint measurement' for the two-attribute case. Several
extensiom to conjoint measurement were made by individuals
such as KranTZ (1964), Luce [1966], and Tversky (1967J.
For a complete summary of tllis field we highly recommend
the book Foundations of Measuremellt by Krantz, Luce, Suppes
and Tversky [1971]. In a general measurement context, this
book also presents representation theorems for a number of
more general value functions than those considered in this
chapter. This includes the large class of value functions
which can he represented by polynomi cd structures. A recent
addition to this class of literature is Fishburn [1974al.
An importanT conTribution toward separating the assess-
ment of a value funCTion into a number of component parts
is Gorman [1968a]. Ilis results allow us to reduce greatly
the number of COllditions necessary to imply a value function
is additive, thus, making the techniques more operational.
Ting [1971] discusses many techniques for decomposing the
assessment of preferences and suggests some guidelines for
verifying the assumptions necessary to use the results .
•
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CHAPTER 4
UNIDIMENSIONAL UTILITY THEORY
This chapter concerns unidimensional utility theory:
the assignment of utilities to consequences that are described
in terms of one scalar attribute. The general problem
addressed can be stated simply. A decision maker must choose
among several alternatives A1 ,A Z'" .,An , each of which will
eventually result in a consequence describable in terms of
attribute X. However, the decision maker does not know
exactly what consequence will result from each of the various
alternatives, but he can assign probabilities to the various
possibilities which might result from any course of action.
What should he do?
*4.1. THE MOTIVATION FOR UTILITY TllEORY
The power of the concept of utility and the grounds for
our interest in it is this: If an appropriate utility is
*Sections4.1 through 4.8 present an expository account of
much of the standard literature of single attribute utility
theory. It draws heavily on the research work in the last
fifteen years of Robert Schlaifer, Kenneth Arrow, John Pratt,
and Richard Meyer. Readers who are thoroughly familiar with
the concepts and results in J'l'att [1964] may wish to skim
briefly these sections.
assigned to each possible consequence and the expected
utility of each alternative is calculated, then the best
course of action is the alternative with the highest ex-
pected utility. Different sets of axioms which imply the
existence of utilities with the property that expected
utility is an appropriate guide for consistent decision
making are presented in von Neumann and Morgenstern [1947),
Savage [1954], Luce and Raiffa [1957], Pratt et al. [1965),
and Fishburn [1970]. The next subsection informally reviews
the basic ideas of the theory.
In terms of our double dichotomy of Chapter 1 depicted
in Fig. 4.1, the problem addressed in this chapter is a
special case of the general problem of Chapter 3 in the
sense that we are concerned with only one unidimensional
attribute but a generalization in the sense that uncertainty
is now involved. One might ask why, when we spend most of
Chapters 1 and 2 arguing that most important "real world"
problems require more than one attribute to adequately
summarize consequences, do we allocate a chapter solely
to the unidimensional case? Our reason is three-fold.
First a thorough understanding of unidimensional utility
theory and the associated techniques in implementing the
theory is essential for work on the multiattribute problem
involving uncertainty, second there are some important
problems where one scalar attribute may be adequate, and
third we shall show that many multidimensional utility
problems can be reduced to unidimensional ones by using
20'1-
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some of the techniques of the previous chapter. These are
expanded on later in this section.
4.1.1 Basic Fundamentals of the Utility Theory
We are assuming that most of our readers are familiar
with the basic fundamentals of utility theory, but as a review
to some and a short introduction to others we offer the
fo 11 owing.
Suppose we start out with just n consequences labelled
x1'x z, ... ,xn . It is immaterial at this puint what the under-
lying scales of these XIS are. Each x could be a scalar, a
vector, or a paragraph of prose describing this consequence.
It is important, however, that the decision maker can rank
the consequences in order of his preference, and we shall
assume the labelling is such that x 1 is less preferred to
xz' which is less preferred to x3 ' and so on. In symhols,
we assume
< ... ｾ x n (4. 1)
Now suppose the decision maker is asked to express his
preferences for probability distributions over these con-
sequences. For example, the decision maker is asked to state
his preference between act a ' and a" \vherc
i) Act a' will result in consequence x. with probability
1
p! , for i = I,Z, ••. ,n. Of course, p! > o , a11 1 , Clnd L.p! = 1 •
1 1 -- I 1
i i) Act a" will result in consequence x. \vi th probability
1
for 1 =1,2, ... ,no Again p'.' > 0, alJ i, and L:.p'.' = 1.
1 - 1 1
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Notice that there are an infinity of potential proba-
bility distributions over this finite set of consequences.
Now suppose the decision maker asserts that, for each i,
he is indifferent between the following two options:
Certainty ｏ ｰ ｴ ｩ ｯ ｮ ｾ
Risky Option:
Receive x .
.1
Receive x
n
(the best consequence)
with probability TI i and xl (the worst consequence)
with the complementary probability I - u i ·
Let us denote the risky option by ＼ ｸ ｮ Ｇ ｾ ｩ Ｌ ｸ ｉ ＾ Ｎ Furthermore,
the decision maker is consistent in Lhe sense that he assigns
U = I and n = 0 and the TI'S are such that
n I
< ••• < TI
n
(4.2)
Comparing (4.2) with (4.1) we can see that the u's can be
thought of as a numerical scaling of the X's.
The fundamental resul t of uti 1 tty theory is that the
expected value of the TI'S can also he used to numerically
scale probahility distributions over the X's. To illustrate
the reasoning, let us reconsider the choice between act a'
(which results in x. with probahility p!) and act a" (which
1 ]
results in x. with probability p'.'). If \ve associate to each
1 1
x. its scaled n· value then the expected n-scores for acts
1 1
a' and a"--let us label these hyiT-' and 1["-- are
TI' == L:.p! 'n.
1 1 l
and
TI" :: L:. P'.' 1f.] 1 1
There are compelling reasons [or the decision maker to rank
210
order act a' and a" in terms of the magnitudes of n' and
nil. The argument briefly follows; Take act a'. It resul ts
with probability p! in consequence x .. But x. in turn is
1 1 1
considered by the decision maker as indifferent to a TT.
1
chance at x
n
and complementary chance at xl. So in effect
,
act a. is equivalent to giving the decision maker a TI' chance
1
at x
n
and a complementary chance at Xl. Similarly a"
yields a chance of TI" at X and a complementary chance
n
at xl. This completes the argument which rests heavily on
the substitution of the risky option < ｸｮｾ ｔｔｩｾｸｬ > for each
x .. The pros and cons of this substitlltion idea,which lies
1
at the core of utility theory, are discussed in Raiffa [1968].
Now if we transform the TT'S into u's by means of a
positive linear transformation
U =a+brri i
then we have
b > 0 , = 1, ... ,n
u <1
and it is easy to see that for prohabilistic choice (such
as between a' and a") the expected u values rank order a'
and a" the same way as the expected'll values. For example ｾ
u' = L:. p! u. = l:. P ｾ (a + h lr.) = a + b 'iT'
1 1 1 1 1 1
If, however, we were to transform the Tf'S into a new
scale--call it w--by a monotone transformation other than
a positive linear transformation, then the w's would reflect
preferences for the simple consequence Xl ,x z' ... ,x n but would
not necessarily reflect preferences for probabilistic alter-
natives such as a' and a".
If one is sold on thc med ts of the above argument
as we, the authors,are then the critical issue becomes:
How can one assess, in a responsible manner, appropriate
n-values? This is really thc essence of our prohlem. If
the XIS are themselves scalars there are, as we shall
see in this chapter, ways of thinking alJout the assess-
ment problcm, which exploit this undcrlying structure.
If the XIS are multidilllcnsionCll vectors, wc will in sub-
sequent chaptcrs describe techniques for structuring
the assessment problem.
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4.1.2 ａ ｬ ｴ ･ ｲ ｮ ｡ ｴ ｩ ｶ ･ ｾ ｅ ｯ ｡ ｣ ｨ ･ ｳ to the IUsky Choice Problem
Does the decision maker need the full power of utility
theory to make choices amongst risky alternatives? Can he
get by, in practice, with less formal machinery, or can
he circumvent the use of subjective judgements altogether
and use more objective meaSllres like means and variances?
Of course, in special cases one can get hy with less
paraphernalia than is needed for the maximization of ex-
pected utility. Suppose the possible impacts of two alter-
natives A and B can be descrihed by the probability densi-
ty functions fA and f B in Fig. 4.2A or alternatively by
the cumulative probability distributions in Fig. 4.2B,
where we have denoted the attribute of importance as X.
Let FA and FB denote the cumulative distribution functions
of A and B respectively. Notice from Fig. 4.2B, the proba-
ｰｲｾ｢ｯＮｨ､［ｴｹ
d e,-.,.s i'ty
o
(A)
I
ｐｲｯ｢ｾ ...bl\ity
oi )( or ｉ ｾ ｳ Ａ ｯ
- o
ls)
)(
bility that any outcome is x or less is greater for alter-
native A than for alternative B. Thus, if we just knew, for
instance, that more of X is preferred to less of X, it would
be appropriate to conclude that B should be preferred to A.
In such a case we say alternative A is probabilistically
dominated by alternative B. When such situations occur,
one can use less information than contained in the complete
utility function over X to make responsible, consistent de-
cisions. This conclusion would not be readily apparant,
however from Figure 4.2A. Of course, one is always not so
lucky to be able to invoke probabilistic dominance.
There are cases where two cumulative distribution
functions FA and FB for alternatives A and B intersect
(so that no probabilistic dominance is present) but where
a bit of subjective informal coml!lOn sense might help one
to make a choice without much ado. Often one merely has
to look at FA and FB and without any formal procedures
whatsoever corne to a comfortable decision. But this again
depends usually on extreme differences. Life is often
more complicated and the choice is not readily apparant.
One would like to probe one's basic feelings more syste-
matically--and here, of course, the full power of utility
theory comes to the fore. But let's look first at some
so-called objective procedures.
One simple proposal is to use the expected value
of the uncertain outcome as a guide. Here one requires
only a knowledge of the probability distributions to cal-
culate the expected value for each alternative. For certain
problems, this may be appropriate. However, many decision
makers would prohably not he different between the following
acts:
act A
-
earn $ 100,000 for sure,
act B
-
earn $ 200,000 or ｾ 0, each with proba-
bili ty 0.5,
act C
-
earn $ 1,000,000 with probability O. 1 or
$0 with probability 0.9,
act D - earn $ 200,000 with probability 0.9 or
lose ｾ 800,000 with probability O. 1 .
Notice that for each of the acts, the expected amount
earned is exactly $ 100,000, and so the expected value of
the consequence would not be an appropriate criterion for
a decision maker with a preference among these acts.
A possible critjcism of this illustration might point
out that "Naturally act A IS preferred to the others since
there is no uncertainty associated with the outcome. How-
ever, if a measure of uncertainty, such as the variance
of the possible outcome, was used in addition to the ex-
pected outcome, we should be ahle to correctly order pre-
ferences for alternatives." This claim seems plausible but
it is not always correct. Simple calculation will show
that both acts C and D above have the same expected out-
comes and variances and hence, any evaluation scheme based
on just the mean and variance of the outcome would ne-
cessarily imply indifference hetween acts C and D. Various
investigations have indicated that many people do have a
2'3
preference between C and D, and thus, no mean-variance
criterion can correctly represent their preferences.
Even if some mean-variance criterion seems appropriate
for evaluating alternatives in a specific problem, one has
to establish an appropriate preference order over the two
attributes "expected outcome" and "outcome variance." This
task, which may require assessing a value function over
these two attributes, could he more involved than originally
assessing a utility function over the single outcome attri-
buteo
There are a myriad of other ad hoc schemes that can
be found in the literature, hut to our mind, no proposal
other than maximization of expected utility withstands the
scrutiny of careful examination, Let us cite one further
proposal there. Let the uncertain outcome resulting from
a given alternative be denoted by t. This proposal suggests
that the distribution of ｾ he summarized by two indices:
a. a = P [i ｾ x
o
] , the probability that ｾ is less
than some critical aspiration level x
o
;
and
b. 8 = E ｛ｾ I ｾ ｾ xo1 ' the conditional expectation
'V 'V
of x, given that x attains the aspiration level x .
a
The analyst can then compute the pair (a,S) for each alter-
native and set up a simple two-dimensional value function.
ｆ ｯ ｾ example, one might want to maximize B subject to the
condition that a < .05. Ad hoc procedures of this kind can
be easily destroyed by citing extreme examples but then
2'4
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the retort usually is: "Oh, in such extreme examples we would
modify our (a, S) proposal by imposjng another constraint
such as ... " There have been endless debates of this kind
in the literature and suffice it to say, here, that we
authors become more and more committed to the principle of
maximization of expected utility, the younger we get and
the more arguments we hear. Of course, this in itself should
not be a compelling argument to you but we are reporting
what we evidently feel is a relevant empirical fact.
4.1. 3 Relevance of Unidimensional Utility Theory to
Multiattribute Problems
Our motivation stated above for introducing unidimensional
utility theory concerns mainly the usefulness for the con-
cept of utility itself and relics on the fact that this use-
fulness can be easily illustrated with the unidimensional
case. There is another very important reason. Namely, in
many of the techniques we shall describe for assessing multi-
attribute utility functions, an essential component part
is the assessment of unidimensional utility functions over
single attributes. That is, our procedures often provide a
basis for reducing the problem of <:lssessing a multiattri-
bute utility function into one of assessing some consistently
scaled unidimensional utility functions. A thorough know-
ledge of unidimensional utility theory is needed for this
latter task.
For instance, although the consequences of a problem
ＲＱｾ
may only be adequately described in terms of n attributes,
it may be possible using the techniques discussed in
Chapter 3 to reduce the dimensionality of the attribute
space from n to (n-1). If n = 2, we then have a unidimen-
sional problem. If n > 2, successive reduction of the di-
mensionality may lead us to the unidimensional case.
In Chapter 3, the techniques discussed suggested pro-
cedures for obtaining a value function ｶ ･ ｾ Ｉ for all possible
outcomes x. Since value is unidimensional and ｖ Ｈ ｾ ｉ Ｉ = ｶＨｾＢＩ
if and only if Xl and ｾ Ｂ are equally prefereable, it is
appropriate to assess a utiUty function ｵ ｛ ｶ Ｈ ｾ Ｉ ｝ over the
unidimens ional at tr ibu te "v a1 ue" and thus assoc ia te a
utility with each possible consequence !. The exact manner
in which this is done is discussed ill Chapter 5.
An alternative approach which does not require a value
function in multiattribute situations is to verify assumptions
implying a specific form of the utility function. The simplest
example of this in two dimensions is the additive utility
function u(y,z) = uy(y) + U
z
(z), ｷ ｨ ｲ ｾ ｲ ･ u y and U z are consistently
scaled unidimensional utility functions. The point is that
both uy(y) and uZez) can be assessed using the techniques
discussed in this chapter.
The assumptions needed to justiCy an additive form
such as
u(x 1 , ••• ,x) = r. k.u.(x.)nil] 1
or various multiplicative forms, sllch as
1T[a. + B· 1I.(x.)]
ill ]]
require various utility illdependcnce assumptions to be
introduced in the sequel. However, even in cases where
such independence does not hold we shell 1 often have to
introduce conditional univariate utility functions, such
as: the conditional utility of xi given that a summary
index Y is at level yO, say.
In summary, we can state that univariate utility
functions will be an essential ingredient in all the
multivariate theory to be developed in ensuing chapters.
21'
4.1.4 Exampl es of Un ｩ､ｩｭ･ｮｾ ional Dec i. s ion Problems
Let us cite some examples where one attribute might
adequately summarize consequences for decisional purposes.
A company's objective is to maximize profits. In this case,
the attribute chosen to describe consequences might be
incremental cash flow, or monetary asset position, or net
monetary profit, etc. One attrihute lIlay be better than
another in the sense that the decision maker can more
easily express his preferences over different amounts of
that attribute. The choice of which attribute to use is
obviously subjective and left largely to the discretion
of the analyst with consultation of the decision maker.*
----------- ._--_.__..•. __ .._..
* In business contexts, it is of tell preferable to use assets
rather than incremelltal flows hecause it helps avoid some
idiosyncratic behavior (c.g. the zero illusion) in the
assessment procedures, and also it is easier to examine
dynamic problems. See Schlaifer [1969), pages 163 - 165.
The question of how to choose an attribute, whether or
not it is sufficient to describe consequences, etc., was
discussed in detail in Chapter 2.
Many of the concepts covered in this chapter will
use money as the unidimenional attribute. The main reasons
for this are (1) many of the past interests and results
in utility theory deal with this special case, and (2)
most readers have already thought about or could think
about their preferences for various amounts of money.
Hence, a better intuitive feeling for the concepts of
preference and risk introduced in the chapter will likely
be developed using money as the primary attribute than
would be the case if a less familiar attribute were used
in illustrations. However, the concepts to be introduced
are relevant to other unidimensional prohlems of importance.
Let us indicate a few examples.
The emergency services, such as amhulance, police,
fire, etc., respond to requests for help by dispatching
an emergency vehicle (ambulance, etc.) to the scene "as
soon as possible." An obvious choice of a measure of
effectiveness in this case is response time, the elapsed
time from receipt of the call requesting help to arrival
on the scene of an emergency vehicle. Larson [1972] and
Savas [1969) have chosen this attribute in some of their
work on police systems and ambulance services, respectively.
In many queuing situations, whether it involves
automobiles at toll booths or customers at a checkout
Lie
C ,Ill!' . Ｎｾ ;: ...' '-' i) i '.' c t j ve is goo J s e rv ice an J t 11 j:j III i g h the
ｭ ｦ Ｇ ｱ ｳ ｬ Ｑ ｲ ｾ Ｇ Ｌ ｬ Ｚ Ｚ ｜ t'_' ( .. /.; uf the attribute "Jclay tlJilO." Anuther
qU0U-:':g r.,',>!,L' .. ,")IlCernS the congestion occurring at the
In[ij,}l' ... 1"1",1, LC;. ;,'itl, this situation,G prime objective of
the efficiency ur:'!;}i\V;)'y' I.Jji-:tat-ions. jJ,lumstein Ｈ Ｑ ｾ ｨ ｾ Ｉ Ｉ Ｌ
. 'I .
\'Ulln.i [ 1 q 7 ') '! ' •. , \.. ｾ J; ... , ,.I lIlu,:;.'Ls of
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As <1 final example, we cOll"i,ler the following un--
ph'L1SClnt situation: A counLy ;:-; seized hy an epidelllic,
and the Incdical director u[ th,' C{1untry mllst ('house all
epidemic. In a variation of ｲ Ｑ Ａ ｩ ｾ Ｇ Ｌ jll'uiiJl..'lli the' undt'rlyill>',
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ｱ ｬ ｬ ｾ ｾ ｮ ｲ ｰ ｳ Ｂ will occur.
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utilities to consequences is presented. This method is not
operationally adequate when there are many consequences,
since the direct method requires a subjective input from
the decision maker for each ｡ ｳ ｳ ｩ ｧ ｮ ｭ ･ ｾ of utility and there
may be too many such inputs to handle practically. In these
situations, it may be desirable and necessary to construct
a utility function u which assigns a utility u(x) to
any possible consequence x over a continuous range of
possibilities. Sections 4.3 through 4.7 develop a frame-
work for examining monotonically increasing utility functions
defined on a real-valued variable--that is, for cases where
more of the variable is preferred to less. This framework
is extended to decreasing and nonmonotonic utility
functions in Section 4.8. The next two sections respectively,
suggest a procedure for assessing unidimensional utility
functions and report examples of such assessments. Section 4.11
and 4.12 extend the ideas of the chapter" to conditional
unidimensional utility ｴ ｨ ｾ ｯ ｲ ｹ and provide a transition to
the multiattribute case considered in Chapters 5 and 6.
4.2 DIRECT ASSESSMENT OF ｕｔｉｊｾｉｔｉｅｓ FOR ｃｏｎｓｅｑｕｅｎｃｅｾ
Let us denote the possible consequences of a decision
as xl ,x 2""'xN. Then, because utility is relative and
not absolute, to establish an origin and unit of measure,
we can arbitrarily assign utilities to two of the con-
sequences and then aSSASS utilities for the other con-
sequences relative to those two. This procedure is pro-
bably easier to illustrate if we define XO and x* as a
least preferred and a most preferred consequence. The
use of "a least preferred" rather than "the least pre-
ferred" indicates there could he more than one consequence
with the same degree of prE'ference.
Now, to set our scale, let us ｾ ｳ ｳ ｴ ｧ ｮ
* 0u(x ) = 1 and u(x ) = 0 ,
and assess for each other consf'quence x, a probability'"
* 0such that x is indifferent to ,-_he lot.tery <x ,'IT,X >,
* 0yielding a 11 chance at x and <l (1- 1f ) chance at x . Then,
because the utility of x mllst eqnal the expected utility
of the lottery, we assign
U (x) = 1f U (x*) i (1 - TI) u (x 0) = 1T •
If utilities were asse:-;sl'd in this manner for all x's,
there would be many possible COTlsistency checks. For in-
stance, let x', x", and x'" dl':; i ｬＧｮ［ｾｴＨＧ an increasing ｰ ｮ ｾ Ｇ Ｍ
ference sequence and let the ,1lternative x" for certain
be indif ferent* to the lottpry .-: x"', p ,x '> ; then for
consistency, p must be such that
u(x") ,: ｰｵＨｸＢｾ + (l-[l)u(x'),
or
ｩ ｾ ｌ ･ ｳ ｳ elliptically we sholJ-\d ｾｾＺ｝ｖ "I.('t the decision maker
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he indifferent hetween x" and ｴ ｾ ]nttery."
In problems with only a few possible consequences--
maybe even up to fifty--this direct assessment technique
may be appropriate. However, we feel that in problems with
many consequences, where there is a natural ordering for
the underlying XIS, an alternate approach is often hetter.
The procedure involves fixing the utilities of a few con-
sequences as above and then fitting a curve--that is a
utilitiy function-- to these. As we will see in the next
five sections, the shape and functional form of the utility
function tells us very much about the basic attitudes to-
ward risk of the decision maker. Hence, our general approach
is to start with these basic attitudes toward risk, to
establish functional forms of utility functions exhibiting
these properties, and then to choose a specific utility
function using a few assessed points. This will become
clearer in the sequel.
4.3 UNIDIMENSIONAL UTILITY rUNCTIONS
Let us introduce some ｧ ｾ ｾ ｡ ｊ ｩ ｴ ｡ ｴ ｩ ｶ ･ characteristics of
utility functions. Each characteristic implies a certain
attitude of the decision maker with regard to his prcfe-
rellces for consequences and lotteries. By expressing these
attitudes mathematically, restrictions on the utility
function implied by these ｾ ｴ ｴ ｩ ｴ ｵ ､ ･ ｳ can be analytically
derived. Provided the decision maker subscribes to a
certain attitude, his III it i ty lllllCl j(IJl is restricted to
a degree, and thUS, the actus.! assessment of his utility
ZZl-
function is simplified. funhcl"mt,re it then becomes possihle
to do sensitivity and hreak<-evvT! :lila]yscs.
4. 3 . 1 Mono ton ie i tL_
Often a very ｲ ･ ｡ ｯ ｮ ｡ ｢ ｬ ｾ chorncteristic is monotonicity.
For example, when monetary asspt position is appropriate
to sUlllmarize consequcnces, ｭ Ｈ ｜ ｾ ｾ ｛ (if not alJ) decision
makers prefer a grc:ater amOUJlt to ,] lesser amount. If we
Ie t x respresen t the an]{lllIl t ()f llIone t::1 ry a s sets and u aut i-'
lity function for such, the ahove statement is expressed.
mathematically by
Ｈ Ｔ ｾ Ｓ ｡ Ｉ
Note that the converse of this is also true due to the
nature in which utility functions arc assessed. That is,
(4.3b)
Let us now consider the preferellces for response time
to calls for alllhula·nce service', Tt s('cms quite reasonable
to assume a smaller response tillle is always preferred to
a larger one. In this case, if t is a secific response
time and u again represents the IIhljty function,
(4.tl)
All this is to say the lltjJity function for rcsponse
It is interesting to J)(;\C tll:Il onC' can easily trans-
----_._---------_.
by simply changing the attribute. For example, suppose
that instead of measuring ambulance service in terms of
response time, we define a "standard response time" as
fifteen minutes and use the attribute "standard minutes
saved in response" to me3sure service. For a particular
call for s e rv ice, i f \ve 1e t y he the s tan cl a I'd In inute s
saved in response anLi def i ne -j t by
y - 1S - t ,
where "t is the previously defined response tillie, then clearly
preferences are increasing in y. And thus, the utility
function for our new at"tributeYis increasing. This is
the case whether or not the "standard minutes saved in
response" is ever negative (i.e. response time is greater
"than fifteen minutes).
Certainly it is clear that one can just as easily
change from an increasing to a decreasing utility function
by switching "the measure 01" effectiveness. Perhaps the must
intuitive example of this involves measuring the operations
of a business concern in tenns of either profits or
opportunity losses. [t is safe to assume then preferences
are increasing in profits and decreasing in opport.unity
losses.
Let us suggest a situation where the utility functioll
is not monotonic. 1n a medical context, a patient may be
having problems with sugar in his blood. The dOCTor in
charge Ilwy h:wc (j varJccy of ［ ｊ ｉ ｔ ｣ ｾ ｉ Ｇ ｊ ｝ ｡ ｲ ｩ ｶ Ｌ Ｍ ｾ ｳ to "try
"to solve the problem. The bloou sugar count may be used
as the measure of effectiveness. TIJCrc is some "normal"
blood sugar count that is dcsirf'd. Below the normal, the
less the blood sugar COll!lt, the worse the situ3tion is;
above the normal, 1 ｾｬｲｧＨｾｲ hlood Sllg:l!' counts are less pre-
ｦ ｌ Ｇ ｲ ｲ ｣ ｾ ｬ thun smaller ones. Tn this CLlse, preferences are
monotOldcally incrcasine up LO the normal .I eve1 ano. mono-
tonically decreasing ｡ ｦ ｴ ｣ ｲ ｷ ｡ ｲ ､ ｾ ［ Ｎ Such a utility function
is illustrated in Fig. 4.3.
4.3. 2
The concept of the ｾ ｾ ｾ ｴ ｾ ｩ ｩ ｮ Ａ ..L equiv .'lIen t is has ic to
utility theory. It is introduced now, since it will he
frequently used "tn the preSl'IltatioIl of the various risk
characteristics of utility funcTions iTl the following
sections.
Let L he a lottery y i e 1Ji n,g con s c que n c e s xl ,x 2 ' •
.. ,x with probabilities PI ,p'}' ... ,p r·cspectiveJy. We
n ｾ n
will denote the uncertain cOTlseqlleIlcc (i .e., a random
variable) of the lottery by x ilnd the expccted consel1uencc
hy x", where of course,
n
--
x = E(x) = L p.X.
i = 1 1 1
The expected utility of this lottery IS
( 4 • S)
E[u(x)]
n
- >: 11. It (X . )
i = 1 l ".I
(4.6)
which is an appropriate index to maximize in choosing
among lotteries.
Ａ Ｉ ｾ ｛ ｩ ｉ ｾ ｩ ｾ ｌ ｯ Ｎ ｾ ｾ 1\ ｣･ｲｴｾ｟ｩｉｬｴｬ｟ＢＨＺ ..ｬｊｬｉｽｶＺｾｊ t:11C ui lot tery L is ;JII
amount X such that t11e decisi(irJ m;lkeris indifferent he-
I
----. '-r----' ,--, .. ｾＭt \0"'''''0\ ----.. ｾ
p, " .
. 1, 'ey
Ｚ ｾ
/
illuo<!
A Nonn\ollotn :1l.i. C tJ t.· .;.J •
. l ltv 1"mlcl ion
tween L and the amount 2 for certain. Thus, i is defined
by
u(x) = E[u(2C)] . (4. 7)
Note that the certainty equivalent of any lottery is unique
for monotonic utility functions.
When the attribute X of interest is monetary asset
position, then a certainty equivalent of a lottery is re-
ferred to as a certainty monetary-asset equivalent. If X
1S a response time, the certainty equivalents arc more
appropriately called certainty response-time equivalents.
However, since it will always be clear from the context
of the discussion, we choose to usc just the term "certainty
e4uivalent" without further ｓ ｉ Ｉ Ｈ ｾ ｣ ｩ ｦ ｩ ｣ ｒ ｴ ｩ ｯ ｮ Ｎ
Jlistorically, much of the devclopment of unidimen-
sional utility theory and thUS, certainty equivalents,
has been concerned with the utility for money. For this
case, the terms cash equ i v alen_! and sell ing pr ice of a
lottery are often found in the literature. Both terms
mean the certainty equivalent of a lottcry with consc-
. *quences representl.ng monetary ctmounts .
*The buying ｰ ｲ ｩ ＼ Ｚ Ｎ ｾ of a lottE.' ry wi th monetary consequences
is another term frequently found in the literature. It is
defined as the largest amuunt Ilf money the decision maker
would pay for a lottery given his present asset position.
Only in special circumstRnccs is the buying price equal
to the selling price of a lottery. See Chapter 4,Section i 1
of Raiffa [1968].
Although it is perhaps obvious, the following point
must he made. Notice that the expected consequence and
certainty equivalent defined by (4.5) and (4.7) respectively
were concerned with a lottery having a discrete numher
of possible consequences. When the possible consequences
of a lottery are described hy a probability density
function f, then the expected conseqeuence x of that
lottery is clearly
x = E (x ) = f x f (x ) dx ( 4 • 8)
and a certainty equivalent x is the solution to
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ｵ Ｈ ｾ Ｉ = E[u(t)] = J u(x)f(x)dx. (4.9)
Before presenting some examples, it is important to
introduce the concept of strategic equivalence.
Definition: Two utility functions, u 1 and u Z' are
Ｎ ＿ ｟ ｴ ｲ ｡ ｴ ･ ｧ ｩ ｣ ｡ ｬ ｬ ｹ Ｎ ｾ ｱ ｵ ｩ ｶ ｾ ｾ Ｌ wri tten u 1 - u Z' if and only if
there exisits constants hand k > 0 such that
u 1 (x) = h + ku Z(x) , for a 11 x • ( 4 . 1OJ
}" 1 -Zx d 6 1ry -2x . 11'or examp e, -e an - je are strateglca y
equivalent utility functions. It is easy to prove
Theorem 4.1.: If ｵ ｬ ｾ ｚ ｟ ｌ ｟ ｾ ｬ ｾ ｴ Ｚ Ｚ ｟ ｾ ｾ ｉ Ｎ Ａ ｡ ｩ ｮ ｴ ｹ equivalents for al!Y
pa!"!)cular_ lottery ｩ ｭ ｰ ｬ ｾ ｟ ｴ Ｚ Ｚ Ｎ ｾ ｬ __ｾｹ __ ｾ ｬ｡ｾ｟ｾｚ｟ＭＬｾｲ･ ..!!le same.
Proof. Assume (4.10) holds and let x be a cert<linty
'\;
equivalent implied by u l for the lottery x, Using
(4.9) dnd (4.10) in succes,;ive :,.;teps,
u 1(x) - E [ u 1 ex) ]
But frolll (4.10),
u 1(x) = h + ku/x).
E[h + kuZ(x)]
11 + k E[uZ(x)]
from the two prey j ous equa t i (ms ,
uz(x) :: E[uZ(X)]
so that ｾ is the certainty equjvalent of X using u Z" <1
As an immediate consequcncc of the above assertion,
we have the following corollary.
"., I'V •
Corollary: If lottery xl is EE..efexred to Ｑ Ｐ ｴ ｴ ･ ｲ ｙ ｾ ｚ ｾ ｳ ｬ ｮ ｧ
utility function u f ' the same preference will
hold us ing ｡ ｮ ｾ ｾ ｲ ｪ Ｚ ｬ tc.g ica ｬ ｾ ｾ Ｎ ･ ｱ ｵ i ｶｅＮＡｾｊｾｾＡＺＡＡＮｪｬ i ty
function u Z"
Proof: Civen
from (4.10)
E[u 1(xI)] > L:[U I (x Z)] , it follows
that: E[U Z(X 1)] > E[uZ(X Z)] • <J
This result means that srrCltcgieaily equivalent utility
functions have identical lmplicatlons for action. Let us
present some examples.
Exalll12}e 4.1 Let u(x) (J .. bx-x, b > O. Suppose the de-
cision maker is faced with a lorrery descyjbed by the pro-
bab il i ty dens i ty Eunc t ion f. Then the expec ted consequence
is
x :: E [xJ :: Ix f ( x ) dx ,
and the certainty equival ewe ｾ ｸ 1S found froIll
. .,. 1
e tl)( J := ｾ ｉ
SiIlce
ｾ A ｾｾ
u(x) := a -;- bx it foll ows th.'lt x x. This example
shows that if the utility function is linear, the certainty
equivalent for any lottery is equal to the expected con-
sequence of that lottery. U
-cx -cxExample 4.2 Let u(x) = a - be ,.., -e ,where b>O, and
suppose the decision maker is faced with a 50-50 lottery
yielding either x 1 or x 2 , written < x 1 ,x 2 > . The expected
consequence x is (x 1 + x 2)/2. The certainty equivalent is
the solution to
ｵ Ｈ ｾ Ｉ = E[u(x) ] ,
or equivalently, the solution to
...
-cx
-e =
2
Table 4.1 exhibits some certainty equivalents and expected
outcomes for a few < x 1 ,x 2 > lotteries given u(x) = -e -cx.
rpab1e 4.1 Certainty Equiv<:1l.c:mts for Lotteries <X1 ,X 2 >
. () -exUSlng u x =-e
-
A
C X X X X
---
-1- -2·-
1 0 10 5 0.69
1 10 20 15 10.69
1 20 30 25 20.69
0.2 0 10 5 2.85
0.2 10 20 15 12.85
0.2 20 30 25 22.85
O. 1 0 10 5 3.8
O. 1 10 20 15 '13.8
O. 1 20 30 25 23.8
--_....._-_... _-.._------
Now suppose the lottery is described by the uniform
probability density function
1(---_.. _.-
f(x) :;::) x 2 - X 1
1 0
, XI < )( -, x
-- - 2
elsewhere
The expected consequence is clearly (xl + x 2)/2 and the
certainty equivalent is found by solving
2"?>O
or
-"
u(x)
ｾ
-cx
-e
Jx 2 -ex 1= ( -0 ) C-----) dxXl x 2 - Xl
-cx -cx
= (. 1 ｾ｟Ｉ Ｈｾ｟Ｎ _2__ e__l.)
x - x .2 1 c
Completing the calculations for a few cases, we obtain
Table 4.2. U
Table 4.2 Certainty Equivalents for Uniform Lotteries
Using u(x) -ex- -e
'"c x _x Z_ x x-'- --1- ---
1 0 10 5 2.30
1 10 20 15 12.30
1 20 30 25 22.30
0.2 0 10 5 4.2
0.2 10 20 15 14.2
0.2 20 30 25 24.2
0.1 0 10 5 4.58
0.1 10 20 15 14.58
0.1 20 30 25 24.58
Ｍ ｟ Ｎ ｟ Ｍ Ｍ ｾ Ｍ ----...._--_ ...-.. ｾ - .-. Ｍ ｾ - ｾＮ __.-.
--------- Ｎ｟Ｎ｟ｾ ｟Ｎ｟ＮＧＭｾＮ｟ＭＭＮ
From Tables 4.1 and 4.2, it appears that if all the
consequences of a lottery are increased by a fixed amount,
the certainty equivalent is increased hy that same amount.
'rhis is an important property of the exponential utility
function.
+ x .0-
Proof. The certainty equivalent 2' for the
second lottery solves
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i'
-ex'
-e
But hy defjnition,
so
Ｍ ｣ ｾ , ." Ae-cxO (_e- cx ) -c(x + xO)-e = -- -e
from which it fo 11 ows that ｾ Ｌ ....... XO' 4= x +
Example 4.3 Let u(x) = log (x + h), x > -b. The expected
consequence for lottery <xl ,xZ> is (x I + xZ)/Z as before.
The certainty equivalent is the solutjon to
A Jog (Xl + 0) + log (xL + b)
log (x + b) = ｾＭＭＭＭＧＭＭＭＭＭＭＭＭＭＭ
7
which is
,..
x =
A few cases are cataloged in Table 4.3. U
Table 4.3 Certainty Equivalents for Lotteries ｾ ｸ ｬ Ｌ ｸ Ｒ ｾ
Using u(x} = log (x + b)
.- ' \b x x x x
-" -1- ._._-, 2- --
1 0 10 5 2.32
1 10 20 15 14.2
1 20 ｾ Ｉ () 2 l 24.5".J
11 0 10 5 4.2
11 10 20 15 14.5
11 20 30 25 24.7
21 0 10 5 4.5
21 10 20 1 5 14.7
21 20 30 25 24.8
One can see from this Table 4.3 for every lottery the
certainty equivalent is always less than the expected
consequence. However, for any particular value of b,
"this difference grows small er as t}le consequences x 1
and x 2 are increased by a fixed ｾ ｭ ｯ ｵ ｮ ｴ Ｎ Later in this
sec"tion, we shall devote a good deal of attention to
utility functions which imply such a behavior for the
certainty equivalents.
Example 4.4 The firSt three examples have all concerned
monotonically increasing utility functions. Let us con-
Ｒ ｾ ｚ Ｎ
sider the decreasing utility function i.e. u(x) 2= -x ,
x ｾ 0, and calculate the expected consequences and cer-
tainty equivalents for <0,10 > nnd <10,20 >. The ex-
pected consequences are clearly 5 and 15, respectively.
The certainty equivalent for <0,10 > is the solution to
.-,2
-x = ·-50 .
,\
Thus, x = 7.07. Similarly the certainty equivalent for
< 10,20 > IS found to be 15.H. This means that the de-
cision maker IS indifferent between obtaining x = 7.07
for certain and the lottery <0,10 >, and that he is in-
different between obtaining x = 15.8 for certain and the
lottery <10,20> . U
By now you should feel at case with the certainty
equivalent. The examples have illustrated calculation of
"[he certainty equivalents for SOllie rejJresenunive lo"ttcries.
However, they dealt only with monotonic utility functions.
But what about the monotonic case? In this situation, the
certainty equivalent may not even be unique. Refer to Fig. 4.4
and consider a 50-50 lottery hetween xl and xz. A certain-
ty equivalent is any consequence whose utility equals the
expected utility of the lottery [u(x l ) + u(xZ)]/Z. As we
can see from Figure 4.4, both x 3 and x 4 are certainty equi-
valents for <xl ,xZ> , and in fact, one of these does not
even fall between the two possilllc consequences of the
lottery.
4.4 RISK AVERSION
In this and the next four sections, we introduce
various basic attitudes tmvard risk and illustrate their
implications on the functional form of the utility function.
In order to maintain a continuity in the presentation and
to help the reader develop an intuitive understanding for
these concepts, the sections through 4.7 concern only mo-
notonically increasing utility functions. And, for the
same reasons, much of our discussion will concern the
cases involving a monetary attribute, such as "net assets"
or "incremental income." However, as we have stressed
earlier, the concepts are equally valid for nonmonetary
attributes. Section 4.8 then extends the risk concepts
to situations with decreasing ilnd Ilonmonotollic preferences.
U I:"
Fi <1 4.4. lho. c. e r\ci ,,7(.\ [. i>1.1 \ Vet\ i> ｬｾＮｳ \j s· 'n1
u. NCIY' ＩＭＧｦ｜ｯＮＬＮｩ［［ＧｾＮＩ n 'c 01 \\i1 t\ F I.A 'Y\& c n
>
')(.
4 • 4 . 1 A Definition of Risk Aversion
Intuitively, one thinks of a risk-averse person as
one who prefers to behave conservatively. Consider a de-
cision maker facing a lottery yielding either a consequence
Xl or a less prefereable cOllsequence x", with equal pro-
bability. Obviously, the expected consequence ｾ of this
lottery is (x' + x")/2. No\\! suppose the decision maker
is asked to state his pre'-t_'l'CllC(' between receiving x
for certain and the lottery < x' ,x" ;>. If the decision maker
prefers the certain consequence x to the lottery(x' ,x")
witIl the same expected consequence, then the decision
maker is actually saying he pr0fers to avoid the risks
associated with the lottery. That is, although i and
<x' ,x"> have the sallie expected consequences, he prefers
x since there is no risk associated with it, whereas
there is risk associated with the outcome of the lottery.
When a decision maker I18s this type of attitude toward
all lotteries, we say he ｩ ｳ ｾ Ｚ ｟ ｘ ｾ ｫ Ｍ ｡ ｶ ･ ｲ ｳ ･ Ｎ Ｎ Let us fornta-
lize this notion.
Definition: A decision Tl1Clkcr is ｔ Ｕ ｳ ｫ Ｍ ｡ ｾ ･ ｙ ｳ ･ if he prefers
the expected consequence or any non degenerate lottery to
that lottery.*'
------------------ -- -._-- .---------
i.j\ nondegenerate lottery is ｏ ｬ ｬ ｜ Ｚ ｾ where no single consequence
has a probability of ont' ()!" occurring. Ir is an academic
point, bur had '\-vt' ＬｾｬＱｯ｜ｊＨＧ､ d",\',lii\..'ratc Jottt'yiesin ､ ｣ ｾ ｦ ｩ Ｍ
nition (4.11), the "greaTer th,lT1" sign" > ", would have
to be replaced by the "greater than or equal" sign "> "
In such a situation, the utility of the expected con-
sequence of any lottery must he greater than the expected
utility of that lottery. So, if the possible consequences
of a lottery are respresented hy x, one is risk-averse if
for all ｮ ｯ ｮ ､ ｣ ｾ ･ ｮ ･ ｲ ｡ ｴ ･ lotteries
u[E(x)] >E[uex)J
It is easy to prove
(4.11)
Theorem 4.3 A decision ｬ ｬ ｬ ｾ ｾ ｽ ｾ ｟ ｾ ｾ ｾ ｟ ｾ ｾ ＿ ｬ Ｌ Ｍ Ｍ Ｍ ］ Ｎ ｡ ｶ ･ ｲ ｳ ･ if and ...ｾｮＡＧｹ
if his uti 1 i ｾｊﾷｵＮｉＡ｣ t iOIl is concave.
Proof: Consider u latter which yields either
xl with probabi.lity p or Xz with probability
(1 - p), O<p<1 The expected consequence is
I,'..
_.
x == pX 1 + (1 - p) x Z' For risk-averse utility
functions, from (4.11)
u [px 1 + (1
0< P <
which is the definition of (strict) concavity.
To prove the converse (done only for ｾ ｨ ･ finite
case) j consider lottery i yielding x. with pro-
1
bability p., for i =1, ... , Ill, where no p. =1.
1 1
Since u is strictly concave, we know that
In
u[E Ｑ Ｉ Ｎ ｸ Ｌ ﾷ Ｑ ｾ ﾷ ): 11 .U(X.)
1 1 ｾ ..' I . li=1 1'" I
This ｩ ｮ ･ ｾ ｵ ｡ ｬ ｩ ｴ ｹ Ｌ Ｎ ｪ ｵ ｾ ［ ｴ (4.11) for the finite
CC:lSC, so u is ri ·:k-'I\. ,··;c. -J
Openltionally, it JIlay be unrealistic to check con-
d i t ion (4.1 1) for a I J nOli dc gell e y ate lot t c Y i e S to th.' t e r -
mine wherher or not one is risk-aveyse. To help matters,
there is the related
s ･ｾ e 11ceo f a 11 v 5 0 - ｾｊ 0 lot t c y v < x , x., > tothe
--' -.. ＭＭＭＭＭＭＭＭＭＭＭＭＭｾＮＭＭＭＮＭＮＭｾ ..-.---.. ---··,·--·-1--1..----· --._-
Ｑ ｣ ｮ ｬ ｬ ｾ ｲ ｙ i-rself is ｲ ｩ ｾ ［ ｫ Ｍ ｡ ｶ ･ ｲ ｳ ･ .
. ＭＭＭＭＭｾＭＭ｟Ｎ｟ＬＭＭＭＭＭＭＭ｟Ｎ｟Ｎ __ ._--- .----_._-.- -----._-
2 .... ',a
PI'oof. l-r f u 1J 0 \\1 S fru!lI the prem1se that
Ｍ Ｍ Ｍ ｾ Ｍ Ｎ Ｎ Ｎ Ｍ Ｍ Ｍ
u (x) 1 I x 2) 1 u(x 1)
1
u (x 2) ,a] 1 I== uti XI + 2' > 'J + 2 XI Xz'-'
which :impUcs u 1S concave. '1
As one learns in every basic cconmicscourse, the
economist's concept of decreasing Illi.lrginal utility implies
-rhe ｵ Ｇ ｃ ｩ ｌ Ｚ ｾ ｌ Ｎ ｌ ｾ Ｚ ｾ Ｎ ｆ ｬ ｾ Ｍ ｲ ｩ ｯ Ａ Ｑ is COJlcavE' 'Illd conversely. 1101'e,
utility fl}2!:5:rion is in it.alics ｬ ｷ ｣ ｡ ｬ ｬ ｳ ｬ ｾ it is a completely
di fferen t cons true t i on fYom the VOll ｬｾ･ｬｬＱｬＱ｡ｮｬｬＭｍｯｲｧ･ｮｳ te rn
utility function \'Jhich we ,Ire cOllsiJl,t'cing in this chapter.
The distinction seellls illlj)ortnl1t C'110\l1',h to ､ ｣ ｳ ｬ ｾ ｲ ｶ ｬ Ｇ :1 brief
Jigression.
When the econmisl >jays U Til i ty for
at-rribute X is decreasing", he JiiC;mS ThaT lhC' ｬ ｮ ｃ ｲ ｃ Ｚ ｬ ｓ ｬ ｾ Iii
uni-cs of ｵ ｴ ｩ ｬ ｩ ｴ ｹ ｾ called ｵ ｴ ｪ Ａ ｴ Ｇ ｾ ［ Ｍ Ｍ ｜ ｬ Ｇ ｬ ｴ ｩ ｃ ｊ ｉ ,lYe ｮ ･ ｖ ｬ Ｎ ｾ ｲ expLicitly
defincd--due -ro alil11CTl\lilcntal uni r uf X from x to x+1 dc-
duced and allY cxpccced utj 1 i t.y c;1! eu LlCed {YOlil such a
.in th(' case of von NeulIi:lllll-fvlorgcnstern uril j I Y functions.
As an example of our economist's utility function
with decreasing marginal utility, suppose one considered
8 utiles as the utility of one day of skiing, 14 utiles
for two days, 18 utiles for three days, etc. Then one
could say the first day is worth 8 utiles, the second an
additional 6, and the third another 4. The marginal utility
of each additional day of skiing is decreasing. However,
if this individual had a choice between two days of skiing
for sure or a lottery yielding either 1 or 3 days with
equal likelihood, one could not say which option should
be preferred using the utility function. This is so even
though the expected number of utiles for the lottery is
13, whereas it is 14 for the sure 2 days skiing. The con-
cept of "expected utiles" has E-0 meaning. The utility
functions we are talking about in this chapter are com-
pletely different from the economist's utility function .
Knowing one implies very little about the other. One can
easily be convex and the other concave for the same attri-
bute.
Let us return to our decision maker and suppose he
did not wish to behave conservatively. In fact, suppose
the decision maker preferred any lottery to the expected
consequence of that lottery. That is to say he was more
than willing to accept the risks associated with any
lottery. This type of individual is said to be risk prone.
Definition: 1\ decision maker is risk prone if he pre-
fers any nondegenerate lottery to the expected consequence
of that lottery.
For such an illdividuaJ, the utility of the expected
consequence must be less than the expected utility of the
lottery, ｴ ｨ ｡ ｾ is
u[E(x)] < E[uex)J. (4.12)
Because of the similarity to the preceding assertion, we
state without proof
ｉ Ｎ ｨ ･ ｯ ｔ ･ ｬ Ｑ Ａ Ｎ Ｎ ｾ Ｚ ｾ ｾ ､ ･ ｾ ｩ ｳ Ｕ ｯ ｾ Ｎ ｟ Ａ Ｎ Ａ Ａ Ｎ ｾ Ａ ｾ ｾ Ａ ｟ Ｎ ｊ Ｚ ｾ ｟ ｲ ｩ ｾ ｾ ｾ ｮ ･ if and ｾ ｾ Ｎ ｬ ｙ
if his ｵ ｴ ｩ ｬ ｩ ｴ ｾ ｮ ｣ ｴ ｩ ｯ ｮ is convex.
There is an alternative way which we couJd have defined
risk aversion for increasing utility functions. However,
since this definition would not be valicl for other cases,
we chose (4.11) to define risk averse and to state the alter-
native as a fact. Let us illustrate this with
ｔ ｨ ｾ Ｎ Ｙ ｲ ･ ｾ ｾ Ｚ For ｩ ｮ ｣ ｲ ｾ ｡ ｳ ｩ ｾ ｒ Ｍ ｾ Ｍ Ａ ｟ ｾ ｬ ｽ ｴ ｹ ｟ ｦ ｵ ｮ ｣ ｴ ｩ ｯ ｮ ｳ Ｌ a dec ｾ ｳ ｩ ｯ ｮ
maker is risk .avers2__ if ｟ ｡ ｬ Ａ Ｎ ｓ ｌ ｾ ｊ Ｎ Ｎ ｌ if his cer- __
Proof. Assume he is risk averse. Then from (4.11)
rE ＨｾＩ ]u ｾ ｾ x > E [u (x)1
But by the definition of a certainty equivalent,
we know
..,
utx) 1: [u (x)]
so
Since the utility function IS increasing, clearly
,\
> x
Now to go the other way, assume
E ex) > x
Then, because the utility function IS increasing,
1
which completes the proof. '-J
For increasing utility functions we make the
following
Definition: The risk premium RP of a lottery x
is its expected consequence minus its certainty
230
equivalent. In symbols we have
-1\'lhere u is the inverse of u.
It is easy to show
make}' is risk averse if and only if his risk
EICliliUlil is'-positivc for all nondegeneratc
10t1:eries.
The proof is omitTed as it follows directly from
the definition of the risk premium.
11: Illay be ilLusrrative to \JOrk llJrough u couple of
exalllpies. Refer to Fig. 4.:'> i'or an illustration of the
Certahlty equivalent and risk premium for < Xl ,x Z> using
a risk averse utility function.
u 1\
x" certainty equilivant fa .. <:''xI)x 2,)
"x
U(X2) ｾ Ｍ Ｍ Ｍ Ｍ Ｍ Ｍ Ｍ Ｍ Ｍ Ｍ Ｍ Ｍ Ｍ Ｍ Ｍ Ｍ
ｵ Ｈ ｾ Ｉ ｾ _
u( x) \to'----------
---=,.v ｾ risk
primium
for (x, ')(2.)
....._----.._-----'----'---------:..----->
ｾ
Figure 4. S.Ar\ Increasing Utility Function Exhibiting Risk Aversion
Example 4.5 From Table 4.1, we sec that uSIng the utility
f . () -0. 2x 1 '. . 1 functIon u x -e , t1e certcnDty 8quIva ent or
<0,.10> is 2.85 and the expected consequence is 5.0. Thus,
the risk prell\iUlI\ is (5.0 - 2.35) or 2.15. Similarly, the
certainty equivalent forQO,30) is 22.85 and the expected
consequence is 25.0, so again the risk premium is 2. 15. [J
E 1 4 b' G' ( ) O.:Z (20 - x) 20x aUlD e . J l V enux == - e , x ｟ｾＬ - ,
He find the certainty equivaients for <-20,-10> and <-10,0>
to be -17.15 and -7.15 respectively. Their expected conse-
({uences are clearly -15.0 and -5.0. Thus, the risk premium
for the first lottery is [-15.0 -(-17.15)] or 2.15. Si-
milarly, 2.15 is the risk premium for <-10,0 >. LJ
Intuitively, the risk premiu/Il ische amount of the
attribute that the decision maker is willing to "give Upll
"
from the average (Le., the amount Jess chan the expected
consequence) to avoid the risks associuted with the parti-
cular lottery.
When the decision maker is faced with an unfavorable
lottery, that is, one which is less preferable than the
status quo, it is natural to :lsk how much would he l'payll
in terms of attribute X 'LO avoid accepting this lottery.
This leads us to make the fo'l! o\;Jing
Defini 'cion: Thi.:' ｾｾＲｾｲ｡ｬｬ｣｣ｊｈ･ｊｬｬｩｵｬｊｬ II' for a
lottery x is the negative oi [he certainty equivalent of
the 10 t [ery. In symbol s
_ Ｎｾ -l t, [ oJ. 0' "IP(x) == -x := - u·\tu(X).)
Z40
24/
If, for example, the lottery x has a certainty equivalent
of -$ 5,000 say, then the insurance premium is $ 5,000.
The decision maker should just be willing to give up
$ 5,000 to rid himself of the financial responsibility
of the lottery.
In the last example, assume that x = 0 was equivalent
to doing nothing, i.e. the status quo. Then <-ZO,-10> and
<-10,0> are unfavorable lotteries since their expected
utilities are less than the utility of the status quo. The
decision maker was indifferent between <-ZO,-10> and its
certainty equivalent -15.8. This means the decision maker
should be willing to pay 15.8 to eliminate the responsi-
bility of the lottery <-ZO,-10> . Thus, 15.8 is the insurance
preJll i um for <- Z0 , - 10>. Likewi s e , the dec i s ion rn a ke r shou I d
pay 5.8 to avoid <-10,0> so 5.8 is the insurance premium.
4.4. Z Restricting the Form of the Utility Function
Before going any deeper into the theory, let us
illustrate how monotonicity and risk aversion can be ex-
ploited to greatly simplify the assessment of a utility
function. Suppose we wish to assess a utility function
u for attribute X, and the decision maker has indicated
that his preferences increase monotonically in X and that
he is risk averse.
To begin, we choose xl <:Ind x t ' where xZ> xl' and
arbitrarily assign u(x'l) and ulx L ) sllbjecl: to the restricl:ion
that u(x Z) > u(x,).This is permissible since utility
functions are unique up to positive linear transformations.
By plotting the points [x, ,u(x,) 1 and [xZ,u(x Z)] on the
graph in Figure 4.6, we can see the decision maker's
utility function is ｬ ｩ ｭ ｩ ｾ ･ ､ to the nonshaded area. Consider
point 3 in the figure. If the utility function passed through
this point, then part of the function would necessarily
ｮ ｯ ｾ be concave. But since the decision maker is risk averse,
his ｵ ｾ ｩ ｬ ｩ ｴ ｹ function must be concave therefore, it cannot
pass ｾ ｨ ｲ ｯ ｵ ｧ ｨ point :5. Similarly, if the decision maker's
utility funCtion passed through point 4, monotonicity would
be violated since x 4> x 2 and u(x 4) < u(x Z)
Now suppose we question the decision maker to find
his certainty equivalent for tIle lottery yielding either
x, or x z' each with probability '/Z. Denoting this certain-
ty equivalent by x S ' we have one additional point,
[xS,u(x S)] , on the utility function, where
u(x,) + u(x Z)
Z
After plotting ｾ ｨ ｩ ｳ point on the graph of Fig. 4.6A we use
the same logic as before to restrict the decision maker's
utility function to the nonshaded region of Fig. 4.69. As
can be seen from the figure, by empirically evaluating the
utility of only one consequence, the shape of the utility
function can be restricted quite a degree by exploiting
the qualitative characteristiv; of llIollotonicity and risk
aversion.
The same type of reasoning Celn be used to bound the
x(A)
.
----y
x
x
(\:))
rrrrrrj Restricted by
lLLLL!J Risk Aversion
ｾ ｬ Hest:ricted byＬ ｾ Honotonicity
certainty equivalents of a lottery. Perhaps this can best
be illustrated with
Example 4.7 Let us say xl == 0, )(2 =IUO, and X s == 40 in
Fig. 4.6. FUYl:hermore, aSSUlik ,vi.: lwd arbitrarily set
u(O) == 0 and u(IOO) == I, so ultlU) -c u.s. 1'ilCll, as we can
see in Fig. 4.7, by elcmcntary gcometric reasoning, any
monotone, risk-averse ut.d i ry i-llllcr ion Jilust 1 ie bctween
x/SO
and
u 2 (x) == 0.167 + x/120.
Suppose we want to bound the ccrtainty equivalent for the
lottery described by the probahil ity dellsity function f(x)
where
f(x) _ { 1/50 , 25 < x < 75 ,
.,. 1 0 ,e1 ｳ ｾ Ｍ ｷ ｨ ･ ｾ ｾ ･ .
To get an upper bound on the cerrainty equivalent for
a lottery, in general we could ohtain an upper bound on its
expected uti I i ty and find the Lnges t va Iue of x which could
possibly have ｾ ｨ ｩ ｳ utility. Because of risk aversion, Theorem 4.5
implies the certainty equivalent call he no greater than
50. However, for the specific lou'ery, note from Fig. 4.7
that it is possible that the utility function be linear
from x = 25 to x = 75. Since the probability density speci-
fies possible outcollles only in this range, the certainty
equivaleIlt could be (IS high a:: SO, t!J(' exrl'cted OUtCOlIlC.
flence, the lowest upper hound ('II til(' certainty equivalclll:
u 1\
u 2 (x) ｾ 0.167 + x/120
100
.----_._--"------:....>
X.)1' '1\40 L)' u S"o
"'nc."
1
0.574
0.5
- 4L: L\;JXtniu - J.7,-
Figur-e 4.7 Bounding the Certainty Equivalent USiH'j
Risk AVtrs;ioh <lY\d ＧＧＧ｜ｯｾＧｵｴｃ＼ｮﾷ［ＮＺＮ｜｜ﾷＧｩ
'-
for our lottery, calJ it x ,is 50.0.
III ax
To find a lower bound on the certainty equivalent,
we could first get a lower bound on the expected utility
ofthis lot t e r y, <:m d 1 hen f j llCl the S 1Il a 11 est value 0 f x
\;1h i c h c au 1d po s sib 1y 11 aveth i. S 11 til i t y. C1ear 1y, reg a r d-
2.44-
less of what the actual utiliTy function u
expected utility of the lottery
is, the
·'75
.! u (x-) f ( .x. ) dx
25
J
'40 (75
ｾ u 1 (x) f (x) dx + )"u 2 (x) f (x) dx ,
2S 40
so
E[u(i)} > 0.122 + 0.452 = 0.574
As can be seen from Fig. 4.7, the smallest possible amount
x, call it x . , which could have a utility equal to 0.574
mln
results when u(x) = u 1 (x) and is found by solving
u (x ) = x . /RO1 min 1Il1n
This gives us
x . = 45.92
nlln
0.574 .
and x. is a lower bound on the "true" certainty equivalentlinn
of our lottery. It is not necessarily the greatest lower
bound since x. was calculated using u = u 1 in the rangemln
x > 40, whereas u = U" \;las useJ ill this range to calculate
ｻ ｾ
the minimum utility for the ｦ ｾ ｩ ｶ ｃ ｉ ｬ probability density. Hence,
tighter bounds could probably be found. 0
, .
However, our purpose in tIlis example was not to find
the tightest possible bounds on the certainty equivalent
but to illustrate how some rather powerful inferences can
be made from a limited amount of information about a de-
cision maker's preferences alld to become more familiar
with some of ｾ ｨ ･ concepts we will be using continually.
2.45"
4.4 .3 The Risk Prone Casc*
Let us now take a look ｊ ｾ the opposite of a risk-averse
decision maker, that is, a risk-prone one. It is easy to
prove
Theorem 4.7: For increasinLutility functions, a decision
maker is risk ｰ ｲ Ｎ ＼ Ｚ Ｎ ＿ ｾ Ｑ ･ if and only if his certain:
ty equivalent fUf any nondegenerate lottery
is greater than Lhe expected consequence of
that lottery.
The proof is ｯ ｭ ｩ ｴ ｾ ･ ､ because of i [s similarity to tIle
corresponding proof for the risk averse case.
Recall that the risk premium was defined as the ex-
pected consequence minus the certainty equivalent for in-
creasing utility functions. Following directly from this
*This subsection examines tll<: risk prone case in a manner
analogous ｾ ｯ the risk aver.:.::;e ｃ［ｪｾＭ［･Ｎ It ｪ ｾ ｪ included primari-
ly for reference purposes ｾ Ｑ ｊ ｝ ､ IIIay he skipped.
z. '+ (.;,
definition, we have
Theorem 4.8: For increasing utjli tl..Junctions, a decision
make-f is risk E-rone if and only if his risk
£!emium is negative for all nondegenerate
lotteries.
The proof is oJltil.:tec1. However, let us illustrate
this result with
ｅ ｸ ｡ ｬ ｬ ｬ ｰ ｬ ･ ｾ Consider Cl risk ｰ ｲ ｯ ｬ ｬ ｜ ｾ utility function of the
form u(x) 2= O.2x as illustraLcd ill Fig. 4.8 and let us
calculate the expected consequence, certainty equivalent,
and risk premium for the lottery < 4,12 > • Clearly, the ex-
pected consequence is
2
4 + 12
x = = 8
The expected utility of this lottery is
1 1 1 (0. 2 16) 1 144 ) 16"2 u(4) + 2 u(12) = 7) x + 2(0.2 x =
..
its certainty equivalent -'" the solution toso x 1S
A 20.2(x) == 16
ｾ A
Solving this, we find x = 8.94. The risk problem, x - x is
then easily found ｾ ｯ be -0.94. U
A risk prone individual is one who is "willing to
gamble." In laboratory experilflcnts and in operational si-
ｴ ｵ ｡ ｾ ｩ ｯ ｮ ｳ in the "real-world," different researchers have
found certain decision makers to 1:0 he risk prone. For in-
stance, Grayson (196ULby Jltcasurin 6 :c;cvcrcd oil ｷ ｩ ｬ ､ ｣ ｡ ｾ Ｑ Ｚ ･ ｲ ｳ Ｇ
ｵ ｴ ｩ ｬ ｩ ｾ ｹ functions for money, found some of them 1:0 have
lAo 1\
28.8
H;
12.8 ｲ ｾ
-1 risk,,-premium"'-"' 3.2 f"... (4,12 >
-"'''1 :>0
x =8 >'4::13.<')4 X0 4 12
O 2 .2. -x
Figure 4.8.An Increasing Utility Function Illustrating Risk Proneness
24,
this characteristic. In other words, these oil wildcatters
were willing to risk their stakes on a lottery (i.e.,
drilling for oil) with an expected return less than their
stakes, but which might result in a very large return
(i.e., striking oil). This large return represented the
opportunity for a "new way of life," and this made the
gamble worth it to In any wi 1Jc at tel's. Aspec ts of Grayson I s
work are discussed in SectiolJ 4.10.
Given that the decision lIIaker's preferences are in-
creasing, that he is risk"prone, and given the certainty
equivalent for one SO-50 lottery, we could bound his uti-
lity function as we did for the risk-averse individual.
Also, we could calculate bounds for the certainty equi-
valent of any other lotteries using the procedure illustrated
in Example 4.7. However, since the ideas are similar to
the previous case, another example would not be parti ..
cularly illustrative, so \-Je omit it.
4.5 A MEASURE OF RISK AVERSION*
Now that the usefulness of rjsk aversion is established,
we will direct our attention toward a measure of this pro-
perty for increasing utiLity functions. We would like a
measure of risk aversion to indicate when one decision
ffThe reader is strongly urged to read Pratt [1964] which
is the original source for JIlUClt of W]lat is J iscussed in
this and the following two sections.
maker is more risk-averse than another in the sense that
for any specified lottery, his risk premium is greater
than that of the other decision maker.
Consider the lottery < x + h ,x - h> where h is a speci-
fied amount of X. Intuitively, it seems the more concave
the utility funcrion u is about x, the larger the risk
premiu1l11r(x,h) for the lottery <x + h, x - h> will be.
However, this norion is quickly disJIlissed by viewing
Fig. 4.9. As can be seen, although u", the second deriva-
tive of u with respect to x, is different for the two
utility functions, the risk premium is the same. There-
fore, the magnitude of u" provides no insight into one's
attitudes toward risk. With good hindsight, we can see
that of course this is the case since utility functions
which are positive linear transformations of each other are
strategically equivalent.
The SIgn of u" does provide some information how-
ever. If u" is negative for all x, then u must be con-
cave, and therefore risk-averse. On the other hand, if
u" is positive for all x, then u IS convex implying the
decision maker is risk-prone. Thus it seems reasonable
to take u" into account in SOIlle way in a measure of risk
aversion.
Let us proceed in the same manner which led to rhe
development of a measure of risk aversion. It seemed de-
ｾ ｩ ｲ ｡ ｢ ｬ ･ that such a lIleasure ｾ ［ ｨ ｯ ｵ ｬ ､ Ｌ iil!lOllg other ｴ ｨ ｩ ｬ ｬ ｧ ｾ ｪ Ｌ
ｚ Ｎ Ｔ ｾ
/
/
,I
-x
u = -3e
-x
u' .. 3e
-'C
, lr(x h)
""" . .
ｾ If(x,h)
x-h x
certainty
equivalent
(A)
:x.+h
___"-:- ｾ｟ＭＧＭＭＭＭＭＭＭｬＭＭＭＭＺＺＮ
x-h l x x+h
certainty
equivalent
(B)
Figure 4 .9
z.49
(1) indicaIe whether a utility function is risk-averse
or ris::<:-prone (which can be done with u lt ) and (2) be identi-
cal for stl':ltcgically equivalent utility functions. Following
this them<2 1 1:\.J1' straccgically equivalent utility functionsu 1
and uz' c Lead y U z =: J + kU 1 , so that U z == ku1, and U z == kU;'.
ｾ ｲ ｯ ｬ ｬ ｜ this 1 one call observe that uZ/u Z == u;'/u" and thus it
se(;;lIIS rhar a relev<.lll'[ Jneasure of one I s aversion to risk might
be the rario of u" alld u'. This was tried and it was dis-
covered thar such a lll\::asure had many desirable properties.
Many of these properties are stated in this section. With
this lIIotivation we inrroduce the following
Definition: The local risk aversion at x, written l' (x) , is
defined by
l' (x) _ ._ u lt (x1
u' (x)
(4.13)
Operationally, it is useful to note that
d
rex) (log u' (x)]
dx
(4.14)
*'The I'isk aversion funcrion preserves all that is essential
concerning u while eliminating the arbitrariness. That means,
more formally,
Theorem 4.9: Two utility funcILolls HJlich are srrategically
and cOllverselv.Ｍ Ｍ ｟ Ｎ ｟ Ｍ Ｍ Ｍ Ｍ Ｍ ｾ Ｍ
''''Whenever reo) IS discussed, we are <JssllJlling thelL u(.) IS
rwice conrinously differentiable.
"2.5 0
ｐｲｾｯｦＮ l.et u 1 (x) = a + b u 2 (x), b > O. Clearly,
u' (x) = bu' (x) and u" (x)1 2.. 1
u (x)
r (x) :: - ｾＱ . :=_
1 u 1 (x)
:= bu 2(x), so
bu2(x) .-
bu;{(x) :;; I' 2 (x)
To prove the COllverse, notice frOJil (4.14) that
J. .)
- r (x) := - -- [I 0 [T u ' (x)dx . U _J
Integra1:ing both sides gives us
j-- r (x ) Jx = log u 1 (x) + C ,
where C is an illtcgration constant. Exponentiating
this, we fino
e -II' (x) dx == elog u' (x)-r c C
:= e u' (x) .
And finally integrating again,
f -J r (x) ､ ｸ Ｇ ｾ c ce = Je u ' (x) dx = e u (x) + d •
Since e C >0 and J are constan1:s, rex) specifies
u(x) up to posi1:ive linear transformations. <J
4 . 5 .1 Interpreting the Risk Aversion function
Let us try 1:0 bu.ild up an intuitive interpretation for
the risk aversion func1:ion. Let Xo denote the decision
wakeI" s in i 1: iul endo\vlll<.:n t 0 fag i ven ill: tr i bu te X, and now
consider adding to X o a lottery ｾ Ｚ Ｚ ｣ involving onl y a small
range of X with an expected consequence E ex) equal to zero.
i\.lso, let 1T(XO 'X) be 1:he decisiolt Illal,er's risk ｰ ｲ ･ ｊ ｮ ｩ ｌ ｩ ｩ ｊ ｬ ｾ ｾ
［ ｾ ａ cautionary \/Ord about a IJossible llotational confusion is
in order. We use the notation ·/J(x,x) as the risk preillium
for the lottery (x<-<) _ When xis the special lo1:Tt'ry
<-h,h> , we usc 1:he syJllbolisIll7r(x,h) instead of TI(x, <-h,h»
for t.he risk premiulfl of the lottery x + < -h,h > , or equi-
valcnt.ly of the Jorcery <x-h,x+h>.
2"':> ,
for Xo + x. By definition of the certainty equivalent
u (x 0 - 'IT) == E [u (x 0 + x) J • (4.15)
Using Tay1 0 I' 's f 0 nnu:l:J toexpan d hot 11 side S 0 f (4. 15), we
find
and
u (x O - 1T) (4.16)
==.G[u(xo) +xu'(xO) +
［ＮｾＡ ｸＺｾｕＢＧ (xO) + •.• J
= u(xO) + i E[x 2 ju"(xO) + 1! E[x 3Ju"'(xo)+···
(4.17)
Equating (4.16) and (4.17) and neglecting the higher order
"terms gives us
-TIU ' (x ) ｾＮＱ E f·X 2 JU II (x ) ( 4 • 18)
o 2 - 0
}{ealizing that E[x 2 J is the variance 0 2 of "the lottery x,
x
since E(x) == 0, and rearranging (4.18), we find
If (x 0 ' x) r.J } 0 ｾ r (x 0 ) (4.19)
where r(xO) is defined by (4.13). Thus, starting with an
initial level xo' the decision 1113kcr's risk premium for a
small-ranged lottery with [(x) == 0 is r(xO) times half the
va:i.'iance of x to a fj rst approx imation. Stated another \vay,
the risk ave r 5 Ion r (x O) is twi ce tIle risk premium per uni t
variance for such lotteries.
Let us now work through a couple of examples to gain
a better feeling for the risk aversion function.
Ex am DIe 4. 9 'f 0 fill J the r ;:'3 k a ve r s ion fun c t ion for
( ) - -cx 1 1 '() b -cx du x == a - IH: • 0> U, we C.l eu ate u x = e e an
Z:S2
, 2 -cx
u"lx) == -c b8 ,so
u"(x)
rex) == - U'(x) =
frolIl (II. I:';).
2 "'..:xｾ｣ I)e
- Ｍ｟ＮＭＮ｟ＭｾＭｾＮ
,-ex
che
c
Using the smile utiliTy funcr'ion, :Ln 'l'aJ..lle 4.1 we displayed
the expected consequence x und certainty equivalents x
for t h r e e d iffere Ill: lot t e r i e s 0 f the form < xl' x 2> for
three different values of c. Using this, it is a simple
matter to calculate the risk premium 'If for all these
lotteries. This is done III Table 4.4. Notice that for
any particular value of c, the risk preJilium for lotteries
of the form <x,x + '10 > are the same. Also, notice that
as c gets smaller, the risk pTellliwDs for the same lottery
get smaller, and tliac all the risk premiums are positive. U
Table 4,4 'l'he Risk Aversion Funct,ion for. u(x) be ｾ ｣ ｸ= a ....
------
... Ｎｾ
I' (x )_C '{ x x X i.'
--
-:-1-- ｾ Ｒ Ｍ
I 0 10 5 0.0Y 4 . ｾＵＱ ,
1 '10 20 1 5 10.09 4.3" I
1 20 30 25 2U.69 4.31 I
O. 2 0 10 5 2.85 2 . 1 5 0.2
0.2 10 20 1 5 12.85 2 . 1 5 0.2
O. 2 20 30 25 22.85 2. 'I 5 0.2
O. 1 0 10 5 3.8 1 . 2 O. 1
0.1 -10 20 1 :; ! 3.8 1 . 2 O. 1
O. 1 20 3U 2S .::) . g I .2 (). I
Obervations such as these might lead one to wonder
what kind of general statements can be implied about the
decision maker's preferences from a knowledge of the risk
aversi.on function. One simple result is
Theorem 4.10 If r lS Dositive for all x, then u is concave
and the decision maker is risk-averse.
P:1"oor. Assume r is positive. Now since u'
is always positive (u is increasing), u"(x)
must be negative. This implies u is concave
which in turn implies the decision maker is
risk averse. <J
And as you might expect, the aHalog is
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Theorem 4.11 If r is negative for all x, then u is convex
and -rhe decision maker is risk-prone.
Let u 1 and U z be utility functions with risk aversion
r 1 and r Z respectively. Then, frolH (4.19) one can sec that
if r 1 (xO) > rZ(xO) at a particular point xO' -rhe risk premium
1T 1 (xO'x) for a small range lottery X with E(x) = 0 is larger
than the corresponding r:isk premiuHl 'TTZ(xO'x). [[owever, a
Inore important result which holds for any lot-rery is
Theorem 4.1Z If ｲ ｬ Ｑ ｾ ｊ ｾ ｺ ｩ Ｒ ｣ ｬ for ｃ ｬ Ｚ ｬ ｬ ｾ ｌ Ｍ ｾ Ａ Ｚ ｬ ｾ ｟ Ｍ Ｒ ｦ ｉ ｊ ｸ Ｌ ｸ Ｉ ｟ ｾ
ｾ ｚ Ｈ ｸ Ｌ ｸ Ｉ for all_X 3119 ｸｾ
(Ill other words if u 1 has a uniformly larger
l<:>_c a ｾ r j 5 k avel' :; ion t k111 11 2' thenthe r i s k
premiulll ror allY luttery x + x is larger with
u 1 -rhan liZ. This mealls that a uniform local
d -1crt u1( Uz (t)J
2-54-
condition has a natural global implication.)
;(-
Proof. Assume 1'1 (x) > 1'2 ex). Therefore,
. l':\.) .. r (x' ') =:: d [1 0 ｾ u' ( 1 1 + d (1 '( ) ]
1. 2. " I) - eli oS 2 x) J ax'L .og u 1 x
• U I (x) ..
=:: ｾＱ｟ Jog __1__ j
llx I ( )ll,) X
'-
lS negacive. It [oll<Ms that log[ u;Cx)/uZ(x)] is decreasing.
Note that
u; (u;l (1:))
Ｎ ｾ Ｍ Ｍ Ｍ Ｍ Ｍ Ｍ Ｍ
uZ(ui-1 (t))
which is also decreasing in t since log lU1(x) /uz(x) J lS.
Therefore u I (u; I (1:)) is a concave function of t.
Working The other direction, by definition
if oj (x , X) =:: X + ErxJ
Then, simply subtracting, we find
'IT 1 (x , X) - if 2 ( x , X) = U ZI (E [ u 2 (x .;. x)])
-1 , [ J
-u, (lJ u l (x + x) )
= u Z
I (ELt]) - u l l (E[u 1 (u2- 1(t))])
-1
where i = U z(x + x). Since u 1 (u Z (1:)) is concave,
from JenS1211'S Inequality)', we have
E [u 1 (u 21 ( 't) ) J < u 1 (u 2 -1 [E ( '0] ).
i<'l'his proof, which is given in PYatt (1964], is loarhematically
i;ore j!.volved tlliln The rest 'of thls section. The details of
TSee William Feller, ｾ ｾ ｬ In1:yoductioll to Probabilit:y Theory
a II J 1,1: S _.6.££) i c ｾｮ ion s, v 0 ｾ 2..:" IV i. J e y, New YOI'k, 19 6 6 .
Substituting this into the previous expression,
we find
1[ 1 (x , X) - 'rr 2 (x , X) > u ｾ 1 (E rt J )
> ｵｾＱ [E(t)]
> 0
- u,l [u 1 (u;l [E COJ )I
- u z
1 [E co J
which is the desired result. <1
It should b0 pointeo out that trw above result required
110 restrictions on the sign of r l or r Z• Thus, the statement
15 valid for both risk-averse and risk-prone decision makers.
An illusrration of the implications of the preceding
result seems appropriate. In example 4.9, we showed the risk
aversion function for u(x) = a - he- cx was c. Table 4.4 in-
dicated the risk premium for <0,10> was 2.15 when c = 0.2
and 1.2 when c = O. 1 . This IS illustrated in Fig. 4.10 where
let u1 (x) h 1e
-0.2x
u 2(x) b 2e
-0. 1x
and setwe = a 1 - = a 2 - ,
u 1 (0) = u 2(0) = 0 and u 1 (10) = IL) ( 10) == 1 for reference.'-'
Our result states that since r 1 (x» rZ(x) for all x, then
1[1 for <0, 10 > must be greater t ha II 'IT 2 for <0 , 10> • That this
ｩ ｾ the case is clear from the figure.
In Figure 4.11, we take things one step further ano
plot the risk premium ano the certainty equivalent for
-cx .
< 0,10 > using u(x) == - e as a functIon of c (the
risk aversion function). As we l'xpccteo, the risk premiulll
decreases as the risk aversion iIlcreases. For all values of
c, the risk premium plus the certainty equivalent must equal
ｾ ｨ Ｐ nxpected consequence, which is always 5.
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4 .6. CONSTANT, DECREASING, AND INCRDASING RISK AVERSION
Z50
In previous section:>wc have spoken of a risk premium
n(x,i) for lottery i given reference point x--i.e., for
lottery (x + i). A veTy interesting question is what happens
1:0 'IT(x,i) as x increases. For greater amounts of x, is the
decision maker's risk premium larger or smaller? Often a
decision maker lIlay be ahle to state that as x increases,
"the risk premiulll he would be willing to pay for x decreases,
for example. As we will shaH in this section, such attitudes
pu"t s"trong restrictions on the functional form of the utility
func"tion. Also, by working directly with the utility function
u, it is difficult to determine whether or not such preference
a"ttitudes are implied. However, they are very apparent from
the risk aversion function r.
For an increasing utility function, let us consider the
risk premium n(x,h) for the lottery <x + h, x - h> for a risk
averse individual. ClearlY,TI is positive for all amounts of
x. However, it might be reasonable that one's risk premium
for this lottery should decrease as x increases. As an
illustration of a situation where such an attitude might be
relevant, suppose x represents a specific monetary asset
positition of a decision maker and h is some monetary amount.
It seems to be empirically true for many people "that as
theil' assets increase, they are only willing "to pay a smaller
risk premium for a given risk. Their reasoning is that as
t hey become richer, they can be t te r aCf 0 I'd to t alee ;:1 spec ific
risk, and therefore will forgo less to avoid it. The same
reasoning implies that the insurance premium associated
with an unfavorable lottery (i.e. one less preferable than
the status quo) decreases as one gets richer and increases
as one gets poorer.
Let us formalize this attitude which is intuitively
appealing for many decision makers.
Definition: An individual is said to be decreasingly
risk averse if (1) he is risk averse, and (2) his risk
premium ｾ Ｈ ｸ Ｌ ｩ Ｉ for any lottery i decreases as the reference
amount x increases.
However, with our present tools, it would be all but
impossible to determine whether or not a specific utility
function implied such an attitude. To accomplish such a
task would require an exhaustive check for all possible
lotteries x. Fortunately, Pratt proves an important result
which gets us out of this difficulty and makes the concept
of decreasing risk aversion operationally significant.
That is,
2.S7
Theorem 4.13. The risk aversion function I' for utility
function u is decreasing if and only if the
risk premium TI ＨｸＬｾＩ is a decreasing function
of x for all x.
Proof. Theorem 4.12 states if 1'1 (x» y2(x),
then TI 1 (x,i» TI2(x,i) for all i. Applying
this to u 1 (x) == u(x) and uZ(x) ::u(x + k)
for posit:ive and Ilcgat:ive k proves the "if"
and "only if" parts of this assertion,
resiJ8ctively. <J
As Ive will soon see, many or the "traditional" candi-
J,nes for a uti! ity function, such as the exponential and
qcauraric utiliry iuncrjons, ｾ ｊ ｲ ･ not appropriate for a de-
creasingly risk-averse decision Ｑ ｉ ｬ ｾ ｬ ｫ ･ ｲ Ｎ Thus, the characteristic
of decreasing risk aversion places strong restrictions on
t:he shape (i.e., fUllcrional forlll) of one's utility function.
If we know thar rhe decision lIlGker desiTes his utility
function to be decreasingly risk averse)then this constraint
significantly simplifies the assessment of his utility
function. Some examples seem ｾ ｰ ｰ ｲ ｯ ｰ ｲ ｩ ｡ ｴ ｣ Ｎ
Exall1ple 4.1Q Consider tIle exponential UTility function
-cx
u(x) = -e ,c > O. Tn example 4.2 we illustrated and later
proved that the risk premium 1T(X,X) associated with any
- -cx] orrery x does nOL depend on x when u (x) = -e . Thus,
although this utility function implies risk aversion, it
clearly does not imply decreasing risk aversion SIllce
ir(x ,x) is constanr, not decreasing, for any x. Ll
Let us consider such an attitude in a little more
detail. A fact related to the previous assertion, which we
srate without proof, is
Theorem 4.14. The risk aversion l' IS constant if and 0!!lx.
if ,.r(x ,x) IS a constant funcrion of x for
all le ..
Definjrion: A decisjon maker lS COllsr8ntlv risk averse
. ｾ｟Ｎ .1--.__.. .. ..._
if l' 15 a positive constant, ConSLlI1tly risk neutral if l'
1 S Z e l'0, and con 5 tan t 1Y l' i s k pr ｯｾｾ if r 1 5 a neg a t i v e con s tan t .
To indicate the strong restrictions these conditions place
on the shape of a utility function, we can show
-·ex ｾ ＮTheorem 4.15 u(x) ｾ -e <.,.-==?r(x) - c> 0, (constant risk aversion) (4.20)
u (x) ｾ x <.=9 rex) - 0 (risk neutrality), (4.21)
u(x) Ｍ ｾ ･ Ｍ ｣ ｸ ｾ ＾ l' (x) _ e < 0, (constant risk
proneness) . (4.22)
Pruof. I .t.' () -ex . 1 f' . .u x Ｎｾ -c ,us lng c e 1I11t1011 (4.13),
l' (x) ::: C.l'JOW, jf rex) "" c> 0, from (4.14)
ｾ ｘ ｛ ｬ ｏ ｧ u'(x)j '" -c.
Integrating and expo!i(:ntiating hoth sides gives
e-cx ::: e -eJdx '" e log u'(x) + d ::: edu'(x),
where d is a constant of integration. Integrating
again yields
je-CXdx ::: -ex dｾ｣ - ::: e u ex) + h
where h is another constant of integration.
-cxFrom this, cl carl y, u (x) ｾ -e .
The other proofs are silllilar. <1
This result says, for instance, that if the
decision maker is constulltly risk averse, his utility function
must be of the form (4.20). Kllowing thj s, one needs only to
determine the value of parameter e ill order to completely
specify his utility fLll)Ccioll. Tl!JS c:m c:l';ily ｨ ｾ done hy
derermining the certainty equivalent of anyone lottery.
However, the sophisticated analyst would employ consistency
checks in his assessments, so the procedure may not be as
simple as it appears. The problem of assessing utility
functions is considered in Section 4.9.
Since we're srill interested in finding a decreasingly
risk averse family of utility functions, let us examine the
following.
Example 4.11. Consider the quadratic utility function
2
u(x) == a + bx - cx , (4.23)
.vhere b > 0, C > 0, and x is constrained to amounts less than
b/2c, since the utiliry function is decreasing beyond this
poinr. Taking derivarives, we find u' (x) == b - 2cx and u ll (x) ==
-2c, so the risk aversion funcrion
ull(x)
r(x):- ==
u' (x)
Since r > ° for all x, clearly u
(4.24)
is risk averse, but r increases
as x increases, so u is certainly ｾ ｬ ｏ ｴ decreasingly risk averse.
IIence we see thar "the quadraric utility function is not
ｾ ｰ ｰ ｲ ｯ ｰ ｲ ｩ ｡ ｴ ･ to use when decreasinR-risk aversion is a compelling
desideratum. U
Aside from possesslng the property of risk aversion, the
quadratic utility function is often used in the literature
because the expected utility of a lottery yielding uncertain
consequence x depends only on the mean and variance of x. That
-. ｾ
.l•• ' ,
E [u (x)] E [ 1 - '" LJ== ｾ a .;. )x - ex
== a .;. bx - C(OL +
- 2
u(x) co
-2
x )
,)
\'J ih ｾ reI ｾ ex) -= ,v, ,1 lid Va l' (x):: 0 i'. Asindie atedin 1her irs t
( I) ],c
The risk aversiolJ r- 1I Il C t i 011 r i sinere a s i ru'
- ---."- ｾ｟Ｎ __ ._---_._._- - ＭＭＭＭＭＭＭＮＭｾＭＭＭＭＭＭＭＭ _. ｟Ｎｾ
l(.cc;dl from (4.24) I-hat r tur t}l(' qU;lllratic 111, Jily
'-tinction is increosingin x. Since thnl: utiLity {\lnetlull
J '", a! :0:0 ! ' ; " 1-
....... 1 '"', ir it ; "L " ｪｮ｣ｲ｣｡ｾ［ｩｮｧｬ y
1 : :-; k a v (' r s co. Si!l C C' t h j S ;l t tit \I d C' i !lI P I i l' s, f (l r ins UI n c C', t h ;1 t
t:) :1 v 01 d l'C'r r;1 in un r;1 vu 1';] i, I C' i (l T I',' r' j C'
I !1l\vC'Vl'J, plovidctl 1 '('(jIl(1 iIi (1 il II l.' I d , r ｃｩＮＩｴｾｪＬｬＬ
I, ! ｾ '. j I r II ｾ
q(x) =. log (x + b), discussed in ｝ ｾ ｸ ｡ ｬ ｬ ｬ ｰ ｬ ｣ 4.3. Taking dc-
['ivat ivcs,
ｾ ﾷ ［ ｯ
we fi nu 11' (x) = ＭＭｾＬ
. x + h
I
an J u 11 (x ) :0: ﾷ ｉ ｾ Ｉ Ｍ Ｇ Ｉ ﾷ ｾ ｬ ,
-r:x--+
!' (x) - ｾｾｃｸｬ _.
u' (x) x + h
Clearly, rex) 1S positive nnJ decreasing in x for all
x > - b. ThU S II ( X ) i sad e C ff' a si. ng 1Y ri s k ave r S e uti 1 i t Y
!"itnet'ioll over this range or x. fJ
Let us digress <lnc1Q'c \'Jhcf'() \ve stand. We have looked
;:t incH'asing risk aversioll, eOIlSLant ri',k ;lversion, ;Jlld
t..1c:creas ing r i,5k aversion. Intuj tive arguments and exp('rience
L-tl us The increasing c(lse is of J ittle interest, and we
It:life C'<..::sentially covered what is important concerning the
Ｌ ｾ ｯ ｮ ｳ ｲ Ｈ ｪ ｮ ｴ casC'. However, morc must he said about the de-
cn:asillg case. l:ro/ll The example, Ow reader may gather 1'11:lt
ft'VI utility functions of simple fot'lli :nc, in fact, de-
cn:'asingly risk averse. This is unFul'tlln,ltc as we ,vould
I ike a ｲｃｾ［Ｑ simple .fami.lies of lIti I ity Illllet ions
\'J j t 11 a ric h v a riC' t y 0 f s pee jr-i C 11](' rn be r s. Th c' n pro v ide d ;If J
individU:l.J wished [0 be decreasinely risk averse, we cnuld
hypothesize a particular Llmily o-L utility funcrions and
concentr:.ltc on evallJating the spl'ciCic member appropriate
r" (he sit ua t ion in Cj U e s 1 ion. T I, ｩｾＬ d (' fin 8 s the r r 0 hIem.
j\ usc rill res lIll 'v 11 j l· h a I I U \'J :; 11 c; t () C (1 Jl stell c t sue 11
II r iIi t y r Iln c t i () n ｾｾ
sum 0 f t \II 0 0 r m0 r e Ll t j 1 i t'l" fun c t i on 5 ｾｶ 11 i c h
ｾｾｾｾｾｾＭ｟｣ＨＡ ＿ｪ｝｟ｾＲＱＭｲｾｌ｟｣ＺＮＰ｟ｪｾｾ t:J.l}tl y risk ｡ ｶ ･ ｲ Ｚ Ｌ Ｍ ｾ
9il_-.-!JJe __ ｌｾｾ｣ｾｅｙ a 1 ｌＺＺ｟ＺＮＮＮＺＧＭＮＺ＼Ｎｌ｟ｾＧｩＭＭＮＱＺ t s c 1£ de ere a s j ng} 1.
ex c e p ton sub i II t c r val s \.Jhere t 11ewe i g h ted
.._--_._ .._-_.__. ＭｾＭＭＭ
rjsk aversion, i'i' ｪ ｣ ｾ decreasinglY risk averse.
_._. __... ｾｾｾ ... -.--_._. --.. Ｍ Ｍ Ｍ Ｍ ｾ Ｍ Ｍ ----- ----_..- ｾ｟Ｎ｟Ｍ｟ ..._.__.--._-'-----_._---- --<.._--
_P_r_oof. Ll't u :::: u l + ku Z' k > o. TheIl
u"
iji-r =
=
U; + ku Z
ｵｾ ｫｕｾ
ＱＱｊＫＭｾｾｲｬＧｴｾｲ 1. + ui + kU2 r2
which is differentiated to yield
r' +1
(u1 + ku 21 u;' - Ull u;' + ku 2)
r ------------..----..-------.--
1 (u' + kU I )21 2
ku Z+ -_.._---- (u; + k\lZH::u'Z - kUzluy -I kU'l)r I ... r,) ....---.--.-.--.--..-------.- ..----
2 U ( u 1 + kU:2) 2
U ly' + kll'r·"11 'L ｾ:::: . . ••... -.• - --- -I
u, + ku Z
== ----------_._-"
u i + ku 2
]( ( r 1 -
(u' +1
S.i nce It , " () u , (! r , 0 and T' " 0, 'I l.' ;--, ｾＭｾＮ ｾＮＧI , ｌｾ , I , "I -- Ｎｾ
That r'< 0 and 1 ｨｾＧ t"t r ()ro the assertion 1S true
for the case u 11 1 ... hl.). The general case,
n
u = [,
i=l
c.u.] 1 Co ::- U, follo'VJs from repeated1
application of the proof. <1
Let us illustrate the applicability of this result
with
.cxClllrpl e 4. 1:5 What is the risk ｡ ｖ Ｈ ｾ ｲ ｳ ｩ ｯ ｮ for u(x) = -ax-e
-ex
- be ,\'Jhere a , b, and c are positive constants? If we
-ax -C Ydefine u 1(x) = -e and u 2 (x) == -e ｾ Ｇ Ｌ then u(x) = 1l,(X) +
.; lJUZ(x). Also, ｾ ｶ ･ know rl(x) ::C;1 ;lIld r 2 (x) ::: c. ,[,hw;, from
Theorem Ｑ ｾ Ｎ Ｑ Ｗ Ｌ it follows that u(x) must lw constantly risk
averse if a = c and decreasingly risk averse if a t c. This
call be validated directly. SUPPOS\' a = c, then u(x) -[IX= -e
-ax -ax
.. he = -(1 + b)e , which we ｫｮｯｾｶ is constantly risk
;llferse. If a f c, u l (x)
2 -ax 2 -cx
-,: e - hc c ,so
-ax - ex
= ;le + ｢｣｣Ｎｾ , and u" (x)
I' (x)-
2 -ax 7. -cx
a e + he e
ae -ax + bel' ·-ex
(4.25)
whose derivative is negative. Thus !lex) is indeed dccrc:lsing1y
risk averse. U
ThE' utility function of the preceding example is frequently
use din actu a las s e s S 1Il E' n t a f r l' e r l' r en e l' ｾ ［ Ｎ Let usc on s j de r
it. in 1Il0re detail t.o further our intuitive ｵ ｮ ､ ･ ｲ ｳ ｴ ｡ ｮ ､ ｩ ｬ ｬ ｲ ｾ of
decreasing risk aversion. To develop a feeling for the ("isk
:Jversion rex) in (4.25) as a [unction of x, we must. first
·,ax: ·-exluok Llt. the behavior of c and C' J. hli.thout loss of
- 'lX -exlet us assume a > c. Both e ,. anel e are
g l'a p 11 e din F:i g. 4. 1 2 wit h a '" 1 an J c c..: O. LS. 13 at 11 t e I'm s
have large positive values TLH large negative amounts of
x, decrease but remain posirlvc for al] x, arc Jess thufl
one for positive x, and I.,IS 'yh'l';( 01 iea 11 y :1 pproaeh zc 1'0
IS perl13ps Tilorc' revealing. Ie, too, is p]ottell in Fig. 4.12
:lUd is clearly of the S:lltlC shape as the orig inal two
f . 'fh -cx" I I 1un c tL OilS • us e <IS very S iii a . c a III pare ( to -axC' for
large negative values of x, they arc cqml at x = 0, and
-ax
e
of x.
. 11 d' - ex r 1 . . . 1IS slIla . compare to P or arge POSI'[IVe va ues
With this background, ll,t':-; look at the dsk aversiol1
. -ax -exfor u(x) =: -e -, be ,:l > C, 111 lIIorc detail. From
( 4 . 25), l' (0) = (:l 2 + b c 2) / (:l + \' c ) ｾ｜ｬ It i chi s 1e ssthan
il but greater than c. For ](1rgC' negative amounts of x,
-cx -ax
since e is small compared to e ,we fi.nd
r (x) =
2 -ax 2 -ex 2 -ax
a e + be cae
__________. ｟Ｌｾ｟Ｎ ,·v .. ...
Cl X - ex"'" - ,1 Xae -, . + hee ,1('
= a
The limit of rex) as x goes to minus infinity is J. For
-ax1arge po sit i ve amounts of x, we know e :i s small compo. red
-ex
e so
bc 2e- cx
l' ( x) ｾ ---- ｣ ｾ C
, -exbee
The 1i In ito f l' (x ) a s x ap pro (J(,: he s p Ius in fin i t Y i s (. .
A graph of rex) as a function of x for a = 1.0, c = 0.25
:lHcl [\/0 (bfiereEl veJJut':-; of b I:; ｾ ｾ h (l 1m i 11 Fig. 4.. 1:-;. Til c-
general shape of each curVl" is a:; we ju:-;t described. The
'-.--
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x
risk ｡ ｶ Ｈ ｾ ｲ ｳ ｩ ｯ ｮ rex) is decreasing iIi x and al\vays bctwel'll
｜ ｶ Ｈ ｾ ｩ ｧ ｬ ｩ ｔ ｩ ｬ ｬ ｧ L.iCIOr b (!8'[crllliIlCS the :llflounlS of x for \vhich
r(x) is csscnri;JlJy ｲ ｾ Ｈ ｸ Ｉ Ｎ '1'hatis, fur lacger values of
b, che Ｂ ｛ Ｈ ｾ ｮ ｬ ｬ rex) is closely apprOXiJli:IICd by rZ(x) [or
smaller values or x. Notice tll:l1 r(x) ｾ ｾ ｪ ｶ ｣ ｮ lJ =1 is Llrger
than rex) given I>::: 4 for all alil011llts of x. [,'1'0111 Theorem 4.12,
we 1<llUi<J This implies tile risk prClIlJlllll ror' :lllY lottery A
fOUlld ｬ ｉ ｾ ［ ｩ ｊ ｬ ｧ U(A)
.. ,
risk prL:i1dUlIl for :x found
ｾ -LOX: . 1 1 I I I I
- Ｂ＾ｉｬｾ \vl Ｉ ｬ ｾ Ｚ ｬ ｲ ｧ ｜ Ｎ Ｂ ｾ r t: 1:]]1 t Ie
.. 'lX -ex\vitlt u(x) .= -c c - 1>2(' if and
AllOl]wr cX;lll1l'le of :1 ､ＨＧｃｴＢｬＧ［ｴｾｾｩｮｧｬｹ risk ;lverSl: util ity
[ullction seclIIs :lppropriall:.
Cor u(x) = -ax-e + hx,
\.J11(' r l: II ::I Jl d barepasit i v c . I f \v C 1C'l 1.I 1 (;-; ) -ax'" -c and
U' J ( x)
"
u(x) liltlst be decrc;lsing1y r"i:;l: averse. To prove (his <Ii r'l'crly,
-ax 2 -ax
we have u'(><.);ae .t\,> and u1:x) == -a C' ,glVlllg
rex)
"2 -ax
a e
ac-:lX + b
Experience from the jJrcccdillg l:x,lmple 1ells us rex) IS
3ppl'ox:ilOately 8Cjlwl to u I'or [:lrgc Ｑ ｬ Ｘ ｧ Ｚ ､ Ｌ Ｂ ｩ Ｎ ｜ ｦ Ｈ ｾ amounts of )\,
2 .[() a / (:1 "T I) )
Z',:l'O as x grows 13.rgl: 1'. tJ
r i s k a vcr:j e U l i j i t Y f II net j () n:. i 11 IIf i j i r y 111 C (J r y, HC Cit 1: I log I il'
ｾｾＰｬｊＱ･ of the more l'OllilllOli OIll'S 1.l1 ｔｾ､ｬＱ｟･ ILS. This list, of
'LI b! e 1.5
Some Common IkereJ:;jngly IZi:;k Averse Utility Functions
res 1 1'Lc [i () 11 S
x + b
decreasing risk
x > -ll
() <c <I
c.' o
(c - 1)
- ｸＭＭＭｾｩｾＭＭＱＩＭ
c + 1
A + 1;
C
( ,\ r 11) (.\ T C -;- b)
X ;- -b
x
" -b
x -h
- :.1..::\. --c x
- be a,b,c,> ()
-axa l '\
2 -ex
.y. be e
- ----- -.__._---
-ex
+ bee
aJ 1 x
-ax
-·t_' .y hx a,]» 0
Ｚｾｾ -. ux
a co
----,-- --- --
-ax,I (' + h all x
'i . () •
.,
Dcc"rcasin o Ri:;k Pf"()ll,.:ncs:/"
--_.- ------\;.>.__._--_.._----_.._----_.-
I tIS pro h ,1 b1Y e vi den t 1) y [ i 0 \'J t h ;Ito 11 C' C a u 1d cat ego r j z L'
risk prone utility fllllCtiollS as either decreasingly risk
pcune, constantly risk prone, or illcrc;lsingly risk prone.
\VI' have already melltiolled ｴ ｨ Ｈ ｾ sec()nd or these, but Lc-c us
(: ,I 11 ｉＩｬｾ umitted Wllhullt i Hlil,1 j r lilt',
Defini-cion:
(1) he is risk prone, and (2) his risk premium 'rrLx,x) for
any lottery X increases as the reference amount x increases.
Recall that u(x,x) for risk prone utility functions is always
negative.
To provide an operational method for implementing the
concept of a decreasingly risk prone utility function, we
have
Theorem 4.18. The utiJi!LfLmction u is decreasingly risk
-_.-----_._-_ .._- .._.._---- -----_._.--._---. . ------.,...--
prone if and only i f ＡＢｴｾＢｾＡＺｬＺｳ soc ia ted ri5k ave rs ion
The proof is omitted because of its similarity to previous
oiles. Let us illustrate tIle result witII ｾ ｬ simple example.
Examnle 4.15
__ .._.:.:.:J...::.. _..__. _ Consider the ULility functjon u(x) 2= x . Since
u'(x) := 2x and u"(x) =' 2, the associated risk aversion rex) = -I/x.
This 1S clearly negative and incrcHsing for positive x so
U(X) I.S decreasingly risk prone for that range of x. The
expected uti]ity of <1,3> is 5, I"rolll which the certainty
equivalent for <1,:» is found to be 2.24. The associated
risk premium is -0.24. Likewise, the risk premiums for
<2,4> and <3,5> are -0.17 and -0.12, respectively. As
expected, they are increHsing. U
11.'7 PROPORTIONAL rUSK AVERSION
I J1 t his sec t i 0 ll, a Jl 0 { 1)(' reo Jl C \' Jl teo II C C rIll Jl g r i ski :j
･ ｘ ｾ ｬ ｬ ｬ ｬ ｩ ｮ ｣ ､ Ｍ Ｇ Ｍ ｮ ｡ ｬ ｬ ｬ ･ ｬ ｹ Ｌ pruporriOll:11 ｲ ｌ ｾ ｫ aversion. And <.IS we
have often done earlier, the ideas will be introduced in the
context of preferences for mOIletiJry consequences. Again how-
ever, the theory is relevant ill other contexts.
Consider the situation of an investor who has an amount
X o he can invest in anyone of H sot of investment plans {T a }
If he chooses investment I his resulting asset position
a
(his gross payoff) will be Xo ｽＺＨｾ where Zet is a nonnegative
random variahle. Thus if the investor has utility function tl-
defined on assets rather than on incrC'wental monetary values,
so that 0 now refers to "ruin" rather than the status quo--
then he will choose that investment fa to maximize E [u(xo 1'o:1J.
Throughout this section, we assume increasing preferences
for assets.
As an illustration, consider the class of investments
where the investor puts up a proportion m, say, of his assets
on a double or notlling bet where the probability of winning
is p and of losing is 1 - p. The ontcome of his investment
can then be depicted as fo]lows:
(1 - rn)x + 2rnx
o
- (1 + m)x
o 0
(1 - rn)x
o
Hence this investment] (';icls to a payoff of x zo TIl
where ｻ ｾ + m \v i t J) proh:lh iii ty Pz =m m with probahility p.- -
ij • 7 . 1 • Investmcnts Jnl1c1)ondcnt ｏ ｬ ｾ J\sset PositionＭ Ｍ Ｍ Ｍ Ｍ Ｍ Ｍ Ｍ Ｍ Ｍ Ｍ ｟ Ｎ ｾ ｾ Ｍ Ｍ Ｍ Ｍ Ｍ Ｍ Ｌ Ｍ -
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We will now consider four special classes of utility
fUll C t i 0 II S r 0 r w!L i c h t 11 cop t i 111 al in vcst IfI e II t pIa 11 cl 0 e s Ａｽｾｴ｟
depend on the ildtial asset position xo. These are shown to
he the ＿ ｾ ｬ utility functions that enjoy this property. As
motivation, consider two examples.
Example 4.1G. Lot: u ＨｸＩｾｸ , the 1jo\.''11' utility function.
The dec is ion maker shou:ld chao se r to nwx jmi ze his expec ted
C(;
utility. In this case
m;H Eu(x .<t)
a 0 ex
IIIax l:(x -2,)
a 0 rx
= ｘＮｾ ｭｾＮＨ 1:(:',)
'U Ct Ct
so tha t the opt illl3 1 in v Ｈｾｓ T JllC']) t do,:, s ｾＱｾＩｾ depend on the amount
Xo to be .invested. Forl3ter PU1'PO,;cs \'i\,' observe that for
u(x) ｾ x, lye have
Ｈ ｾ
xr(x) u"(x) =
- -x u' (x) 0, for all x.
Example 4.17. 1-cSuppose u(x) :: X for 0 f c < 1. Then the
expected utility of the optimal investment is
JIlax
a
lIlax
Ct
1-c
= X o
so that again the optimal investment docs not depend on the
<lmount Xo to be invested. For this case ohserve that
XI' (x):: u"(x)Ｍ ｸ ｾ ﾷ ｟ Ｍ Ｍ
ll' (x)
= c
Note rh:1t when c < 0, sillce x is !Hmncgative, then l' is
lwgatjvc so u is risk prone. WllC'Il c> 0, u is risk averse. U
With this as background we shall now prove the following
Result and Corollary.
Theorem 4. 19. : If in .?21Y c.lass of investments the optimal
investment plan docs not ､ ｣ ｰ ｾ ｮ ､ on ｴ ｨ ｾ amount to be invested
and if a risk averse u is "well-heJl;:lved", then
｟ ｸ ｾ Ｌ ｾ ｻ Ｈ ｘ ｬ is constan t.*
'11 x)
• 1ｾｾＡＺ｟ｯｯＨＺＮＮ Suppose p j s some fixed Tlumher where 2' < P < 1. Cons ider
the class of investments described earlier where
Z
m
ｾ {1 + TIl
1 - TIl
with prohahility
p
- p
and 0 < m < 1. Now
To find the maximum m to invest (3ssuming it is an internal
maximum) we differentiate with respect to JJl and set the reslllt
equal to zero, getting
N01'; by the h Yll 0 the sis, the va III C 0 i TIl t hat s:lt i sf i esth co
above .is constant for all x o ' Letting
-_._-- - - -------------_._-_._--_._-_._._----------
Hny "well-behRved" we mean u is twice differentiable, and
ｾ ｽ Ｎ
1 ilil
exists.
.. x ｵｾＨｸＩ
11' ex)
K = (1 - P) / p t X -- Xo (1 - m.1 tan d )...= (1 + m) / ( 1 - m)
we get
u' (Ax) = K u' (x) t for a 11 x .
But then
Au"(Ax) = K u"(x)
and dividing the above two equations t we get
u"CAx) _ u"(x)
-AX U'lAX) - -x Il'(x)
or
AX r(Ax) = x rex) for all X .
Now using the existence of lim x rex) as x+O we must prove
x rex) is constant. Suppose, to tIle contrary, that
Xl r(x 1 ) f: x 2 r(x 2) .
Then we have
x1 (X 1) x2 Ｈｘｾ
---r--=x r(x):j.x dx) =--r-An An 1 - 1 2 2 An A
Taking the lilllit as n+oo in the above (ohserving that ;\>1),
we conTradict the existence of lilll x rex) as x+o.
If the opIillla1 1II is not an internal maximum, then the
optimal III = 0 or 1. But hoth these cases can be ruled out:
the case 111 = 0 hy ohserving that II hehaves like a ｬｩｮｴｾ｡ｲ
f!lnction in tlw small and nez ) >1; til(' case m =: 1 by oh-
m
serving that since u is risk averse there is an asset amount
a crnnplementary chance at o. (For this last argument think
of p as some value such as .51.) This completes the proof. <3
for ° t c < 1, or _x-(c-1)
ｃ ｯ ｲ ｯ ｬ ｬ ｾ
( i)
(i i)
(iii)
The following are pquivalent:
xr(x) is constant
1-cu(x) ｾ ｬ ｯ ｧ x, or x '
for c>1 ,or u(x) ::: x.
the optimum investment plan is independent of
assets.
By examples 4.16 and 4.17 (plus ,m:llogous examples for u-x
and u __x-(c-1), c > 1), it is shown that
(ii) + (iii) and (ii) + (i). The above theorem demonstrates
(iii) + (i) . It remains to show (i) + (ii).
Proof: From
x rex)
we have
d
= -xCIX [log 11' (x)] c ,
or
ddx log u' (x) c= - x
log u'(x) = -c log x + constant, for c i 0,
-c
"'log x " for C f ().
It follows that
U ' (x) _0 x - c f -J °' , . or CT .•
Par c = 0, it is easy to show that u'(x) ..... k, where k>O.
Hence, we have
U(x)
for c 0
tor c <I
for c
c i ° , (4.26)
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xr(x)
is calle,! rJlt: Ｚ ［ ｬ Ｇ Ｉ ｩ Ｇ ｏ Ａ Ｇ ｩ ［ ｌ Ｇ Ｌ ｾ ｾ ｩ ｉ ]<)"'::1] ｊ ｪ ｾ ｬ Ｌ Ｎ ::vcrsion LIt x.
ｾ Ｎ ｟ Ｎ Ｍ ._- --_.-.._ _ -._. '- '-.'- _ _._-_.._----
To in t e r p Y c: T T ni Ｌ ｾ Ｏ ...: ,illS i. d C j' the f' u 1 10 ｾＧｩ in g t \'1 0 0 P t ion s :
I. C,-'ci.:,iE]IY iJpliCil(: jI,cceivl' clssct posit.ion
ql
II S S ' • r I' U ':i i L ｩｯｮ［ｾ x. (I i Ill) () r x ( 1 - Ill).
risk prcmiulil. Nov! Ｌ Ｌ Ｚ ｾ ｩ ｬ ｬ Ｚ ｲ Ｈ ｪ Ｎ ｉ ｾ ｾ ｊ / ilWI ]jO! !ng the risk premium
*X7T X,Jn
we get
lim
xm ., 0
" [j"lx)
2 11'(.\} r(x)
or
L
') ); ( (::)
.-
*-
'0
:! ., i:l1 j III I
e,m .,. 0 m
and hence ｗ ｬ ｾ ｾ Ｇ Ｌ ｣ ｴ tile I ,-'!'iii Ｇ ｊ ｉ ｾ Ｉ Ｎ Ｑ Ｉ ｟ Ｇ Ｉ Ａ llf)lial iucal risk aversion
For x r(x).
4. 7 . 2
1I1<lker aSLcl'rains rtlCli 1H' h.:lti i " I I '; c' : : II l I I I t Y i .U IIell () 11 ｜ｾ 1 1. 1\
determine the apptopri:lte p;lralileter c'?
Let the decision maker's current endowment of the given
:tttribute he x . We ask ldm to compare the two options:
o
the status quo, i . c . , x for certain
o
2 a 50-SO lottery which will either douhle his endowment
[0 2x or reduce it to px .
o a
If he is indifferent hetween options I and 2 when
fF 1/2, then c = 1 or u(x) -log x. rf we keep r = 1/2 and
he ｲ ｲ ･ ｦ ･ ｲ ｾ ［ option 1, then c> 1; if he prefers option 2, then
c <I. Suppose the decision maker is indifferent between the
two options for p>I/2, "the case where c > 1 . Then c can be
evaluated us JIJ.g u(x) -(e-I) from (II Y) by solving the_. -x . Ｎｾｕ
or
-(c-1)
-x .
o [ -(px )-(c-I)_(2x )-(C-1)]2. a a
2 = p--(C-l) ｾ
For p < 1/2, the case where c < 1, \;IC ｭ ｬ ｬ ｾ ［ ｴ solve the equat ion
(.) . ) 1 - cl
+ ｾ i. Xo oJ
01'
1-c 1 -c2 ::= p + 2
A plot oC c against p is ｩ ｬ ｬ ｵ ｳ ｴ ｲ ｾ ｉ ｻ Ｈ Ｇ ､ In Figure 4.14. Thus if
\' were .8 for example, c could he read as equal to /I and then
- -")
ulx)---x '.
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4.8 MONOTONICALLY DECREASING AND NONMONOTONIC UTILITY
ＭＭＭＭｾ
FUNCTIONS*
In this section, we will extend the concepts of risk
introduced in the last four sections to monotonically decreasing
and nonmonotonic utility functions. The former case will be
considered first, and the order of presentation will he the
same as for monotonically increasing utility functions. The
concepts of risk averse and risk prone are ､ ･ ｦ ｩ ｮ ･ ､ ｾ then
a measure of risk aversioIl introduced, and increasing, de-
creasing, and constant risk aversion discussed. The last
subsection concerns the nonmonotonic case. Proofs of results
which arc analagous to those presented in earlier sections
will be omitted here.
4 . 8 • 1 Risk Aversion
For monotonically decreasing preferences, one will be
referred to as risk averse if he prefers the expected con-
Ｕ ｾ ｱ ｵ ･ ｮ ｣ ･ of any nondegenerate lottery to that lottery. Then
of course, if the utility function u represents such pre-
ｦ ｴ ｾ ｲ ･ ｮ ｣ ･ s, the uti I i ty of the cxpec ted consequence mus t be
gl'eater thcln the expected utility of the lottery. If one
prefers [is indifferent to] every nondegenerate lottery
to its expected consequence, then he is said to be risk
ｾ ｮ ｣ Ｚ ｲ ｌ ｩ ｳ ｫ ｟ ｾ ｾ ｴ ｲ ｡ ｉ ｊ . As with the increasing case, one
;40 . I . ..fice agaIn tllS sectIon 15 inc:luoC'cl rriJII:lrily for reference
purposes. It can be skipped without impairing the continuity
of the development.
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need not try to verify the property of risk aversion, for
example, by checking every possible degenerate lottery.
A necessary and sufficient condjtion for this to hold is
that it holds for alISO-50 lotteries. It is not difficult
to prove the following
Theorem 4.20. A decision ｭ ｾ ｫ ･ ｲ is risk averse [risk prone;
risk neutral] if and only if his monotonically decreasing utility
function is concave [convex; linear].
Figure 4.15 illustrates these cases.
Before preceding further, let us suggest a couple of
problems which involve monotonically decreasing preferences.
Fi rs t, cons ider the response time s to ca 11 s for ambul ance
service. Because of the manner in which response time relates
to the patient's condition, it may be reasonable to assume
that for any response time t, the certainty of t would be
preferred to the 50-50 chance at t - 1 or t + 1. Hence,
u(t) >[u(t- 1) + (t + 1)J/2, from ""hich it follows that the
decision maker's utility function is concave.
A second illustration concerns response times to calls
for police service. Tn this situation, the decision maker
may prefer a sbre response time t to a lottery <t + 1, t - 1>
for any t. The reasoning might be that the probability of
apprehcnding a criminal decreases very fast as the response
riwe increases. This means that lI(t) <[u(t -1) + u(t + 1).1/2,
\;lIi eh j Inp1 i es u is convex and ri sk prone. The decision maker
j::; "i'JI.LI illg to gamble ill 1.1I1s sitU;lljoll in order to hDVt' :l
reasonable chance of obtaining a ＺＧｾｭ｡ｬＱ response time.
'\-.) .- k -.::>"., '1" ''' .•
..... ,.;' _ T, _ ....
x
ＭＭＭＭＭＭＭＭＭＭＭＭｾ
x
J.77ck.
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I
-------_..- ...•
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i- tel vtl ,- __ ｾ rS- ..
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--:1,,__. ｾｬ ", "_ .\,: '1''. l
__ r·. ｜ ｾ Ｇ Ｚ Ｚ ..... I u.l
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So far, the definitions and results stated in this
section have been identical to those given for the mono-
tonically increasing case. Now a few differences will come
out. Recall that for increasing utility functions, the
certainty equivalent had to be less than the expected
consequence of a lottery for a risk averse individual. Just
the reverse is true for risk averse decreasing utility functions.
Furthermore, in the context of increasing utility functions,
the risk premium, defined as the expected consequence minus
the certainty equivalent represented the amount the decision
maker would be willing to give up (from the expected consequence)
in order to avoid the risks associated with a particular lottery.
To keep this connotation for decreasing utility functions, we
are forced to change the definition of the risk premium for
the decreasing case. In this context, we define the risk
premium of a lottery as the certainty equivalent minus the
expected consequence of that lottery. Then, it follows that
the risk premium is again the amount the decision maker is
willing to give up (from the expected consequence) in order
to free himself of the responsibilities of a particular
lottery. Now, ｷｾ can state
Theorem 4.21. For decreasing utility functions, a decision
maker is risk averse if and only if his risk
premium is positive for all nondegenerate
lotteries.
An example may be helpful.
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Example 4.18 Consider the risk averse, decreasing utility
function of the form u(x) = _eO. 1x illustrated in Fig. 4.16.
Let us find the expected consequence, certainty equivalent,
and risk premium for a lottery yielding either x = 2,
x = 3, or x = 7, each with a probability of 1/3. The expected
consequence is
- 1 (2 3 7) 4x =
"3 + + = ,
and the expected utility is
E[u(SC)] = ! (_eO.1 (2) - 0.1 (3) - eO. 1 (7)) = -1.528.3 e
Therefore, the certainty equivalent x is such that
0. 1 ｾ
-e = -1.528 .
Solving this, we find ｾ = 4.24. The risk premium, ｾ - x,
is then 0.24. II
Now let us consider risk proneness.
Theorem 4.22. For decreasing utility functions, the following
are equivalent:
1. a decision maker is risk prone,
2. the certainty equivalent is less than the
expected consequence of any nondegenerate
'lottery,
3. the risk premium for all nondegenerate lotteries
is negative.
To help illustrate this result, consider
-0 2xExample 4.19 Suppose u(x) = e . ,and we are interested
in the certainty equivalent and risk premium for <0,10> .
-7
ｾ risk
premium
2o
-1
-1. 531------------.......
-1. 35---.---
-1. 221-- ---'....
l'
u(x)
-2 Ｎ ｕ ｬ ｬ Ｍ Ｍ Ｍ Ｍ Ｍ Ｍ Ｍ Ｍ Ｍ Ｍ Ｍ Ｍ Ｍ Ｍ Ｍ Ｍ Ｍ Ｍ ｾ
ｆ ｩ ｧ ｵ ｲ ･ Ｔ Ｎ ｬ Ｖ Ｎ ａ ｄ ｾ ｣ ｲ ･ ｡ ｳ ｩ ｮ ｧ Utility Function Illustrating Risk Aversion
...ｾ ."
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The expected utility of this ｬ ｯ ｴ ｴ ｾ ｲ ｹ is
± (e -0.2 ( 0 ) -0.2(10))+ e = 0.568.
ACalculating the certainty equivalent x from
e-0 . 2x = 0.568
we find 2 = 2.83. Since the expected consequence, x = 5,
the risk premium,
in Fig. 4.17.
A .
X - x, IS -2.17. This is all illustrated
4 • 8 • 2 • A Measure of Risk Aversion
By a development similar to that for increasing utility
functions, we can show that a relevant measure of risk aversion
for decreasing utility functions is
u"(x) d .q(x)= u'(xT = ax [log (ul(x))] (4.27)
Notice that q(x) is defined almost the same as rex) in
Section 4.5; only a minus sign is different. The reason for
this is, as you will see in the examples, is motivated by
Theorem 4.23.
•
If q is positive ｦ ｾ ｲ all x, then u is concave
and the decision maker is risk averse.
Proof. Assume q(x) is positive. Then since u' (x)
is negative for decreasing utility functions,
u"(x) must be negative implying u(x) is concave.
This in turn implies the decision maker is
risk averse. <l
The idea is then consistent with the case of increasing
utility functions; positive risk aversion means the decision
0 X =2.B3 )(=5 10 x
,
'>
1
I I Ik-
-, risk premium .. 2.17 IIt I IIU(x) .568 II
-0.2x I= e
.....- I
I
.135
- ___ I
.--:::,.-. ..
Figure 4 .11.A Decreasing Utility Function
• Illustrating Risk Proneness
Ｒ ｾ ｏ ｯ Ｎ Ｎ
maker is risk averse. Also, analogous to the previous case,
we have
Theorem 4.24. Two utility functions are strategically
equivalent if and only if they have the same
risk aversion function.
This says the arbitrariness of a utility function as to
Scale and origin is eliminated by the risk aversion function
although one's attitudes toward risk are retained.
To link this risk aversion function q, which represents
the decision maker's risk attitude toward small lotteries
with a zero expected consequence, to his risk attitudes
toward any lottery we have
LSI
Theorem 4.25. ｾｾ Ｑ Ｈ ｸ ﾻ ｾ Ｒ Ｈ ｸ Ｉ for all x, then TI1 (x,x),
the risk premium for any lottery ｾ given ref-
erence x and a utility function with risk
function ql (xl, is larger than ｔ ｉ Ｒ ｊ ｘ Ｌ ｾ Ｉ Ｎ
Some examples seem appropriate to illustrate these results.
Example 4.20 In example 4.4, we showed using u(x) = 2-x ,
the certainty equivalents for <0,10> and <10,20> were 7.07
and 15.8, ｲ ･ ｳ ｰ ｾ ｣ ｴ ｩ ｶ ･ ｬ ｹ Ｎ The risk premiums are then 2.07 for
<0,10> and 0.8 for <10,20>. Using (4.27) we find the risk
aversion function for u(x) = _x 2 to be q(x) = 1/x. This is
positive for x ｾ 0, so we expect risk premiums for lotteries
with consequences in this range to be positive. Our results
follow this pattern.
·'
Notice that q is decreasing. Thus the risk aversion
in the range 0-10 is greater than the risk aversion in the
range 10-20. Hence, you would expect that risk premiums
for a particular lottery x in the range 0-10 would be greater
than these for an equivalent lottery, x + 10, in the range
10-20. The risk premiums for < 0,10> and <10,20> bear this
relationship. LJ
Example 4.21 What is the risk aversion for u(x)
Working directly for the definition (4.27),
q(x) = u"(x)u-'()x
In example 4.18, we used this utility function and found
the risk premium for the lottery yielding either x = 2,
x = 3, or x=:7 with probability 1/3 was 0.24. Since q is
positive, we expected this risk premium to be positive. C
Example 4.22 Suppose u(x) = e- O. 2x and we are interested
in the risk aversion function. From the definition
q(x)
•
= u"(x)
U I (x) == -0.2 .
Notice this is negative. In example 4.10, we used the same
utility function and found the risk premium for <0,10> to
be -2.66, also negative. tJ
fhis example is an indication of
Theorem 4.26. ｟ ｾ Ｍ Ｎ Ｙ Ｎ Ｈ ｸ Ｉ is negative for all x, then u(x)
is c_onve0_anL_!J1e decision maker is risk prone.
2.'lS3
In Section 4.3, we discussed the possibility of changing
attributes in a manner such that the utility function
for a new attribute is increasing whereas the utility
function for the present attribute was decreasing. Let us
consider the effects of such a transformation on the risk
aversion of the decision maker. Suppose Y is the attribute
of concern and u(y) = _e cy where c is positive. Note u(y)
is decreasing and risk averse with q(y) = c. Let us define
* - ｾx = y - y, for all y, where I is some standard amount
of Y. Let u l (x) be the utility for x and define it by
* *"ul(x)::u(y*" - x) = _ec(y - x) = _(ecy )e- cx .
*"
Since e CY is just a positive constant,
-cx
u l (x) - -e
which is increasing with risk aversion rex) = c. The con-
elusion is that although a transformation was used to
change from a decreasing to an increasing utility function,
the decision maker's attitudes towards risk were not
effected by this change.
Let us try to generalize this notion.
Theorem 4.27 .
•
*"If a transformation of the form x ｾ｟ｾ
lS made to change from a decreasing utility
function u(rl to_ an increasing utility function
w(x), the risk ｾ ｶ ･ ｲ ｳ ｩ ｯ ｮ q(y) associated with
ｾ ｲ ｬ and the risk aversion rex) ｡ ｳ ｳ ｯ ｣ ｩ ｟ ｾ ｴ ･ ､
*Ｎｾ i t 11._\11 (x ｬｾｾｾｾｾｾＮｾｪｾｾ｟ t 11 ｾｊ T r (x) = q ( y - x),
*'or equivalently, 4(Y) = r(y - y).
In other words, the risk aversion function associated with
a particular consequence, either x or y, is not changed by
the stated transformation.
Proof. By definition, q(x) = u"(y)/u' (y) where
-- y y
the subscript designates differentiation with
respect to y. An appropriate utility function
for x is w(x) = u(y* - x). Taking derivatives
of w(x) with respect to
. *.It'V)_du(y - x) (it)ｷ ｸ ｾ - dy dx
and
x, we find
u ' (y)(-1)y
dw'(x) d[-u'(Y)] d
w" (x) = x = ＭｾＭｹ｟ＭＨｑｙＩ = -u" (y) (-1) .
x dx dy ax y
Substituting these into rex) = ＭｷｾＨｸＩＯｷｾＨｸＩＬ we
have
l' (x) - -
Thus rex) =
ulrey)y
-u I (y)
Y
*q(y -
ulrey)
］ Ｍ ｾ
u' (y)y
x). Substituting variables,
4.8.3
q (y ) = l' (y* - y). <J
Increasing, Constant, and Decreasing Risk Aversion
The most important category of decreasing utility
functions is probably those which arc increasingly risk
averse. Let us formally define what we mean by this category,
and then argue its importance. Concerning decreasing utility
functions, we will sayan indiviJual is increasingly risk
averse if (a) he is risk Clvcrse, ,:lllJ (b) his risk premium
'V 'V
nex,x) for any lottery x increases as the reference amount
x increases. Notice that the words used to define increasing-
ly risk averse in this case are the same as those used to
define this concept for monotonically increasing utility
functions. However, since the risk premium is defined
differently for these cases, the definitions of increasingly
risk averse are different.
To be increasingly risk averse implies that the risk
premium that a decision maker would be willing to pay to
avoid the lottery <x - h, x + h> would increase as x in-
creased. This might be quite reasonable if X represented
costs, for example. For smaller amounts of X, the decision
maker could afford to take the lottery, but as x increased,
he might be forced to avoid the same lottery since the
potential high cost might cause severe financial problems.
The same reasoning would apply to decision problems
within fire departments, where X represents the response
time to a fire. A chief may prefer <1,3> to a response
time of 2.2 minutes, and also prefer 4.2 minutes to <3,5>.
In other words, he would not be willing to pay a 0.2 minute
risk premium t@ avoid <1,3>, but he would pay this premium
to moid<3,5>. The chief wants to behave more conservatively
when dealing with larger response times, so his utility
function must be increasingly risk averse.
Another consideration is as follows. Suppose the
decision maker's utility function for X was decreasing and
and increasingly risk averse. Then, if we transform to an
*attribute Y, where a specific value y = x x, the
decision maker's utility function for Y will be increasing
and decreasingly risk averse. That is to say, the increasing-
ly risk averse category of decreasing utility functions
corresponds to the decreasingly risk averse category of
increasing utility functions. More formally, we have
Theorem 4.28. If decreasing utility function u(x) is
increasingly risk averse and if y = x* -x,
the utility function w(y) is increasing and
decreasingly risk averse.
Proof. If 'l(x) IS the risk aversion for
u(x) and r(y) is the risk aversion for w(y) ,
the result follows directly from Theorem 4.27.4
And thus, the intuitive reasoning gIven for decreasing risk
aversion concerning increasing utility functions is relevant
to the current case in point.
All of the important results of Section 4.6 have analogs
for decreasing. utility functions. For instance,
Theorem 4.29. The risk aversion q(x) for utility function u(x)
is increasing [constant, decreasing] if and
only if the risk Ercmium n(x,i) is an increasing
Jconstant z ､･｣ｔ｟｣Ｈｬｾ［ｩＡＡＮﾣＺｌｦｵｮ｣ｴｩｯｮ of x for all i.
Let's try to find some simple examples of increasingly
risk averse utility functions.
Example 4.23 Suppose u(x) = cx-e c > 0. Then cl early
cx 2 cx
u' (x) = -ce and u" (x) = -c e ,so the risk avers ion
q(x) = c. Certainly u(x) is decreasing and risk averse,
but q(x) is constant, not increasing. tl
This example motivates some definitions and a
generalization of the result. We will say a decision maker
is constantly risk averse if q(x) is a positive constant,
constantly risk neutral if q(x) is zero, and constantly
risk prone if q(x) is a negative constant. As with increasing
utility functions, these conditions place strong restricitons
on the shape of the utility function. More specifically,
we can show
Theorem 4.30 u(x) cx#- q(x) c > 0, (constant risk aversion),-e =
u(x) -x ｾ >- q(x)
°
(risk neutrality),
u(x) cx 0, (constant risk proneness).e (=) q(x) = c <
Provided the assumptions implying such a utility function
were valid, one would only need to determine the certainty
equivalent of·one simple lottery in order to specify the
entire utility function.
Example 4.24
the form
Consider the quadratic utility function of
u(x) = a - bx 2- cx ,
b
where b > 0, C > 0, and c > -2c. This last condition is necessary
as u is only decreasing In this range. It is a simple matter
to calculate
u"(x)
q(x):'u' (x) = 2cb + 2cx
from which one can see q(x) is positive but decreases as
x increases. (J
In example 4.24, u is decreasingly risk averse. To define
this notion more precisely, we will say one is decreasingly
risk averse if (a) he is risk averse, and (b) his risk
premium n(x,x) decreases in x for any lottery x. Such an
attitude is, by definition, opposite of increasingly risk
averse.
Example 4.25 Suppose u(x) = log (b-x). Then, u'(x) =
- 1 / (b - x ) and u" (x) = -1 / (b - x) 2, so q (x) = 1 / (b - x).
Clearly q(x) is positive and increasing in x for x < b. This
implies u(x) is increasingly risk averse for x< b. LJ
ax b cxEx amp1e 4. 26 Let u (x) = - e - e ,where a > 0, b > 0,
and c>O. If a = c, then u(x) = -(1 + b)ecx which is
constantly risk averse as we have shown. If a 1 c, then
u' (x) = _ae ax - bce cx and u"(x) = _a 2e ax
•
2 ax + b 2 cxa e c e
q(x) = ax cx
ae + bce
b 2 cx so- c e ,
In this case, the risk aversion q(x) is always positive and
increasing in x. Thus u(x) is increasingly risk averse if
a :f: c. Assuming a < c, which can be done wi thout loss of
generality, the risk aversion is slightly larger than Q
for large negative amounts of x, increases to (a Z + bcZ)j
(a + bc) at x = 0, and approaches c as x becomes positively
large. 0
In this example, we used a general result analogous
to one for increasing utility functions. That is,
Theorem 4.31 A utility function, which is !he weighted
sum of two or more utility functions which
are increasingly or constantly risk averse
on the interval ｾ ｌ ｊ is increasingly riskx,x ,
averse on [xC ＬｸＪｊｾ｣･ｰｴ on subintervals
where the weighted utility functions have
equal and constant risk aversion. Then it
is constantly risk averse.
Note that in example 4.Z6, if we set u 1 (x) = _e
ax and
uZ(x) = _e cx , then u(x) is a weighted sum, namely u(x) =
u 1 (x) + bUZ(x). Now u1 and Uz are each constantly risk
averse. If they don't have equal risk aversion functions,
that is if a ｾ c, then u must be increasingly risk averse,
and if they do have equal risk aversion functions, then
"clearly u must be constantly risk averse.
As we did with increasing utility functions, we could
categorize the monotonically decreasing utility functions
which are risk prone as increasingly risk prone, constantly
risk prone, or decreasingly risk prone. Also we could ue-
fine and investigate proportional risk aversion in the
context of monotonically decreasing utility functions.
However, at this point, we feel the exercise would provide
little, if any, insight, so it is omitted.
4.8.4 Nonmonotonic Utility Functions
Our definitions for risk averse and risk prone are
the same for nonmonotonic preferences as they were for
the monotonic cases. Specifically, one is said to be risk
averse if he prefers the expected consequences of any
nondegenerate lottery to the lottery itself, and one is
said to be risk prone if he prefers any nondegenerate
lottery to its expected consequence. From these definitions
one could prove
Theorem 4.32 Concerning nonmonotonic preferences, a
decision maker is risk averse [risk prone]
if and only if his utility function is
concave [convexL_
Examples of risk averse and risk prone nonmonotonic utility
functions are given in Fig. 4.18.
As we illustrated earlier in Section 4.3, the certainty
equivalent fot' nonmonotonic utility functions is not
necessarily unique: Because of this, there are no alter-
nate definitions of risk averse and risk prone in terms
of the certainty equivalent as there was for monotonic
utility functions. Also, the risk premium cannot be use-
fully defined for nonmonotonic utility functions. In addition,
1-- -:;.
X ><.
for nonmonotonic utility ｦ ｵ ｮ ｣ ｴ ｩ ｯ ｾ ｳ Ｌ the first derivative
of u(x) is either undefined or zero for at ｬ ･ ｡ ｾ Ｎ ｯ ｮ ･ value
of x. Hence, a measure of risk aversion similar to the
rex) and q(x) in the monotonic cases would not be defined
for all x. Perhaps an alternate definition of a local risk
aversion exists for this case, but this seems to be an
academic point. For operational problems, a reasonable
approach would be to divide the range of the attribute
into intervals such that preferences are monotonic in
each interval, and then, treat each interval separately
using the theory relevant to the respective cases.
4.9 A PROCEDURE FOR ASSESSING ｕｾｌｉｔｙ FUNCTIONS
From the heading of this section, one might think
it contains "a procedure for assessing utility functions"
applicable to anyone at any time, that is, a general
procedure. But in fact, it contains "a procedure for
assessing utility functions" applicable to some of the
people some of the time, maybe. So, clearly the question
that must be addressed before we begin the main topic of
this section fs 'Given the situation as stated, what is
the relevance of this material?'
To make sure there is no misunderstanding, note that
we did not state that one cannot evaluate a utility function
for the decision maker in most prohlems. It was stated,
however, that the procedure to be discussed now is not
2'jZ
necessarily appropriate in many cases. The main reason
for this is that assessment of utility functions is as
much of an art as it is a science, and as such no single
set of rules can be laid down which invariably result in
a utility function. In fact, there are not only many
different techniques* for evaluating utility functions,
but numerous variants of each of these. Also, which
technique might be best in a certain situation would be
very hard to predict beforehand and would depend on the
particular decision maker and the context of the problem
in addition to many less obvious factors. Thus, this
section does not contain a generally applicable procedure
simply because there isn't one.
The basic ideas, however, which one uses in assessing
a utility function remain more or less the same for all
the procedures. That is, regardless of the technique
being used to assess a utility function, the specific
points or objectives which must be considered and accomplished
by any assessment procedure are essentially the same.
To help clarify this, let us divide procedures into the
following five steps:
•
(1) preliminaries to actual assessment,
(2) specifying the relevant qualitative
characteristics,
*For example, see Mosteller and Nogee [1951J; Davidson,
Suppes, and Siegel [1957]; Becker, DeGroot, and Marschak
[1964]; and Schlaifer [1969].
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(3) specifying quantitative restrictions,
(4) choosing a utility function,
(5) checking for consistency.
The different assessment procedures result from the numerous
ways of carrying out each of these five steps. Although, this
division allows us to emphasize exactly what goes into the
assessment of a utility function, in practice the distinctions
between certain steps may not be so clear.
Before beginning the main discussion, it should be
mentioned that the level of detail given here is much greater
than would be required for the assessment of a given decision
maker's utility function. The analyst, being aware of all
the small points described, will no doubt find it convenient
to skip explicitly many of them in most circumstances. For
example, the preliminaries to assessment may be omitted
when dealing with someone familiar with decision analysis,
since this step is to insure that analyst and decision maker
are speaking the same language.
4.9.1 Preliminaries to Actual Assessment
Recall from chapter one that the paradigm of decision
•
analysis is divided into five steps: pre-analysis, structuring
the problem, assessing the judgmental probability distributions,
assessing preferences for consequences, and maximizing ex-
ected utility. Before assessing the preferences, we would
have explained the ｣ ｯ ｾ ｣ ･ ｰ ｴ of decisioll analysis to the de-
cision maker and with his help, structured the problem. Thus,
we can assume that the decision maker realizes the purpose
in assessing his preferences and is sufficiently motivated
to think hard about his feelings for the various consequences.
It is at this point that we begin to assess his utility
function.
Before any assessments are made, it should be clear
to the decision maker that the preferences we are interested
in are his. It must be understood that there are no objecti-
vely correct preferences; that the preferences of importance
represent the subjective feelings of the decision maker.
At any time if the decision maker feels uncomfortable with
any of the information he has offered about his subjective
feelings, it is perfectly all right, in fact, necessary for
a correct analysis, for him to change his mind. This is
one of the purposes of decision analysis, to require the
decision maker to reflect on his preferences and hopefully
straighten them out in his own mind.
Let us hasten to add one caveat at this point. Ex-
perience has shown that in assessing utility functions
for the first time, many individuals fall into certain
standard traps. They respond to certain hypothetical
•
questions and perhaps even feel comfortable about their
responses. But then they are aghast at some of the
implications of their judgmental inputs. The experienced
analyst may wish to point out these implications to the
assessor and by various compromises help guide him over
these troublesome rough spots. Now, of course, there is
a danger in doing this since we are seeking the decision
maker's preferences and not the analyst's, but some healthy
tensions might force the decision maker to think a bit
deeper about his problem. If the intervention of the analyst
is crude and overpowering, then, of course, one subverts
the whole process of trying to organize the decision maker's
preferences into a coherent whole.
In this chapter on unidimensional utility theory we
are concerned with the case where each possible consequence
of any act can be adequately described in terms of a single
attribute. Let X be the evaluator function, which associates
to any consequence Q say, the real number x = X(Q). It is
crucial that the decision maker understands the orientation
of the scale: Are higher x numbers more or less desirable?
Do preferences increase with x up to a point and then decrease?
In some contexts the attribute X may be quite natural and
the x-scale can be given in natural physical units like
monetary assets, share of the market, lives saved, or time
elapsed. In other contexts the values on the x-scale may
involve subjective appraisals, such as an index for comfort,
for ｡ ･ ｳ ｴ ｨ ･ ｴ ｩ ｣ ｳ ｾ for functionality. No matter how we find the
x-values we assume that it is meaningful to ask whether we
prefer a consequence x 1 to consequence xZ.
Next, we want to limit the region over which we must
assess preferences to as small a region as reasonable. From
the problem structure, the decision maker should be able
to bound the possible amount which x could assume. Then we
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would choose X O and x* such that l any possible x is bounded
by XO below and x* above. These values should be chosen for
convenience and meaningfulness to the decision maker. For
instance, if x ranged from ° to 8.75 in the specific units,
we might define XO = ° and x* *"= 10. A value of x = 10,000,
for example, probably would have little meaning to the
decision maker. The preferences which we eventually assess
1 b h f ·h 0.-*must on yet ose or consequences x WIt x:!f x:::: x
As a final check on the decision maker's understanding
of how consequences are represented as real numbers, we
might ask him whether or not he prefers consequence T to
consequence S in Figure 4.19, where the points Sand T
should be chosen such that it is clear to us, the analyst,
that the decision maker would almost for sure prefer a
particular one. If the decision maker's preference in this
case agreed with the expected result, we could proceed to
assess the utility function. If not, it would seem desirable
to ask the decision maker to clarify his reasoning and
perhaps then to repeat some or all of the familiarization
process.
Enough h.s been said about the preliminaries. The basic
idea is to acquaint the decision maker with the framework
which we use in assessing his utility function.
All these preliminaries are theoretically trivial and
you might feel that we are talking down to you by emphasizing
the self-evident. However, we have made many errors ourselves
t
x*
T
••
Q
X(Q)
S
Q
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in helping others assess utility functions and it is often these
simplistic preliminaries that foul up the procedure.
4.9.2 Specifying the Relevant Qualitative Characteristics
At an early stage in the assessment process we should
determine whether or not the utility function u is monotonic.
Referring to Figure 4.19, we ask the decision maker if S
or Q is more preferable. Suppose Q is preferred to S. Then
we might ask whether T is preferred to R; and again, assume
it is. A few more questions of this nature may be appropriate,
but finally we ask: "If xk is greater than x j ' is xk always
preferred to x j ?" For example, from the previous responses,
we would probably expect an answer of yes, implying that
uC-) is monotonically increasing in x. If this did not agree
with our own understanding of the consequence, we should
offer our reasoning to the decision maker and recheck his
preferences. This serves to educate the decision maker,
not to bias him, and hopefully, it forces him to think
hard about his preferences.
Next, we want to determine whether u is risk averse,
risk neutral, or risk prone. First we ask the decision
ｾ
maker if he prefers <x + h, x - h> or x for some arbitrarily
chosen amounts of x and h. If he prefers the lotterf, we
have reason to believe he might be risk prone, whereas if
he prefers the expected consequence x, this indicates he
might be risk averse. The same question should be repeated
using many different amounts for either x or h while holding
the other amount fixed. If the lbtteries are chosen to cover
the entire range of possible consequences and if the expected
tonsequence is always preferred, it is reasonable to assume
the decision maker is risk averse. In similar circumstances,
if the lottery is always preferred, he is risk prone. And,
of course, indifference between each lottery and its expected
consequence indicates risk neutrality. For a mathematically
sophisticated decision maker who prcferrred x to the initial
lottery <x + h, x - h>, we might simply ask "If x and hare
allowed to vary over the range of possible consequences,
would you always prefer x to <x + h, x - h>?" An affirmative
response is a sufficient condition for risk aversion.
The less sophisticated decision maker may require a
more specific version of this procedure. For example, we
might divide the range of attribute X into ten equal segments,
where division points are denoted by xo' x 1 , ... , and x 10
respectively. This notation is illustrated in Figure 4.20.
Now we ask the decision maker whether or not he prefers
<x 2 'xO> or x 1 . For risk aversion, x 1 should be preferred.
Similarly we ask for preferences between <x i + 1 ,x i - 1> and
x. for i = ＲＬｾＬ ... ,9. If u is risk averse, the certain con-
I
I
sequence (which is the expected consequence) should be pre-
ferred to the lottery in all these cases. Given the decision
maker answered all the questions in this manner, we would
be justified in assuming he is risk averse. If he always
preferred the lottery, we would assume he is risk prone.
It would now be useful to determine if u is increasinglYa
X b XJ
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that the decision maker is indifferent between
this involves finding the certainty equivalent
decreasinglY,or constantly risk averse. One method to do
A
xl' such
A
Xl and
<x 2 ' xo>. A procedure for evaluating such a cerainty equi-
valent is given in the next subsection. Also, we would like
to determine certainty equivalent ｾ ｩ which is indifferent
to <x i + l ' x i - l > for i = 2, 3, ... ,9. For increasing utility
functions, if the risk premium ex. - ｾＮＩ decreases [increases,
1 1
is constant] as i increases, then u is decreasingly [ in-
creasingly, constantly] risk averse. It may be rather difficult
to determine the Q.'s exactly, but the decision maker should
1
be able to qualitatively answer whether ex. - ｾＮＩ is ｩ ｮ ｾ
1 1
creasing, decreasing, or remaining constant as i increases
without actually specifying
"possible that ex. - x.) may1 1
the amounts of the x. 'so It is
1
be increasing in certain regions
of X and decreasing in other regions. This information is
also valuable.
For the more sophisticated subject the analyst might
ask him for his risk premium for a lottery of the form
<x - h, x + h> for a specific x and h. Then he would be
asked how ｴｨｩｳｾｲｩｳｫ premium would behave as x is increased
with h held fixed. If, as is often the case for monetary
assets, this risk premium decreases as x increases there
is a strong presumption of decreasing risk aversion. In
implementing this procedure one can often ascertain that
the subject: is decreasingly risk averse without evcr fon.:jng
him to give a specific numerical value for the risk premium
of any specific lottery <x - h, 1 + h>. It is encouraging
to note how often subjects feel comfortable with these
qualitative type questions.
We've just illustrated a few ways of determining some
possible qualitative characteristics of u, namely, monoto-
nicity, risk aversion, decreasing risk aversion, etc. These
methods have proven to be important in many decision problems.
In other problems, however, a characteristic of main interest
may be propotional risk aversion.
In a style similar to that just illustrated, the analyst
should be able to devise a simple technique to ascertain
which proportional risk characteristics apply. Such a technique
should take into consideration the problem context and the
abilities of the decision maker.
After the qualitative characteristics have been speci-
fied, one needs to assess quantitive utility values for a
few points on X. The analyst could either then fair in a
"smooth" utility function satisfying the qualitative
characteristics and quantitative assessments or perhaps
assess appropriate parameter values for an appropriate family
of utility functions that exhibit the qualitative specifi-
,-,'
cations already elicited from the subject. Let's consider
these quantitative assessments.
4.9.3 Specifying Quantitative Restrictions
Our step three in assessing a utility function is de-
termining some ｱｵ｡ｮｾｩｴ｡ｴｩｶ･ restrictions. That is, we want
to fix the utilities of a few particular points on the ｵ ｾ ｩ ｬ ｩ ｴ ｹ
"3>G I
function. This usually involves determining the certainty
equivalents for a few fifty-fifty lotteries. Refer to
Fig. 4.21 for the meaning of the consequences xa,xb ' etc.,
and assume we want to determine the certainty equivalent
for (x ｾ x").
We begin by asking the decision maker if he prefers
<x I , x"> or x . The consequence x is chosen such that a
a a
particular answer is expected. Suppose the decision maker
prefers ｾ ｨ ･ lottery to x and this agrees with our expectation.
a
Then we ask the decision maker whether he prefers <x', x">
or xb ' where xb is chosen so that we expect xb would be
preferred. Assume this is the case. Next, we inquire about
ｾ ｨ ･ preferences of <x', x"> relative to x . Since x is
c c
"near" x
a
' we somewhat expect that the lottery will be pre-
ferred to xc' but perhaps not. We continue with this con-
vergence procedure until a consequence ｾ is reached such
'"that <x' ,x"> and x are equally desirable (or undesirable)
to the decision maker.*
If the decision maker indicates any preferences which
we do not feel represent his "true" preferences, this should
he pointed out and discussed again. Provided the assessments
are correct in the sense that the decision maker really is
ｾ ｔ ｨ ･ questions should be in a framework that the decision maker
understands and finds reasonable. For a good example of this,
see the work of Grayson (1960). whjcll is briefly discussed
in Seccion 4."10.
ｩＭＭＭＭＭｉｬｾＭＭＭｴＭＭＫＭＭ .....i--}-:-i-lＭ Ｍ Ｔ ｉ ｦ Ｍ Ｍ Ｍ Ｍ Ｍ ｩ ｉ Ｌ Ｎ Ｍ Ｍ Ｍ Ｍ ｩ Ｍ Ｍ Ｍ Ｍ ｾ Ｑ
Ｌ ｾ Ｌ 'v X \.1 X ｾｘ 'X' X Xli
.... ....0.. c:. A e ｾｲﾷﾷ ... h Xi d Xb
/-'-'. 4' ｾＩ IiCjure .... .
A ｾｏｉＧＱｶ･Ｎｾｳ･ｮ｣｣ＮＮ ｜･ｾｾ｜ｴＢｾｵｾＮ Ｋｏｾ ａｳＭ［Ｎ･ｾ＼Ｚ Il"IJ ｾ ｃ･ＧＨＱｾｈｾｾ｜ｦＺＮＧｻ｜ｯｉｾＢ C\ l Q ｾ
indifferent between x and <X', Xli), then ｾ is the certainty
equivalent for that lottery. And of course, the utility
assigned to ｾ must equal the expected utility of <x', Xli>.
More specifically, we set
A 1 1
u(x) = "2 u(x') + "2 u(x") .
Using this procedure, we can determine the certainty
equivalents for some lotteries which will help us specify
the decision maker's utility function. In particular, suppose
we are interested in a utility function u(o) for all x such
that X
o
2. x 2. x 1 · The reason fOT this notational change will
soon be clear.
A reasonable first step would be to assess the certainty
equivalent x. S for the lottery <x 1 ,xo>. Then, clearly
(4.28)
Next, we assess the certainty equivalents for <x 1 ' x. S> and
<x.S,xo>, which we will designate as x. 7S and x. 2S respecti-
vely. And, obviously,
and
u(x. 7S ) (4.29)
(4.30)
Suppose the decision maker's preferences are increasing in
x and that x 1 > x ,o then we can arbitrarily set
u(x ) = 0
, 0 (4.31)
and
(4.32)
Substituting, these into (4.28), (4.29), and (4.30), we
easily obtain
and
u(x. 5) = 0.5,
u(x. 75 )= 0.75,
u(x. 25 )= 0.25.
(4.33)
(4.34)
(4.35)
Equations (4.31) through (4.35) fix five points on the
utility function for X as shown in Figure 4.22. A utility
function with the previously specified qualitative character-
istics can be fa ired through these points.
Before this is done, however, some simple consistency
checks should be included in the procedure. For instance,
we can assess the decision maker's certainty equivalent
ｾ for <x. 75 , x. 25>. To be consistent, ｾ should equal x. 5
since u (x. 5) = 0.5 and
A 1 1
u(x) = 2 u(x. 75 ) + 2 u(x. 25 ) = 0.5.
Also, we now have the necessary information for a simple
check on ｷ ｨ ･ ｴ ｾ ･ ｲ the utility function is risk averse or risk
prone. For u increasing, recall that the certainty equi-
valents x. 25 , x. 5 , and x. 75 are less than the expected
consequences of their respective lotteries if
u is risk averse. These certainty equivalents must be larger
thall the expected consequences if u is risk prone. for mo-
notonically decreasing utility functions, as previously
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discussed, just the reverse is true.
When these consistency checks reveal inconsistent
preferences, the discrepancies should be pointed out to
the decision maker, and part of the assessment procedure
must be repeated to iron out the differences and obtain
consistent preferences. This iterative procedure hopefully
results in a "better" statement of the decision maker's
preferences.
Before proceeding any further, the great amount of
overlap between determining the qualitative characteristics
of a utility function and specifying qualitative restrictions
should be explicitly mentioned. To take a simple example,
suppose that in checking the risk aversion of utility
function u(-) for 0 ｾ x ｾ 1000, the decision maker stated
400 was the certainty equivalent for the lottery <1000,0>_
We noted this and then asked "Is the expected consequence
always preferred to a lottery?" A positive response indi-
cated the decision maker was risk averse. Next suppose it
was determined that he was constantly risk averse, so his
preferences could be represented with the utility function
u(x) = _e- cx . ｾｩｮ｣･ this function has only one parameter,
namely c, we do not need to get any more quantitative
restrictions since we already know
1 1
u(400) = 2 u(1000) + 2 u(O) .
From this we can calculate a value for c. Of course, it will
often be prudent to make consistency checks on This value.
In Section 4.7, we indicated how the one parameter families
of constant proportional risk averse utility functions could
be assessed with the answer to one question. This also
illustrated the interaction among the steps of a utility
assessment--steps that we have identified mainly for dis-
cussion purposes.
We now raise two points about assessments that are
discussed by Schlaifer [1969]. First, the consequences
used to assess utility functions must be psychologically
real ｾ ｯ this decision maker. As an example, if we are
interested in assessing someone's utility function for mone-
tary amounts between zero and twenty-thousand dollars, he
should not be asked to consider consequences like a million
dollars. This consequence might be inconceivable to him
and inconsistent assessments would likely result. The second
point is that the differences between consequences must be
psychologically real to the decision maker. Again for the
same monetary utility ｦ ｵ ｮ ｾ ｴ ｩ ｯ ｮ Ｌ assessing the certainty
equivalent for <$0, $10> would likely not provide very use-
ful information, since any extrapolation of the result to
the range of interest would have little relevance. In terms
of the total range of money cons ide red , $0, $10, and the
;.'
certainty equivalent would probably be thought of as
essentially equal in preference for all practical purposes.
4.9.4 Choosing the Utility Function
After we have qualitatively determined the characteristics
of the utility function and quantitatively ｡ ｳ ｳ Ｈ Ｌ ｳ ｳ ｬ ｾ ､ the pre-
ferences of approximately five consequences and satisfied
ourselves that the results represent the true feelings of
the decision maker, we next fair in a smooth utility function.
However, having obtained this information, the analyst is
faced with several questions. First, are the qualitative
and quantitative assessments consistent, that is, does a
utility function exist which simultaneously satisfies all
of them? If there is such a utility function, how restrictive
are ｾ ｨ ･ ｳ ･ assessments, and how should an appropriate utility
function be determined? If there is not such a utility
function, how should one proceed to obtain a consistent
set of assessments?
A method for addressing these questions involves first
finding a parametric family of utility functions which
possesses the relevant characteristics, such as risk aversion,
etc., previously specified for the decision maker. Then
using the quantitative assessments, that is, the certainty
equivalents, we try to find a specific member of that family
which is appropriate for the decision maker. The information
on certainty equivalents is used to specify values for the
parameters of ｾ ｴ ｨ ･ original family of utility functions. If
we are lucky, we will find a utility function satisfying
all the qualitative and quantitative assessments simultaneous-
ly. Unfortunately, no general procedure exists for either
determining whether a given set of qualitative and quanti-
tative assessments are consistellt or indicating an appropriate
functional form of the utility function when the assessments
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are consistent. To our knowledge, the most advanced work
on these problems is that of Meyer and Pratt [1968] 7 who
have answered these questions for some important cases.*
The first situation concerns the case where certainty
equivalents for some simple lotteries are given and regions
of risk aversion and risk proneness specified. Increasing
and decreasing risk aversion are not considered. They
prove a utility exists satisfying these assessments pro-
vided certain linear constraints arc satisfied. Finding
bounds for the acceptable utility function is essentially
a linear programming problem.
The second important case is when the decision maker
is decreasingly risk averse and an arbitrary number of
certainty equivalents is given. Meyer and Pratt develop
and illustrate an algorithm which checks the consistency
of these assessments and bounds the possible utility
functions satisfying the constraints.
As a simple illustration of a couple points, suppose
the decision maker's utility ｦ ｵ ｮ ｾ ｴ ｩ ｯ ｮ was monotonically
increasing in x and decreasingly risk averse. From Section 4.6,
we know a family of utility functions which satisfies these
characteristics is
u (x) == h + k ( - e - ax - be - cx) , (4.36)
ｾ ｉ ｮ their ｡ ｲ ｴ ｩ ｣ ｬ ･ ｾ Meyer and Pratt ｾ Ｙ ｇ Ｘ ｝ address consistency
quesT-ions in 1:\.;0 siIuations concerning increasing lnility
functions. Using their methods, it would be a straight forward
exercise IO obtain results analogous to theirs for decreasing
utility functions.
where a,b,c, and k are positive constants. Using (4.36) to
evaluate the utilities of the consequences in (4.31) through
(4.35) will give us five equations with five unknowns. Then,
provided these equations can be solved subject to the re-
strictions on the parameters, they will give us the specific
member of (4.36) which represents the decision maker's
*'preferences . If they have no solution the analyst is faced
with implictly weighing the disadvantages of choosing an "almost
appropriate" utility function against the disadvantages of further
search for a "more appropriate" utility function, with a knowl-
edge that further search might not improve matters. Thus, in
many situations, choosing a utility function subject to the
given constraints is somewhat of a heuristic search process.
Unfortunately, we can't offer any clear-cut procedures for
solving such a problem. However, if we have obtained a utility
function which satisfies almost all of the constraints and
which is not grossly incompatible with any of the others,
then due to the subjectiveness of utility assessments, it
would seem appropriate for the decision maker to operate
wi th this util i ty func ｴ ｩ ｯ ｮ Ｊ ｾ .
.'
ｾ･･ Section 4. 10.3 fo r a brief descript ion of a compu ter
program that addresses this problem.
ｾ Ｊ ｓ ･ ･ Hammond [1974], ｷ ｨ ･ ｾ he indicates that in some situations,
an ･ ｡ ｳ ｹ Ｍ ｾ ｯ Ｍ ｵ ｳ ･ simple utility function can be substituted
for a more complex utility function which is not precisely
known.
The final point we wish to address in this suhsection
concerns utili ty functions ､ ｬ ｩ Ｈ ｾ ｨ aH' not monotonic. The
theory for this case is not Sl) It j '.C ｾ but operationally,
the problem is only ali ttte !Tt\.: ＺＧＨｾ d Uficul t than in in-
stances where the utility fUHctiun is monotonic. Suppose
one's preferences for X increase up to x and then de-
m
crease. A reasonable way to quantify these preferences
is to assess one utility function u 1 (x) for x < x aJld- m
another uZ(x) for x ｾ x
m
. Obviously u 1 (x) is monotoni-
cally increasing in x and uZ(x) is monotonically decreasing,
and the theory previously discussed is applicable to those
cases. The only remaining problem would be to correctly
scale u 1 and u Z. First we would fix one point on each
utility function by setting u l (xm) = uZ(xm). Secondly, we
could determine x'< x and x"> x such that the decision
m m
maker is idifferent between x' and x". Then, of course,
we Sct U1 (Xl) = uZ(x"), which fixes a second point on
e:..:.ch utility function. llaving completed this, a utility
function valid fur all x is
u(x)
.I'
) u l (x)
\. U z(xJ , x ｾ x .III
4 . 9 . 5
There are many different: consistency checL, \-J1Ji ch
function which ｾ ｶ ･ have assessed For him dues nut represeJlt
his true preferences. We will discuss two consistency checks
in this subsection. With these, as well as those discussed
throughout this section*, as a guide, the decision analyst
should have no trouble developing other checks designed to
uncover discrepancies in a utility function.
One generally useful check involves asking the de-
cision maker his preference between any lottery and any
consequences, or between two lotteries. In both cases,
the expected utility of the preferred situation must be
greater in order to be consistent.
A more "subtle" consistency check is illustrated by
the following example. Suppose the decision maker's utility
function is being assessed over the attribute 'incremental
monetary assets' so zero is the status quo. And let us
suppose we want u ex) for -100' x , 100. Experience has in-
dicated that often in practice, the decision maker may
seem to be risk averse in the entire range except for
small negative amounts, say for -10 ｾ x ｾ 0, where he has
indicated that he would rather face the lottery A=:!< -10,0>
than take the sure consequence B :: -4. Note that consequence
B is essentially payment of 4 units. The analyst may be
a bit skeptical about the appropriateness of the risk be-
havior and probe its implications with the decision maker.
*For instance, earlier in this section, two techniques for
determining whether or not one is risk averse were described:
one concerned preferences between lotteries and their ex-
pected consequences and the other involved evaluating
certainty equivalents of some lotteries. Either of those
can be used as a consistency.check of the other.
-.., i:"') , I
Suppose an option C, defined as'the decision maker pays 4
and then immediately must face the lottery <-b,4>, is dis-
played, along with A and B, for the decision maker. The
options A, B,and C are illustrated in Figure 4.23.
We al ready know the dec is ion maker indica ted A> B.
Then he is asked for his preference between Band C. He
responds "In both situations, I must first pay four units.
Then with B, I am finished. However, with C, I must face
the additional lottery <-6,4> which has a negative expected
value of -1. My preference is clear, I prefer B." Therefore
B >- C.
But now, the analyst asks "Compare A and C, and give
consideration to the total impact to yourself." Thinking
out loud, the decision maker says "Lottery A is clear, I
either get -10 or 0 with a fifty-fifty chance. For C, I
lose 4 and then either gain it right back or lose 6 more.
I guess with C, I also either get -10 or 0 with a fifty-
fifty chance, so I should be indifferent between A and C."
The punch line should be clear, the decision maker
has said A is preferred to Band B is preferred to C,
but then C is indifferent to A. An intransitivity has been
created. When this is pointed out, most subjects are a little
surprised and indicate they do not want such inconsistencies
in their preference structure. On reflection, subjects
often will feel comfortable maintaining that B>C and C,..., A.
Hence they are forced to conclude that B >- A. This can lead
to a removal of the risk prone segment of the utility function
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An important part about this example is that through
the facility of the analyst, the decision maker ends up
teaching himself his preferences and in the process, help
ｾ ｩ ｭ ｳ ･ ｬ ｦ to 'straighten out his head.'
Obviously, for utility functions implying a complex
preference structure, both the need and opportunity for
meaningful consistency checks increase. As has been mentioned
before, if the checks produce djscrcpancies with the previous
prefernces indicated by the decison maker, these discrepancies
must be called to his attention and parts of the assessment
procedure should be repeated to acquire consistent preferences.
Once a utility function is obtained which the decision maker
and the analyst feel represents the true preferences of the
decision maker, one can proceed with the analysis.
4.9. G Using the Utility Function
In this subsection, we will consider two practical topics
whjcll are useful in sensitivity analysis. This ties in with
the consistency checks and with the entire assessment pro-
cedure since it helps indicate hov{ precise our assessments
need to be.
Simplifying the Expected Utility Calculations. Often
one deals with utility functions which have exponential ternlS.
For instance, a common example is the constantly risk averse
utility function for X of the form
u(x) -ex= -e (4.37)
\vhere c is a p05iUvc const:lnt. Another very important
example is the decreasing] y risl( :1 verse utili ty function
U (x) -_ Ｍ＼Ｎｾｸ ·1 -ex. -e -)e • (4.38)
where a, b, and c are positive constants. There is a simple
method to calculate expected utiLity when such utility
functions are valid and whell thc' possible consequences are
described with a probability di.strihution function.
Tile exponential transform Tv-(s) for a probability
"
dis t ributi 0 n funcd Oil L l. x ) ｾＮｊ Ii i c iJ I:; d ｩｃｾ fine J by
'[' (s)::: E Ie - SX] -:: JI" tv (' - S x [(x) Jx
x ·._00 (4.39)
fwhere indic ate s SUllllll<i ti un fo r disc rete dis t ribu t ion s ,
has been calculated for most common probability distribution
functions. Table tl.6 gives a partial list. Given a utility
function of the form (4.37) and a course of action resulting
In a random outcome x described hy probability distriblltion
f, the expcc ted uti li l: Y 0 f t h j s ｾＮ 0 u r ｾ［ C 0 f act i u n can e a s i 1Y
be calculated by observing from (4.39) that
(4.40)
If the utility function was of the form (4.38), the expected
utility could be calclllatcd from
E [ U (x) J =I.: (_. e - ax - b e - ex) [C xJ dx - -T (a) - b T (c)
x· x
( 4 • 41 )
In a simi.lar ｬ ｬ ｬ ｾ ｭ ｮ ･ ｲ Ｎ the Mel] in transform M (5) for
x
n probability dlstrJlllltJOll Li)() js del Liled IJy
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This transform has also been tabulated for many common
probability distributions and could be used in expected
utility calculations where the utility function contains
powers of x.
Parametric ａ ｮ ｡ ｬ ｹ ｳ ･ ｳ Ｎ ｾ The sophisticated analyst
would usually include a sensitivity analysis in his work.
For decision problems, this might mean that the sensitivity
of the best decision to parameters of the utility function
be determined. For example, suppose from his character-
istics, we found a decision maker's preferences would be
quantified by the utility function
u (x) = 1 - -cxe (4.43)
I1owever, further suppose he had difficulty in specifying
certainty equivalents for lotteries, and thus our confidence
in the value of parameter c might not be too great. His
certainty equivalents for different lotteries may have
led to quite different values of c between one-third and
one, for example.
In such a case, the appropriutenessof a sensitivity
analysis is cLear. First, we would evaluate the expected
utilities of each course of action as a function of para-
meter c. If there were three possible courses of action,
a plot of this might be shown as in Figure 4.24. Wi th
such information, alternative 3 would imlnediately be
eliminGted frolll further consideration sin'ce it is domina'ted
ex pc. ｣ｬｾＮ｣｜
\it I \ rt)'
11\
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by both alternatives 1 and 2. If c < 0.8, alternative 2 is
best; otherwise alternative 1 should be chosen. Now rather
than specify the exact value of c to solve the decision
l,[oblem, we only need to deterlll i.ne \vhether c is larger
or smaller than 0.8. Thi.s should be elll easier assessment
task than our former one.
4.10 ILLUSTRATIONSOF THE ASSESSMENT OF UNIDIMENSIONAL
UTILITY FUNCTIONS
The purpose of this section is to illustrate by example
the assessment of some unidimensional utility functions. It
is by no means meant to be a catalog of the work on this
problem. In fact, to illustrate the state of the art, so
to speak, we emphasize more recent work at the expense of
some earlier investigations which helped pave the way to
our present status. However, let us briefly mention two of
these initial efforts.
One of the pioneering attempts to measure utility functions
was that of Mosteller and Nogee [1951]. In a laboratory
setting, an individual was offered his choice between
accepting a monetary lottery<h,p,k>, a lottery yielding
h cents with probability p or costing k cents with proba-
bility 1-p. During the course of the experiment, the same
lottery was offered several times. From this the proportion
of times the lottery was accepted was calculated. By using
this procedure and varying h while holding p and k constant,
the amount of money h
o
where the acceptance proportion was
one-half determined. Then zero (not accepting the lottery)
was taken as the certainty equivalent for <ho,p,k>, so
's \1
u(O) = pu(h ) + (l-p)u(k)
o
(4.44)
where u is the subject's utility function. The experimenters
arbitrarily set u(O) = 0 and u(k) = -1 and used (4.44) to
calculate the realtive preference of h . By repeating
o
the above procedure for seven different values of p, the
utilities of seven experimental points were specified
from which the subject's utility function was graphed.
Another important contribution to the measurement
of utility functions was that of Davidson, Suppes, and
Siegel [1957] who attempted to improve upon the work
just described. One of their major criticisms of Mosteller
and Nogee's experiment was that almost every choice offered
to the subjected involved choosing between accepting or
rejecting a lottery. Thus, one alternative had uncertainty
and participation in the experiment associated with it,
while the other alternative involved no uncertainty or
participation. If a subject were biased either toward or
against gambling or participation, this procedure could
have led ｴ ｾ distorted results. A second criticism concerned
the fact that Mosteller and Nogee used objective probabili-
ties as if they were the subjective probabilities perceived
by the subjects. To deal with these problems, Davidson,
Suppes, and Siegel offered their subjects choices between
lotteries, which hopefully canceled out distot"tion due
to preferences for gambling and participation, and ex-
perimentally determined the subject's subjective proba-
bilities.
The stated purpose of both of these experiments was
to test the appropriateness of the expected utility de-
cision model with regard to small sums of money. In both
cases, their results established that utility functions
could be measured in laboratory settings, at least for
small StUllS of money. Tlley also pointed out some of the
"do's and donl's II in assessing utility functions. An
important remaining problem was demonstrating that meaning-
ful utility functions could be assessed for decision makers
faced with real-world decision problems.
4.10.1 Preferences of Oil Wildcatters
One of the first major attempts to assess utility
functions in an operational situation was that of Grayson
(1960]. lIe spent: a considerable amount of time quantifying
the preferences for money of a number of oil wildcatters
engaged in exploratory search for gas and oil. Ilis approach
was as follows. A hypothetical drilling venture was offered
to a wildcatter, and he was asked to, accept or reject this
on the basis of the investment required, potential payoff,
and probability of success.
For instance, the operator would be asked whether he
would invest $ 20,000 in a venture which had a potential
a 0.4 probahility of success. If the answer was yes, the
probability of success was Ｑ Ｐ ｷ ｣ ｾ Ｇ ･ ､ until the operator was
indifferent hetw('cn accepting <lnd rejecting the venture.
If the investment was originally rejected, the probability
of success was raised to the indifference probability.
If this incliffcl'ence probability is p, then
u(O) = ｰｵＨｾＸＰＬｏｏｏＩ I- (l-p) u(- ｾ Ｒ Ｐ Ｌ ｏ ｏ ｏ Ｉ Ｎ (4.45)
By a l'b ira l' iJ y set t j ng t Iv 0 poi n t s on the 11 til i t Y fun c t i on u,
a thircl ｾ ｶ ｡ ｳ cmpiric:llly cV:JluaLcd using (i.45). This pro-
cedure W:1S ｮ ｾ ｰ Ｐ ｡ ｣ Ｈ ｾ ､ i'l)j' d larg0: lllllllbt'I' uf velltures, thus
providing many puillts on the wildcatter's preference curve.
Finally a "best fit" curve (detcI'lI1ilH:'d v isually) was drawn
through these ｰ ｵ ｩ ｮ ｴ ｾ Ｌ Ｎ
Before ｰ ｲ ｣ ｾ ｳ ｣ ｬ ｊ ｴ ｩ ｬ Ｑ ｧ a specific cx:uuplc of Grayson's
""ork, t\vO COJI1JJlents em his work are in cHder. First of all,
no a t temp twas ITl ade to exp 10 itt· he gene ral clw r ac tel' i s tics
of utility functions, such as risk aversion, in assessing
the wi 1dca t tel" s preferences. or course, seminal research
in this area did not appear unti.1 after Grayson's work.
Secondly, as pointed out by ｇ ｲ ｡ ｹ ｾ ｾ ｯ ｮ Ｌ inconsistences in
an operator's preferences were 1101: broul',ht to his attention
for possible modification e:xcept in one casco For this
operator, William BearJ ()f Be:ud Oil Company, these .in-
consistencies were reduced to a nominal level.
Mr. Beard's utility function for moncy on October 23,1957
lS illustrated ill I:ig. 4.l5. The points marked by an "oQ on
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iGrayson. Kaufman [1963] later found that an analytical
function which is an "astoundingly good" fit to this
empirical data is the logarithmic utility function
u (x) == - 263 . 31 + 22. 093 log (x + 15a ,000), x > -1 50, 000 ( 4 . 64)
where x reprsents the change in Mr. Beard's asset position
in dollars.
It is evident from Fig. 4.25 that u is monotonically
increasing and risk averse. Also, by calculating the risk
;lversion
rex) == u"(x) ==u' (x)
1
x + 150,000 ' (4.47)
it is clear that r decreases as x increases, so u is de-
creasingly risk averse. If it had been possible to deter-
mine beforehand that Mr. Beard subscribed to these character-
istics, the number of empirical evaluations required to
accurately assess his utility function would have been
considerably smaller.
4.10.2 Preferences of Business Executives
Another large effort to assess utility functions was
conducted by Swall11 [1966]. He interviewed approximately
one hundred people from various corporations in an attempt
to evaluate experimentally their corporate utility function
for money. That is, he was interested in the utility function
they used to make corporation decisions as differentiated
from Ih.:'l'sonal dec is ions. The j 11 tent of this wo rk was to
describe, not prescribe,how these people made corporate
decisions.
The first step in each interview was to familiarize
the decision maker with the concept of utility theory.
Then his lplanning ｨ ｯ ｲ ｩ ｺ ｯ ｮ ｾ defined as twice the maximum
amount he might recoJllmend be spent ill anyone year, was
determined. The utility functions were assessed for con-
sequences up to the planning horizon, as it was felt amounts
greater than this would not be meaningful to the decision
maker.
The type of questioning used to empiricallt evaluate
points on the utility curve involved choices between simple
50-50 ｬ ｯ ｴ ｴ ･ ｲ ｩ ｾ ｳ with two consequences and another consequence
for certain. The sure-thing consequence was then adjusted
in succeeding questions until the decision maker was in-
different between it and the lottery (i.e., the certainty
equivalent for the lottery was found). By arbitrarily
setting the utility for the consequences of this lottery,
the utility assigned to the certainty equivalent, which
had to be equal to expected utility of the lottery to be
consistent, was found easily. This provided an empirical
point on the utility function. Now, the certainty equivalent
could be used in new lotteries to fix the utilities of
other consequences. A number of points on the utility function
involving both gains and losses were specified in this
manner. Finally a smooth curve was fitted to the data.
Throughout the questioning, the alternatives available
to the llccisjolJ lllnkPY were J!lndc ｡ ｾ ［ realistic to him as pn<:;sihlc.
'2 2·' l
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As an example quoted from SwaIm:
"Suppose your company is being sued for patent in-
fringement. Your lawyer's best judgment is that your chances
uf winning the suit are SO-SO; if you win, you will lose
nothing, but if you lose, it will cost the company $1,000,000.
Your opponent has offered to settle out of court for
$200,000. Would you fight or settle?"
Two of SwaIm's conclusions were particularly interesting.
First, he found businessmen did not attempt to maximize
expected dollar income in situations involving risk, and that
cardinal utility was "at least a step in the right direction."
Secondly, most junior executives Dlade company decisions
in a manner that put their OWIl interests before the com-
pany's interests. From our point of view, that is, from one
mainly interested in the normative implications of utility
theory, perhaps the most important result was that many
people's utility functions were assessed over consequences
which had operational significance to the individual de-
cision makers involved.
Spetzler [1968] has quantified the preferences of a
number of business executives from one company in an attempt
to evaluate a corporate utility function. The objective
,was to develop a corporate risk' policy for capital in-
vestment decisions. A major part of this work concerned
assessing utility functions for t]]jrty-six managers of
this firm, including all the top executives. The initial
interview with each ｩ ｮ ､ ｩ ｶ ｩ ､ ｵ ｾ ｬ was to acquaint him with
the concept and need for quantifying his preferences
and to determine which risk characteristics represented
his attitude. To accomplish this, the decision makers
were given an investment opportunity yielding a present
value of x net dollars if successful and xf net dollarss
if it failed. The probability of success p was also given,
and the decision maker chose whetller or not to accept such an
investment. The probability p was then ｶ ｡ ｲ ｩ ｾ ､ to find the in-
difference probability Po where the decision maker was indifferent
between accepting and rejecting the project. For this
value PO)
which gives one the relativE' ｰ ｲ Ｈ Ｇ ｦ Ｈ Ｇ ｦ Ｇ Ｈ ｾ ｬ ｬ ｣ ･ ｳ of three consequences.
By repeating this procedure for twenty different investment
opportunities at each of two cOlilpany investment levels,
three and fifty million do]]ars l)cr investment, a numher
of points on a utility function ｾ ｶ ･ ｮ ｾ empirically deter-
mined for each decision maker.
From the questioning, it was [ounu that each of the
decison makers was risk aversC'. It \\'as assumed they should
square error approach, uecreasjngJy risk averse utility
functions of the fo nn
u(x) == a + b log (x + c), b>O, (4.48)
were fitted to the empiTlcill utility points. Using the
resulting "best-fit" utility function, 8c1justed incUffercnce
probabiIi tie s we r e cal cuI ;1 ted f U 1 cae h i nvestmen t s, and
these in turn 'lfere discllssed wi i.h the ｲ ･ ｳ ｰ Ｈ ｾ ｣ ｴ ｩ ｶ ･ decision
makers. ｍ ｾ ｮ ｹ of the indivic1u8]s felt these Hdjustments
more adequately expressed their preferences than their
original responses. !lowE'ver. some did not, so a more
flexible utility functioll
u(x) == a'" h log (x'" c - cllxlL b>O, () < d<1, Ｈ Ｑ Ｎ Ｔ ｾ ｊ
was tried. This function still satisfied all the original
risk characteristics except for a break at the origin.
By repeating the procedure just described using (4.49)
to calculate adjusted indifference probabilities it was
found a few decision makers were still not satisfied.
Thus, to partially smooth this break at the origin, another
parameter was added while maintaining the decreasing
risk aversion property. The newly revised utility function
was
u (x) ::: a + b log {x + c - c1 r(x 2+ f 2)1 I 2 - f]}, ( 4 . 50)
where b>O, 0 ｾ､＼ＱＬ £>0 and {x + c - d [ex 2 + f2)1/ 2 - fj}>O
for all possible amounts of x. The adjusted indifference
probabilities calculated using the "best-fit" utility
function of form (4.50) were not only acceptable to each
decision maker but \Vere preferred to his original probabi··
1 i tiesin a 11 cas e ｾ［Ｎ r" 0 r r.: e r t ai n val u e s 0 f par ametc l' s c, d ,
and f, one can prove u is decreasingly risk averse, but
for some individuals the best-fit utility function violated
this condition.
An important result of Spetzler's work was that by
using both qualitative risk characteristics and quantita-
tive assessments, he developed utility functions which ad-
equately expressed the preferences of a number of decision
makers faced with real-worJc1 investments problems. The
value of cOllsisten,.:y checks, \lJltich in this case involved
the repeated interviewing of the decision makers concerning
the adjusted indifference probabilities, is particularly
evident from this work.
4.10.3 Computer Programs to ｾ ｳ ｳ ･ ｳ ｳ Preferences for Money
Quite a different approach to assess utility functions
has been in use at the Harvard Business School since 1966.
A number of computer programs (see Schlaifer [1971J) are
used to assess utility functions of different forms which
are consistent with various input data specifying both
qualitative and quantitative characteristics of the utility
function. Here, to illustrate the idea, we will briefly
discuss the first program wllich computes a decreasingly
risk averse utility function of the form
-ax ··cx
u(x)=-e -be ,a>O,bc>O, (4.51)
consistent wi th a ded sian maker's certainty equivalents
for three 50-50 Jotteries. If no function exists which
is consistcllt, t1l1:; ｬ ｾ ﾷ ｾ ｩ ｊ ｬ ､ ｬ ｣ ｡ ｬ ﾷ Ｌ Ｎ Ｇ ｣ Ｑ by tlw IH'ogram. By
i
presenting the decision maker with three 50-50 lotteries
where the consequences have equal spread, it is easy to
check the appropriateness of the decreasingly risk averse
assumption.
As an example, suppose we were assessing a ､ｾ｣ｩｳｩｯｮ
maker's utility function for change in monetary asset
position between - $1000 and ｾ Ｓ Ｐ Ｐ Ｐ Ｎ We might begin by
asking his certainty equivalents for lotteries <$0, -$1000>
<$1000, $0>, and <$2500, $1500>. If his certainty equi-
valent for the second lottery was greater than $500, we
would know he was not risk averse, but risk prone for
this region at least, and therefore, not decreasingly
risk averse. Another decision maker faced with the same
three lotteries'10ight give his certainty equivalents as
-$550, $400, and $1850, respectively. Clearly this de-
cision maker is risk averse since his risk premiums, tlle
expected monetary values minus the certainty equivalents,
nre positive. llowever, he is increasingly risk averse
since the risk premiums increase as the potential payoffs
increase. For both of these cases, a utility function of
form (4.51) would not be appropriate.
Suppose a third decision maker stated his certainty
equivalents were -$650, $400, and $1950, respectively.
This decision maker is decreasillgly risk averse. By using
(4.51) and equating the utilities of the certainty equi-
valents to the expected utilities of the respectjve
lotteries, we get three equations with three unknowns,
a,b, and c. The computer solvei for these unknowns and
outputs the resulting utility function. Even when the
three certainty equivalents are consistent with a de-
creasingly risk averse utility function, there may not
be a utility function of form (4.51) which both fits
these data and is decreasingly risk averse for all amounts
of x. For instance, if both b<O and c<O, the resulting
utility function becomes risk prone for x greater than
some amount. If the decision maker's operational range
of x includes part of the risk-prone range, one must
either try a different functional form for the utility
function or repeat this procedure with a different set of
input lotteries.
The research program on the assessment of utilities
at the Harvard Business School has the following pragmatic
orientation: The researchers assume that a time-sharing,
intersective computer terminal can be used during the
interrogation procedure. The respondent is first asked
a series of qualitative questions which establish the
qualitative structure of his utility curve. Next one or
two hypothetical numerical questions are posed and the
respondent can give either explicit numerical values or
ranges of valups. At any stage in the protocol the computer
program checks for internal consistency of the past
responses and for any hypothetical lottery the program is
prepared to ｣ ｯ ｮ ｾ ｵ ｴ ･ the possjbJe range of certainty
equivalents for that lottery that is consistent with the
3"l+
input data. In practice then, one can often resolve one's
actual choice problem without fully defining a single
utility function. With some familiarity with the programs
the respondent can run his own sensitivity tests and;in so
doing}build up a sense of confidence in the procedure.
And in those cases which the sensitivity analysis under-
mines one's senses of security it is better that this be
overt rather than not realized.
As an intersting sideline, utility functions for money
are assessed for M.B.A. students at Harvard Business School
using this program. In approximately 70 per cent of more
than a thousand assessments, a decreasingly risk averse
utility function of the form (4.51) has been found to be
satisfactory for the decision maker.
4.10.4 Preferences in a Hospital Blood Bank
A final example of an empirically evaluated utility
function in a context quite different from the previous
examples concerns the operation of a hospital blood bank.
One of the important ｭ ･ ｡ ｳ ｵ ｲ ｾ ｯ ｦ effectiveness for evaluating
hospital blood bank inventory pclicies is blood shortage.
Here, shortage is defined as blood requested by a doctor
which could not be assigned from the hospital inventory.
As part of a larger effort, which is discussed in detail
in Section 5.10, a utility function was assessed for percent
of blood shortage in a year, that is, the percent of all
blood requested by doctors which could not be assigned
from hospital inventory at a particular hospital. In this
shortage situation, a special order for the particular
type ·of blood is placed with a central blood bank, pro-
fessional donors may have to be called, an operation may
be postponed, etc., but only in extremely rare circum-
stances would a death result from shortage as we have
defined it.
The person whose preferences were assessed was the
nurse in charge of ordering blood at The Cambridge Hospital
in Cambridge, Massachusetts.
First it was established that, in this hospital,
shortage would never exceed ten percent of the units de-
manded. The problem was then to evaluate a utility function
for shortages between zero and ten percent.
Clearly, preferences decreased as percent shortage
increased so the utility function had to be monotonically
decreasing. Using the converging technique discussed in
subsection 4.9.3, the certainty equivalent for the 50-50
lottery <0,10> yielding zero or ten percent shortage was
found to be 6.5 percent shortage. Since preferences were
､ ｾ ｣ ｲ ･ ｡ ｳ ｩ ｮ ｧ and the certainty equivalent was greater than
the expected consequence, there was reason to believe
the decision maker was risk averse. Next, the certainty
equivalents for the lotteries <0, 6.5> and <6.5, 10> were
found to be 4 and 8.5, respectively. With these responses,
it H:1S justifiahJe to assume the decision maker was risk
averse.
if the utility for x percent shortage is represented
by u(x), from the certainty equivalents, we know
1..1(6.5) = fu(O) + u(10)J /2,
u(4.0) = [u(O) + u(6.5)J/2,
and
u(8.5) = [u(6.5) + u(lO)J/2
(4.52)
(4.53)
(4.54)
For simplicity, a constantly risk averse utility function
of the form
b(1_ecx ) was fit to the data using (4.52) after the origin
and unit of measure were respectively set by
u(O) = 0
and
u(10) = -1.
(4.55)
(4.56)
As can be seen from Fig. 4.26, the utility function
() 1 (1_eO.13x)u x = 2.67
fit the empirical data quite closely.
(4.57)
A consistency check was used to see if indeed the
decision maker was risk averse. She was asked whether
she preferred <i+1 ,i-1> or i percent shortage for i = 1,2, ... ,
9. In all cases, the sure i percent shortage was pre-
ferred. This verified that the decision maker was risk
averse.
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4.10.5 Summary
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Actual assessments of unidemenional functions can
be categorized into three groups. The first attempts to
evaluate utility functions were made in laboratory settings.
These experiments indicated that preferences could be
quantified and provided some experience with the assess-
ment procedures. Building on this work, utility functions
for decision makers faced with operational decisions ｷ ｾ ｲ ･
next determined by fitting a curve to a number of empiri-
cally evaluated utility points. Since the appearance
of Pratt's paper on risk aversion in 1964, qualitative
characteristics of utility functions have been exploited
to complement the quantitative certainty equivalent in-
formation. This has led to both a simplification of pro-
cedures for assessing utility functions and resulted in
ｾ ｴ ｩ ｬ ｩ ｴ ｹ functions which more accurately express the de-
cision maker's preferences. In Chapter 7 and 8, additional
examples illustrating the assessment of unidimensional
utility functiollS and their relevance to multiattribute
problems are given.
4.11 EXPLICATING A SINGLE ATTRIBUTD BY MEANS OF MULTIPLE
ATTRIBUTES.
In later chapters of this book we shall consider ways
of coping with preferences and utilities for consequences
Ihat call only ｌ ｴ Ｌ ｾ <.lcscribC'd \vith lIlIl)t ipll JtClibutes. We
shall investigate techniflues that reduce mult.idimensional
problems dOlvn t.o unic1illlcnsic)Jlal prohlems, thus enahling
us to apply the technique of this chapter. But, as we
shall show in this section, ｴ ｨ ｣ ｔ Ｇ Ｈ ｾ are examples \vhere the
reverse procedure lIlay nC8d to he employed. It is somet.imes
cons t ruc tive to exp lode \vlw tis seemingly a un idimens ional
problem into a multidimensional one. Let us explain this
by an example. Norman Toy [1971] in his doctoral thesis
investigated how ｩｊｬ､ＮｩＮｶｩｴｬｬｊＺｴｬｾ［Ｌ :iuch :-IS we authors or other
academics, should manage their retirement pension funds.
Take the example of a professor whose sale source of in-
come after rctirment will cOllle from social security payments
and the retirement funds of his university. He t.ypically
has a range of options each year: he can choose to invest
the funds set aside for his later retirement years in
fixed interest hands (or cO)lIparatively fixed), or else
to invest a portion (within houlIds) of these funds in
equities whose future ｶ ｡ ｬ ｵ ｣ ｾ ［ depend on the vi.cissituclc$
of the stock market. !lis clloic"(' e,m appreciably affect
his post-retiremcnt life style. Not only docs the professor
have to \vorry about. the uJ)certllinties of the stock market
but also about inflation T,ltes, about. the longevity of
his spouse, and so on. One Jl3tllral way to approach the
problem is to assess a utility function for total wealth
at retirement. roy asked Ilis suhjects such questions as:
Would YOl1r:lther Ｑ ｬ Ｚ ｊ ｶ ｴ Ｚ ｾ :1 i-,iI;I' "i i !'(.'ilI n nt fund or ｾＱＵｻＩＮｏｏｏ
for certain or a 50·,5U chillier at f,100,OOO or $250,000?
.... .
This question, if taken really seriously, is terribly
difficult to answer. It depends on so many things: What
is the inflation rate? ... Well, that's not conceptually
so difficult: one can normalize all amounts to today's
price index. How certain can one be that one's spouse
will be alive to share those retirement years? ... Well,
that complication can be handled, as is done in Section
4.12, by assessing utility function for total wealth
at retirement ｣ ｯ ｮ ､ ｩ ｴ ｩ ｯ ｾ ｡ ｬ on tIl<' spouse surviving and
on not surviving. But still the prohlem is not easy to
think about--even if one conditions the outcome by the
status of one's family obligations. One is forced to
think hard about the implications of different monetary
amounts in one's post-retiremeut standa.rd of living.
Wealth in itself can be thought of as a surrogate for
consumption streams that ｣ ｾ ｮ be purchased with that level
of wealth. It is complicated further by the fact that
without the availability of inflation-free annuities,
one cannot be certain of which consumption stream one
will enjoy (or perhaps not enjoy) starting from a given
wealth position.
Toy grappled with this prohlem in several manners.
In one informal approach he had his subjects simulate
choices to be made in their post-retirement years. The
simulation exerc:ise took pl<lcc at a time-sharing computer
terminal. ｔ ｡ ｫ ｬ Ｚ ｾ the C;ISC: of r}lIj ｛ ｬ ｲ ｵ ｲ ｾ Ｇ ｳ ｳ ｯ ｲ ｾ ｶ ｬ ｴ ｯ re"Lires '\lith
a retirement fund of $150,000 when he is 67 years and his
wife is 66. He must decide in year (first year after
":l ::? 4.
_.J •. ｾ
retirement) how much to consume, how much to put into
stocks, and how much into bounds. Toy's interacti.ve
computer model had a built-in simulator of inflation
rates, of the equity and bond market, and of longevity
rates based on actuarial tables for the male and female
partners. The subject is asked to decide year by year
what he wants to do (how much he wishes to consume and
to invest) and then the computer obligingly handles all
the accounting in the probabilistically simulated world.
Sooner or later one of the partners dies and the spouse
carries on. Since the environment is uncertain, it is
important to experience many runs with the same initial
conditions before one generates an appreciati.on of what
it means to be left with a retirement fund of $150,000.
Since the year-by-year process is slow to simulate, Toy
allowed his subjects to choose various strategies over
time which obviated the need to make these time consuming
simulated year-by-year decisions. By means of this simulated
experience, Toy's subjects become better prepared to
respond more responsibly to hypothetical questions about
wealth at retirement.
In a more formal approach to this problem Toy investi-
gates his subject's utility preferences over consumption
streams, a process which involves multidimensional assess-
lHt.:nts, and he then deduced hy thi s ｉｬｬ･ＺＺｴｮｾｾ ｾＡ ｾＱｾｲｊｾｾＮｾ､ ur i 1 it>'
function over the surrogate ｵ ｮ ｩ ､ ｩ ｾ ･ ｮ ｳ ｩ ｯ ｮ ｡ ｬ variable:wealth
at retirement. Scott F. Richard (1972J in his dissertation
addressed the same problem in a more systematic, rigorous,
analytical fahsion. Richard's work is based on the path-
breaking results of Professor Richard Meyer, which concern
utility assessments of consumption streams over time and
are discussed in Chapter 9.
We close the subsection by reiterating the point of
this discussion: In certain contexts there may be a con-
sequence that can be described quite naturally by a uni-
dimensional attribute but it may not be natural to assess
a utility function directly over this attribute. Instead
one might have to seemingly complicate the analysis by
introducing multiple attributes, over which it may be
more natural to assess preferences.
•.2 .) Ｌ Ｌ ｾ ｟ .
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4.12 Conditional Unidimensional Utility Theory
This section is meant to illustrate directly the re-
levance of unidimensional utility theory to multiattribute
utility problems, and as such, to begin a transition to
the next chapters.
4.12.1 State Dependent Preferences
As in previous sections, let us assume that the de-
cision maker's choice of an act a determines the probability
distribution of an uncertain payoff ｾ Ｎ But now let us
assume that in reacting to simple lotteries with various
x payoffs the decision maker is concerned about which state
of the world, w1 , ... ,w., ... ,w will prevail. To take aJ I'
i
simple example, if x represents the decision maker's
wealth at retirement twenty years hence, his certainty
･ ｾ ｵ ｩ ｶ ｡ ｬ ･ ｮ ｴ for a 50-50 gamble between x1 and xz' say,
might depend on the status of the health of his wife and
of himself. He can, of course, answer the question- ｰ ｯ ｳ ｾ ､
keeping informally in mind the possible states of health
and their probabilities, but instead of answering the
question in an unconditional or marginal sense, he may
feel more comfortable thinking about the question conditionally
on each state, and then somehow combining these conditional
evaluations to get an unconditional evaluation.
We simplify by assuming that the choice of act i
affects the probability distribution of ｾ but not of ｾ Ｎ Let
'VP(w = w.) = p. for j = 1, .•. , r.
J J
(4.58)
We assume, however, ｴ ｨ ｾ ｴ the decision maker's utility
function u depends on both x and w. He wishes to choose
the act a to
'V 'V
max E u(x,w),
a (4.59)
where the expectation operator E
a
depends on 2 since the
probability distribution of ｾ (not of ｾ Ｉ depends on 2.
How can the decision maker think systematically about
constructing his two-dimensional u(.,.) function? That's
the issue. We hope to demons tra te the usefulness of uni-
dimensional utility theory to this question.
Let's examine our problem in terms of the decision
I
tree in Figure 4.27. At move 1, the decision maker chooses
an act! from A; at move 2, Chance chooses x from a dis-
tribution that depends on ｾ［ at move 3, Chance chooses
w. with probability p. (for i= 1, ... ,r) independently
1 1
of the choices at moves 1 and 2. The consequences resulting
from the path (a,x,w.) has a utility u(x,w.).
1 1
We define the unconditional utility of x to be
r
u(x) = E u(x,w.)p. (4.60)
i=l 1 1.
and for the purpose of making a decision at move 1, the
unidimensional unconditional utility function ij(o) is
all that is necessary to know. If the decision maker
can directly assess u, fine; but he still might prefer
to get at u indirectly through a set of conditional
assessments.
4.12.2 Conditional Assessments
Assume that we are concerned with a range of x values
that fall in the interval* from x O to x*. If the decision
maker knew that Wi were to prevail then let him be in-
different between obtaining x for certain and obtaining
the lottery which yields x* with probability TI.(x) and XO
1
with probability 1 - TIi(x).
x*ｘ ｾ ｾ
ｾ ;(Jr) XO
Schematically,
, given Wi (4.61)
---_._------------------------
*This assumption can easily be relaxed but is made for convenience.
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In other words TIi(o) is the decision maker's conditional
utility function for
by the requirements
x-values given the state w., normalized
1
o *TIi(x) = 0 and TIl (x ) = 1. Clearly TI i
is a unidimensional utility function.
In principle, at least, we can think of the utIlity
function in two attributes u(e,e) and it must be such that
for any i there are constants c. and b.> 0 where
1 1
u (x ,w.) = c. + b. IT • (x), for a11 x,
1 III
(4.62)
and for i = 1, ... , r. Hence in order to assess u (e ,0) it is
not enough to assess the r conditional utility functions
TIl (e), ... ,ffr(e)--we must somehow also assess the scaling
constants c 1 ,b 1 ,c 2 ,b 2 , ... ,c r ,b r . That's our next concern.
From (4.62) and (4.60) we observe that
r
u(x) = E [c i + b.1r.(x)]p.i=l 11
r r
= E c.p. + E b. TI.(x)p .. (4.63)
i=l 1 1 i=l 1 1 1
But for decision purposes we can ignore the constant term
on the right-hand side of (4.63) and thus we see that we do not
have to determine the c.' s. This is a tremendous he lp because
1
otherwise we would have to ask such disconcerting questions
as: "If you were at postion (x,w.), how much, in terms of
1
attribute X, would you be willing to give up in assets to
modi fy "1:/. to w.?" And fortunately we can avoid such ques tions.
1 J
4.12.3 Condi tiona1 Certain!L Equiva1 en ts
For any act ! let the resulting payoff be denoted by
the uncertain quantity ｾ Ｈ ｡ Ｉ Ｎ The conditional certainty
equivalent for ｾ Ｈ ｡ Ｉ given wi' denoted by ｾ ｩ Ｈ ｡ Ｉ Ｌ satisfies
the relation
ｬ ｲ Ｎ Ｈ ｾ Ｎ Ｈ ｡ Ｉ Ｉ = E TI.(x(a.)).
1 1 a 1
(4.64)
Hence any act ! can be evaluated hy the r-tup1e of con-
ditional certainty equivalents [21 (a) ,'" Ｇ ｾ ｲ Ｈ ｡ Ｉ ｊ Ｎ In practice
if one has only a few acts to choose amongst one might wish
to directly assess x. (a) for all i and a without formalizing
1 -
the conditional utility functions TI. for i = 1, ••• ,I'. But
1
how the problem boils down to tradeoffs or substitution
rates amongst the I' component, conditional, certainty-equi-
valent values.
Let us now consider the lottery, which will yield a
certain amount x. if w. prevails, for i = 1, ... ,1'; illustrated
1 1.
in Fig. 4.28. Let's characterise this lottery by the symbol
(XI , ••• ,xi" .. ,x r >, and our task is to structure the de-
cision maker's preferences in this evaluation space. If we
let
< '> - < ' '>x = x 1 , ••• ,x r
then by (4.63) we see that
ano <x" > _ <x',' , ... , x">
r
I'
<x' > !::, ＼ｾＢ＾ＣＮ l:
1=1
b.p.'J[.(x!) >
111 1
I'
L
i=1
b . p . 7T. (x ｾ ｉ )
J. J. J. J.
(4.65)
Recall, however, That we still have to develop a method for
,./'/
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Idetermining appropriate b. values.
]
Let us compal:e the following two lotteries.
Lottery L' : The return is a for each state tox w1 w .I'
Lottery L": The return is 0 for each state tox w1 wI'
except for states w. and w. ; the return for
1 J
is a + for is a 13 .•w. x a. w. x -
1 1 J J
Now suppose the dec i s ion maker aJj us t 5 0::. and ｾ Ｇ so that L"
1 J
-is indifferent to L'. Then from ('1.65) we have
a a 0 ab.p.n.(x) _+ b.p.1T.(X) == h.p.1T.(x+a.) + b.p.1T.(X
111·· JJJ III 1 JJJ £$.). (4.66)J
Since in (4.66) the a. and B. values are known, it is a
1 J
simple matter to solve for the ratio
b·p·/b.p ..
1 1 J J
If, for example, we repeatedly use this pairwise indifference
procedure by letting i = 1 and j == 2, ... ,1' successively
then we can determine the ratios
(4.G7)
Now, since u in (4.6?) call be arbitrarily scaled, there is
no loss of generality in letting h 1P1 == 1. Using this 31H1
(4.67), we can determine the appropriate scaling constants
h 1, .. ' ,b r , Observe also that if one wishes to do so, one
can always suppress the formal determination of the p.'s.
. 1
But, of course, the tradeoff question between the lotteries
in Fjgure 4.27 does irnplicjtly require the decision maker
to weigh in his mind the chances of w. and w..
I J
4. 13 WHERE WE STAND
Many of the important aspects of utility theory have
been introduced in this chapter. The theory necessary to
make the concept of utility operationally useful has been
discussed in detail, methods for assessing unidimensional
utility functions have been described, and examples where
ｵ ｾ ｩ ｬ ｩ ｴ ｹ functioffihave been assessed in operational situations
illustrated. The conditiona.! unidimenional utility theory
ｩ ｮ ｾ ｲ ｯ ､ ｵ ｣ ･ ､ in the proceeding sections begins to bridge
the gap between unidimensional and multiattribute utility
theory. Only with a firm understanding of the fundamentals
in this chapter do we begin to tackle the main problem of
concern in the next two chapters, the structure and assess-
ment of multiattribute utility functions.
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•CHAPTER 5
MULTIATTRIBUTE PREFERENCES UNDER
UNCERTAINTY: THE TWO-ATTRIBUTE CASE
In this and the following chapter, the ideas developed
and results presented are useful for assessing multi-
attribute utility functions. The results are mainly re-
presentation theorems specifying the functional form of
the utility function provided certain assumptions concern-
ing the decision maker's preferences are appropriate. We
shall develop reasonable preference assumptions, determine
when such assumptions are appropriate, and assess the re-
suIting utility functions.
Many of the concepts of importance in multiattribute
utility theory can be illustrated with the two-attribute
problem. Therefore, to avoid unnecessary complications
and detail, we have chosen to focus on this case in
Chapter 5. Assessments involving three or more attributes
are addressed in Chapter 6. However, the material in this
first section is relevant to both situations.
5.1. The Basic Problem
We will assume that an objectives hierarchy has been
specified and that attributes Xl 'X 2 ' ... 'Xn have been iden-
tified and are appropriate for the problem. If x. desig-
1
nates a specific level of X., then our task is to assess
1
a utility function* u(x) = u(x l ,x2 , ... ,xn ) over the n attri-
butes.
The utility function u has the salient characterizing
property that given two probability distributions A and B
'\,
over multiattribute consequences ｾ then: Probability dis-
tribution A is at least as desirable as B if and only if
.343
(5.1)
where EA and EB are the usual expectation operators taken
with respect to distribution measures A and B respective-
ly**. This merely asserts that expected utility is the
appropriate criterion to use in choosing among alternatives.
As a special degenerate case of (5.1) we conclude that:
Alternative xA is at least as desirable as x B if and only
if
B
u Ｈｾ ). (5.2)
*To be consistent with our past usage we should refer
to the utility function as u or u(o) and not ｵ Ｈ ｾ Ｉ Ｌ which is
strictly speaking the value of u at x. But we believe our
occasional sloppiness in notational usage will simplify the
presentation a little and will not cause any real confusion
--perhaps a bit of aesthetic displeasure.
** If probability distribution A is defined in terms of
a joint probability density function fA(o) in R
n
, Euclidean
n-space, then
EA[U(j()J= f ｵＨｾＩ ｦａＨｾＩ､ｾＮ
Rn
In our presentation, we will differentiate between
cases when one already has determined a value function over
the attributes and when one has not. The value function
can be exploited in determining the utility function.
5.1.1. Assessing a Utility Function Over the Attribute
"Value"
Recall from Chapter 3 that a value function
ｶ Ｈ ｾ Ｉ = v(xl ,x2 , ... ,xn ) over n attributes assigns a ranking
to all possible consequences. It is a function which sat-
isfies the special case (5.2) required of a utility
function. And so, by definition, a utility function is a
value function, but a value function is not necessarily a
utility function*.
*Unfortunately, there is no standarized terminology for
what we have chosen to call value functions and utility
functions. In the literature, our value functions are some-
times referred to as worth functions, ordinal utility
functions, preference functions, Marshallian utility func-
tions and even utility functions. Similarly, out utility
functions are referred to as preference functions, cardinal
utility functions, von Neumann utility functions, probabilis-
tic utility functions, and utility functions. Although
clearly we can't be consistent with all the existing liter-
ature, we will try to be internally consistent with our own
Use of value functions and utility functions as we have de-
fined them.
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Chapter 3 indicated several methods one might use to
acquire the value function ｶ Ｈ ｾ Ｉ Ｎ Because this function
assigns a scalar "value" to each consequence ｾ Ｌ one can
consider V as the scalar attribute "va l ue " which takes on
levels designated by v. Furthermore, since ｖ Ｈ ｾ ａ Ｉ > ｶＨｾｂＩ
if and only if the decision maker finds ｾ ａ preferable to
x
B
, the utility function over V must be monotonically in-
creasing. Hence any of the ideas discussed in Chapter 4
for assessing unidimensional utility functions are appro-
priate for assessing ｵ ｛ ｶ Ｈ ｾ Ｉ ｝ Ｎ
Operationally, the problem is not quite the same,
however, since different levels of V per se do not have a
physical interpretation to the decision maker. The tech-
\
I
niques of Chapter 4 are useful in assessing ｵ ｛ ｶ Ｈ ｾ Ｉ ｝ but
usually one must fall back to the interpretations of the
original attributes Xl ,X2 , ..• ,Xn , in order to implement
the assignment task. This idea can probably best be illus-
trated with a simple example.
Example 5.1. Consider Figure 5.1 and suppose a value func-
tion v(xl ,x2 ) has been specified over the attribute space
o *X = Xl ｾ X2 for x. < x. < X., i = 1,2. And for convenienceJ. - J.,... J.
assume that v is continuous and increasing in both Xl and
, ,
X2 . Also, for any consequence (xl ,x2 ), let us assume
that there is a consequence of either form Ｇ Ｈ ｾ ｬ Ｇ ｘ ｾ Ｉ for
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Figure 5.1. Assigning Utility to Consequences When a
Value Function is Known
- . ,
o * * 0 *xl ｾ xl < xi or of the form (xl ,x2 ) for x 2 ｾ x2 < x 2 which is
, ,
indifferent to (x l ,x2). The loci of all points of the form
Ｈ ｸ ｉ Ｇ ｸ ｾ Ｉ or Ｈ ｸ ｾ Ｌ ｸ Ｒ Ｉ are indicated in the figure by heavy
lines. Thus if one had a utility function u defined for
34<a
all points of the form Ｈ ｸ ｉ Ｇ ｸ ｾ Ｉ or
easy to extend u to all points (x l ,x2 ) in the domain of
, , " 0 ' ,
concern. If v(xl ,x2 ) equals v(xl ,x2 ), then clearly u(xl ,x2 )
" 0must be assigned to equal u(x l ,x2), which is already known.
The problem then boils down to the assessment of u
over the heavy lines in Fig.S.I, but this is a much easier
task than assessing u over all X. Furthermore, the tech-
niques of Chapter 4 can be directly applied to assess the
otwo one-attribute (conditional) utility functions u l (xl ,x2 )
'"as a function of xl and u 2 (x l ,x2 ) as a function'" of x 2 •
The only additional difficulty is that u l and u 2 must be
consistently scaled to yield an appropriate u. Procedures
for doing this are discussed in Section 5.8 later in this
chapter. III
The generalization to more than two attributes is con-
ceptually simple. One assesses a number of one-attribute
/(conditional) utility functions over the X. attributes and
0..;,••••_ ___----"R-......-.-- ._--L.__ Ｎ ｟ ｾ Ｍ Ｍ Ｍ Ｍ Ｎ __._---
'"Once again we apologize for our notational inconsis-
tencies. oWe could talk about the functions u l (.,x 2 ) and
'"u 2 (xl ,·) but at timesit is more natural for us in this
chapter to use the notation in the text.
｟ｾｑｅＮｾ｟ｩＮＺＮｾＮＡＺ･ｾｾｊＺｹ ... ｟Ａ＿｟ｳＺ｡ＡｾＮｾ .. ｟ＮＺｴＺＮＺＮＡｽＮﾧＡ｟ｳ･ｾ｟ｴｩｬｩ tL.functions to form one
Ｎ ｾ Ｍ ｾ ｾ Ｎ Ａ Ｎ ｾ Ａ Ｚ ｾ ｌ ｟ functj.on u. over a subspace of X. Then for each x a
bto which u is not directly assigned, one finds an x with a
u assigned, such that v(xa ) = v(xb ), and then sets
a b
u (x ) = u Ｈｾ ).
5.1.2. Use of x* and xO
Now consider the case where the value function has
not been specified over X. If there are only a few possible
1 2 R
consequences ｾ Ｌ ｾ , ... Ｌ ｾ ' it may be reasonable to assign
a utility to each of these directly. One sets the utility
of two of the consequences and evaluates the others in
terms of the first two (or other consequences with utili-
ties already assigned).
be the least preferable
For example, if we define x O to
1 2 R *of {x ,x , ..• ,x } and x to be the
- - - -
most preferable of this set, then we can arbitrarily set
*= 0 and u(x ) = 1 (5.3)
rFor each ｾ ' one empirically assesses a probability TI
r
such that x r is indifferent to the lottery yielding either
x* with probability TI or x O with probability (l-TI ). By
r - r
equating expected utilities, it follows that
r
u (x ) = TI ,all r.
- r
(5.4)
This approach is reasonable for perhaps up to fifty
consequences, although with this size the procedure would
be very tedious, and one would need many consistency checks
to develop confidence in the assessments. Note that the
basic idea is identical to that used in Chapter 4 for
directly assessing utilities of consequences. The only
difference is that the stimuli, the xr,s, are now vectors
rather than scalars.
In situations where there are many possible x conse-
/ quences contained in X, for which utilities are needed, the
same approach could be used to assign utilities to a number
of consequences in X. A curve-fitting procedure, interpo- '
lation, extrapolation, etc. could then be utilized to ac-
quire utilities for all the other consequences. Especially
when X represents a continuum in multiattribute space, such
"? [C·Ｚ ｾ ia
a procedure has two major practical shortcomings: (i) it
fails to exploit the basic preference structure of the de-
cision maker, and (ii) the requisite information is diffi-
cult to assess and the result is difficult to work with in
expected utility calculations and sensitivity analysis.
The ideas presented in the next subsection are" motivated
by these inadequacies.
5.1.3. The General Approach
The basic approach utilized in this and the next chap-
ter is (i) to postulate various sets of assumptions about
the basic preference attitudes of the decision maker, and
(ii) to derive functional forms of the multiattribute
utility function consistent with these assumptions. To use
the results, one must first verify whether some of the
assumptions hold in the particular problem at hand, and
then one must assess a utility function consistent with the
verified assumptions. The ｭ ｯ ｾ ｩ ｾ ｡ ｴ ｩ ｯ ｮ for this procedure is
-.-. .,-
that it addresses the shortcornings of the more direct approach
suggested in the last subsection. The basic preference
attitudes of the decision maker are exploited in ｳ ｰ ･ ｣ ｾ ｦ ｹ ｩ ｮ ｧ
a utility function, and the actual assessment is simplified.
Note that this is exactly the same approach used in Chapter
3 to assess value functions and Chapter 4 to assess unidi-
mensional utility functions.
The assumptions investigated are felt to be operation-
ally significant and relevant to many decision problems.
Of fundamental importance in identifying simple ｲ ･ ｰ ｲ ･ ｳ ･ ｮ ｴ ｡ ｾ
tions of individual preferences is the verification and ex-
ploitation of certain independence properties which may
exist among the decision maker's preferences for various
amounts of different attributes. Ideally, we would like
to obtain a representation of the utility function such
that
u(xl 'X2 '···,Xn ) = f[f1{x1 ), f 2 (x2),···,fn (xn )], \\,
(5.S)
where f. is a function of attribute X. only, for i = l,2, ••• ,n,
ｾ 1
and where f has a simple form--an additive or mUltiplicative
form, for example. When this is possible, the assessment of
u can be greatly simplified. The fruitfulness of this
approach, both in theoretical terms and in applications, is
illustrated in this and the remaining chapters.
5.1.4. Outline of the Chapter
Chapter 5 develops two-attribute utility functions.
Fir,t, the concepts of independPDce and their theoretical
ｩ ｭ ｰ ｬ ｾ ｣ ｡ ｴ ｩ ｯ ｮ ｳ are presented. Then a procedure for assessing
\\
such utility functions is suggested. Finally, the detailed
.assessment of a utility function in a real-world setting
is presented.
notational convenience we shall denote the generic
two-space as (y,z) rather than the more cumbersome
(xl 'x2). The utility function u(y,z), which is a two-
attribute utility function when written in this form, may
have more than two dimensions. For instance, if Y is a
two-dimensional vector attribute and Z is a three-dimensional
vector attribute, then u(y,z) can be interpreted as five-
dimensional utility function. All the results of this
chapter are appropriate for all two-attribute utility func-
tions, regardless of the dimensionability of each of the
arguments. However, often for convenience, we will treat
Y and Z as unidimensional, scalar attributes.*
5.2. Utility Independence
One of the fundamental concepts of multiattribute
utility theory is that of utility independence. Its role
in multiattribute utility theory is similar to that of
probabilistic independence in multivariate probability
*Throughout, we will ｵ ｾ ･ y and z, rather than the more
conventional ｾ and !, to represent what may be either scalar
or vector consequences.
theory. Here and in Chapter 6, much attention will be
concentrated on utility independence and its implications
for the following reasons:
1. Various utility independence conditions imply
that the multiattribute utility function must be
of a specified form. These forms include many
possibilities for the final shape of the utility
function including sltuations involving an inter-
action of preference among the attributes, and
yet these indepencknce assumptions simplify greatLy
the assessment of t!lf' or 19 ina1 uti 1 i ty function.
2. The utility independc!llce assumptions are appro-
priate in many ｲ ･ ｡ ｬ ｩ ｾ ［ ｴ Ｚ ｩ ｣ problf:ms and thc;y ar('
operationally verifiable in practice,
3. Utility functions exploiting utility independence
have been used in a number of important problems.
Chapter 8 presents ｴ ｨ Ｈ ｾ details of one such problem
concerning the development of tht.::! iJirport facili-
ties of the Mexico City Metropolitan Area. Other
problems in which utility indep0ndence has been
used are covered in 10sB detail in Chapters 7 and 9.
The concept of utility independence can also be viewed
as a specialization of concept of preferential independence,
which was exploited in Chapter 3.
5.2.1. Def ini tion of util i "'=Y__ ｾＭＮＡｾ､･ｾｮ､･ｮ｣｟ｾ
In this section we begin wj t:h a definition of utility
independence in the two-attribute case. Let the attribute
space X be partitioned into Y and Z such that X = Y x Z
and denote a typical point in the attribute evaluation
space by (y,z). Let us assume
o *y < y < y and o *z < z < Z •
-
(5.6)
In analyzing a problem of this kind it is natural first
to look at various unidimensional conditional utility func-
tions. For example, we might investigate the conditional
utility function for various y values given zO; that is,
the utility function along the heavy line in Fig. 5.2. We
may then inquire if the decision maker's utility function
shifts strategically if the given z-level changes from zoo
We are led to such questions as: "If z is held fixed
throughout at zO, what is your certainty equivalent for a
50-50 gamble yielding values Yl and Y2 say?" Let us
suppose the answer is y, so that
Now we ask: "If z were held fixed at some other fixed
I
Value, say z , would your certainty equivalent 9 shift?"
In a surprisingly large number of contexts the certain-
ty equivalent y does not shift. And this would be the case
zy
Figure 5.2. Preferences Over the Heavy Line May Be Interpreted
as Conditional Preferences for Y Levels Given ZO
"'-for any fixed Yl and Y2. The certainty equivalent y would
depend solely on the Yl and Y2 values and not on the fixed
z value. In this case the conditional utility functions
-----..-------.... ｾ ..._' ....•.--- --.__..-. ＮＭＮＭＭＭＭｾＮＭＭｾＭ
u(·,zo) and u(o,z) would be strategically equivalent. Thus,
_,, Ｎ ｾ ._•• •• ｟ ｾ ｟ ri __ • ＭＮｾＮｾ｟ｾＮ｟Ｎ｟ＮＮｾ｟ｾ _
from Theorem 4.1, we know that all the conditional utility
functions along horizontal cuts in Figure 5.2 would be posi-
tive linear transformations of each other. In particular
we would have
,
u(y,z) = g(z) + h(z) u(y,z ) (5.7)
for all y and z, where g(o) and h(o) > 0 only depend on z and
not on y. Of course the functional form of g(o) and h(o)
,
will depend on the particular z choseno Note that if (5.7)
,
holds for one z , then it must be valid for any other level.
Definition. We shall say that Y is utility independent of
ｴ ｖ ｚ ｾ ｾ ﾷ "', ._...··-..:::::x·.""/<::.n.... -·
Z when (5.7) holds*.
*An alternate interpretation of utility independence is
as follows. Given that Y is utility independent of Z, we
know all utility functions of the form u(o,z) are strategi-
cally equivalent. If y is scalar and if the second derivative
of u(o,z) with respect to y is continuous, one can define a con-
ditional local risk aversion function over Y, for each z,
analogous to that in Section 4.5. When Y is utility inde-
pendent of Z, the local risk aversion function defined on Y
for fixed z will not depend on z. The converse is also
true. See Keeney [1973d] and Pollak (1973].
When Y is utility independent of Z the conditional
utility function over y given z does not strategically de-
pend on z. Whenever this condition prevails we can ellipti-
cally talk about the utility function for Y without refer-
ring to any particular z. Already we have a great deal of
structure to exploit!
Similarly it is natural to investigate whether Z is
utility independent of Y. If we hold the Y-Ievel fixed at
r say, and consider preferences for lotteries over z, do
,
these preferences depend on y? If not, then Z is utility
independent of Y, and we can talk about the utility func-
,
tion for Z without worrying about a dependence on y •
In practice it is natural to investigate at an early
stage whether Y is utility independent of Z and whether Z
is utility independent of Y. Notice that all cases are
possible: neither holds, one holds without the other, or
both hold. To show that this is possible mathematically
let us consider the following utility functions:
a. u(y,z)
b. u (y, z) = g (z) + h(z) uy(y)
c. u(y,Z) = key) + m(y) uz(z)
d. u (y, z) = kluy(y) + k 2y z(z) + k 3 uy(y) uz(z)
e. u(y,z} = [ (l + B uy (y) ] [y + <'i uZ(z)]
f. u(y,z) = kyuy(y) + kzUZ(Z).
In case (a),neither attribute is utility independent
of the other. In case (b), Y is utility independent of Z,
i!''-
but not in general vice versa. In (c), Z is utility inde-
pendent of Y but not vice versa, and in cases (d), (e), and
(f), each is utility independent of the other. We will in-
vestigate representation theorems in the sequel so that we
shall be able to recognize from purely qualitative consid-
erations whether a particular form is appropriate. Natu-
rally, these representation results will materially affect
the assessment protocol.
Utility independence is important because it is a
!
\necessary and sufficient condition for one to speak about
: single utility function over one of the attributes. When
ｾ is utility independent of Z, there is H a " utility function
over Y. In this case, preferences for varying amounts of
Y can be assessed after fixing Z at any convenient level.
When Y is not utility independent of Z, then it is not
meaningful to speak of a utility function over Y, and
assessment of u(o,e) becomes much more difficult. In this
,
case, the conditional utility function for Y given z = z
"and the conditional utility function for Y given z = z ,
, "that is u(e,z ) and u(e,z ), respectively, are not strategic-
ally equivalent. Each must be assessed separately, and
completely, since knowing one may imply little about the
other.
5.2.2. Getting a Feeling for Utility Independence
Before proceeding, let us try to get a flavor for the
manner in which utility independence helps us out consider-
ably in the assessment of utility functions. If we are
o *preferences over (y,z) such that y ｾ y ｾ y
*z , then in the absence of any simplifying
interested in
o
and z < z <
assumptions, one must directly assess the utility function
u over the entire shaded region of Figure 5.3A.
However, suppose that Y is utility independent of Z.
Then the general shape of the conditional utility functions
ｾ ..,r =t: 1
u(o,z) cutting across Y for various levels of z must be
positive linear transformations of each other. Hence, as
we shall see later, we can get enough information to com-
pletely specify u by knowing the utilities of the darkened
consequences in Figure 5.3B. This means we would have to
assess and consistently scale three one-attribute condition-
al utility functions.
To take another case, if Z is utility independent of
Y, and Y is not utility independent of Z, one can, for
example, completely specify u by consistent assessment of
the three one-attribute conditional utility functions in
Figure 5.3C. In this case, the conditional utility func-
tions u(y,o) cutting across Z for various levels of yare
all positive linear transformations of each other. To
illustrate this using the notation of the figure, we know
2 1
u(y ,z) = k l + k 2 u(y ,z), all z. -(5.8)
The conditional utility function u(yl,o) is known because
it is assessed, and the k l and k 2 are found by evaluating
2 1 2 2"(5.8) at (y ,z ) and (y ,z ), two consequences whose
utilities are known. The resulting simple equation is then
easily solved. More about this later.
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Figure 5.3. Exploiting Utility Independence to Simplify
the Assessment of the Utility Function
Now suppose that Y and Z are utility independent of
each other, a condition which we will define as mutual
utility independence. Then taking Figure 5.3B as a start-
ing point, one can see that the two conditional utility
.. 0 *functions u(y ,0) and u(y ,0), as functions of z, must be
positive linear transformations of each other. Thus,
. *rather than assess u(y ,0) for all z, we just need, for
instance, the utilities of two points on the curve to fix
the correct transformation. The implication is that, if
Y and Z are mutually utility independent, one need only
consistently assess two conditional utility functions and
. . * *the utlllty of (y ,z ) to completely specify u. The con-
sequences whose utilities are needed are blackened in
Figure 5.3D.
ｾ Actually, when mutual utility independence holds, one
has the freedom to choose any arbitrary conditional utility
functions u(o,zl) and u(yl,o) and the utility of any arbi-
trary consequence (y2,z2) to specify u(y,z) for all y,z.
1 1 2 2This freedom can be used to select y ,z ,y , and z to
simplify the decision makerls assessment problem. That is,
he may feel more comfortable assessing u(o,zl) than u(.,zo)
because his accumulated experience with consequences of the
1form (y,z ) may be considerably greatero Figure 5.3E indi-
cates what needs to be assessed in this case.
If mutual utility independence ｨ ｯ ｬ ､ ｳ ｾ and if also an
additivity assumption holds, which we will describe later,
we can completely assess u(y,z) for all (y,z) using only
the two conditional utility functions darkened in Figure 5.3F.
This is the simplest two-attribute utility function one can
have without simplifying the form of the ｯ ｮ ･ ｾ ｡ ｴ ｴ ｲ ｩ ｢ ｵ ｴ ･ con-
ditional utility functions or without making various trade-
off assumptions, such as a constant rate of substitution,
discussed in Chapter 3. Thus, in some sense, the darkened
information in Figure 5.3F represents the minimum actual
ihformation that needs to be assessed to specify u(y,z)
for all (y, z) .
In the following sections, we begin discussing differ-
ent forms of the utility function implied by the various
sets of assumptions beginning with the simplest case (Fig.
5.3F) first. After presenting the results, we suggest
procedures for verifying the requisite assumptions and
assessing such utility functions and illustrate the tech-
niques with a -real-world example.
5.3. Additive Independence and the Additive Utility
Function
The additive utility function which has the form
where ky and k z are positive scaling constants, allows one
to add the separate contributions of the two attributes
to obtain the total utility. It is the best known of the
mUltiattribute utility functions and important both because
of its relevance to some real problems and its relative
simplicity.
As one can.easily verify, and as indicated in the pre-
vious section, the additive utility function implies that
Y and Z are mutually utility independent. However, the
Converse is not true. Mutual utility independence does
*not imply that the utility function is additive. The
assumptions, in addition to mutual utility independence,
which imply that the two-attribute utility function is
additive are presented in Section 5.4. Here, an alternate
set of assumptions about the decision maker's preferences
which allow one to use the additive utility function is
discussed.
Necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence
of an additive utility function can be stated using the con-
cept of additive independence. Unfortunately, this termi-
nology is not universal, and what we refer to as the
"additive independence" condition has been referred to else-
where as "independence." However, the adjective ｾ ｡ ､ ､ ｩ ｴ ｩ ｶ ･ Ｂ
is needed to differentiate it from other independence con-
ditions which we have introduced.
*por example, if u(y,z) = yUz8, 1 ｾ y ｾ 10, 1 < z ｾ 10,
then Y and Z are mutually utility independent, but u is not
additive. Taking logarithms, one gets log u(y,z) = U log Y
+ B log z, which is clearly additive. However, this log u
is not a utility function since it is not a positive linear
transformation of u. On the other hand, log u is an appro-
priate value function since it preserves the ordering of
the consequences (y,z).
Definition. Attributes Y and Z are additive independent
if the paired preference comparison of any two lotteries,
defined by two joint probability distributions on Y x Z;
depends only on their marginal probability distributions.
The condition above is written in the form stated
because it is easy to generalize. In two dimensions, as
we shall soon verify, an equivalent condition for Y and Z
to be additive independent is that the lotteries
/'-0
.> \IJ
(y',z')
and
must be equally preferable (i.e. indifferent> for all (y,z)
given an arbitrarily chosen y' and z'. Note that in each
of these two lotteries, there is a one-half probability of
getting either y or y' and a one-half probability of get-
ting either z or z'. The only difference is how the levels
of Y and Z are combined. From this it should be clear that
it is not meaningful to have Y additive independent of Z,
but Z not additive independent of Y. The property is re-
flexive, which is not the case with the other independence
conditions we shall discuss.
5.3.1. A Fundamental Result of Additive Utility Theory
The following result is due to Fishburn [l965al,but
exposited slightly differently here.
Theorem 5.1. Attributes Y and Z are additive independent,
if and only if the two attribute utility function is addi-
tive. The additive form may be written either as
° °u (y, z) = u (y, z ) + U (y , z) ,
or as
where
(5.9)
(S.IO)
(1) u(y,z} is normalized by u(yO,zo) = 0 and
1 1 1 1
u(y ,z ) = 1 for arbitrary y and z such
that (yl,zO) > (yO,zo) and (yO,zl) > (yO,zo),
, I
, I
,
(2)
(3 )
uy(y) is a conditional utility function on Y
normalized by uy(yo) 1 1,= o and uy{y ) =
U z (z) is a conditional utility function on Z
and
(4)
°normalized by uz(z )
1 °ky = u(y ,z ),
1
= 0 and Uz(z ) = 1,
° 1(S) k
z
= u (y , z ).
Proof. Clearly additive independence implies indifference
. * ° ° °between the two lotterles «y,z), (y ,z » and «y,z ),
o(y ,z)>, since they have the same marginal probability
•We remind the reader that 'the lottery denoted by <A,B>
has consequences A and-B each with probability one-half.
distributions on the attributes. Equating the expected
. ':
utilities of these two lotteries gives us
o 0 0 0ｾ u (y, z) + ｾ u (y ,z ) = ｾ u (y, z ) + ｾ u (y ,z).
(5.11)
If we arbitrarily set u(yO,zo) = 0, equation (5.9) follows
directly from (5.11). Defining
(5.12)
and
(5.13)
to allow for free scaling of the one-attribute utility func-
tions" and substituting these into (5.11) yields the result
(S.lO) ,
To prove the other half of the theorem, that an addi-
tive utility function implies additive independence, note
that the expected utility of any lottery using (5.9) or
(5.10) depends only on the marginal probability distribu-
tions for Y and Z. Hence, preferences among such lotteries
cannot depend on the joint probability distribution of Y
and Z so the two attributes are additive independent.'"
The assumptions required for the justification of an
additive utility function are rather restrictive. They
allow for no interaction of the decision maker's prefer-
ences for various amounts of the two attributes. Often,
one might expect the desirability of various amounts of one
attribute to depend on the specified level of the other
attribute. For instance, consider a farmer with preferences
for various amounts of sunshine and rain because of the im-
pact this will have on the season's crops. Here, one might
expect that the farmer's preferences for various amounts
of sunshine to be different depending on whether there had
been only a little rain or much rain. Such an interaction
of preferences cannot be expressed with the additive utility
function. In the subsequent sections, we will present some
more general two-attribute utility functions, which do
allow for certain types of interaction.
In Section 5.8 we discuss procedures and techniques
that can be employed to (1) verify additive independence
and (2} assess the appropriate unidimensional utility func-
tions and scaling constants.
5.4. The Implications of Mutual Utility Independence
In this section we derive functional forms for evalu-
ating the utility function u(y,z) when attributes Y and Z
are mutually utility independent. First it is illustrated
how this assumption restricts the form of u(y,z). Then the
manner in which the resulting utility function accounts
for possible interactions in the decision maker's prefer-
ences for the two attributes is discussed.
The theorems and proofs in this and the following
sections are presented in terms that indicate exactly what
must be empirically assessed to specify the utility function.
3{o3
The results stated are consequently a bit more "bulky" than
would be the case if we just wanted to prove the mathemati-
cal result and to ignore the assessment aspect.
Throughout Chapters 5 and 6, algebraic proofs will be
given for the theorems. While this demonstrates the result
for the general case we had in mind, it does not communicate
as much of an intuitive feeling for the result as is possible
with alternate less formal proofs. With a loss of some
generality more natural proofs can be given for the results.
So in some cases, especially here where we begin to discuss
utility independence, we will offer a more intuitive, less
formal proof in addition to the main algebraic one.
From (5.7), one sees that the assumption of mutual
utility independence can be mathematically represented by
(5.14)
for an arbitrarily chosen zo' and
(5.15)
for an arbitrarily chosen y. Equation (5.14) says Y is
o
utility independent of Z and (5.15) says that Z is utility
independent of Y.
5.4.1. The Multilinear Utility Function
When Y and Z are mutually utility independent, then
*u(y,z) can be expressed by the multilinear representation
where u,yy' and U
z
have a common origin and are consistently
scaled by the scaling constants k y > 0, k Z > 0, and kyz .
Since the dimensionality of the utility functions uy and Uz
is less than the dimensionality of the original utility
function u, its assessment is simplified when the stated
assumptions hold.
A geometrical interpretation of the result for the
case where Y and Z are scalar attributes is shown in
Figure 5.4. Our result says that subject to the requisite
assumptions, the utility of any consequence in the speci-
fied consequence space is uniquely determined by the rela-
tive utilities of the consequences along the heavy lines
and at the heavy point in the figure.
To see why this is true, refer to Figure 5.4 and
follow these steps:
(1) Consistently assess u(o,zo)' u(yo,t) and u(Yl,zl)o
(2) For any point Q (where Q can assume values
A,B, ..• ,H) denote the value of u at Q by UQ " Let
*Because there are just two attributes, we could have
referred to this utility function as the bilinear utility
function. Since the representation is generalized to n
attributes in Chapter 6, we have chosen to use the general
term "multilinear" in this chapter also.
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Figure 5.4. Mutual Utility Independence Implies u(y,z)
is Completely Specified from the Utilities
of the Heavy Shaded Consequences
A represent the generic point (y,z) and denote
u(y,z) as uA•
(3) Express uA in terms of u B and uC. This follows
from the relationship of uo ' uE' uF' since Y is
utility independent of Z.
(4 ) We know u B but not u C • Therefore, express U c in
terms of uF and uH' using the fact that Z is
utility independent of Y and using the utilities
(5 )
I
The utility uA is now expressed in terms of the
known utilities u B' uF' and uH•
If A were not originally chosen to fall within the region
'cornered' by 0, F, G, and H, slightly different steps--
using identical reasoning--would be required. With this
motivation, we prove the following.
Theorem 5.2. If Y and Z are mutually utility independent,
then the two-attribute utility function is multilinear.
particular u can be written in the form
u(y,z)
(5.16)
or
where
(1) u(y,z) is normalized by u(y ,z ) = 0 and
o 0
u(Yl,zl) = 1 for arbitrary Yl and zl such
that (Yl'zo) > (y0' zo) and (yo,zl) ｾ (yo,zo),
(2) uy(Y} is a conditional utility function on Y
normalized by uY(Yo) = 0 and uy(Yl ) = 1,
(3) uZ(z) is a conditional utility function on Z
normalized by uZ(zo) = 0 and uZ(zl) ｾ 1,
(4) ky = u(yl,zo)'
(5) kz = u(Yo,zl)'
and
Proof. Let us set the origin of u(y,z) by
(5.1S)
Evaluating (5.14) at y = y ,
o
(5.19 )
Substituting (5.19) into (5.14) and evaluating at an
arbitrary Yl 1 Yo'
or
u(Yl,z) ... u(Yo'z)
=
u(yl,zo) (5.20)
Using (5.19) and (5.20) in (5.14), we now have
u(yl,Z) ... u(Yo,Z)
u(y,z} = u(Yo'z) + u(Yl'zo) u(y,zo)' all z.
(5.21)
Similarly, by evaluating (5.15) successively at Z = Z and
o
u (y, z)
at an arbitrary zl f zo' it becomes
u(y,zl) - u(y,zo)
= u(y,zo) + ( ) u(y ,z), all y.
u Yo,zl 0
(5.22)
Evaluating (5.22) at y = Yl and substituting this into
(5.21), we conclude
[
U(Yl'Zl) -u(Yl'z ) -u(y 'Zl)]
=u(Yo'z) +u(y,zo) + u(y z) ｵ ｾ ｹ z )0
l' 0 0' 1
• u(y ,z) u(y,z ). (5.23)
o 0
Equation (5.23) can be written as (5.16),
where k is an empirically evaluated constant defined by
k =
u (yl' Z1 ) - u (Yl' Z0) .- u (yo' z 1 )
u(Yl,zo) u(Yo,zl) (5.24)
To provide for arbitrary scaling of the conditional utility
I\.functions, we can define uy and Uz such that
= u ly , z) ,
·0
/
".
ｾＡ (5.25)
......
where ky and k z are positive scaling constants and where uy
and Uz are scaled as stated in the theorem. Then, substitut-
ing (5.25) into (5.16) and defining kyZ = k ky k z gives us
(5.17). From (5.18) and (5.25), it follows that the origins
of uy and Uz must be
respectively. It is important to realize that there are no
other restrictions on the functional forms of the conditional
utility functions uy and u z. ｾ
*5.4.2. Use of Iso-Preference Curves
Because the decision maker may be unaccustomed to think-
ing in terms of a particular attribute, it may be difficult
to assess one of the conditional utility functions required
to use (5.16). However, one might be able to obtain an iso-
preference curve, that is, a set of all consequences which
are equally desirable to the decision maker. In this section,
we show that an iso-preference curve may be substituted for
one of the conditional utility functions required by
Theorem 5.2. provided it covers the same range.
*This section describes another way of assessing a
utility function when each attribute is utility independent
of the other. It exploits the existence of an assessed iso-
preference curve. The section can be skipped without inter-
fering with the reading of the main results of the chapter.
However, other sections using iso-preference curves should then
also be skipped. These sections will be appropriately desig-
nated.
A geometrical interpretation of the result is shown
in Figure 5.5 for the case where Y and Z are scalar attri-
butes. We prove that if Y and Z are mutually utility inde-
pendentt then u(Ytz) is uniquely determined in the specified
consequence space by assessing a conditional utility func-
tion along the vertical heavy line, a utility for the heavy
point in the figure and the iso-preference.curve.
The reasoning goes as follows:
(1) Determine u on L in Figure 5.5 setting u
e
= 0 and
assess up for consequence P.
(2) Then u along the indifference curve N must be a
zero.
(3) Select A with arbitrary coordinates (y,z).
(4) Express uF in terms of uH and up i using the fact
that Z is utility independent of Y and using uD'
uG' and uM.
(5) Similarly, express uK in terms of uH and up using
uJ ' uD' and uM.
(6) Express uA in terms of uG and uF ' using the fact
that Y is utility independent of Z and the rela-
tionship of uJ ' u B' and uK"
Since uG and uF are known, the reasoning is complete. If A
had not been in the region cornered bye, H, P, and M, a
Slightly altered proof using the same reasoning would be
required. This provides the motivation for
.',.. "
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Figure 5.5. Mutual Utility Independence Implies u(y,z)
is Completely Specified from the Utilities
of the Heavy Shaded Consequences
Theorem 5.3. If Y and Z are mutually utility independent,
then
where
u (y, z) =
u (y ,z) - u (y ,Z (y»
o 0 n
I + k u ( Yo' zn (y) ) (5.26)
(I)
(2 )
u (y ,Z ) = 0,
o 0
zn(y) is defined such that (y,zn(y» - (Yo'zo)'
and
(3) k =
u (Yo' Z I) - u (y I ' Z I) -u (Yo' Z n (yI) )
u(YI,zl) u(Yo,zn(YI» (5.27)
where (yI,zl) is arbitrarily chosen such that (Yo,zo) and
(yI,zl) are not indifferent.
Proof. Let us define Z (y) to be such that the set
n
{(y,zn(Y»; all Y} is an iso-preference curve over all Y.
*We can set the utility level of the iso-preference curve
and the origin of u(y,z) by
u (y, Z (y» = o.
n
(5.28)
as Z •
o
Then of course,
u (y , Z ) = 0,
o 0
which is consistent with our origin in Theorem 5.2. Thus
'"For any y, we only need to determine one z (y) such
n
that (5.28) holds in order to specify u(y,z).
we can evaluate (5.16) at (y,z (y)) and solve for u(y,z )
n 0
to find
37L.
-u (y , Z (y))
. 0 n
= 1 + k u (y , Z (y)) •
o n
(5.29)
Now substituting (5.29) into (5.16) and rearranging, we get
=
u(y ,z) - u(y ,Z (y))
o 0 n (5.30 )
To determine k from (5.24), we need to know u(Yl'zo). We
can assess u(yl,zl) for an arbitrary (yl,zl) such that it is
hot indifferent to (Y ,Z ). Substituting this into (5.30)
o 0
yields
u(y ,zl) - u(y ,Z (Yl ))o 0 n
1 + k u(y ,Z (Yl))
o n
which, after rearranging; gives us the desired result
k =
u(Yo,Zl) - u(yl,zl) - u(Yo,zn(Yl ))
u(Yl,zl) u(Yo,zn(Yl ))
Ｎ ｾ
5.4.3. The Product Representation
The multilinear form
u(y,Z) = u(y,z ) + u(y ,z) + ku(y,z ) u(y ,z)
o 0 0 0
(5.16)
of Theorem 5.2 has a strategically equivalent product repre-
sentation provided that k ｾ O. To this end, let
,u (y, z) = k u (y, z) + 1
37-3
, ,
= u (y,zo) u (yo,z). (5.3l)
, ,
When k > 0, then u (y,z ) and u (y ,z) are conditional
o 0
utility functions for Y and Z, respectively. When k < 0,
they are just the negative of the respective utility func-
tions. Thus, if two attributes are mutually utility inde-
pendent, their utility function can be represented by either
a product form, when k ｾ 0, or an additive form, when k = O.
5.4.4. Additive Representation
It would be interesting to know when k in (5.l6) is zero.
In this case the multilinear representation reduces to the
additive representation discussed in Section 5.3. We can
state the following
Theorem 5.4. If Y and Z are mutually utility independent
and if
for some Y3'Y4,z3,z4' such that (Y3,z3) is not indifferent
to either (Y3,z41 or (Y4,z3) then
u(y,zl = u(y,z ) + u{y ,z)
o 0
where u{y,z) is normalized by
and
(1) u(y ,z ) = 0
o 0
(2) u(Yl,zl) = 1 for arbitrary Yl and zl such
that (Yl'zo) } (Yo,zo) and (Yo,zl) > (Yo,zo),
Remark A. Given the above hypotheses, an alternate form
of the utility function is given by (5.17) with its usual
normalizations and with k yZ = o.
Remark B. The difference between Theorems 5.1 and 5.4 should
I ｾ
be clarified. In Theorem 5.1 we require that «y,z), (Y ,z »
, ,
ｾ «Y,z ), (Y ,z» for all (y,z). Theorem 5.4 requires this
ｩ ｮ ｾ ｩ ｦ ｦ ･ ｲ ･ ｮ ｣ ･ condition to hold for only one set of four
points. However, of course, Theorem 5.4 also requires mutual
utility independence.
Proof. Equating the expected utilities of the lotteries,
We have
Evaluating these terms using (5.16), canceling and trans-
posing, we find
Since u(Y3,z3) ｾ u(y3 ,z4)' because of utility independence,
u(Yo,z3) ｾ u(Yo ,z4)' and similarly, u(Y3,z6) ｾ u(y 4 ,zo),
Therefore k must be zero and (5.16) reduces to the additive
representation. ｾ
From Theorem 5.4, it should be clear that additive
independence implies mutual utility independence, but the
converse is not true. Additive independence is obviously
the stronger condition.
(1)
'"COROLLARY. Given the same conditions as the Theorem 5.4,
u(y,z) is completely specified by
u(y ,z), a conditional utility function for
o
Z, for arbitrary y ;
o
(2) an iso-preference curve over all Y.
Proof. In this case, k = 0, and (5.26) becomes
5.4.5. Interpretation and Implications of Parameter k
There is an interesting manner in which to interpret
the parameter k. Consider the two fifty-fifty lotteries
(A,C) and (B,D) illustrated in Figure 5.6. We will assume
that preferences are increasing in both Y and Z in the
figure. If this were not originally
the case, simple transformations as indicated in Chapter 4
could be used to meet this requirement. Using the mUlti-
linear utility function (5.16) to calculate expected utiliM
ties, it is easy to show that
In some sense, consequences A and C are such that one
either gets a high level of both Y and Z or a low level of
each. On the contrary, with Band D, one either gets a high
"'This corollary should ｡ ｬ ｾ ｯ be skipped if the reader
did not read Section 5.4.2.
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Figure 5,6. Using Lotteries <A,e> and <B,D> to Interpret
the Interaction Term in the Multilinear
Utility Function
level of Y or Z, but not a lot (or a little}of both. Think-
ing about it this way, if <A,C) is preferred, it is as if
one needs an increase of Y to complement an increase in Z
in going from A to C. Otherwise the full worth of the in-
crease in Z could not be exploited. On the otherhand, to prefer
(B,D) implies that it is important to do well in terms of
at least one attribute, and given a high level of Y, the
increased preference due to an increase in Z is not so much.
Thus Y and Z can be thought of as substitutes for each other.
Two simple illustrations may help clarify the idea.
First suppose the president of a corporation has two large
divisions operating in entirely different markets. She
may be interested in profits of division 1, represented by
Y, and profits of division 2, represented by Z. Achievement
on these attributes would likely be substitutes for each
other. If division 1 was doing well financially, the presi-
dent would likely not be as concerned about division 2, as
in the case when division 1 is doing poorly. If either
division was quite successful, the corporation as a whole
would probably live comfortably.
To illustrate a complementary case, consider the general
who is fighting a battle on two fronts. Attribute Y and Z
represents the performance on the respective fronts. Here,
if either of the fronts break, the consequence is probably
almost as bad as if both break. 'Average' achievement on
both fronts would likely be preferred by the general to
'fantastic success' on one and' 'miserable failure I on the
other. Hence, these attributes have a complementary effect.
Complementarity, as we have used it here, is just a formali-
zation--though somewhat weakened-...of the saying "a chain is
only as strong as its weakest link".
Further insight into the implications of parameter k
can be seeA if we rewrite (5.16) as
[l+ku(y,z)].
o
(5.32)
N6w from (5.32) it is clear that if u(y ,z) is increasing
o
in z,
o ｾ dU(y,Z)
-, dZ
y=y1
·1 :
<
dU(y,Z)
dZ
y=y2
Thus, if k is negative [positive, zero], and u(y ,z) is in-
o
creasing, the increase in utility due to an incremental in-
crease in Z is smaller [greater, the same] for more preferred
amounts of Y. In the case where u(Yo'z) is decreasing in z,
dU(y,Z) I 1<
d z !y=Yl :
dU (y, z)
az
y=y2
In this sense, again k may be interpreted as a parameter
that indicates the manner in which the amount of one attri-
bute affects the value of the other attribute. If k is
positive, more preferred amounts of Y complement more pre-
ferred amounts of Z. Just the reverse is true where k is
negative. Here, one can consider more preferred amounts of
Y and Z as being substitutes for each other. And in the
additive case when k = 0, there is no interaction of pref-
erence between Y and Z.
5.5. Use of Certainty Equivalents
* ｾRecall that if we have a lottery (y,z), the certainty
ｾ A
equivalent for y given z is the amount yz such that
A ｾ
u(y ,z) = E[u(y,z)]
z
(5.33)
where y in general will depend on the level z. Because
z
the expected utility E[U(y,z)] of the lottery in (5.33) is
difficult to interpret physically, it is often easier for
the decision maker to visualize the situation by considering
the equivalent certain consequence (y ,z), a consequence
z
with the same utility as the lottery. It would be especially
convenient if the certainty equivalent for lotteries on Y
did not depend on the level of Z, and similarly if the cer-
tainty equivalent for lotteries on Z did not depend on Y.
Provided certain conditions hold, this is true, so one may
use the respective certainty equivalents in calculating
*A lottery over Y ｾ Z with an uncertain outcome y coup-
ｾled with a certain outcome z will be denoted by (y,z). We
assume that a probability measure is known for the uncertain
quantity (random variable) y.
expected utility and assessing implications of alternative
decisions.
"-' "-'Consider the lottery represented by (y,z) where Y and
Z are mutually utility independent. We do not assume,
however, that random variables y and ｾ are probabilistically
independent. Then using (5.16), expected utility can be
calculated as follows
(5.34)
since the expected value of a sum is the sum of the expect-
ad values. In the cases where Y and Z are also probabil-
istically independent, (5.34) becomes
"-' "-' "-' "-' "-' "-'E[u(y,z)] =E[u(y,z )] +E[u(y ,z)] +k E[u(y,z )] E[u(yo'z)].
000
(5.35)
Now (5.35) can be reduced using (5.33) to
(5.36)
This illustrates
Theorem 5.5. "-' "-'Given a lottery of the form (y,z), separate
ｾ ｾ "-' "-'
oertainty equivalents y and z for y and z respectively may
be calculated using the marginal probability distributions
on y and ｾ to form a joint certainty equivalent (y,z) for
Ｈ ｹ Ｌ ｾ Ｉ provided either
(i) the attributes are mutually utility independent
and probabilistically independent,
Or"
(ii) the attributes are additive independent.
That condition (i) is sufficient is proven by (5.36). When
additive independence holds, k = 0 in (5.34) from which the
desired result immediately follows.
5.6. Utility Functions With One Utiltiy Independent
Attribute'"
In the previous sections, we have been concerned with
representing and assessing two-attribute utili.ty functions
when the attributes are at least mutually utility indepen-
dent. That is, all our work dealt with assumptions which
were at least that strong. In this section, we look at
the implications of the weaker assumption, where only one
attribute is utility independent of the other. It is shown
that the two-attribute utility function can be specified
b1 either three conditional utility functions, or two con-
ditional utility functions and an iso-preference curve, or
one conditional utility function and two iso-preference
curves. Special cases of these results, including the
additive and multilinear utility functions, are indicated.
For all the work in this section, we will denote the
attributes as Y and Z and assume Z is utility independent
of Y. That is, for any arbitrary y ,
o
all y. (5.37)
5.6.1. Assessments In Terms of Three Conditional Utility
Functions
Let us begin with an illustration of what we will prove.
If Z is utility independent of Y, then u(y,z) is completely
specified by two arbitrary conditional utility functions
for Y and one conditional utility function for Z, subject
to consistent scaling. To see this in the case where Y
and Z represent scalar attributes, consider Figure 5.7.
If we consistently assess the utilities along the heavy
lines in the figure, we will have enough information to
assign the utility to every consequence. For example,
consider an arbitrary point A with coordinates (y,z). The
utility of A can be expressed as a linear combination of
the utilities u B and Uc where the weights are determined
(since Z is utility independent of Y) by the values of uD'
uE ' and uFo
As an alternate way of looking at the same proof, con-
sider any vertical line at arbitrary point y. The utility
function u(y,') must be strategically equivalent to the
function u(y ,')--which is given. The utilities at Band
o
C serve to normalize u(y,·).
To formalize this argument, we have
Theorem 5.6. If Z is utility independent of Y, then
u(y,z) = u(y,z )
o [ l-u (Yo' z)] + u (y, z1) u (Yo' z) ,
(5.38)
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Proof. We can define Z and zl to insure u(y ,zl) > u(y ,Z )
o 0 0 0
and then arbitrarily set the origin and unit of measure of
u(y,Z) by
u(Yo,Zo) = 0 (5.39)
and
u(Yo,zl) = 1 (5.40)
Since Z is utility independent of Y, (5.37) holds. Evalu-
ating (5.37) at Z = Z and using (5.39), we find
o
Combining (5.41) and (5.37) and evaluating at Z = zl'
and using (5.40), we conclude
(5.41)
(5.42)
Now, (5.41) and (5.42) can be substituted into (5.37) to
give
which is the desired result. ｾ
It should be noted that u(yo,o), u(o,zo)' and u(o,zl)
are conditional utility functions. Equations (5.39) and
(5.40) specify the origin and unit of measure of u(yo,o)
and fix one point on the u(o,zo) and u(o,zl) curves 0 One
other point on each of the latter two conditional utility
functions must be evaluated empirically in order to set
their units of measure equal to that of u(y ,0) and thus
o
insure consistency of the unit of measure of u(o,o). This
can be done by finding a consequence (yo'Z2) which is in-
different to a consequence (Y2'zo). Thus, u(yo,z2) equals
u(Y2'z ) which specifies a second point on u(o,z ), thereby
o 0
fixing its unit of measure. Similarly, one can find a
(yo,z3) which is indifferent to (Y3,zl) to consistently fix
the unit of measure of u(o,zl).
To provide a better understanding of (5.38), we offer
graphical illustrations of two special cases. First, let
us assume Y is two-dimensional, that is y = (x l ,x2 ), and
Z is one-dimensional. For this case, Theorem 5.6 states
that provided Z is utility independent of Y, u(y,z) can be
specified by assessing two two-dimensional conditional
utility functions, u(o,zo) and u(.,zl)' and the one-
dimensional conditional utility function u(y ,0). Refer-
o
ring to Figure 5.8A, this means we must assess the rela-
tive utilities of the shaded consequences to specify u(o,o).
As a second illustration, suppose Y is one-dimensional
and z = (x l ,x21. In this case, the theorem states u(o,o)
is specified by two one-dimensional conditional utility
functions, u(o,zo) and u(o,zl)' and the two-dimensional
conditional utility function u(y ,0), provided Z is utility
o
independent of Y. Thus, .to determine u(o,o) in this case,
(A) Z 'IS ut'diT'1 inde.r e""de..,1
o-f Y=\X"Xzl
z .
o
ｺＺＮＭＭＭＭａＮｾ ---I': ｾ
y
(B) Z=tX'J)(21 ｜ｾ uti\\ty
\ndepe",c\e",i 01 y
Fi<jl.\re. 5.8. Assessing Utilities for the Shaded Consequences
Completely Specifies the Utility Function
J
one must assess the relative utilities of the consequences
shaded in Figure 5.8B.
5.6.2. Substitution of One Iso-Preference Curve for One
*Conditional Utility Function
In certain problems, it may be more convenient to
assess an iso-preference curve than a conditional utility
function. We prove that in evaluating u(y,z) an iso-
preference curve may be substituted for either a condition-
al utility function for Y or Z provided it covers the same
range. Let us begin with
Theorem 5.7. If Z is utility independent of Y, then
where
u(y,Z) = u(y,z ) +
o
(5.43)
(1) u (y ,Z ) = 0
o 0
(2) zn(y) is defined such that (y,zn(y» ｾ (Yo,zl) for
an arbitrary zl.
[Remark before proof: Thus to implement the results of
this theorem one must ascertain that Z is utility indepen-
dent of Y, assess the functions u(",z ) and u(y ,"), and
o 0
determine one iso-preference curve with a full range of
y' s. ]
*This subsection can be omitted without interfering
with the continuity of the presentation. It should be omit-
ted if the reader skipped subsection 5.4.2.
Proof. We will set the origin of u(y,z) by
u(y ,Z ) = 0, (5.44)
o 0
and define Z (y) to be such that the set {(y,z (y»: all y}
n n
is an iso-preference curve over all Y. Since the curve
{(y,Zn (y»: all y} must intersect the line {(y ,z):
. 0
all z},
we can denote the intersection point as (Yo,zl) and set the
utility level of the iso-preference curve by
(5.45)
Evaluating (5.37) at Z =
ly find
Z and at z = z (y), we respective-
o n
and
(5.46)
or
u(yo'z) - u(y,zol
u(y ,z (y»)
o n
(5.47)
Substituting (5.45) and (5.46) into (5.37), we conclude
38b
In the special case when the iso-preference curve goes
through (yo,zo) [Le., the case where zl = zol, u(yo,zl) = 0
and (5.43) simplifies to
u (y, z) = u (y, z )
o
u (Yo' z) ]
u (y , Z (y»
o n
(5.48)
The geometrical interpretation of Theorem 5.7 in the
case where Y and Z are scalar attributes is given in Fig.
5.9. To specify u(·,o) one must consistently assess the
utilities of the consequences covered by heavy lines in the
figure.
It is also of interest to use an iso-preference curve
in place of the conditional utility function for Z in the
assessment of u(o,o). Let us formalize this with
Theorem 5.8. If Z is utility independent of Y, then
where
u(y,z) =
u(y,z )u(y (z), zl) -u(y,zl)u(y (z),z )
o n n 0
(5.49)
and
(2 ) Yn(Z) is defined such that (y (z),z) ｾ (y ,z ).
n 0 0
[Remark before proof: Thus to implement the results of this
theorem one must ascertain that Z is utility independent of
Y, assess the functions u (0, zo)" u (0, zl)' and determine one
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iso-preference curve with a full range z's.]
Proof. Let us define the origin of u(y,z) as the point
where the iso-preference curve, {(y (z),z):
n
all z}, crosses
the line {(y,z): all y}.
o
y, call it Yo' and thus
This must occur ｾ ｴ some
u (y (z), z) = u (y , z ) = 0 .
n 0 0
Furthermore, we can set the unit of measure by u(yo,zl) = 1.
Thus, since Z is utility independent of Y, we can use (5.38)
to evaluate u(y (z),z) to yield
n .
u(y (z),z) =O=u(y (z),z ) [l-u(y ,z)] +u(y (z),zl) u(y ,z),
n n 0 0 n 0
which, after rearranging, becomes
u(Yo'z) (5.50)
Substituting (5.50) into (5.42) we get the result Ｈ Ｕ Ｎ Ｔ ｾ Ｉ Ｎ ｾ
A geometrical illusttation of Theorem 5.9 is given
in Figure 5.10 for the case where Y and Z are scalar attri-
butes. Expression (5.49) gives one a method of evaluating
ue·,·) from the relative utilities of the consequences
along the heavy lines in the figure. From the orientation
of the iso-preference curve in Figure 5.10, it should be
clear that preferences must be ｾ ｮ ｣ ｲ ･ ｡ ｳ ｩ ｮ ｧ in one attribute
and decreasing in the other.
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*5.6.3. Use of Two Iso-Preference Curves
It is possible to sUbstitute an iso-preference curve
for each of the conditional utility functions for Y
necessary to implement (5.38). To this end, we prove
Theorem 5;, q. If Z is utility independent of Y, then
where
u (y, z) (5.51 )
and
(1)
(2)
(3 )
u(y,z) is normalized by u(y ,z ) = 0 and
o 0
zm(y) is defined such that (y, z (y» ｾ (y ,z ),
moo
z (y) is defined such that (y, z (y» ｾ (y ,zl).
n n 0
[Remark before proof: To implement this theorem, one must
ascertain that Z is utility independent of Y, assess the
function u(yo,e), and determine two iso-preference curves
with the full range of zls.}
Proof. Let us define z (y) and z (y) such that the sets
m n
{ (y ,zrJ y ) }:, all y} and {(y, zn (y) ) : all y} represent two
iso-preference curves over all Y. Both iso-preference
curves must intersect the line {(y ,z): all z}, so we can
o
set the origin and unit of measure of u(e,e) and define
*Skip this subsection if the previous subsection was
skipped.
and
u (y , zm (y)) = u (Yo' Z0) = 0 (5.52)
(5.53)
By evaluating u(y,zm(y» and u(y,zn(y» using (5.38)
we find, respectively
u(y,Zm(y)} =o=u(y,zo} [l-u(Yo,zm(y»] +u(y,zl) u(Yo,zm(y»
(5.54)
and
u (y , Z (y» = 1 = u (y , Z ) [1 - u (y , Z (y»] + u (y , Z1 ) u (Yo' Zn (y) ) •
n 0 0 n
(5.55)
Equations (5.54) and (5.55) are two equations with two
unknowns, which can be solved to yield
(5.56)
and
1 - u(Yo,zm(y»
u(y,zl) = u(y ,Z (y» - u(y ,Z (y»
o nom
Substituting (5.56) and (5.57) into (5.38), we conclude
(5.57)
(5.58)
u (Yo' Z1 - u (Yo r zm (y) )
= u(Yo' zn (y» ... u (Yo r zm (y) ) '4
When Y and Z both represent scalar attributes,
Theorem 5.9 can be illustrated geometrically as shown in
Figure 5.11. We have proven that provided Z is utility
independent of Y, u(o,o) is specified by assessing the
relative utilities of the consequences along the heavy
lines.
A utility function gives us a measure of the decision
maker's attitude toward risky or uncertain situations. To
assess the utility function, the decision maker must spec-
ify his preferences for lotteries. An iso-preference curve,
on the other hand, yields no information about the decision
maker's attitudes towards risk and can be assessed by com-
paring only certain consequences. Thus, since only one
conditional utility function is necessary to implement
(5.58), the decision maker's attitudes toward': risks in-
volving both uncertain Y and Z can be specified by consider-
ing risky situations involving only uncertain Z.
*5.6.4. Special Cases
As proven in Section 5.4, if Y and Z are mutually
utility independent,
u(y,z} = u(y,zo) + u(y ,z) + k uty,z ) u(y ,z),
o 0 0
(5.59)
where k is an empirically evaluated constant, It would
be interesting to know what additional conditions must hold
*In a cursory reading of the book, the remainder of
Section 5.6 can be skipped.
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for the results of this section to reduce to the form
(5.59) or to the additive utility function. To this end,
we prove two results which can be thought of as corol-
laries to Theorem 5.6.
COROLLARY 1. Given Z is utility independent of Y, it is
a necessary and sufficient condition for u(y,z) to be of
form (5.59) that
(5.60)
for arbitrary zl F zo' where a and b > 0 are constants.
In other words, this corollary states that if Z is utility
independent of Y, in order to get the multilinear utility
function (5.59), we do not have to assert that all condi-
tional utility functions u(·,z) be strategically equivalent.
It is enough that there be merely a single pair, say
u(.,zo) and u(.,zl)' that are strategically equivalent.
Proof. For sufficiency, let us substitute (5.60) into
(5.38) giving
u(y,z) = u(y,zo)[1 - u(y ,z)] + [a + b u(y,z)] u(y ,z)000
= u(y,z 1 + a u(Yo'z) + (b-l) u(y,z ) u(y ,z).000
(5.61)
Since from (5.391, u(y ,z ) = 0, evaluating (5.61) at
o 0
y = y yields
o
u(y ,z} = 0 + a u(y ,z) + 0
o 0
so
a = 1. (5.62)
Substituting this result into (5.61) and defining k - ｢ｾｬＬ
we get (5.59).
To prove that (5.60) is a necessary condition for
(5.59), we only need to observe that (5.59) implies
COROLLARY 2. Given Z is utility independent of Y, u(y,z)
is additive if and only if «y ,z ), (y,zl» is indifferent
o 0
to «y ,zl)' (y,z » for all y.
o 0
Proof. Equating expected utilities of the two lotteries,
for all y.
Recalling the origin and unit of measure of u(y,z) were
set by
and
u(yo,zl) = 1,
we can substitute these into (5.63) to give
(5.63)
(5.64 )
Expression (5.64) is the necessary and sufficient condi-
tion for the multilinear form stated in Corollary 1. Noting
for ｴ ｨ ｾ case that a=l and b=l, the additive utility func-
tion follows directly from (5.61). 4
Recall from Section 5.3 that in general, additivity
follows from an assumption that
«y ,z ), (y,z» 'v «y ,z), (y,z »
o 0 0 0
for all y and z given some arbitrarily chosen y and Z •
o 0
Corollary 2 states that if we can assume Z is utility
independent of Y, then additivity follows if we set z=zl
and the above assumption holds for all y given the arbi-
(5.65)
trarily chosen Yo'zo' and zl. Earlier in Theorem 5.4, we
proved that if mutual utility independence holds, then the
additive utility function follows if y=Yl and z=zl are both
set and assumption (5.65) is valid for the single set of
5.6.5. Usefulness of Certainty Equivalents
As before, a certainty equivalent y for y in the
lottery (y,z) is defined by the relation
When Z is utility independent of Y and when y and z are
probabilistically independent, the expected utility of
(y, z) using (.5. 38) is
=u(Y ,Z } [l ...u(y ,z)] + u(yl,zl} u(y ,2L
o 0 0 0
ｾ ｾ
where Yo and Yl
ｾfor y when z =
alent for ｾz.
are respectively the certainty equivalents
.1\ • • ,Zo and z = zl' and Z 1S the certa1nty equ1v-
The use of certainty equivalents for evaluating lot-
teries is discussed in more detail in Section 5.5. The
basic explanation for their applicability is as follows.
Utility independence allows us to express the expected
utility of a lottery with more than one uncertain attri-
bute in terms of the expected utilities of lotteries in-
volving only one uncertain attribute. Probabilistic ｩ ｮ ､ ･ ｾ
pendence allows us to calculate expected utility over these
latter lotteries by evaluating the expected utility over
each component of the terms separately. Thus we have an
expression for expected utility of the multiattribute lot-
tery in terms of the expected utilities of one-variable
lotteries. A certainty equivalent may then be substituted
for the uncertain attribute in these simple lotteries,
which should greatly facilitate interpretation of the im-
plications of the lottery.
5.6.6. Utility Independence as an Approximation Technique
Even if neither attribute is utility independent of
the other, the utility representation (5.38) which was
derived using the assumption that just one of the attri-
butes was utility independent of the other may provide a
good approximation for the true utility function.
The basis for our argument is that (5.38) gives us
five degrees of freedom in assessing u(y,z}, whereas the
multilinear formulation of (5.16) gives us four degrees of
freedom, and the additive formulation of (5.10) offers only
three degrees of freedom in assessing u(y,z). Consider
the two-dimensional illustrations in Figure 5.12.
The degrees of freedom are shown on the figure as
heavy lines or points. The two consequences marked "0"
represent the consequences chosen to establish the origin
and unit of measure of u(y,z).
using the additive form, we can then arbitrarily
determine
(a) the shape of u(o,zo)' a conditional utility
function for Y,
(b) the shape of u(yo,o), a conditional utility
function for Z,
(c) the unit of measure of u(y ,0) by assessing
o
u(yo,zl)'
These are the three degrees of the additive representation.
With the multilinear form, we have in addition to (a),
(b), and (c), the freedom to fix
(d) the unit of measure of u(o,zl)' a conditional
utility function for Y, by assessing u(Yl,zl)'
Using (5.38), we can add to this list the freedom to
evaluate
(e) the shape of u(.,zl).
In Figure 5.13, we ｩ ｬ ｬ ｵ ｳ ｴ ｲ ｾ ｴ ･ some of the general
shapes of u(y,z} which one can obtain using (5.38). The
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Figure 5.13. Different Shapes of utility Functions
.. u.(y:,z) Where Z is Utility Independent of Y
y
common restriction on each utility function is that all
the conditional utility functions over Z must be strate-
gically equivalent. In each of the fifteen drawings, two
such functions are darkened. Note however that the u(y,o)
can have many shapes. Rows A and B in Figure 5.13 illu-
strate the effect of varying the shapes of u(o,zo)' u(o,zl)'
and u(yo,o). Various combinations of convex and concave
conditional utility functions are shown.
With row C, we intend to illustrate the freedom
created by selecting the units of u(o,zo) and u(o,zl).
Finally, in rows D and E, we wish to point out that
there are no restrictions, such as monotonicity or certain
risk properties, on the conditional utility functions. To
repeat the only restriction on the forms of u(o,o) in
Figure 5.13 is that u(y,o) has the same general shape
(i.e., is strategically equivalent to) as u(y ,e) for all
o
values of y.
5.7. *What To Do If No Independence Properties Hold
Suppose we have ascertained, using assessment· techni-
ques discussed in the next section, that neither Y or Z
is utility independent of the other. Then clearly, since
mutual utility independence is a necessary condition for
*The reader may wish to omit this entire section, but
we suggest that he at least quickly read the introduction
of the section before proceeding to Section 5.8,
additive independence, none of the functional forms of
two-attribute utility functions discussed in the preceding
sections are strictly appropriate. Furthermore, suppose
we have tried to implement the techniques discussed in
Chapter 3 to reduce the dimensionality of the problem.
TheSe did not help either. However, we still want to
quantify the decision maker's preferences. The ｱ ｵ ｾ ｳ ｴ ｩ ｯ ｮ
is, what can one do to obtain a reasonable u over txz for
decision making? Several possibilities exist includings
(A) transformation or adjustment of Y and Z to new
attributes which might allow exploitation of
utility independence properties,
(B) direct aSSessment of u(y,z) by acquiring utili-
ties of several consequences in the range of
y x Z, and then using interpolation, extrapolaw
tion, and/or curve fitting,
(el apply various of the results in preceding
chapters over subsets of the Y x Z space, and
then consistently scale them,
(D) develop or uSe existing more complicated assump-
tions about the decision maker's preference
structure which imply more general utility func-
tions.
Let us clarify ourselves on these options. The relative
desirability of one approach versus another, of course,
is very much a function of the problem at hand.
5.1.1. A Transformation of Attributes
It may be possible to select an alternate set of
attributes and proceed to analyze the problem with this
new set. Unfortunately, in this case the questions raised
in Chapter 2 concerning the appropriatenesS of the set of
attributes, such as completeness and measurability, must
bs reconsidered. rurthermore, it may make it necessary
to repeat much of the analysis, including perhaps ｰ ｲ ｯ ｢ ｡ ｾ
bilistic assessments. To avoid this, perhaps the new
attributes can be chosen to have some simple functional
relationship to the original ones. Then, very little of
the original analysis already completed will be worthless.
As a simple illustration, let Y and Z designate
respectively measures of the crime rates in the tWd sec-
tions of a city_ It may be that there is a complicated
preference structure for (y,z) pairs. The relative or-
dering of lotteries for criminal activity in one section
may depend very much for political reasonS on the leVe1
of crime in the other section. However, suppose we
define S ｾ (Y + i>/2 and T ｾ IY - ｾｉＮ Then S may be ｩ ｮ ｴ ･ ｲ ｾ
preted ｾ Ｙ Borne kind of an average crime index for the city
and T is an indicator of the 'balance' of that activity
between the two sections. Attributes Sand T are ｦ ｵ ｮ ｣ ｾ
tionally related to Y and Z. Given probability distribu-
tions over Y and Z, one could derive probability ､ ｩ ｳ ｴ ｲ ｩ ｢ ｵ ｾ
tions over Sand T. In addition, although there may be
no simplifying preference assumptions in YxZ space, such
properties may exist in SxT.
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Example 5.2. Suppose that no utility independence proper-
ties exist among the original attributes Y and Z. Still
it may be possible to define new attributes S = Y + Z and
T = Y - Z which do possess independence properties. For
instance, Sand T might be additive independent with the
form
u(s,t) = s2 + t.
In this case the assessment of (5.66) should not be too
､ ｩ ｾ ｦ ｩ ｣ ｵ ｬ ｴ Ｎ
Notice that
u(y,z} _ u[s(y,z}, t(y,z)] = (y+z) 2 + (y-z)
2 2
= Y + Y + Z - Z + 2yz,
which illustrates that indeed no utility independence prop-
erties existed between Y and Z••
5.7.2. Direct Assessment of u(y,z)
This procedure is essentially that discussed in the
subsection of Section 5.1 entitled "Use of x* and x o ."
One picks as reference, two consequences and assigns
utilities to these. Then using reference lotteries and
empirical assessments of the decision maker, utilities
are successively assigned to a number of consequences
throughout Y x Z. Utilizing a curve-fitting technique,
a utility can be assigned to all possible consequences.
5.7.3. Employing Utility Tndependenc·e Over Subsets of Y x Z
The idea is simple--just subdivide the consequence
space into parts such that various of the functional forms
of preceding sections are appropriate. One needs to be
careful to insure consistent scaling on u(y,z).
Example 5.3. Suppose we are interested in assessing u(y,z),
" ｾ "y ｾ y ｾ y and z ｾ z ｾ z where preferences are increas-
ing in both attributes. For y ｾ Yo' Z is utility indepen-
,
dent of Y, so from (5.42), if we set ul(Yo'z ) = 0 and
, I!
U 1 (y, z) =u1 (y, z ) [1 - u1 (Yo' z) ] + U 1 (y, z ) u1 (Yo' z) ,
., "
y < Yo' z < z < z •
For the rest of the original region, suppose Y is utility
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, " ,
independent of Z, so if we set u 2 (yo,z ) = 0 and u 2 (y ,z ) = 1,
then
, " ,
u 2 (y,z) =u 2 (yo,Z)[1-u2 (y,z)] +u(y ,z) u (y,z ),
, "
y ｾ Yo' z < z < z .
Since both ul and u 2 have the same origin, then in
order to consistently scale Ul and u2 we need only deter-
mine a scaling constant X defined by
ｾ ］
"u 2 (Yo' z )
.. JI
u l (Yo,z· 1
401
In this case a consistent utility function for all Y x Z
is
{ AU1 (Y. z).
, II
Y < Yo' z < z < z .
- -
u (y, z 1 =
,
"u 2 (y, z) , y > Yo; z < z < z . IJ
- -
lie
5.7.4. Weaker Assumptions on the Preference Structure
This subsection is meant to indicate a couple of more
general models than those of the previous sections. As is
evident and expected, the requisite assumptions for these
models are more complex than those used earlier. One
could obviously develop even more general models than
those in this section. The advantage is clear. Such models
are more likely to be appropriate for a specific decision
maker's preference structure and, therefore, less likely
to misrepresent it. The disadvantage is operational. It
is more difficult to verify the assumptions of the more
general models and then more difficult to assess u(y,z)
once they are verified. This tradeoff must inevitably be
considered in selecting a model for one's utility function.
REVERSING PREFERENCES. If Z is utility independent of Y,
then
(5.67)
lie
In this subsection, we will be quite informal. The pur-
pose is (1) to communicate a flavor for some generalizations
of material presented earlier in. this chapter which have been
developed, and (2) to indicate sources for this work.
where c 2 (y) must be greater than zero. This implies that
the preference order over lotteries on Z will always be
the same regardless of the amount y. Suppose one allows
,
c 2 (y) to also be negative or zero. Then if c 2 (y } < 0,
,
the preference order on lotteries over Z given y is exactly
,
reversed from this order given Yo' If c 2 (y ) = 0, then,
one is indifferent between all lotteries Z given y .
Fishburn [1974] allowed for these reversals of preference
and indifference and derived results analogous to those in
Section 5.4.
A GENERALIZATION OF UTILITY INDEPENDENCE. The most general
result we have discussed so far is (5.3a) which require
two one-attribute utility functions over Y and one one-
attribute utility function over Z. The question arises as
to what type of functional form might be developed using
two one-attribute utility functions over each of Y and Z,
and what would the associated requisite assumptions on the
decision maker's preference structure be? Fishburn [1974]
has developed necessary and sufficient conditions for
determining u(y,z) by assessing adequately scaled utility
functions over the heavy lines of Figure 5.120. The result
is that
40Z
(5.G8)
The requisite assumptions and proof for (5.G8) along with
a discussion of scaling the functions uy,uZ,fy ' and f Z is
found in Fishburn [1974bl.
PARAMETRIC DEPENDENCE. As indicated in Section 5.2, if
Z is utility independent of Y, then onets attitude toward
risk in terms of lotteries over Z is independent of Y.
Kirkwood [1973] developed parametric dependence, which
eliminates this restriction, but requires the preferences
over Z for different amounts of Y to be representable by
members of the same parametric family of utility functions.
For instance, if preferences over Yare increasing and
constantly risk averse for all z, but the degree of risk
aversion varies, we have
u (y , z) ,..., - e -ye (z) , e (z) > 0 (5.69 )
Equation (5.69) indicates that all conditional utility
functions over Yare dependent on z through the parameter
e(z). In this case we would say that Y is parametrically
dependent on Z. More formally, we will say that Y is
parametrically dependent on Z if the conditional utility
functions over Y given different levels of z depend on z
only through a parameter O. This means that
(5.70)
where d 2 lZ) > 0 and uY!z indicates a conditional utility
function over Y given z.
To illustrate the use of parametric dependence and to
provide an intuitive flavor( consider
Theorem 5.10. If Y is parametrically dependent on Z, then
uC.,·) is completely determined by three consistently scaled
utility functions on Z given levels of y and one utility
function on Y given z.
Rather than a formal proof, refer to Figure 5.14 for
the basis of an informal one. Theorem 5.10 says that sub-
ject to the stated conditions, the utility of any point
can be assigned given the consistently scaled utilities of
the darkened lines. From u(.,zo) we know the functional
form of the utility function u(',z) for all z. To deter...
mine the value of the parameter for a particular z, we just
,
use the utilities of (yo,z), (y ,z), and (Yl'z). Then
u(·,z) is scaled by u(yo'z) and u(Yl'z), which allows us
to assign a utility to any (y,z).
Obviously the parametric dependence concept could be
extended to include families of utility functions involving
two parameters rather than one. Then it would not be dif-
ficult to derive results analogous to Theorem 5.10. For
instance, the only change in Theorem 5.10 would be that
four conditional utility functions over Z, one more than
before, would need to be assessed. Similarly, results
making use of both parametric dependence and utility inde-
pendence can be derived. Kirkwood [1972] presents some
of these.
SUMMARY STATE DESCRIPTORS. Let us terminate this section
with one further generalization which will be elaborated
on in Chapter 9. Consider the two attributes Y and Z
but now assume that Z is multidimensional. In some cir-
cumstances the conditional utility function u(·,z) on Y
Zl ..----------...------------
z
Zo ..--...- ...ｾ Ｍ Ｍ Ｍ Ｍ Ｍ Ｍ Ｍ ...-
Yo Y'o
y
Figure 5.14. When Y is Parametrically Dependent on Z,
the Utility Function u(y,z) is Completely
Specified by the Utilities Over the Heavy
Shaded Consequences
might depend on (the multidimensional) z only through some
summary state description, say -€H z), of z. In some cases
the range of ｾ might be unidimensional. For example,
suppose we are concerned with time streams of consumption.
The utility of future consumption starting from a point in
time to might depend on past and present consumption. But,
as an approximation, we might be able to assume that the
utility for future consumption depends only on the past
through the present consumption at to. Hence the consump-
tion stream up to and including time t can be effectively
o
summarized by the state description: consumption at to.
This example is a natural analogy of Markovian probabilis-
tic dependence, and other weak forms of probabilistic
dependence have their analogies in the utility domain. In
other words, if we cannot assume as reasonable various
utility independence notions, then just as in conventional
probabilistic analysis, one can introduce weak forms of
utility dependence. As far as we know this research direc-
tion has hardly been scratched.
As indicated at the beginning of this subsection, with
the greater generality of the models comes the greater
complexity of utilizing them. For many problems, the sim-
pIer models likely are "good enough" approximations even
if they are not precisely valid. However, for those prob-
lems where this is not the case, it is important to realize
how to add generality to the model and still keep the
assessment task within bounds ..
5.8. Assessment Procedure for Multiattribute Utility
Functions
After reading the unidimensional case in Chapter 4,
it should come as no surprise to the reader that we feel
that one cannot identify a series of steps which, when
followed, will result in a properly assessed multiattri-
bute utility function. Just as before, the process re-
quires a good deal of foresight and improvisation. Before
assessing any preferences or utilities, we assume that
the analyst (or interrogator) has properly set the stage
for the decision maker or his delegated expert. In partic-
uiar, we assume that the respondent realizes the purpose
of the exercise and is sufficiently motivated to think
hard about his feelings for the various consequences.
It is at this point that we begin to assess his
utility function. As with the one-attribute case, the
assessment procedure can be segmented for discussion pur-
poses to highlight various aspects which must be completed.
Although our discussion will focus on two-attribute utility
functions, the basic ideas are relevant to all multiattri-
bute utility assessments. The sequence one might follow
in determining a utility function can be described in five
stages:
(1) Introducing the terminology and ideas,
(2) Identifying relevant independence assumptions,
(3) Assessing conditional utility functions or iso-
preference curves,
(4} Assessing the scaling constants,
(5) Checking for consistency and reiterating.
*5.8.1. Introducing the Terminology and Ideas
Suppose we have structured the decision problem and
specified two attributes Y and Z, which are adequate to
describe the consequences. Then we must assess a utility
function over all possible (y,z) consequences. A conse-
quence space should be illustratedf as in Figure 5.15 as
a graphical aid to the decision maker.
Before any assessments are made, it should be clear
to the decision maker that the preferences we are inter-
ested in are his. It must be understood that there are
no objectively correct preferences, that the preferences
*In Section 4.9, an assessment procedure for assessing
single-attribute utility functions was discussed. The pre-
liminaries to assessment were essentially the same as those
discussed in this subsection, since the purpose in both
cases is to make sure the decision maker understands the
process and its motivation. The basic ideas are included
here to render this section a complete unit.
f The figures and examples in the text in this section
concern scalar attributes in order to simplify the presen-
tation. All of the suggestions do generalize for vector
attributes, although then clearly the problem becomes more
involved.
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of importance represent the subjective feelings of the de-
cision maker. At any time if the decision maker feels un-
comfortable with any of the information he has offered about
his sUbjective feelings, it is perfectly all right, in fact,
necessary for a correct analysis, for him to change his mind.
This is one of the purposes of a utility analysis namely:
to help the decision maker think hard about his preferences
and hopefully straighten them out in his mind.
Now, the analyst--let's assume this role for ourselves
--must make sure that the decision maker understands the
c5nsequence space representation of Figure 5.15. We might
explain that by consequence Q we mean the consequence where
y = Yl and z = zl' Then we might ask him what is meant by
consequence R. The answer, of course, is y = Y2 and z = z2'
The decision maker should realize the directions in which
y and z increase in Figure 5.15.
Next, it is helpful to limit the region over which we
must assess preferences to as small a region as possible.
From our earlier involvement in structuring the problem
with the decision maker, we should already know the maximum
and minimum amounts which both y and z could assume. Then
o * 0 '"we would choose a y ,y ,z , and z such that for all possi-
ble (y, z) ,
4-08
z <
-
*'z •
The values should be chosen for convenience and meaningful-
ness to the decision maker. For instance, if y ranged from
a to 8.75 in the specific units, we might define yO = a
* *and y = 10. A value of y = 10,000, for example; probably
would have little meaning to the decision maker. The pref-
erences which we eventually assess must only be those for
. ( ) . h 0 lC dconsequences y,z Wlt y ｾ y ｾ y an
is the region shown in Figure 5.15.
*'z • This
As a final check on the decision ｭ ｡ ｫ ･ ｲ ｾ ｳ understanding
of the consequence space representation, we might ask him
whether or not he prefers consequence T to consequence S
in Figure 5.15. The points Sand T should be chosen such
that it is clear to us, the analyst, that the decision
maker would almost for sure prefer a particular one. If
the decision ｭ ｡ ｫ ･ ｲ ｾ ｳ preference in this case agreed with
the expected result, we could proceed to more difficult
questions. If not, the decision maker's reasoning should
be pursued, and perhaps the familiarization process should
be repeated, in part or in full.
Enough has been said about the preliminaries. The
basic idea is to acquaint the decision maker with the frame-
work which we use in assessing his utility function.
5.8.2. Verification of Independence Assumptions
Here we will discuss procedures to verify if Y and Z
are additive independent and if either attribute is utility
independent of the other.
ADDITIVE INDEPENDENCE. Suppose we wish to assess preferences
over the consequence space yO < Y < y* and zO < z < z* as
... ...
shown in Figure 5.16. As defined in Section 5.3, Y and Z
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are additive independent if and only if the lotteries
(y, z)
Ｈ ｙ ｾ 2.')
and
(y,2.')
are indifferent for all amounts of y,z given a specific y' ,z'.
So the obvious method to verify additive independence is
, ,
to select a y and z and see if indifference between Ll
and L2 holds for some (y,z) pairs.
Practically speaking, if Y and Z are divided into four
1 b t · b {o .25 .5 .7 5 *} dequa su sec lons y y,y ,y ,y ,y an
{ 2.0, ,,25 12:,·6 l z· 75,z*} respectively as indicated in
Figure 5.16 and if Ll is indifferent to L2 for each possi-
ble (y,z) pair taken from these two groups of five, then
it seems justified to assume Y and Z are additive indepen-
dent.
An alternate procedure to check for additive indepen-
dence involves first trying to verify that Y and Z are
mutually independent.
Recall that mutual utility independence is a necessary,
but not a sufficient condition for additive independence.
If Y and Z are mutually utility independent, they are
additive independent if there exists a Yl'Y2,zl' and z2
such that
are equally desirable, where neither (Yl,z2) or (Y2,zl)
are indifferent to (Yl,zl). On the other hand, if there
4 too-
z
ｆｉｾｕＢｾ S.lb, A Graphical Aid for Verlfying Additive
Independence Conditions
'.:C'}::ists any L3artd L4 such that they are not indifferent,
1.:L8n clearly addi tive independence cannot hold.
41 ,
ｾＢＢｾｾｲＮｉｔｙ INDEPENDENCE. Again, suppose we have two scalar
attributes, Y and Z, and wish to assess preferences over
yO ｾ Y ｾ y* and ZO < z < z* as shown in Figure 5.17. The
letters P,Q,R,S, etc., designate consequences referred to
in the discussion.
'fo verify whether Y is utility independent of Z,
cgin by asking the decision maker if he prefers <P,Q>, a
lottery yielding either P or Q with equal probability, or
2he consequence S is chosen so a particular answer is
ｾ ｙ ｾ Ｐ ｣ ｴ ･ ､ Ｎ Suppose the decision maker prefers <P,Q> to S
and this agrees with our expectations. Then we ask the
decision maker whether he prefers <P,Q> or T, where T is
chosen such that we expect T is preferred to <P,Q>. Next,
we inquire about the preferences of <P,Q> relative to W.
Since W is "near to" S, we somewhat expect that <P,Q> will
be preferred to W, but perhaps not. We continue with this
convergence procedure until we reach a consequence R such
that <PtQ> and R are equally desirable (or undesirable) to
the decision maker.
If the decision maker indicates any preferences which
W2 do not feel are consistent with his "true" preferences,
1:11is should be pointed out and discussed again.
Notice from Figure 5.17 that consequences P,Q,R,S,T,
<"lc3 W all had a common amount of Z and only differed in
';-)('.>Lc amount of Y. Thus, R is· a certainty equivalent for
Ｚ ｮ ｬ ｾ luttery <P,Q>.
4110.
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Now we move our concentration to the set of consequences
I
lidth a different amount of Z in common, say z , and ask a
similar set of questions. First we want to determine wheth-
I
er or not the decision maker prefers T I Ito <P ,Q >. To
avoid a repetition of the previous answers without thinking
• I
about the current questlons, T should be chosen such that
. ,
the amount of Y, and not only the amount of Z, in T and T
are different. Suppose the decision maker prefers T l to
, I I I
<P ,Q >. Then we ask about his preferences between <P ,Q >
ail'..l oS I, between <P I ,Q I> and w', and eventually determine
I I I
that <P ,Q > is indifferent to R for the decision
, ,
rnaker. If Rand R have a common amount of Y (i. e., R
lies directly above R in Figure 5.17), then we begin to
think Y might be utility independent of Z. What we have
:::/) far determined is that the relative preferences of P ,Q,
I I I
and R and the relative preferences of P ,Q , and Rare
the same.
Again we repeat the procedure for another amount of
II II
Z, say z , and hopefully find that R , a certainty equiva-
.. " f' R l •lent for <P ,0 >, has a common amount 0 Y wlth Rand
If this is the case, we can feel reasonably confident that
Y is utility independent of Z. The assumption can be
further checked following the same procedure to determine
I
a consequence N indifferent to <P,R> and a consequence N
1 ,
indifferent to <P , R >, for example. If Y is utility
independent of Z, we would expect Nand N l to have a common
a.mount of Y.
Finally, we ask the decision maker in general if
«y;(,z'), (yO,z'» is indifferent to (yl,Z') and if
*" 0" t· II
< (y , z ), (y , z ) > is indifferent to (y , z ), then can
we conclude that «y*,z), (yO,z» is indifferent to (y',z)
for all possible values of Z? If Y is utility independent
of Z, the answer of course, must be yes. As a last ques-
tion on this point, we ask if for any arbitrary Yl'YZ' and
2'3' if «Y1'z), (Y2'z» is indifferent to (Y3'z) for one
particular value of z, will the same relation hold for all
possible values of Z? A yes answer to this definitely
implies that Y is utility independent of Z.
Another way of verifying that Y is utility independent
of Z might go as follows.
"Consider a 50-50 lottery between Yl and Y2 for a
"fixed level of z, say z = zl ' our analyst asks the deci-
sion maker. "Look at the figure on the page in front of
you. Now think hard about what y amount you would want
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for certain, always keeping zl fixed, so that you are in-
different between the certainty amount and the 50-50 lottery.
Reflect on this problem for a while" .•. "O.K." the analyst
continues, "Now when you were thinking about your breakeven
y, was it important to you to keep in mind the level of z.
Suppose we let z = z2 instead of zl' would it have made
any difference?".
Now if the answer were "No, it would not", then the
analyst should check with the respondent whether this could
'Je assumed to be generally the' case if Yl and y 2 were
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changed and if zl and z2 were changed. If this is verified,
then we could assume Y is utility independent of Z.
If in our original set of questions, we found Rand
,
R did not have a common amount of Y, then assuming Rand
•R correctly represented the decision maker's preferences,
Y could not be utility independent of Z. However, since
utility independence is not reflexive, Z may yet be utility
independent of Y. Even if this is not so, if the amounts
,
of Y in Rand R are "reasonably" close to each other, we
might approximate the true utility function by assuming Y
to be utility independent of Z and assessing a utility
function accordingly.
Suppose we label the certainty equivalent of the
, "lottery «y ,z), (y ,z) by (yz'z). Often, in practice,
the decision maker might feel there is a slight dependence
"'-
set y
z
for all z provided that the relevant
of ｾ on z but it might be a convenient "lie" to
z
equal to a fixed value
range of z is small. And therefore in practice it is often
crucially important to be able to restrict the range set
of an attribute such as Z. One way of achieving this re-
striction is by eliminating acts that are dominated or
lI practically" dominated by others. By restricting the
domain of Z, one can make an idealized abstraction--or lie--
such as, Y is utility independent of Z more palatable.
This issue was discussed in subsection 5.6.6.
5.8.3. Assessing Conditional Utility Functions
The conditional utility functions uyCo) over Y and
uz(o} over Z may be either multidimensional or unidimension-
al. That is, the arguments y and z respectively may be
vectors or scalars. If they are vectors, hopefully we can
further decompose the utility function using the indepen-
dence properties discussed in this and the next chapter in
order to decrease the dimensionality of utility functions
which must be directly assessed. If this is not possible,
then some of the ideas of Sections 5.1 or 5.7 must be
utilized.
On the other hand if the conditional utility functions
are unidimensional, then the procedures discussed in
Chapter 4 are appropriate. If this is the case and if the
previously suggested procedure to verify utility indepen-
dence was used, then one already has a number of certainty
equivalents, which are appropriate in assessing the condi-
tional utility functions. Obviously, this information,
and any other obtained in verifying independence assump-
tions, should be utilized wherever possible.
5.8.4. Assessing the Scaling Constants
In all the models in this chapter, the form of the
utility function u(y,z) has been specified in terms of a
number of conditional utility functions over either Y or
Z and scaling constants. For example, with the mUltilinear
utility function discussed in Section 5.4,
(5.71)
4 It..
there is one conditional utility function for each of Y
and Z and three scaling constants: ky' k z, and kyz . Both
of the utility functions in (5.71) can be scaled from zero
to one since the scaling constants are used to insure
internal consistency.
The basic idea for evaluating the three scaling
constants is to obtain a set of three independent equations
with three unknowns, which are then solved to obtain the
k's. These equations can be generated from certainty con-
siderations, probabilistic considerations, or a combina-
tion of both. For example, using certainty scaling, if
consequences (Yl,zl) and (Y2,z2) are indifferent, then
equating these utilities using (5.71), we have
ky u y (y1) + k z u Z (z1) + k y z u y (y].) u Z (z 1) = k y u y (y2) + k z u Z (z 2 )
+ kYZUY (Y2)uZ (z2)
(5.72)
Both uy and Uz are known, since we are assuming they have
already been assessed, so (5.72) is one equation with at
most three unknowns. Using probabilistic scaling, suppose
(Y3' z3) is indifferent to the lottery < (Yl' zl); p; (yZ ' z2) >
which yields (yl,zl) with probability p and (Y2,z2) with
the complementary probability I-p. Then, equating expected
utilities
(5.73 )
which when combined with (5.71)· yields an equation involving
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k y ' k z , and kyZ as the only unknowns. Clearly, using either
or both certainty and probabilistic scaling, one can gener-
ate three independent equations with the three k's as un-
knowns. Let us illustrate this.
Consider again the multilinear utility function (5.7l)
where the origins of u,uy ' and Uz are
o 0 0 0
u(y ,Z ) = 0, uy(y } = 0, and uzlz } = o. (5.74)
And suppose we are interested in preferences over the con-
o * 0 *sequence space where y ｾ y ｾ y and z < z < z. For
illustration purposes, let us further assume that prefer-
ences are increasing in both Y and Z so the utility func-
tions can be scaled by
ｾ * * *u(y ,z ) = 1,uylY ) = 1, and uz(z ) = 1. (5.75)
* *Using (5.75) to evaluate (5.71) at (y ,z ), one finds
that for consistency
(5.76)
Furthermore evaluating (5.7l) at (y*,zo) and (yO,z*) respec-
tively gives us
(5.77)
As a starter, let us first try to see which is larger;
ky or k Z? This could be done, for instance, by asking the
* 0 0"'"decision maker if he preferred (y ,z ) or (y ,z ). From
(5.77), if the former is preferred, then ky > k Z; if the
latter is preferred, then k
z
> kyi and if they are indiffer-
ent, ky = k z . Suppose we find ky > k z • Then we can look
for an amount y such that decision maker is indifferent
'00*between (y ,z ) and (y ,z J. Equating their utilities
using (5.71) yields
(5. 78)
,
where uy(y ) is known. To help the decision maker identify
y , we might present him with a specific choice between
(y,zo) and (yO,z*) with y fixed. If the first consequence
were preferred to the second, y would be decreased and the
binary choice reofferedi if the second consequence were
preferred, y would be increased and the procedure repeated.
,
ｾｩｴｨ this approach, one should soon converge to y .
Equation (5.78) is the result of certainty scaling.
For an example of probabilistic scaling, suppose
using techniques discussed in Chapter 4 we assessed the
indifference probability TI such that Cy*,zo) is indifferenty
* * 0 0to «y ,z )i TIyi Cy ,z ). Using (5.71) and equating
expected utilities, we find
(5.79)
The system of equations C5.76), (5.78), and (5.79) has
three unknowns, which can be solved for ky,k Zr and k yz •
For TIy = 0.5 and uyCy') = 0.8, one easily concludes that
ky = 0.5, k z = 0.4, and k yZ = 0.1. C5.80}
Let us generalize the ideas in this sUbsection. All
our two-attribute formulations in this chapter express
u(y,z) in terms of conditional utility functions over the
individual attributes and scaling constants. Thus, if
there are Nand M conditional utility functions over Y and
Z respectively and if there are R scaling constants, we
can write
u (y, z) 1 N 1 M= f [uy (y), ••. ,uy (y) ,uZ (z), ••• ,uz (z) ,k l ,k2 ,.·. ,kR] .
(5.81)
where f is specified. The utility functions in (5.81) can
all be scaled zero to one since the scaling constants pro-
vide overall consistency.
Thus to evaluate the R scaling constants, we must
generate R independent equations and solve. As illustrated,
each equation can be generated from certainty considera-
tions or probabilistic considerations.
One operational problem of concern is how to generate
independent equations, or said another way, how is redun-
dancy in the equations avoided? In practice, one1s under-
standing of the problem and knowledge of the functional
form of the utility function are probably the best guards
against a large number of redundant equations. When a
redundancy does occur, we need to empirically generate
another equation that is not redundant to substitute for
a redundant one. To illustrate this, let us return to the
proceeding example.
42..0
Suppose that after (5.78) had been determined, we
,," "0 (0"assessed a y and z such that (y ,z ) and y ,z ) were
equally desirable. Then equating expected utilities,
(5.82)
Clearly (5.76), (5.78), and (5.82) are three equations
with three unknowns, but (5.78) and (5.82) are not inde-
pendent of each other. Both are concerned with setting
the scaling between Y and z. To get around this, we can
obviously use probabilistic scaling as we did in the orig-
inal example. If one preferred to use certainty scaling,
one could assess a y" such that (y",z*) is indifferent to
* 0(y ,z). Then of course,
"k y = kyuy(y ) + k z + kYZuy(yll), (5.83)
"where uy(y ) is known. Now (5.83) is independent of both
(5.78) and (5.82). So, for example, equations (5.76),
(5.78), and (5.83) can be solved for ky,k Z ' and kyZ ' and
(5.82) can be used to check the consistency of the result-
ing u(y,z).
5.8.5. Checking for Consistency and Reiterating
There are many different consistency checks which can
be used to detect errors in the decision maker's utility
function. By an error, we mean that the utility function
which we have assessed for him does not represent his
preferences when it is tested by hypothetical examples,
Three such consistency checks are suggested in this section,
With these as a guide, the decision analyst should have no
trouble developing other checks designed to uncover discrep-
ancies in the utility function.
One method to check the validity of a utility function
involves paired comparisons of various consequences. Con-
cerning a utility function u(y,z}, we might ask the decision
maker if he prefers (Yl,zl) to (Y2,z2). If so, then u(yl,zl)
should be greater than u(y2 ,z2) to be consistent. This
type of check can be repeated as many times as it is felt
useful. It might be wise to start with some easy compari-
sons and work up to more difficult ones. This acquaints
the decision maker with the technique before really pressing
his judgment for difficult choices among consequences.
A more systematic way of doing this would be to use
the u function on Y x Z to generate a family of indifference
curves in the Y x Z plane--we are assuming here, of course,
that Y and Z are each unidimensional. Then the decision
maker could reflect whether these indifference curves seem
reasonable to him.
Another check on the utility function is to empirically
determine whether or not he is risk averse on positive rays
of the form (y,cy) where c > o. We might ask the decision
maker what consequence (Yl,cYl) is indifferent to
«y2 ,cY2); 1/2; (Y3,cY3». For the case where u(y,cy} is
increasing in y, if Yl is less than (Y2 + Y3}/2, we might
expect he is ray risk averse. From Section 4.4, we have
the theory how to determine if the decision maker is risk
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averse on this and any other positive rays. If we do
decide he is ray risk averse, for the case where prefer-
ences are increasing in Y and Z, then using the theory in
Section 4.5, it should be clear that to be consistent
u
l (y,cy) must be positive and u"(y,cy) negative for all y,
where u l and u" denote first and second derivatives with
respect to Y. If he is not ray risk averse, then obvious-
ly u(y,z) should not possess ray risk aversion.
In cases where the utility function is of a special
form, a particular consistency check may be applicable.
For example, if u(y,z) is of the multilinear form (5.16)
of our preceding example, we can choose any Yl'Y2,zl' and
z2 such that
and
u (Yo' z 21 > u (Yo' z l) ,
(5.84a)
(5.84b)
and check the sign of parameter kyZ in the following manner.
We ask the decision maker whether he prefers Ll :: «Y2,z2)'
(Yl,zl» or L2 :: «YZ,zl)' (Yl,z2». If Ll is preferred to
L2 , then k yZ must be positive. If the lotteries are in-
different, kyZ must be zero, and if L2 is preferred to Ll
then k yZ should be negative. Also, if Ll is preferred to
L2 for any set of Yl'Y2,Zl' and z2 satisfying (5.841, it
must hold for all such sets satisfying (5.84). More is
said concerning this point in ｓ ｾ ｣ ｴ ｩ ｯ ｮ 5.4.
In practice, the imagination of the analyst will not
be strained in an attempt to develop efficient and effec-
tive consistency checks. And as has been mentioned before,
if the consistency checks produce discrepancies with the
previous preferences indicated by the decision maker,
these discrepancies must be called to his attention and
parts of the assessment procedure should be repeated to
acquire consistent preferences. Once we obtain a utility
function which the decision maker and the analyst feel
represents the true preferences of the decision maker,
we may proceed with the analysis. Of course, if the re-
spondent has strong, crisp, unalterable views on all ques-
tions and if these are inconsistent, then we would be in
a mess, wouldn't we? In practice, however, the respondent
usually feels fuzzier about some of his answers than
others,and it is this degree of fuzziness that usually
makes a world of difference. For it then becomes usually
possible to generate a final coherent set of responses
which does not violently contradict any strongly held
feelings. Finally, if the decision maker and his analyst
remain a bit squeamish about accepting any "compromise"
utility function, then they can always embark on a sensi-
tivity analysis.
5.9. Interpreting the Scaling Constants
It is not easy to interpret the scaling constants
since they depend on the choices of yO,y*,zo, and z*
which, in turn, depend on the possible consequences of the
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problem. Let us illustrate our discussion with the
additive function
where
u(y0 , zO) 0, uy(Yo) 0, 0 0,= = U
z
(z ) =
and
u(y)/( )It I, '* I, uz(z*), z ) = uy(y ) = = 1-
Then clearly, for consistency
(5.85)
(5.86)
(5.87)
(5.88)
If the assessment of ky = 0.75 and k z = 0.25, one
ｾ ｯ ｴ say that y is three times as important as Z. In
fact, one cannot conclude that attribute Y is more impor-
tant than z. Going one step further, it is not clear how
one would precisely define the notion that one attribute
is more important than another. We can say, however, that
if starting from the point (y0 0 would rather change, z ), we
ZO to z* than change yO to y* , then k
z
> ky ' and vice-versa.
If-, for instance, 0 and y'* "close together, " that is,y are
the range of y is relatively small, then ky may be small
but still the Y attribute may be mighty important. Chang-
o *ing the range of y to Y will necessarily change the
value of kyo Because of the consistency condition (5.88),
the scaling constant k
z
will alsd change. To better
illustrate the point, suppose in comparing jobs, attribute
Y refers to monetary rewards and all jobs under considera-
tion pay almost the same amount so yO and y* are close
together; then ky may be small but this does not mean
that money is unimportant to the decision maker.
ｾ
and y become closer and closer, the value of ky
oAs Y
approaches
zero. Clearly when using an additive utility function in
such situations, the pay would have little influence on
the final choice of a job, but one can still not conclude
money is not important.
To graphically illustrate the point, consider
Figure 5.18 ｷ ｨ ｩ ｾ ｨ exhibits two consequence spaces*, both
of which could be used to evaluate the same problem pro-
vided all possible consequences fell within the smaller
of the two. Furthermore, suppose the additive utility
function is appropriate. If the utility function U(y,z)
scaled from zero to one is assessed over (y,z) for
yO < Y ｾ y* and ZO ｾ z ｾ z*, we might find, for instance,
(5.89)
where ky = 0.75, k z = 0.25, and uy and Uz are also both
scaled zero to one. And since uz(z+) must fall between
o and 1, let us assume it is 1/3. So from (5.89), note
that
o +
u(y ,z ) ( * 0)= u y ,z . = 0.25. (5.90)
*For simplicity, we'll assume preferences are increasing
in both Y and z.
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Figure 5.18. An Illustration That Scaling Constants
Cannot Be Interpreted As a Indicator
of Attribute Importance
Now suppose that we had originally decided to assess
o * 0 +preferences over (y,z), where y ｾ y ｾ y and z < z < z
,
using u (y,z). The additive utility function
where each of the utility functions can be scaled by
100 '0 '0
u (y ,z ) = 0, uy{y ) = 0, uz(z ) = 0
and
, )j: + I * ' +u (y , z ) = 1, uy (y ) = 1, u Z (z ) = 1,
then holds. For consistency, clearly
1 = ｫｾ + ｫｾ
(5.91)
(5.92)
(5.93)
(5.94)
and since (yO,z+) and (y*,Zo) are indifferent from (5.90),
utilities can be equated using (5.91), (5.92), and (5.93)
to yield
(5.95)
Combining (5.94) and (5.95), we see
Now if one insists on interpreting the scaling con-
stants as indicators of the importance of their respective
attributes, then obviously from u, one must conclude that
Y is three times as important as Z. And for the exact
same attributes, using u t , one would conclude Y and Z are
equally important. This may be overemphasizing the point
that scaling constants do not indicate the relative impor-
tance of attributes, but because this misinterpretation
is so common, we thought a little overindulgence might be
in order.
5.10. The Assessment of a Utility Function in a Hospital
Blood Bank*
This section is meant to tie together the ideas of
this chapter and illustrate our method for assessing multi-
attribute utility functions. This is done using a specif-
ic problem--one concerned with blood bank inventory con-
trol. The suggestions of Section 5.8 are followed in
assessing the preferences of the decision maker in.a hos-
pital blood bank over the shortage--outdating consequence
space. Although the example involves only two attributes,
the general method described is applicable to a wide range
of problems requiring multiattribute utility functions.
Additional examples are discussed in Chapters 7, 8, and 9.
5.10.1. The Blood Bank Inventory Control Problem
Briefly discussing the blood bank inventory control
problem and formulating it in the decision theoretic frame-
work helps to motivate the assessment of the utility func-
tion presented below. Jennings [1968] developed a detailed
model of a whole-blood inventory system for a blood bank
in a hospital and examined the control of such a system.
Various operating policies were evaluated in terms of blood
*Several parts of this section were adapted from
Keeney [1972b].
shortage and blood outdating. Shortage is the blood
requested by a doctor which could not be assigned from
the hospital inventory. In this situation, a special
order for the particular type of blood is placed with a
central blood bank, professional donors may have to be
called in, an operation may have to be postponed, etc.;
but only in extremely rare circumstances would a death
result from shortage as defined here. Outdated blood is
the blood not used during its legal lifetime, which cur-
rently is 21 days in most hospitals.
One basic decision that must be made in hospital blood
banks is what type of daily inventory ordering policy is
best for each of the blood types. In this ｳ ･ ｣ ｴ ｩ ｯ ｾ the
problem is analyzed for anyone blood type. The decision
maker must choose among the courses of action denoted by
A. where i = 1,2, .•. ,n. For each A. there is a probability
1 1
distribution for consequences described in terms of Y and
Z which represent shortage and outdating, respectively.
More specifically, shortage can be stated in terms of
yearly percent of units demanded and not filled from stock,
and outdating can be measured in terms of yearly percent
of units which outdate. The probability distributions can
be obtained by simulation using a model such as Jennings'
and from empirical records kept by the blood bank.
The structure of the inventory problem is illustrated
in Figure 5.19, where the notation Ｈ ｾ ｩ Ｇ ｾ ｩ ｬ is used to des-
ignate the uncertain consequence of act A .• The decision
1
A. is a.n o.lte.r\"\a1ive.,
Yi j, 1he. 'Sho..ｔｾｾ ｃＩＧｾｑＮｮ Ai1, is "tile ｯ ｵ Ｑ ､ ｯ ｔ Ｌ ｮ ｾ C)\VQt'\ Ai
,.----- (y','i.)
Figure 5.19. The Blood Bank Problem
maker should choose an act based on the assessed probability
distributiomof the paired random variables and his pref-
erences for the various consequences.
A Perspective. The experiences recounted below are
those of one author (Keeney) who contacted the doctor in
charge of the blood bank at the Cambridge Hospital in
Cambridge, Massachusetts. As part of a doctoral disserta-
tion concerned with utility independence and assessing
utility functions, the main purpose of the visit was to
see if, in fact, the property of utility independence could
be exploited in assessing utility functions. Hence, cer-
tain approaches which an analyst might take on a consulting
assignment were not followed. Aside from considerations
of whether the problem was the 'real problem', etc., one
could cite two major shortcomings of this work if it had
been a consulting assignment. These are (1) no attempt
was made to exploit the value structure, using ideas such
as those discussed in Chapter 3, before diving headfirst
into the utility structure with probabilistic questioning,
and (2) practically no concern was given to whether the
decision maker was assessing preferences by considering
only impacts to herself, or whether she included her per-
ceived viewpoint of the impacts to patients, doctors, the
hospital, and the public.
Notwithstanding the above caveats, we do feel that the
process of assessment described below does provide a good
indication of the general procedure.
5.10.2. Assessing the Utility Function
Introducing the Terminology and Ideas. On a first
visit, Jennings' work was discussed with the doctor and
the nurse in charge of ordering blood, and the importance
of assessing preferences over the shortage-outdating space
was indicated. On a subsequent visit the preferences of
the nurse were assessed.* In the interim, she had read
Jennings [1968] and developed a good understanding of
the purpose of interviews. Before assessing the prefer-
ences, the purpose of utility theory was explained to
the decision maker, and the meanings of the chosen mea-
sures of effectiveness were made clear. Thus, the deci-
sion maker realized the purpose of assessing her prefer-
ences and was motivated sufficiently to think hard about
her feelings concerning the various consequences.
Prior to assessing her preferences, it was deter-
mined that shortage would never exceed ten percent of
the units demanded and that outdating would not exceed
ten percent of the total units stocked during a year.
Thus the consequence space was limited, as shown in
* .The nurse's preferences were used S1nce she had re-
sponsibility for ordering whole blood for the blood bank.
As indicated, the issue of whether her preferences appro-
priately represent those of the doctors and patients is ig-
nored. Presumably, the nurse's preferences are influenced
by her perceived preferences of the community served by the
blood bank.
Figure 5.20. A check was made to ensure that the decision
maker knew what was meant by a point (y,z) in the conse-
quence space. When it was clear that the decision maker
completely understood the basic ideas, it was possible to
begin assessing preferences. At this time, it was stressed
that there were no objectively correct or incorrect an-
swers to the questions that would be asked.
Verifying Relevant Independence Assumptions. It was
necessary to check whether Y (shortage) was utility inde-
pendent of Z (outdating). This was done with the aid of
Figure 5.21 where P,Q,R,S, etc. represent consequences.
And as before, the notation <P,Q> will mean a lottery
yielding either P or Q with equal probability. The deci-
sion maker was asked if she preferred <P,Q> or S. The
consequence S was chosen by the questioner to make the
question relatively simple. She preferred S, as one
would expect intuitively. Next she was asked to choose
between <P,Q> and T, and she chose <P,Q>i this also was
a relatively easy question. Progressively more difficult
questions were posed about preferences between <P,Q> and
N, <P,Q> and W, etc., and eventually her preferences
"converged" to the fact that «0,0), (10,0» was indiffer-
ent to (6.5,0). Then the same types of questions were re-
peated using <pI ,Q'> instead of <P,Q>, and indifference
between «0,6), (10,6) > and (6.5,6) was established. In
fact, the decision maker stated that she did not see why
the 6.5 should be different from the previous answer. In
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response to a general question she stated that the same
was true for any level of Z held constant for all conse-
quences. With this, it was concluded that Y was utility
independent of Z. In a similar manner, Z was found to be
utility independent of Y. Thus, the attributes were
mutually utility independent, and the multilinear utility
function previously discussed was applicable.
Assessing Conditional Utility Functions. Next, a
conditional utility function for (y,O) was assessed. It
was easy to establish that preference was monotonically
decreasing in Y. Previously the lottery «10,0), (0,0»
was shown to be indifferent to (6.5,0). In addition
< (6.5,0), (0,0) > was indifferent to (4,0), and < (l0,0), (6.5,0»
to (8.5,0). Thus, it was felt that the conditional util-
ity function for (y,O) which will be denoted by uy(y,O)
was risk averse.
After arbitrarily setting the origin and unit of
measure of uy(y,O) by
and
uy(O,O) = °
uy(lO,O) = -1,
(5.96)
(5.97)
the points on the utility function were plotted as indi-
cated in Figure 5.22A. For simplicity, a utility function
of the form b(l - e CY ) was chosen. Using «10,0), (0,0»
ｾ (6.5,0), the parameter c was specified. Parameter b was
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Figure 5.22. The Utility Functions in the
Blood Bank Problem
then determined using (5.97) giving the result
uy(y,O) = 1 (1 _ e· 13y )2.67 (5.98)
shown in the figure. This form fit the other empirically
assessed points very well. Since parameters band c are positivE,
this utility function is monotonically decreasing and
risk averse.
Similarly, in assessing uz(O,z), the conditional
utility function for Z, < (0,10), (0,0» was found indif-
ferent to (0,5.5), <(0,5.5),(0,0» indifferent to (0,3),
and «0,10), (0,5.5» indifferent to (0,8). Thus, by
scaling
uz(O,O) = 0
and
uZ(O,lO) = -1
(5.99)
(5.100)
the points on the utility function shown in Figure 5.22B
were determined. Again by fitting curves, this utility
function was
u
z
(0, z) = 1 (1 - e· 04z ). (5.101)0.492
Assessing the Scaling Constants. The next step of
the assessment involved the consistent scaling of uy(y,O)
and uz(O,z). It was determined that (0,10) was preferred
to (10,0), (2,0) was preferred to (0,10), and finally that
(0,10) was indifferent to (4.75,0). Now, it is possible
to scale the utility function for (y,z), which will be
denoted by u(y,z), as follows. First, set
u(O,O) = 0
and
u(10,10) = -1 ,
and define ky and k z by
u(10,O) = ky
and
u(0,10) = k z .
(5.102)
(5 . 103)
(5.104)
(5.105)
From (5.96), (5.97), (5.102), and (5.104), it follows that
(5.106)
Likewise, from (5.99), (5.100), (5.102), and (5.105),
(5.107)
Also, u(4.75,O) = u(0,10) or, by substituting from (5.100),
(5.106), and (5.107),
(5.108)
Using (5.98), u y (4.75,O) = -0.32, which can be substituted
into (5.108) to yield
(5.109)
Because of mutual utility independence between Y and
*Z, u(y,z) is of the form
u(y,z) ( 0) (0) + u(10,10) -u(0,10) -u(10,0) ( ) ( )= u y, + U ,z u(10,0) u(0,10) u y,O u O,z •
(5.110)
Substituting (5.98), (5.101), (5.106), (5.107), and
(5.109) into (5.110), one finds
(5.111)
u (y, z) = -ky (1_e. 13y) _ 0.32ky (1_e. 04z ) _ (1+1.32ky )2.67 0.492 (2.67) (0.492)
(l_e· 13y) (1_e· 04z ).
The only parameter needed in (5.111) to completely
specify u(x,y) is kyo To calculate ky it was established
that the decision maker was indifferent between «10,10), (0,0»
and (6,6). Then using (5.102) and (5.103),
u(6,6) = 1/2 u(10,10) + 1/2 u(O,O) = -1/2.
Equation (5.111) now can be evaluated at (6,6) and
equated to (5.112) to yield
ky = -0.87.
(5.112)
(5.113)
One obtains the desired utility function, shown in
Figure 5.23, by sUbstituting (5.113) into (5.111):
u(y,z) = 0.32 (1_e· 13y ) + 0.57 (1_e· 04z ) + 0.107 (1_e· 13y)
(1_e· 04z ). (5.114)
Checking for Consistency. Two types of consistency
checks were conducted on this utility function. First, an
*Proof of this result is identical to Theorem 5.2 with the
scale of u from minus one to zero rather than zero to plus
one as in the theorem.
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alternative procedure was used to determine whether the
conditional utility functions were risk averse as previous-
ly found. The decision maker felt (i,O) was preferred to
«i + 1,0),(i-l,0» for i = 1,2, .•. ,9, and thus u(y,O) was
indeed risk averse. The same procedure resulted in a
similar conclusion for u(O,z).
The second check involved pairwise comparisons of
consequences R,S,T,U,V,W, and P as defined in Figure 5.24.
In response to questioning, the decision maker said
R > S,T > R,U ? R,V >W, and P >- V where> is read His
preferred to." In the table of Figure 5.24, the utilities
of these consequences, calculated using (5.114), are
shown. A check shows them to be consistent with the deci-
sion maker's comparisons. This is true in spite of the
fact that only one of the comparisons was simple, that is,
an almost obvious choice. The particular outcome of the
pairwise comparisons is due, at least partially, to
happenstance. Nevertheless, this method for checking
consistency is important.
5.10.3. Conclusions
By exploiting general characteristics of the prefer-
ences structure, such as utility independence, some of
the difficulties of obtaining multiattribute utility func-
tions are overcome. This reduces the actual amount of
subjective information needed to specify the utility func-
tion. The procedure described here is operational both
for identifying the utility independence characteristics
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of the preference structure and for assessing the multi-
attribute utility function.
Two concluding observations of the assessment process
are noteworthy. First, the decision maker was interested
and enthusiastic about what was being done, and she was
willing to think hard about her preferences. This coopera-
tion allowed the assessment procedure to go very smoothly
and resulted in a utility function which seemed to repre-
sent her preferences accurately. Secondly, the decision
maker ｾ ｡ ､ a degree in liberal arts, along with her nursing
credentials, but no formal education in the quantitative
areas; this did not hinder the assessment in any way.
One could speculate from this that open-mindedness and
willingness to think hard about the consequences are more
important for correctly assessing preferences than any
formal quantitative education.
CHAPTER 6
MULTIATTRIBUTE PREFERENCES UNDER
UNCERTAINTY, MORE THAN TWO ATTRIBUTES
The development of this chapter parallels that of
Chapter 5 with the distincion that here we are concerned
with multiattribute utility functions with more than two
arguments. The problem to be addressed in this Chapter,
as well as the last one, was outlined in Section 5.1
and also in that section we discussed procedures for
assessing a multiattribute utility function without first
specifying the functional form. As indicated there,
these procedures are valid for two and "more than two"
attribute problems. Therefore, here we illustrate how
various sets of additive independence, preferential inde-
pendence, and utility independence assumptions among the
attributes X., i = l, ... ,n imply a utility function of
1
the form
(6.1)
where x. is a specific amount of X., f is a scalar-
1 1
valued function, and u. is a utility function over X..
1 1
These results generalize forms of (6.1) which have been
derived for specific sets of preference assumptions by
Fishburn [1965a, 1966, 1971], Keeney [1968, 1972a,1974],
Meyer [1970], Pollak [1967], and Raiffa [1969].
The results in this chapter are important for appli-
cations in that the ｡ ｳ ｳ ｵ ｭ ｰ ｴ ｩ ｯ ｮ ｾ ［ are reasonable and
operationally verifiablF' for Hlany problems and furtller-
more the assessment of the resulting utility function
in such a case is greatly simplified. A number of
fundamental ｴ ｨ ･ ｯ ｲ ｣ ｾ ｴ ｩ ｣ ｡ ｬ Ｎ relarionships between various
independence cond l t -lons are ;lIsa presented. These have
practical imporLmce in tha t they provide us with
simpler sets of necessary and/or sufficient conditions
for specific functional forms uf the utility function.
6.1.1 Nota tion
In this chapter, j t. will be convenient to intro-
duce a few new bitco of ｮ Ｈ Ｉ ｴ ､ ｴ ｾ Ｎ ｩ Ｈ Ｉ ｮ to streamline the pre-
sentation. For rc:ference, the important notation in
this chapter 1.S cataloqed here:
Attributes. The basic attributes In most of our con-
structions will be Xl' ｘ ｾ Ｌ ... ,X , where X. may be either
c: n 1
a vector attribute or a scalar attribute. Beginning
in Section 6.7, we introduce an additional attribute
X , which plays a role that is distinct from the other
a
X., i = 1,2, ... ,n.
1
Sets of Attributes. The set of Clttributes X is
defined as {Xl 'X 2 ' .. . ,Xnl. When we use Xo ' it also is
in X. If Y is a subset uf X, we will refer to the set
If twu sots of attributes, call
them Yl and Y2 partition X, ｾ ｨ ･ ｮ we will refer to Yl and
Y2 as complements of each other. Often the complement
of Y will be written Y.
Preferential Independence 9nd Utility Independence.
Rather than repeatedly say that Yl is utility indepen-
dent of its complement Y or that Y2 is preferentially
independent of its complement, we will write Y1 is UI
and Y2 is PI respectively. This is done when no ambi-
guity can result, and it should be understood that UI
or PI is implied relative to the complement.
Consequences. The consequence space Xl x X2 x ••• x Xn
represents a rectangular subset of finite dimensional
Euclidean space. Consequences are designated by
ｾ = (x l ,x2 ' ... ,xn ) where xi designates a specific amount
of X. for i = 1,2, .•. ,n. When referring to a subset
1
Y of X and its complement Y we shall often designate
x by (y,y); thus for example, if n = 5 and Y = {Xl,X)},
then y = (xl,x)) and y = (x2 ,x4 ,xS).
Utility Functions. As in previous chapters, we assume
throughout Chapter 6 that a set of assumptions, such
as von Neumann and Morgenstern's [1947], implying the
existence of a utility function, are appropriate. The
utility function u is assumed to be continuous in each
xi and bounded. We will write u(x) or u(xl ,x2 '· .. ,xn )
or u(y,y) interchangeably.
Scaling. The symbol ｾ Ｊ = ＨｸｩＬｸｾＬ ... ,xri) = (y*,y*)
designates the most desirable consequence and
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desirable. The utility function is scaled by ｵ Ｈ ｾ ｯ Ｉ = 0
and u(x*) : 1. Rather than repeat many superscript
zeroes, we sometimes take the liberty and write, for
. 00 0 0 0 00Instance, u(x l ,x 2 ,x3 ' ... ,xn ) and u(xl,x2,x3,x4,xS,x6)
as u(xl ) and u(x 2 ,x 4 ), respectively. That is, all
attribute levels not explicitly denoted as arguments of
a function are at their least desirable level. Granted,
the symbolism is not entirely consistent, but the con-
text should dispel any confusion. At least we hope so.
6.1.2 Independence ｃ ｯ ｮ ｣ ･ ｾ
Now the concepts of preferential independence and
utility independence introduced in previous chapters
must be generalized.
Definition. Attribute Y, where Y C X, is preferentially
independent of its complement Y if the preference order
of conseguences involving only changes in the levels in
Y does not depend on the levels at which attributes in
Yare held fixed.
Preferential independence implies the conditional
indifference curves over Y do not depend on attributes
Y. The concept concerns the decision maker's prefer-
ences for consequences where no uncertainty is involved.
Utility independence, on the other hand, concerns
preferences for lotteries which do involve uncertainty.
Definition. Attribute Y is utility independent of its
complement Y if the conditional preference order for
-Cf4 I
lotteries involving only changes in the levels of at-
tributes in Y does not depend on the levels at which the
attributes in V are held fixed.
By definition, it follows that if Y is UI, then Y is PI.
The converse is not necessarily true. This relationship
can be seen by noting that degenerate lotteries, those
involving no uncertainty, are the same things as a con-
sequence. Hence, the preferential independence condi-
tion could be stated in terms of the preference order
for degenerate lotteries only, and since the utility
independence condition holds for all lotteries, the
former is implied by the latter. Utility independence
is the stronger condition.
If Y is preferentially independent of Y, it follows
that
[u (y;y+) I; u(y" Ｇ ｙ Ｋ ｽ ］ ｾ ｲ (y' ,}') ;! u(y" 'Y]
where y+ is any fixed level of y. Similarly, if Y is
utility independent of V, then since utility functions
are unique up to positive linear transformations
( 6.2)
for all y and y
( 6. 3)
where g is always positive and y' is an arbitraYily
chosen specific amount of V. Functions f and g, in
general, will depend on the specific value of y' but not
on the variable y,
As indicated, throughout this chapter we choose for
simplicity to scale the utility function from zero to
one. Hence,
and
u (y* , y* ) -. 1 ,
o -0
where y and yare least preferred levels of Y and Y
and y* and y* are the most preferred levels. Then, by
o
evaluating (6.3) at y , we find
- 0 -f(y) = u(y ,y)
so condition (6.3) can be written as
( 6.4 )
( 6. 5)
( 6 • 6)
44.3.
where we have chosen to set y' -0in (6.3) equal to y .
Equations (6.2) and (6.6) will be used in our proofs.*
6.1.3 Organization
The next section presents a number of representa-
tion theorems for three attributes. This (i) indicates
some of the issues involved in assessing utility
functions with more than two attributes, (ii), illus-
trates the type of results to be expected, and
-----,*_.__._---
Preferential independence and utility independence
call be (jeneralized to allow for reversals of preferences
as indicated in appendix 6A.
Result 1.
Ｔ ｾ ｊ Ｔ
(iii) helps motivate the restlof the chapter. Functional
forms of "-attribute utiljty functions which follow
from various sets of preferential and utility inde-
pendence conditions are presented in Sections 6.3
through 6.5, and assessment of such utility functions
follows. Sections 6.7 through 6.10 generalize and tie
together the concepts of preferential independence and
utility independence. The extension of our results
to hierarchical structures of attributes using condi-
tional preference assumptions is the topic of Section
6.11.
6.2 Utility Functions With Three Attributes
Here we state and illustrate four results con-
cerning utility functions with three attributes.
Proofs are not included as all of these results are
special cases of theorems presented and proven later
in this chapter. The results are stated with the most
restrictive case (in the sense of the strength of the
requisite assumptions) first, and then the second most
restrictive, the third, and finally the most general
case.
If preferences over lotteries on Xl 'X 2 ' and
X3 depend only on their marginal probability distribu-
tions for these attributes and not on their joint dis-
tribution, then
( 6 • 7 )
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This result is the additive utility function of three
attributes. The utility functions u,ul ,u 2 ' and u 3 can all
be scaled from zero to one and the k. 's are scaling constants.
1
Using a weaker set of assumptions, we have
Result 2. If Xl is utility independent of {X 2 ,X3}, and if
{Xl ,X2 } and {x l ,X3 } are preferentially independent of X3
and X2 ' respectively, then
(6.8 )
Each of u, the u. 's, and the k. 's in (6.8) have the same
1 1
meaning as in (6.7). In addition k is an additional
scaling constant. Clearly if k = 0, then (6.8) reduces
to the additive form (6.7). If k ｾ 0, then by multiplying
each side of (6.8) by k, adding 1, and factoring, one
obtains the multiplicative utility function
3
ku(xl ,x 2,x3 ) + 1 = ITi=l
[kk .u. (x.) + 1]
111
( 6 .9)
Two important things to note about Result 2 are that
it uses both utility independence and preferential inde-
pendence assumptions and that these assumptions concern
"overlapping" sets of attributes. Both of these charac-
teristics are very unportant j n specifying multiattribute
utility functions with many attributes. Since we use the
notation u 2 and u l in this result, we implicitly imply
that it can be proved that X2 and X3 are each utility
independent of its complementary set of attributes.
Becoming more general, one gets
Result 3. If each of xl ,X 2 , and X3 are utility independent
of their respective complements, then
Again, the utility functions u,u l u 2 , and u 3 and the
scaling constants k] ,k 2 , and k 3 are defined as before.
In addition, one needs to assess the additional scaling
(6.l0)
constants k12,k13,k23' and k123 " Expression (6.10) is
referred to as the multilinear utility function in three
attributes. It should be clear that both the multi-
plicative and additive utility functions are special
cases of the multilinear.
The most general case considered in this section is
Result 4. If X2 and X3 are utility independent of their
respective complements {xl ,X 3 } and {Xl ,X2}, then
(6.11)
where
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In (6.11), again each of the utility functions is scaled
from zero to one, with Ｈ ｸ ｴ Ｌ ｸ Ｓ Ｇ ｸ ｾ Ｉ being the best conse-
000quence and (xl ,x 2 ,x3 ) the worst. If f 2 ,f 3 , and f 23 are
of certain forms, then it is easy to see that Results 1,
2, or 3 could result} and thus the additive, multiplica-
tive, and multilinear utility functions are all special
cases of (6.11).
If we consider the attributes as scalar attributes,
then we can graphically illustrate what must be empiri-
cally assessed using each of the above results. This
is done in Figure 6.1, where the dark lines and points
indicate consequences which must be assessed on a
common scale.
Most of the remainder of this chapter is used to
develop results for n-attribute utility functions
similar to those in this section. Once there are three
or more attributes, it is possible to have overlapping
sets of utility independence and preferent.ial independence
assumptions without. having them contained in each other.
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Theorem 6.1.
This was not possible with just two attributes. As
hinted at by the requisite assumptions for Result 2,
it turns out to be very fruitful to look at the implica-
tions of such overlapping independence conditions. In
the next three sections we begin to explore these
implications by proving general theorems for n-attribute
utility functions.
ｾ The Mul ｴ ｩ ｅ ｬ ｾ ｣ ｡ Ａ Ｎ ｾ Ｌ Ｚ Ｚ Ｂ ･ Util ｩ ｴ Ｚ ｌ ｟ ｆ ｾ ｟ Ａ Ａ ｣ ｴ ｩ ｯ ｮ ｟ Ｋ Ｔ
One of the most important results of multiattribute
utility theory specifies conditions that enable one to
conclude that a utility function is either multiplicative
or additive. Let us first define mutual utility inde-
pendence which is a sufficient condition for the fundamen-
tal result. After stating and proving this result, we
will suggest several weaker sets of assumptions which
imply mutual utility independence.
Definition. Attributes xl ,X 2 , ... 'Xn are mutua!}y utility
independent if every subset of {X l ,x2 , ... ,Xn } is utility
independent of its complement.
If attributes Xl ,X 2 , .. . 'Xn are mutually
utility independent, then
n
+ k
2 I
i=l
j>i
jJ', j
k.k.k"u. (x.)u.(x.)u,,(X n )l J x, l l J J x, x,
u(x) ==
n
1.
i=l
k.u.(x.)
l l l
n
+ kI
i=l
j>i
k.k.u. (x.)u.(x.)
l J l l J J
(6.12)
+ • •• u (x )
n n
.._--------
where
(i) u is normalized by ｕ Ｈ ｸ ｾ Ｌ ｸ ｾ Ｌ ... Ｌ ｸ ｾ Ｉ = 0 and
( 2) u. (x.) is a conditional utility function on X.
111
normalized by u. Ｈ ｸ ｾ Ｉ = 0 and u. (x,) = 1,
.. 1. J. .1 1
i=1,2, ... ,n,
-0(3) k. = u(x'\',x.),
111
and
(4 ) k is a scaling constant· which is a solution to
11
1 + k = TT (1 + kk. ) •
i=l 1
n
Remark: When r k. = 1, then k = 0 and (6.12) reduces
i=ol 1
to the additive utility function
n
u(x) .- I
i. :-: 1
k.u.(x.)
1.1. .1.
(6.13)
On the other hand, when
can multiply each side
and factor to obtain
n
ill k i ｾ 1, then k t 0, so we
of (6.12) by k, add one to each,
n
ku(x) + 1 = l!
io.-:1
[kk . u. (x.) + 1]
.1 1.' J.
(6.14)
When k is positive in (6.14), then u' (x) ｾ 1 + ku(x)
and u! (x.) = 1 + kk.u. (x.) are utility functions over the
1 1 111
appropriate domains and
n
u' (x) = n
h,l
ｵ ｾ (x.)
.1. 1
When ｬ ｾ ,;c: neQC1t i Vi?, note that n' Ｈ ｾ Ｉ :: Ｍ｛ｫｴ｝ＨｾＩ + 1] and
ｵ ｾ (x.) ": -lli- kl<.u. (x.) j dI.t:' III Ll.LC,: functions over X
1 1 J. 1. 1
--"--,;-'--' ...__..._---- -_.._._--._._ .._........._-- ._.._......... - .... '-""--'''- ----
Procedures for choi)sjng ｌ ｬ ｨ ｾ rorrect value of k are
(1 i veT) ill +-he appendix 6B at the ｩ ｾ ｮ ､ of this chapter.
and X., respectively, so
1
n
-u I (x) = (-·1) n 11 ui (xi)
i=l
Hence we can refer to form (6.14) as a multiplicative
utility function.
Proof. Mutual utility independence by definition implies
-X. is DI for i = 1,2, ... ,n - 1 which implies
1
u(x) U(X,)i c.(X.)\l(5('.) j
J _L 1 l'
1,2, ... ,n - 1
(6.15)
Setting all x. =
1
oX.
l except Xl and x j ' j = 2,3, ... ,n - 1,
we get the equality
or
U(X l ) + c (x )u(x.) =1 1 J u(X.) + c.(x.)u(xl )J J J
c.(x.) - 1
J J
u (x.)
J
j = 2,3, ... ,n - 1
u(x.) f:. 0
J
(6.16)
where k is some constant.
so it follows that
If u (x .) = (), clearly c. (x .) =-= 1,
J J J
c. (x. )
1 1
kll(X.) -t- 1
1.
for all ] 1,2, ... ,n - 1
(6.17)
We can repeatedly use (6.15) to obtain
451
+ ... + cl(xl ) ••• c l(x l)u(x)n- n- n
(6.18)
Substituting (6.17) into (6.18) yields
. [ku(x 2 ) + 1] ••. [ku(xn _ l ) + l]u(xn )
(6.19)
When k = 0, (6.19) becomes the additive utility
function
n
u(x) = I
i=l
u (x. )
1
(6.20)
When k i 0, we can multiply both sides of (6.19) by k,
then add 1 to each, and rearrange terms to find
n
ku(x) + 1 = IT
i=l
[ku (x .) + 1]
1
( 6. 21)
o 0 0 0Recall that u(x.) actually means u(xl, ... ,X. l'x. ,x·+l' ... ,x ).
1 ｬｾ 1 1 n
Since we define
u (x.) =: k. 11 . (x. )
1 1 l 1
so the u. (x.) can be scaled from zero to one, (6.20) and
1 1
(6.21) become respectively (6.13:) and (6.14) which
completes the ｰ ｲ ｯ ｯ ｦ Ｎ ｾ
Notice that the results in Section 5.4 showing that the
two-attribute utility function u(x i ,x 2 ) is either multi-
plicative or additive if Xi and X2 are mutually utility
independent is a special case of the above result.
Given that the conditions of Theorem 6.1 do hold,
it is important to know whether the utility function
is additive or multiplicative. One procedure is to
pick any two attributes, say Xl and X2 . Then, choose
two amounts of Xl' call them xi and xl' between which the
decision maker has a preference, and similarly, choose
two amounts of X2 , say x 2 and x 2 . Next, fix the amounts
of all the attributes other than Xl and X2 at some
-+
convenient level. Let us designate this as x12 . Now
we can state without proof the following
Corollary. If in addition to the-requisite assumptions
of Theorem 6.1, the decision maker is indifferent
between a lottery yielding either Ｈ ｸ ｩ Ｌ ｸ Ｒ Ｌ ｘ ｾ Ｒ Ｉ or
Ｈ ｸ ｬ Ｌ ｘ Ｒ Ｇ ｘ ｾ Ｒ Ｉ with equal probability or a lottery yield-
. . h (' ,,-+) ('" -+) . h 1lng elt er x l ,x2 ,x12 or x l ,x 2 ,x12 Wlt equa
probability, the utility function must be additive.
If he is not indifferent between these two lotteries,
then the utility function must be multiplicative.
If the indifference or preference condition between
the lotteries holds for one ｾ ｲ Ｒ Ｇ it can be shown to hold
for all x12 because {Xl ,X2} is DI. Thus, it is not
4S.s
-+
necessary to worry about the value of x12 in ascertain-
ing whether the assumption is appropriate.
6.3.1 Weaker. Cond_i tions ｾ ｭ ｰ ｾ ｹ ｩ ｮ ｧ Mutual Utility _Independence
There are several sets of weaker conditions which
imply mutual utility independence. These are important
because they drastically :ceducp the number of conditions
which need to be verifjed jn order tu utilize Theorem 6.1.
Given a set of n attributes {Xl ,X2 , ... ,Xn } there are
2n - 2 subsets which must be tIL if mutual utility inde-
pendence holds. For n = la, this means that in the
absence of weaker conditions, 1022 assumptions would need
to be verified to ascertain mutual utility independence.
The weaker conditions require at most n assumptions.
Theorem 6.2. Given attributes Xl ,X 2 , ... ,Xn , the
following are equivalent:
(1) attributes Xl ,X 2 , ... 'Xn are mutually utility
independent,
( 2)
(3 )
x. is UI, i = 1,2, ... , n,
1
{X. , X . +l' . . . , X } i sUI, i = 2, 3 , . • • , n , a nd
1 1 n
{X1 ,X 2 , ..• ,Xn _ l } is UI,
(4) {xi,X i +l } is UI, 1 = 1,2, ... ,n - 1; n 2: 3,
(5) Xl is UI and {Xl,x i } is PI, i = 2,3, ... ,n; n > 3.
Notice that by definition, case (1) implies (2) through
(5). The reverse implications are proven in Section 6.9.
Ther0 ｾ ｲ ｲ ｮ ｾ ･ ､ ｵ ｲ ｾ ｾ ｇ ｲ generating sets of assumptions
implying mutual util lty independence is given. Cases
(2), (3), and (4) are all special cases of this general
L 5--4t '-
result. The proof that (5) implies (1) also requires a
fundamental relationship between preferential independence
and utility independence derived in Section 6.7. Pollak [1967]
used condition (2) and Meyer [1970] condition (3) to prove
that the resulting function must be either multiplicative or
additive. For conditions (4) and (5), note that there must
be at least three attributes. Otherwise the conditions do
not apply as their meaning is transparent.
With conditions (2), (3), (4), and (5), the number of
assumptions increases linearly with the number of attributes.
However, the sets (2), (3), and (4) require the decision maker
to express preferences over lotteries with from two to n-l
attributes varying at a time. This turns out to be a very
taxing task for a decision maker. The assumptions of (5)
require only preferences over consequences with two attri-
butes varying and preferences over lotteries involving one
attribute. These latter conditions .seem reasonable for many
problems and have proven in practice--see Chapter 7 and 8--
to be operationally verifiable.
6.4 The Multilinear Utility Function*
The multilinear utility function with n-attributes is a
generalization of the three-attribute Result 3 discussed in
Section 6.2 and a generalization of both the additive and
*The results of this section have been generalized in
Fishburn ｛ Ｑ Ｙ Ｗ Ｓ ｾ ｡ ｮ ､ Farquhar [1974J. The latter work includes
decompositions with non-separable interaction terms.
multiplicative utility functions, The result is
Theorem 6.3. Given the set of attributes X - {xl 'X2 ' ... ,Xn }
with n > 2, if X. is utility independent of i., i = 1,2,._,n,
- 1 1
then
n n
u(x) = y. k.u. (x.) + I L k .. u. (x.)u.(x.)
i=l 111 i=l j>i 1J 1 1 J J
n
+ 2 I Y. k. 'j/,U' (x.)u. (x.)uR.(xj/,)
i=l j>i R.>j 1J 1 1 J J
+ ••• + k123 ••• nUl (xl )u 2 (x2) ••• un(xn )
(6.22
where
and
(1 )
(2)
000
u is normalized by u(xl ,x2 , ..• ,xn ) = 0 and
ｵ Ｈ ｸ ｩ Ｇ ｸ ｾ Ｌ ... Ｌ ｸ ｾ Ｉ = 1,
u. (x.) is a conditional utility function on X.
1 1
normalized by u. (x.) = 0 and u. (xt) = 1,
1 1 1 1
(3) the scaling constants can be evaluatedt by
-0k. = u ( x'!C , x . )
1 1 1
(6.23a)
k ..
1J
-0
= u(x;,x=t=,x .. ) - k. - k.
1 J 1J 1 J
-0 -0 -0
= u (x, , x, , x .. ) - u (x, , x.) - u Ｈｸｾ , x. )
1 J 1J 1 1 J J
(6.23b)
t To simplify expressions, we will extend our notation so
that, for instance, when we write (xl ,x2 ,x12 ), the symbol x12
will designate levels of all attributes except Xl and X2 .
-0
= u (x* , X'\' , ｸｾ , X .. n )
1 J )I., 1JK. k ..1J
= (,., * * -0) (.It.s. -0 ) (.It * -0 )U Xl", X . , Xn , X. . n - U XT , XT , X.. - U XT , Xn , X. n
1 J )I., 1J)I., 1 J 1J 1)1., 1)1.,
- U(xj
and finally
(6.23c)
k123...n = u(X*) - I k l ••• (i-l)(i+l) ••• n-··· - iJ>ikij - I k i
o n-2 \' 0 n-l \' -0
=1-2u(x.,X!)+···+(-1) L u(X"',X'tC,x .. ) + (-1) LU(X;,Xi ). 1 1 . .. 1 J 1J . 1
1 1, J >1 1
(6.23d)
Proof. Because of the utility independence assumptions,
from (6.6)
u (x) = u(x.) + c. (x. )u(x.)
111 1
c. > 0
1
i=1,2, ... ,n
(6.24)
where u will be scaled from zero to one. Let us define
u. to be a utility function over X. scaled from zero to one.
1 1
Then, noting that u(X.) = k.u1·(x.) for some positive con-1 1 1
stant k., we can define d. (x.) = k.c. (x.) and rewrite
11111 1
(6.2 LI) as
u(x) _. u (x.)-t d . (x.) u . (x. )
11111
d. > 0
1
i=1,2, ... ,n
(6.25)
To evaluate the d's, set x. at its most desirable level
ｾ I
ｸｾ and evaluate (6.25), yielding
ｾ
o - -ｵＨｸＪｩＧｸｾＩ = u(x.,x.) + d. (x.)u. (x'!')
ｾ ｾ ｾ ｾ ｾ ｾ ｾ
and since u. Ｈ ｸ ｾ Ｉ = 1
ｾ ｾ
d. (x.) = u(x'!',x.)
ｾ ｾ ｾ ｾ
o -ti(x.,x.)
ｾ ｾ
i = 1,2, ... ,n
Substituting (6.26) into (6.25) and rearranging,
we find
(6.26 )
u(x) - 0 -= u. (x.)u(x'fc,x.) + [1 - u. (x.)]u(x.,x.)
ｾ ｾ ｾ ｾ ｾ ｾ ｾ Ｎ ｾ
i=1,2, ... ,n (6.27)
u(x)
The proof is conceptually simple, although alge-
braically tedious, from here. One repeatedly substitutes
(6.27) into itself for i = 1,2, ... , n and rearranges terms
to get the result. We indicate the first step, where
(6.27) with i = 2 is substituted into (6.27) with i = 1:
(6.28)
i
Repeating the procedure, we get the desired result (6.22)
and (6.23) • .q
That (6.22) is a generalization of the multiplicative
and additive utility functions can be seen by comparing
the results of Theorem 6.1 and Theorem 6.3. With the
multilinear utility function (6.22) , there are 2n
- 1
scaling constants, but since u ＨｾＪＩ = 1, we know the sum
of all these constants must equal 1 so only 2n - 2 are
independent. Using (6.23), these can be evaluated
from the utilities of the "corner" consequences in X.
6.5. The Additive Utility Function
In this section, we are interested in the n-attribute
additive utility function. Much of the work in additive
utility theory has been done by Fishburn [1964, 1965a,
1965b, 1966, 1967a, 1967b, 1967c, 1970, 1971, 1972].
He has derived necessary and sufficient conditions
for additive utility functions in many situations,
including whole product sets, denumerable pro?ucts sets,
incomplete product sets, and interdependencies among
some attributes. Pruzan and Jackson [1963] and
Pollak [1967] also present necessary and sufficient
conditions for a utility function to be additive.
With n attributes, Fishburn's additive independence
condition can be defined as follows.
Definition. Attributes Xl 'X2""'Xn are additive
independent if preferences over lotteries on Xl 'X2""'Xn
LiS9
depend only on their marginal probability distributions
and not on their joint probability distribution.
With this condition we can state a fundamental
result of additive utility theory.
Theorem 6.4. (Fishburn): The n-attribute additive
utility function
u (x) . ==
n
l.
i=l
-0
u(x. ,x.) =
1 1
n
I
i=l
Jeu. (x.)
111 (6.29)
is appropriate if and only if the additive indepen-
dence condition holds among attributes Xl 'X 2 '·· .,Xn ,
where
o 0 0(1) u is normalized by u(xl ,x2 , ... ,xn ) = 0 and
u (xi ' ｸｾＬ ... , xri) = 1,
( 2) u. is a conditional utility function on X.
1 1
normalized by u. (xC;» == 0 and u. (x'\C) = 1,
1 1 1 1
i == 1,2, ••. ,n,
-0(3) k. == u(x'l',x.), i = 1,2, .... ,n.
111
Proof. The proof follows from repeated use of the
derivation of the two-attribute additive utility
function in Theorem 5.1. If we define Y as {X2 ,x3 , ... ,xn },
from Theorem 5.1,
(6.30)
Then to break down uy ' we define Z = {x3 ,x4 , ... ,Xn }
and invoke Theorem 5.1 again to yield
(6.31)
We proceed in this manner and ｾ ｨ ･ ｮ substitute (6.31)
into (6.30), etc., to yield the result (6.29). To insure
proper scaling, all the utility functions can be scaled
from zero to one. The converse follows directly from
calculating the expected utility of any lottery using
the additive utility function. ｾ
Pollak's [1967] formulation of necessary or suf-
ficient conditions for additive utility functions leads
to
Theorem 6.5 (Pollak). An individual's utility function
ｾ ｳ additive if and only if his preference between any
two lotteries
L - (-') ( a -a) d L - ( -II) (b -b)1 = < x. x. , x., x. > an 2 = < x., x. , x., x. >1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
. f -, -II a -a b d-b1S the same for all x. or any x. ,x., x. ,x. ,x., an x ..
1111111
[Remark before proof. Pollak's basic assumption is
illustrated in Fig. 6.2, where Ll is (A,B) and L2 is
(C,D). Note that consequences A'and C have the same
amount of attribute X.. Pollak's assumption says that
1
whatever preference we have between Ll and L2 , we must
also have if the level x. in A and C is changed. That
1
is, if A and C are slid horizontally to A' and C', the
preference between Li = (A',B) and L2 = (C',D) must be
the same as between Ll and L2].
Proof. If u is additive, the expected utilities of the
above lotteries <using 6.29) are, respectively,
1 -0 1 0 - 1 a-a
= -2 U (x I I x.) + -2 u (x, , x!) + -2 u (x. , x. )11 '11 11
x, DＯｾ
-" .l!x" C
-X·
..
-')c,
A A'
,
x·)C. x\ \
'"
ｘｾ
Figure 6.2. An Illustration of Pollak's Additivity Condition
and
> •
b 0
= x. = x ..
1 1
o -(x.,x!)
1 1
ｾ｢ - -a - a
on _x.. Let us set x. = x! ,x. = x", and x.ｾ 111 i 1
L ( -') (0 -II) d L (-11)1 = < x., x . , x . , x . > an 2 = < x . , x. ,1 1 1 1 1 1
oFor one value of xi' namely xi' lotteries Ll and L2 are
equally preferable. Therefore, from the condition of
the theorem, this must be the case for any x .•
1
It now
follows directly from repeated application of Theorem 5.1
that u is ｡ ､ ､ ｩ ｴ ｩ ｶ ･ Ｎ ｾ
The main advantage to the additive utility function
is its relative simplicity. The assessment of the
n-attribute utility function is reduced to the assessment
of n one-attribute utility functiQns and n - 1 indepen-
dent scaling constants. Any of the techniques discussed
in this book could be used for assessing the one-attribute
utility functions. The problem of evaluating scaling
constants is addressed in the next section.
A major shortcoming of the additive utility function
is the restrictiveness of the necessary assumptions. We
could often expect the utility of a lottery to depend
not only on the marginal proba"bil i ty distributions of
the respective attributes, but also on their joint
probability distribution. Another problem is that it is
difficult to determine whether ｾ ｲ not the requisite assump-
tions would be reasonable in a specific real-world problem.
This difficulty arises because the assumptions are stated
in terms of the decision maker's preferences for probability
distributions over consequences, with more than one attri-
bute simultaneously varying.
6.6. Assessing Multiattribute Utility Functions*
With the additive, multiplicative, and multilinear
utility functions, preferential independence and utility
independence have been used to reduce the assessment of
an n-attribute utility function to the assessment of n
one-attribute utility functions, which can be designated
as u l ,u2 , ••• ,un ' and some scaling constants k j , j = 1,2, •.• ,r.
And so we have
u(xl ,x 2 ,···,xn ) = f[ul(Xl),u2(X2),···,un(xn),kl,k2,···,kr]'
(&. '32.)
where f is a scalar function. Each of the u. can be
. 1
assessed independently, since the scaling constants are
meant to insure consistent scaling among the u. 'so Thus,
1
except for the fact that there are more of them, the
problem of assessing the ui's is no more involved than
;..
Three publications with discussions concerning the
assessment of multiattribute utility functions are Fishburn
｛ Ｑ Ｙ Ｖ Ｗ ｾ ｝ Ｉ Huber [1974b], and Kneppreth, et al. [1974]. Boyd
[1970,1973] discusses an interactive routine for multi-
attribute utility assessment.
in the two-attributE" CnSf' consjdered in Section 5.8.
Therefore, we won't address Lhis topic here. However, the
problems of verifyinq thp i tHiependence condi tions and asses-
sinq the l<,'s ｡ ｮ ｾ lTlGn-o. invnlvr'd Vlith more attributes. The
l
approach remaillsthc.c;;:].TfIt> n c, in thf' two-attribute case, but
operationally ｴ ｨ ｩ ｮ Ｈ ｊ ｾ ｾ ljPL a Ijnle ｭ Ｈ Ｌ ｳ Ｚ Ｍ Ｚ ［ ｪ ｾ ｾ ｲ Ｎ
'j'r) Ｌ ｟ Ｚ ｩ ｬ ｬ ｾ ｃ ｊ Ｌ Ｍ vJlll'ther Y is pre-
ferentially independent.: of Y., we miqh l proceed as follows.
-+First choose y with all components at a relatively undesir-
able level and clJousP y' -+and y" such that (y',y ) is indif-
-+ferent to (y",y ). Then pick another point ｾ Ｇ with all
cision maKPrif (y ' ::'1
.' '.> " ｩ｣Ｎｾ in,liEfer-ent to Ｈ ｹ Ｂ Ｌ ｾ Ｇ Ｉ Ｎ This
must be tr'.lP if Y 'is 1.ireferentially independent of Y. If
the decision Hlnker' s ｡ｵＬＭｾｷ･ｲ WFlS affirmative, repeat the same
procedure for 0 t:.her pet ir s of y consel}uencps wi th ｾ fixed at
various levels. If thr:= anSWr-;rs to these questions still
indica te ｰ ｲ ･ ｦ Ｈ ｾ ｲ ･ ｮ ｴ La 1 independpoce, then ask the decision
maker, "If you are ｩ ｮ ｣ Ｑ ｪ ｦ ｦ ･ ｲ ｅ Ｍ ｾ ｊ ｬ ｌ hei'y,'C"(,n (y' ,y) and (y" Ｌ ｾ Ｉ
for some pa.r t:i en 1 aT ;:, (bes th i ,--:i rnpl y the same indifference
would hold fnr every choice of' y?" A positive answer implies
Y is preferenti.aLly ind2pendcill: uf Y.
An ohvious "Fl.)' to checK Ｇ ｲ ｬ ｫ ｾ i ｾＱｃｲ Y is u til i ty independent
qiven difff--'renl: i'\'1)Pill\j-·,:; of Y. If they are positive linear
transformations of each other, the utility independence
assumption would be appropriate. More specifically, one
could assess certainty equivalents y such that (y,y) is
i.ndifferent to a lottery yielding either Ｈ ｹ Ｇ Ｌ ｾ Ｉ or Ｈ ｹ Ｂ Ｌ ｾ Ｉ
with equal probability. If the certainty equivalent for any
lottery did not depend on the amount y, then Y would be
utility independent of Y. In practice, if such a condition
held for three or four fifty-fifty lotteries covering the
range of Y for approximately four different values of y
covering the range of Y, one would usually be justified in
assuming Y is utility independent of Y.
6.6.2. Evaluating Scaling Constants
The basic objective to be followed to evaluate k l to kr
should be obvious from Section 5.8. We want to obtain a
set of r independent
These are then solved to get the k.'s.
J
knowns.
equations which have the k.'s as r ｵｮｾ
J
The set of
equations can be generated from certainty considerations,
probabilistic considerations, or a combination of both.
For example, if consequences ｾ and yare equally preferred
by the decision maker, then clearly u(x) = u(y), or from
(6.32)
(6.33)
ｕ ｮ Ｇ ｾ ･ the u.'s have been assessed, u. (x.) and u. (y.) are just] 1 1 1 1
numbers, so (6.33) is one equation with at most r unknowns.
Also, for example, if x ｾ ＼ｹＬｰＬｾ＾Ｌ then substituting (6.32)
i,
into
gives us another equation with at most r unknowns.
Two operational problems of concern are (1) how does
one guarantee the equations are independent and (2) what
should one do with more than r independent equations when
they are inconsistent.
In practice, one's understanding of the problem and
knowledge of the functional form of the utility function
are probably the best guards against a large number of re-
dundant equations. Even so, it is interesting to think
about one approach which can be used to avoid any redundancy
with the multilinear utility function since it involves
the most scaling constants of any of our functional forms.
n .Recall that for this case we need 2 -2 scallng constants,
where n is the number of attributes. nThere are 2 "corner"
consequences of the form (X l',x2', ... ,x') ,where x! = x'!' or x?,n 1 1 1
o 0 0
= 1 and u(xl ,x 2 ' ... ,xn ) = 0 are
used to scale u. If each corner consequence is evaluated
in terms of these two reference consequences, or other
previously assessed consequences, we will get an indepen-
dent set of 2
n
_2 equations. The most obvious, although
not necessarily the best, way to do this is equate each
corner consequence to a lottery of the form «xt,x3' ... Ｇ ｸ ｾ Ｉ Ｌ
o 0 0 > .p, (xl ,x2 ' ... ,xn ) by assessing the approprlate p. When
redundancies do occur, in a set ｾ ｦ equations, one needs to
empirically generate additional equations relating the k.'s
J
until we do have a set of r independent equations. An example
illustrating this is given in Section 5.8.
Concerning overdetermination with inconsistencies, the
desire is clearly to have the decision maker reflect on the
inconsistencies--which perhaps can be illuminated by the
analyst--and change some responses to imply a consistent set
of preferences. If, due to time considerations or whatever,
this is impossible, then perhaps sensitivity analysis using
the different sets of implied scaling factors would indicate
the same alternative was best. Or at least, it may be pos-
sible to drop some options from further consideration. Of
these remaining, we should be able to identify which parameters
are critical to the decision, and from this, develop a pro-
cedure to specify these parameter values.
6.6.3. Scaling the Conditional Utility Functions
As will become apparent in this section, the problem of
scaling conditional utility functions is very similar to that
of scaling conditional value functions addressed in Section 3.7.
The techniques discussed for assessing scaling factors in the
value function context are directly applicable to our current
problem. However, in the utility context, the additional
possibility of scaling by using probabilistic questioning is
appropriate.
The additive, multiplicative, and multilinear utility
functions can be written
n
u(xl ,x 2 ,···,xn ) = Li=l k . u. (x.) + POTｾ ｾ ｾ (6.34)
where POT designates ",possible 2ther ｾ ･ ｲ ｭ ｳ Ｎ ｬ ｉ With the
additive form, there are no other terms, whereas the opposite
is true with the multiplicative and multilinear forms. In
each case, when the u i and u are scaled from zero to one by
(6.35)
and
u. (x'!') 1, 0 0 for all= u. (x. ) = x.ｾ ｾ ｾ ｾ ｾ
then
0 k. 1,2, ... ,nu(x'f,x.) = ｾ =ｾ ｾ ｾ
(6.36)
(6.37)
The problem of interest in this subsection is assessing the
scaling factors for the conditional utility functions in
(6.34) which is done by specifying the k. 's for i = l, ... ,n.
ｾ
This requires n independent equations with the n unknown k. 's
ｾ
to be generated.
Because the difficulty in manually solving n equations,
which are not necessarily linear, with n unknowns is to say
the least tedious, current practice in assessing the k. 's
ｾ
usually requires sets of equations that are simple to
evaluate. This basically limits the questions to two types.
Question I. For what probabilitr p are you indifferent
between
(1) the lottery giving a p chance at x* and a 1 - P
o
chance at ｾ , and
( 2) h ( 0 0 * 0 0)t e consequence xl'·· .,xi_l,xi,xi+l' ... ,xn .
If we define the decision maker's answer as Pi' then using
(6.35), the expected utility of the lottery is p., and from
1
(6.37) the utility of the consequence is k.. Equating the
1
expected utilities, we find
k. = p.
1 1
One could then clearly generate the values of each of the
k. 's in this fashion.
1
The second type of question is illustrated by
Question II. Select a level of X., call it x!, and a level
1 1
of X., call it ｸ ｾ Ｌ such that, for any fixed levels of all
J J
other attributes, you are indifferent between
o(1) a consequence yielding x! and x. together, and
1 J
o(2) a consequence yielding ｸ ｾ and x. together.J 1
Using (6.35) and (6.36), the utilities of these two indif-
ferent consequences can be equated to yield
k.u.(x!) =k.u.(x!)
111 J J J
(6.38)
Once the single attribute utility functions u. and u. are
1 J
assessed, both u. (x!) and u.(x!) are easily found, so (6.38)
1 1 J J
is a simple linear equation. Suppose in addition, for
8xample that xl = xi, then by (6 136), the relationship
between k. and k. given by (6.38) is even simpler.
1 J
A major shortcoming of questions of both types I and II
is the use of the extreme levels of the attributes, that is
the X,\,I S and x? ,. s. Since the range from x? to x'!' must cover
1 1 1 1
all the possible x. IS, the implications of, and hence pre-
1
ferences for, the extreme levels are usually very difficult
for a decision maker to assess. A further difficulty with
Question I is the fact that the effect due to varying all
n attributes simultaneously must be considered. Hence for
computational ease, we must force the decision maker to
respond to questions much more difficult to evaluate than
would be theoretically necessary. A computer program devel-
oped to eliminate this necessity is discussed in Appendix 6e.
A common practice in assessing the k. 's would be to
1
first rank them, then to use question I to evaluate the
largest k., and finally to use type II questions to evaluate
1
the magnitude of the other k.'s relative to the largest k ..
J 1
Once we have the k. IS, the additive form must hold if they
1
sum to one. Otherwise, the k. 's are substituted into (6.34)
1
to use in evaluating k for the multiplicative form or the
other constants in the multilinear form. This task in it-
self can be difficult.
It should not be a particularly difficult task to
order the k. 'so This can be done, for instance, by asking
l
(6.37) if the former is preferred, then k l > k 2 ; if the
latter is preferred, then k 2 > k 1 and if they are equally
preferable, then k l = k 2 . Repeating this for other binary
comparisons, one would get a complete ranking of the k. IS.
1.
At most it would require (n 2-nJ/2 such comparisons for
a complete ranking, but judicious choice of the order could
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reduce this to only n-l comparisons. for instance, it
isn't unreasonable to ｰ ｲ ･ ｳ ･ ｾ ｴ the decision maKer with a
list of consequences and ask him to rank them. Using this
ranked list as a beginning, we could check its consistancy
by asking the n-l binary choices between now adjacent con-
sequences. The ideas of how one might order the k. 's should
1.
now be clear*. Asking a decision maker to rank the k. 's
1.
before actually assessing them serves to introduce him to
the tradeoff considerations which he must make without
initially overwhelming him with complexity.
Example 6.1. Suppose we ｡ ｳ ｣ ･ ｲ ｴ ｡ ｩ ｾ that k l > k 2 > k 3 , and
actually, for future purposes in this example, we only
need to know the largest k.. Next we ask the decision
1.
maker for an xl' call it xi, such that Ｈ ｘ ｩ Ｇ ｘ ｾ Ｌ ｘ ｾ Ｉ and
Ｈ ｸ ｾ Ｌ ｸ ｾ Ｌ ｸ ｾ Ｉ are equally preferable. From (6.34), it follows
that
(6.39)
where u l (xi) is just_ a number bl'twepp ｚ ｦ ｾ ｲ ｯ and (ne .
..---*-------- --_.__ ._-- --- _._._-- .-.._.- -- -----_._-- ----- _.- _.- '-'---'- ---- ----
As discussed in Section 5.8, the k. cannot be inter-
1.
preted as indic:at:ors of the relntive importance of the
ati:r5.butes X .•
1.
Similarly,
( " 0 0)xl' x2 ' x 3
we ask for another xl' call it xl' such that
ｾ Ｈ ｘ ｾ Ｇ ｘ ｾ Ｇ ｘ Ｓ Ｉ Ｎ Equating utilities gives us
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k l U l (xl) - k 3 (6.40)
Note that our information is identical to that used in Chapter 3
to scale value functions.
If our utility function is additive, then from (6.29)
for consistency, we know
k l + k 2 + k 3 = 1
The set of equations (6.39),
(6.41)
(6.40), and (6.41) can easily
be solved to yield the appropriate values of the kits. And
of course for consistency, k 3 must be less than k 2 ·
If our utility function is multiplicative, then from
(6.14) for consistency,
k + 1 = (kk l + 1) (kk2 + 1) (kk 3 + 1) (6.42)
Equations (6.39), (6.40), and (6.42) together have four
unknowns: k l ,k2 ,k 3 , and k, so we must generate another equation.
Using probabilistic scaling, we might determine PI such that
Ｈ ｸ ｴ Ｌ ｸ ｾ Ｌ ｸ ｾ Ｉ is indifferent to «(xi,x2'x3), PI' Ｈ ｸ ｾ Ｌ ｸ ｾ Ｌ ｸ ｾ ﾻ Ｎ
Using the three attribute multiplicative utility function and
equating expected utilities, we find
k l = PI (6.43)
This equation, together with (6.39), (6.40), and (6.42) can
be solved to yield the scaling constants. Ii
6.6.4. Scaling the Additive Utility Function
To make a specific point, let us turn our attention to
the kits in an n-attribute additive utility function. Note
that one needs only to assess empirically n-l of the k.
1
factors since the nth can be specified from these and the
consistency requirement
ny k. = 1
l
(6.44)
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Al though the use of '1tlf.:st iO[iS c t t y&:'e' I ar,d II for
assessing the K;' S .is s:i lllpJ c F,rccedu 1,'11 J 2" j t ｬｩｬＭｩｾＧ not. be so
simple operation;:,] Ly.
some of the quesLjotls askec of tl:im D;;j I,e; tbi, (lIC, hOcl very
difficult.
before discussinq \vays to (,et arc,ulci SlC" (Jij'Li cui tit'S. For
any subset '1' of the inciicE:: {J,:-', •.. J,i, 1: t Y'l' hi' dll' ｾ point
, tL
where the 1 ,tiL! ibutc'
then
j C \' *
0-' ".J
:i I
i f (
1(",. "r,d Ｎ ｾ ｳ xC: if
]
, ｾｾ I ｌｾ } ,
X f' ') L'
I. .... , L. f r J
Al so let us de;: inp
i.
i 1:;'1'
(6.45)
:6.46)
indifferent ｢ ･ ｴ ｷ Ｈ Ｇ ｦ Ｚ ｾ ｮ lot blJ'-' 1
.- -- • Y "I' .: /",'j< I ' n,)- <" -<'. ' );r 1 F ＧｾＮ ' 111'1 Ｇ ｾ Ｈ ｊ ｲ ｬ ｓ Ｈ ｾ ｱ ｵ ･ ｮ ｣ ･
Ｈ ｾ ｸ ｰ ･ ｣ ｴ ･ ､ utility .)i" T-"r IS :I.PdJ'L\f P'I' il ,,1 ,) (,(,,1
(6.47)
From (6" II 6) , :::in
subset T from the ｪ ｮ ､ ｩ ｶ ｩ ｾ ｵ ｾ ｴ k s . ｦＱＰｾＮＬｲ＿ＧＮｔＬ＿ '", ,) 11e 'TID t iva tion
'(>'t'", l.S !.tEll i. t "l"
i i , . , , 1, 's.
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iThis can be done using (6.46) and (6.47).
Example 6.2. Again let n = S and suppose T = {l,2,4} and
R = {l,2}. Then if we empirically assess PT and PR' it
follows from (6.46) and (6.47) that
and
kR = k + k = P1 2 R
Clearly then for this example
k = p - PR4 T (6.48)
There are obviously many consistency checks which can be
performed to verify our assignment of k 4 . For instance,
suppose we assess PQ for Q = {l,2,3,S}. Then since from
(6.47), it follows that
and from (6.45)
we know
Another obvious ｣ ｯ ｮ ｳ ｪ ｳ ｴ ｾ ･ ｮ ｣ ｹ check on k 4 is to assess it
directly, as previously indicated, by obtaining P4' ｾ
An alternative approach to 'assessing the k. factors is
1
suggested by the following idea from probability theory.
In assigning probabilities to a finite set of mutually ex-
elusive and collectively exhaustive events {El ,E 2 , .•. ,Er },
it is often natural to make an assignment first to a subset
of these events and then to use conditional probability
considerations to further subdivide this assignment. We
might find it helpful to proceed in an analogous manner in
the present context. To this end suppose S is a subset of
T. We want to find what portion of the weight of kT should
be assigned to S. Letting PS1T be the probability such
that Xs is indifferent to ＼ ｸ ｔ Ｌ ｐ ｓ ｉ ｔ Ｇ ｾ ｯ ＾ ' and equating
expected utility,
From this, we establish the rule that
(6.49)
which is analogous to the multiplication rule of probabili-
ty theory.
How one finally chooses to assess the ｫ ｾ ｳ Ｌ whether
1
directly, or indirectly by using (6.49), depends on which
procedure seems most natural in the context of the real
problem under consideration.
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6.6.5. Scaling the Multiplicative Utility Function*
Techniques for evaluating the scaling constants k. in the
1
mUltiplicative utility function were addressed in subsection
6.6.3. However, the scaling constant k is special to the
k. = 1, then the additive
1
function is multiplicative and the
Given
n
If 1. k i ｾ 1, the utilityi=l
additional constant k
is considered now.it
n
L
i=l
utility function is appropriate.
Theorem 6.1 holds and
multiplicative form so
in (6.14) can be found from the k. values.
1
In this case, we can evaluate (6.14) at x* to find
n
1 + k = II
i==l
(1 + kk.)
1
(6.50)
k. > 1, then using (6.14) and (6.50), the utility
1
n
If l.
i=l
independence properties of the utility function (6.14) can
only be preserved given that -1 < k < O. In this case, by
iteratively evaluating (6.50) given the k., i = 1,2, ... ,n,
1
one can converge to the appropriate value of k, call it k*.
First set k = k ' and substitute this into (6.50). If the
right-hand side is smaller than the left-hand side, then
k* < k I • If the r.h.s. is greater than the 1.h.s. , then k* > k' .
n
When L k. < 1, it follows from similar reasoning
i=l 1
that k* > O. Let us arbitrarily set k = k l in (6.50).
If the r.h.s. > l.h.s., then k* < k ' , whereas if the
1. h. s. > r. h. s ., then k* > k'.
Ｍ Ｍ ｾ Ｊ ｲ Ｍ Ｍ Ｍ Ｍ Ｍ Ｍ Ｍ Ｍ Ｍ Ｇ ------- Ｍ Ｍ Ｍ Ｎ ｟ Ｎ ｟ Ｎ ｾ Ｎ
The assertions in this subsection are proven in
Appendix 6B at the end of this chapter.
To illustrate some of the ideas of this section, let
us consider the problem of selecting a job. And just to
keep matters simple, let us assume there are three attri-
butes to be considered about each job, namely, monetary
compensation, commuting travel time, and degree of urbani-
zation of the area. ｾ ｨ ･ ｳ ･ will be designated by x l 'x 2 ' and
x3 ' respectiv0]y. Purthermore, we will assume monetary
compensation is broken down ｾ ｮ ｴ ｯ starting salary and future
prospects for increases, which we will designate as Yl and
Y2 , respectively. The measurement
scales for each of the att.ribut.es are summarized in Table
6.1.
T<iDle 6.1
ｈ ･ ｡ ｳ ｵ ｮ ｾ ｮ ｨ Ｂ Ｇ ｩ ｬ ｴ Scales for Attributes
Aetr ｩ ｢ ｵ ｴ ｣ ｾ Measurement Scale
starting salary starting annual income in
dollars
ｦ ｵ ｴ ｬ ｬ ｮ Ｇ ｾ i ﾷ｜ｩＧＮ＾ｾＰＧＹ ｣［｣ｾｳ 1nsa ln ｾ ｹ annual salary after five
years in dollars
COiillnu ting trd. vel time door-to-door travel time
from work to job in minutes
degree 'J 1= urbdni n. ｬ ｬ ｾ ｌ ｯ ｮ met-ropol i tan area population
Now Sur-'l"Si' tl-ji'l t. ｲｨ｣ｾ -lc:,litive independence assumptions
have ｢ ･ Ｈ ｾ ｮ verified for all t-he X. terms, and furthermore
1
that this cnnditi.on '108S not hold for Y l and Y 2 • Then according
to Theorem Ｖ Ｎ Ｑ ｾ Ｌ the ut-ility function u(xl ,x2 ,x3 ) is additive.
possibJ e our':()j!lfH , 'IIH1(-'( dlly JUJ.J fu.l t"dcll uf Lhe attri.buLes,
i. e. , the ｸ ｾ and xt ｶ ､ ｬ ｵ ｾ ｳ Ｎ
1 1
Let us assume these are found
as shown in Table 6.2.
Tab]e 6.2
___Range _
Best Worst
starting salary
future salary increases
$18,000
$25,000
$12,000
$12,000
commuting travel time 10 min. 60 min.
degree of urbanization 15 million 0.5 million
oY2 ::: 12,000 so
Similarly, letthat 0xl
0 60x 2 ==
ｸｾ == 0,
o
and x 3 == 0.5. Then choose xi == (18,000;25,000),
and ｸ ｾ == 15. Notire that x3 was set equal to zero
minutes travel time eVI?Tl thouqh the best condition required
at least ten minutes. This is legitimate for our purposes
since the only ｣ ｯ ｮ ｾ ｩ ｴ ｩ ｮ ｮ on ｙ ｾ was that it be at least as
good as the best possible COl sequence.
Now that we llHVP speci f ·.::-d our xC: and xt amounts, we
1 1
can write from (6.)Y) that
( 6 • 51)
ＴＷｾ
whe:re
o
u. (X.) = 0
1 1
u.(x'!') = 1
1 1
for all i (6.52)
The manner in which one would assess the u 2 and u 3
functions subject to the convention of (6.52) was exten-
sively covered in Chapter 4, so nothing more will be said
about this here. But the utility function u l is a utility
function for more than one scalar attribute, namely, Yl
and Y2 . And as we stated, the decision maker is unwilling
to accept the additive independence assumption for these
two attributes, so a simple additive function is not
appropriate. Perhaps we could use some of the substitution
schemes discussed in Chapter 3, which essentially reduce
a two-dimensional representation to a unidimensional re-
presentation before the conversion to utilities is effected.
But what if we're not so lucky? Alternatively, some of
the methods to assess two-attribute utility functions dis-
cussed in Chapter 5 may be appropriate.
Now let us return to the scaling constants of (6.51).
It is possible to ask the decision maker some meaningful
qualitative questions about k. 's to get some "feeling" for
1
their values. For instance: "Imagine that each of the
"Would you
performance measures are at the state ｸ ｾ Ｎ Would you rather
1
have attribute Xl pushed to xi than both attributes X2 and
X3 pushed to ｸ ｾ a.nd xj?" A yes answer would imply k l > k 2
+ k 3 , which means k l > 0.5. We could then ask:
If there exists a subset T
4 f)
o
rather have attribute X2 pushed from x 2 to ｸ ｾ than X3 pushed
ofrom x 3 to ｘ ｾ ＿ Ｇ ｉ And if this question received an affirmative
answer, we would know k 2 > k 3 .
of attributes such that xT ｾ xT' then we can infer that
In many ways the richer the set of attributes, the
easier it becomes to group attributes in a way that permits
the analyst to infer properties of the k. 's without asking
1
probabilistic questions. At any stage of an anlysis such
as this, the sophisticated analyst would use sensitivity
checks to determine whether he need probe any further.
Perhaps the crude qualitative measures already obtained
suffice to resolve the original problem.
Another methodological point that needs clarification
is the notion of consistency. When questions are asked one
way/it might turn out that k l > 0.3, say, and when asked
another way k l < 0.3. This will happen, and when it does
the decision maker will just have to think harder about the
issues and modify some of his assumptions or evaluations
in order to attain consistency. This is psychologically
painful and time-consuming and once again this step should
be preceded by a sensitivity analysis to determine whether
the inconsistency is worth resolving.
Let's proceed. Suppose that we assess k l = 0.6, that
is, the decision maker is indifferent between Ｈ ｸ Ａ Ｌ ｸ ｾ Ｌ ｸ ｾ Ｉ and
the lottery ﾫ ｸ ｬ Ｌ ｸ Ｒ Ｇ ｸ ｾ Ｉ Ｌ 0.6, Ｈ ｸ ｾ Ｌ ｸ ｾ Ｌ ｸ ｾ ﾻ Ｎ Then of course
4 \s'()
k 2 + k 3 = 0.4 and we can ask, for instance, "What is the
value of p such that you are indifferent between Ｈ ｸ ｾ Ｌ ｸ ｾ Ｌ ｸ ｾ Ｉ
and ﾫ ｸ ｾ Ｌ ｸ Ｒ Ｇ ｸ ｾ Ｉ Ｌ p, Ｈ ｸ ｾ Ｌ ｸ ｾ Ｌ ｸ ｾ ﾻ ＿ Ｂ If the decision maker's
response os 0.7, from (6.49) we have
k 2 = p(k 2 + k 3 ) = (.7) (.4) = 0.28.
Then clearly, k 3 = 0.12 so the utility function is
u(xl ,x2 ,x3 ) = 0.6 ul(xl ) + 0.28 u 2 (x 2 ) + 0.12 u 3 (x 3 )
(6.53)
where each of the utility funcitons is scaled from zero to
one. Expression (6.53) is then appropriate for evaluating
decisions under uncertainty. Of course, one might want to
run sensitivity tests on those aspects of the assessment
procedure that appear to be most unstable.
6.6.7 Consistency Checks
As with all phases of assessing utility functions, it
is important to include consistency checks to develop some
confidence in our representation of the decision maker's
preferences. Clearly, when we check the consistency of the
overall utility function, we are also checking the appro-
priateness of the scaling constants. It is also prudent to
include consistency checks specifically for these scaling
constants. In all of these checks, we simply set up addi-
tional equations which have some scaling constants in them.
But since we have already evaluated these constants, we can
plug in their values to check the original assessment. The
ＴＧｾＢ t
different approaches for evaluating scaling constants can
obviously be used as checks of each other. In most situa-
tions, the imagination of the analyst will not be stretched
in an attempt to develop efficient and effective consistent
checks for the scaling constants.
6.7. A Fundamental Relationship Between Preferential Independence
and Vtility Independence
We now begin to introduce general results which allow
us to weaken the assumptions necessary to invoke Theorems
such as those in Sections 6.3 to 6.5. The result of this
section relates our two independence conditions concerning
cardinal and ordinal preferences over the consequence space
X. It allows us to build "higher order" utility independence
conditions from the weaker preferential independence condi-
tions of the same order and lower order utility independence
conditions. * Decision makers find it very difficult to think
about lotteries involving more than one attribute because
they must consider simultaneously both tradeoffs between
different levels of the attributes and the probabilities that
the various consequences occur. However, one can reasonably
specify a preference order for lotteries involving only one
attribute. Also, although it is not easy, one can fairly
accurately indicate the tradeoffs between two attributes
*Let Y C X = {Xl' ... ,X
n
}. If Y is VI or PI, the order
of the assumption is the number of X. 's in Y. Thus, for
1.
example, the assumption that Y = {XZIX3 } is VI is a second order
assumption.
under certainty with all the levels of the other attributes
fixed. By completing each of these tasks separately, the
assumptions necessary to invoke Theorems 6.1 to 6.4 implying
specific forms of the multiattribute utility function can be
verified.
The general case of our main result can be proven with
x = {X
o
,Xl ,X2 } since the Xi's can be vector attributes.
The attribute X
o
introduced is distinct from the other Xi's.
Throughout this chapter, it will never be assumed or implied
that X is either PI or DI. Hence, it will never be the
o
case that preferences for X
o
will ever be independent in
any sense of X. We are interested in the utility function
o
u(x
o
,xl ,x2 ), which is assumed to be continuous, with each
argument of u having a definite effect on preferences. It
is assumed that preferences over X are bounded and Ｈ ｸ Ｖ Ｌ ｸ ｩ Ｇ ｸ ｾ Ｉ
will designate the most desirable and Ｈ ｸ ｾ Ｌ ｸ ｾ Ｌ ｸ ｾ Ｉ the least
desirable consequence.
Theorem 6.6.* Given three attributes {X
o
'Xl ,x2}, if {Xl 'X 2}
is preferentially independent of X
o
and if Xl is utility
independent of {X
o
'X2}' then {Xl 'X 2 } is utility independent
of X
o
•
Remark: This result says preferential independence of
{Xl ,X2} from its complement can be strengthened to
*This result does not require boundedness and the in-
dependence conditions can be weakened to allow for reversals
of preferences over various attributes as proven in Fishburn
and Keeney [1974],
utility independence, provided that either Xl or X2 is DI.
Theorem 6.6 provides necessary conditions for a "second order"
utility independence assumption in terms of a "second order"
preferential independence assumption and a "first order"
utility independence assumption.
The proof of Theorem 6.6 is fairly involved, but the
presentation can be simplified with a special notation.
To avoid subscripts where unnecessary, we will define
attributes R = Xo,S = Xl' and T = X2 . Thus for instance, s
will be a specific amount of S, and the utility function of
interest will be written as u(s,t,r}.
[Idea of Proof. The mode of the proof can be illustrated by
taking sand t as scalars. Let r' be any fixed value of R
and consider the three iso-preference or indifference curves
shown in Figure 6.3A. These same conditional indifference
curves are appropriate for any other value, r" say, since
{S,T} is PI. Suppose that given r', we know that B '" (A,C).
The essence of the proof is to show that given any other
value of R, r" say, then it still holds that B '" (A, C).
But one of the fundamental axioms of utility theory is the
substitution principle: a lottery is not made better or
worse by substitutiong equivalent (or indifferent) prizes.
Hence given r' or r ll we know that (A,C) '" (A',C') and B '" B'.
But since S is DI we know that B' '" (A' ,C') given r' implies
that it still is valid given r'. This demonstrates the
essence of the proof and it would be simple to clean up
the details of the proof if each indifference curve would
cut a single horizontal line. But what happens if we have
t'- t---------------,
T
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s
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two indifference curves P and Q as shown in Figure 6.3B?
In this case we have to modify our previous argument and
build up the domain of applicability in stages. It is
first shown (see Figure 6.3C) that the condition for {S,T}
to be utility independent of R holds for all r and (s, t)
pairs in Al . Then, because the line t = t
l
overlaps with
Al , show the condition holds for all
1 Sincewe can (s,t ).
each- (s,t) pair in A2 is indifferent to some pair (s,t
l ),
the necessary utility independence condition can be extended
to include A2 . Then an amount t
2 is chosen such that the
line t = t 2 overlaps A2 , and the procedure is repeated.
Eventually, one of the Ails (A4 in Figure 6.3C) will overlap
with the line t = t* so the utility independence condition
can be proven valid on that line and extended to AS" Since
the A. 's cover all (s,t) pairs, the utility independence1.
condition is valid for all s,t, and r.J
Proof.* We can represent the condition that S is utility
independent of {T,R} by
u(s,t,r) = u(t,r) + b(t,r) u(s) b > O. (6.S4)
Also, since {S,T} is preferentially independent of R, from
(6.2) we know
, 'Vr.
(6.SS)
*In this proof, when an attribute is at its least desirable
amount, designated as so, for example, we may delete it in the
function when no ambiguity will result. Thus, rather than
. (0 0 0 0
wr1.te u s ,t ,r), u(s ,t,r), and b(t ,r), we will use u(r),
u(t,r), and b(r).
For each pair (s,t) in Al defined by
Al - {( s , t) : u ( S , t , r °) ::. u (s * , t o , r 0 ) }
there exists an s' such that
(6.56)
(s,t) E Al (6.57)
From (6.55) and (6.57), it follows that
u(s,t,r) = u(s',tO,r)
Evaluating (6.58) with (6.54), we find
u(s,t,r) = u(r) + b(r) u(s')
which combined with (6.57) gives us
Vr, (s, t) £ AI' (6.58)
Vr, (s, t) £ Al
(6.59)
u(s,t,r) = u(r) + b(r) u(s,t) ,Vr, (s,t) S Al
Equation (6.60) says {S,T} is utility independent of R (6.60)
for (s,t) £ Al and all r. We want to extend this condition
to all possible (s,t) pairs.
Choose a t l such that
000 010 00
u(s ,t ,r ) < u(s ,t ,r ) < u(s*,t ,r )
o 1Since (s ,t ) £ AI' from (6.60)
011
u(s ,t ,r) = u(r) + b(r) u(t ) Vr (6.61)
Evaluating (6.54) at t = t l and r = r O yields
Vs (6.62)
Setting t = t l in (6.60) gives us
1
u(s,t ,r) = u(r) + b(r) u(s,t l ) 1(s, t ) E: Al (6.63)
which can be combined with (6.62) to yield
u(s,tl,r) = u(r) + b(r) [u(tl ) + b(tl ) u(s)]
= Vr,
1(s, t ) E: Al
(6.64)
Comparing (6.64) to (6.54) with t 1= t shows
all r (6.65)
Substituting (6.61) and (6.65) into (6.54) with t = t l yields
which can be combined with (6.62) to give
u(s,tl,r) = u(r) + b(r) u(s,tl ) Vs,r
Vs,r (6.66)
(6.67)
To extend result (6.67), let us define A2 by
A 2 := {(s,t)
o 0 0 1 o}u(s*,t ,r ) < u(s,t,r ) :::. u(s*,t ,r )
For any (s,t) E: A2 , there exists an s" such that
( 0) _ (" 1 0)u s,t,r - u s ,t ,r
so from (6.55), it follows that
(s,t) E: A 2 (6.68)
u(s,t,r) = u(s",tl,r) , . all r (s,t) E: A2 (6.69)
Evaluating the right-hand side of (6.69) with (6.67) gives
u(s,t,r) = u(r) + b(r) u(s",tl )
which, combined with (6.68), gives us
u(s,t,r) = u(r) + b(r) u(s,t) (s,t) E: A2 (6.70)
Equation (6.70) says {S,T} is utility independent of R for
(s,t) pairs in A2 .
The process from (6.61) on is now repeated by choosing
an amount t 2 such that
010 020 10
u(s ,t ,r ) < u(s ,t ,r ) < u(s*,t ,r )
and then proving that (6.67) holds with t 2 substituted for
t l . Then (6.70) is extended to include all (s,t) pairs
such that
( * 1 0) ( 0us, t , r < us, t, r )
Because of the continuity assumptions on u and the
fact that S is essential (i.e., u(s) is not a constant and
b(t,r) is positive), by repeating this process with a more
preferred t on each iteration, we will eventually prove
u(s,t*,r) = u(r) + b(r) u(s,t*)
so that for any (s,t) pair such that
o 0
u(s,t,r) = u(s',t*,r )
for some s', the utility independence expression similar
to (6.70) will follow, More formally, let us define
h = min
t,r
o[u(s*,t,r) - u(s ,t,r)]
so that it follows from (6.54) that
h = min [b(t,r)]
t,r
which is positive. Then in choosing the series t l ,t2 , ... ,if
k 0 0 k 0 k+lt is such that u(s ,t*,r ) < u(s*,t ,r ), choose t = t*.
Otherwise select t k + l such that
o k+l 0 0 k 0 h
u(s,t ,r) = u(s ,t ,r ) + "2
Since u(sO,t*,ro ) must by definition, be less than one, the
. 1 2 t*'11' 1 2serles t ,t , ... , Wl requlre at most h/2 = h members.
By the manner in which the Ai's are defined, collecting
all the equations similar to (6.60), (6.70), etc., will
prove that
u(s,t,r) = u(r) + b(r) u(s,t) Vs,t,r (6.71)
which is the desired result. ｾ
6.8 Relationships Among Utility Independence Assumptions
Let us look at some implications of different sets of
utility independence conditions. In particular, we will
be interested in implying higher order utility independence
conditions from lower order conditions. The results included
in this section are requisite for the general theorems which
follow in the next sections. Here our result concerns the
implications of two overlapping utility independence assump-
tions.
Definition. Let YI and Y2 be subsets of X = {XI 'X2 ' ... ,Xn }.
Attributes YI and Y2 ｯｶ･ｲｾｾｰ if their intersection is not
empty and if neither contains the other.
Theorem 6.7. Let YI and Y2 be overlapping attributes contained
in X c {XO,XI'.,.,X
n
}· If YI and Y2 are each UI then
( i) YI U Y2 , the union of YI and Y2 , is UI,
(i i) YI n Y2' the intersection of YI and Y2 ,is UI,
(i ii) (YIn Y2) U (YIn Y2) , the symmetric difference of
YI and Y2 , is UI,
(iv) YI n Y2 and YI n Y2 , the differences, are each ur.·
Proof. Since X. can designate a vector attribute, the
1
general case can be proven by considering the special case
where X = {X
o
,XI ,x 2 ,X3}, YI = {xl ,X 2}, and Y2 = {X 2 ,X3},
and where YI and Y2 are each assumed to be UI.
We must show in this case that (i) {XI 'X 2 'X3 } is UI,
(ii) X2 is UI, (iii) {XI 'X3 } is UI, and (iv) Xl is UI and
X3 is UI. From (6.6), our hypotheses can be written
respectively as
(6.72)
and
(6.73)
where as before we have taken the liberty to delete argu-
ments of u,c, and d when they are at their least preferred
levels and no misunderstanding can result, that is, when
o
x. = x .. Hence, for instance, u(xl ,x 2) and d(x ) will1 1 0
denote ｵ Ｈ ｸ ｾ Ｌ ｸ ｬ Ｌ ｸ Ｒ Ｇ ｘ ｾ Ｉ and ､ Ｈ ｸ ｯ Ｇ ｸ ｾ Ｉ respectively. Note,
however, from (6.72) and (6.73) that
(6.74)
Equating (6.75) and (6.76) with x 3 = ｸｾ indicates
Part (i). Substituting (6.73) into (6.72) and then (6.72)
into (6.73) gives us, respectively,
u(x) = u(x
o
) + d(x
o
) u(x3 ) + c(xo 'x3 ) [u(xl ) + d(xl ) u(x2)]
(6.75)
..
and
ｵ Ｈ ｾ Ｉ = u(x
o
) + c(x
o
) u(xl ) + d(xo'x l ) [u(x3 ) + c(x3 ) u(x 2 )]
(6.76)
(6.77)
which, together with (6.76) implies
(6.78)
Evaluating (6.73) at x
o
we see
and so from (6.78) it follows that
(6.79)
Expression (6.79) says {Xl 'X2 'X 3 } is utility independent of Xo .
4 C)/
Part (ii). Substituting (6.73) into (6.72) yields
(6.80)
o
which can be evaluated at x 2 = x 2 giving
(6.81)
Combining (6.80) and (6.81) and denoting c(xl ,x 3 ) d(xl ) as
f(x
o
'xl ,x3 ), we find
(6.82)
which says X2 is utility independent of {Xo ,Xl ,x3}.
Part (iii). Setting X
o
= ｸｾ and x 2 = ｸｾ in (6.72) and
(6.73) and equating indicates
which can be rearranged to yield
(6.83)
u(x.) f 0
1
i = 1,3,
(6.84)
where k is a constant since (6.84) has a function of x 3
equal to a function of xl· If u(xl ) = 0, from (6.83) , it
follows that d(x l ) = 1 and similarly c(x3 ) = 1 when u (x3 ) = O.
Thus, from (6.84), one sees
and
(6.85)
(6.86)
which can be substituted into (6.75) with x
o
yielding
o
= x ,
o
492..
= u(x2 ) + [ku(x2 ) + 1] [u(xl ) + u(x3) + ku(xl ) u(x 3)]
(6.87)
Combining (6.87) and (6.79), it follows that
(6.88)
where g(x
o
'x2 ) = c(xo ) [ku(x 2 ) + 1]. Expressi,_;) (6.88)
proves the desired result that {Xl,X]} is util."y independent
of {X
o
,X 2}.
Part (iv). We are given that {x l ,X2} is utility independent
of its complement and part (iii) has shown {x l ,X3 } is utility
independent of its complement. Hence, from part (ii), it
follows that the intersection Xl is utility independent of
its complement {X
o
,x 2 ,X3}. Similarly it follows that X3
is utility independent of {Xl ,Xl ,X2}. ｾ
Theorem 6.7, which assumes utility independence condi-
tions and concerns preferences for lotteries, closely
parallels a result of Gorman [1968a] concerning preferences
for consequences derived from preferential independence
conditions. If each designation of the term utility inde-
pendence in Theorem 6.7 were replaced by preferential inde-
pendence, we would essentially have Gorman's result, which
was presented in Chapter 3.*
6.9 Decomposition of Multiattribute Utility Functions
Roughly speaking, the more utility independence proper-
ties we can identify, the simpler the assessment of the
utility function becomes. It is important to specify the
simplest functional form of the multiattribute utility
function consistent with an arbitrary set of utility inde-
pendence assumptions. With this in mind, we want to generalize
the results of Section 6.8 by constructing a "chaining theorem"
using Theorem 6.7 as the building block. Let us illustrate
with a simple example.
Example 6.3. Let X - {XI,X2'X3'X4,XS,X6} and suppose Y
YI = {XI ,X 2 } and Y2 = {X 2 ,X3 ,X4 } are each UI. Then, by
invoking Theorem 6.7 repeatedly we can show possible unions
of XI ,X 2 , and {X3 ,X4 } are also UI. In particular we know
{Xl ,X2 ,x3 ,X4 } is UI.
Now suppose that in addition we find out that X4 is UI.
This may eventually help in assessing a utility function,
but since X4 does not overlap--as distinct from being
contained in--any of the existing sets of UI attributes,
the implications of X4 being UI can not be further exploited.
We may also find out that X6 is UI, but since it does not
overlap any UI attributes, it cannot be used to imply addi-
tional utility independence conditions.
*Since UI implies PI we could have exploited Gorman's
results (see Theorem 3.7) in the proof of Theorem 6.7. But
UI is such a strong condition that it enables us to present a
straight forward algebraic proof directly.
However, if in addition it is determined that
Y3 = {X4 ,XS} is UI, many implications follow from Theorem 6.7.
Because {X3 ,X4 } is UI also, we know X3 ,X4 , and Xs are each
UI. And as can be verified, given Yl ,Y 2 , and Y3 are UI,
each possible union of the elements Xl ,X2 , .•. ,XS is also
DI. IJ
1 <.: \) Cl<J"("
4'" }-;"
Given an arbitrary set of utility independence assump-
tions, say Y. is UI of Y., j = 1,2, ... ,J, we want to exploit
J J
this to the maximum extent possible in structuring the
resulting utility function. If J = 2, three possibilities
relating Yl and Y2 exist:
(1) Yl and Y2 overlap,
(2) Yl and Y2 are disjoint,
(3) Yl or Y2 is contained in the other.
The previous section studied case (1). Here we want to
investigate the generalization of this case when J > 3.
The implication of cases (2) and (3) for J ｾ 3, as: well as
combination of all three cases, will be considerGd in the
remainder of the chapter.
Definition. A utility independent chain is a collection
of sets {Yl, ... ,YR}, where (1) Yj is UI, j = 1, ... ,R, and
(2) there is an ordering of Yl through YR such that each
Y. (other than the first in the ordering) overlaps at least
J
one of its predecessors in the ordering.
We will be interested in finding utility independent
chains which consist of as many sets as possible. This
will allow us to exploit the utility independence properties
to the fullest extent in simplifying the implied functional
form of the utility function.
befinition. Let {Yl, ... ,YJ } be a set such that Yj is UI,
j = 1, ... ,J and let {Yl, ... ,YR}, R ｾ ,T be a utility indepen-
dant chain. This ｣ ｨ ｡ ｩ ｾ is a maximal utility independant chain
if no Y., j = R + 1, ... ,J, overlaps any Y.; j = 1, ... ,R.
J J
To gain some insight into this definition, let us con-
struct a maximal utility independent chain, from Yj , j = 1,
2, ... ,J where Yj is UI. Select a Yl such that Yl is not
Y. ,
J
Y. is found which
J
contained in Y. for any j ｾ 2. Next we search for a
J
j > 2, such that Y. overlaps Yl . If no
- J
satisfies this condition, then Yl by itself can be considered
a maximal utility independent chain. Suppose Y2 does over-
lap Yl , then Yl and Y2 are both members of a utility inde-
pendent chain. The process now repeats using {Yl ,Y2 }
rather than Yl .
We search for a Y., j
J
least one Yk , k = 1,2.
> 3, such that Y. overlaps at
- J'
If no such Yj is found, then the
collection of sets {Yl ,Y2 } is a maximal utility independent
chain. If Y3 does satisfy this condition, then {Y l ,y2 ,Y3 }
is formed and the process repeats until we have {y l ,Y2 , ... ,YR}
and no Y., j > R + 1, exists such that Y. overlaps at least
J - J
one Yk , k 2 R. When this situation holds, the collection
{Yl, ... ,YR} is a maximal utility independent chain. Note
that more than one maximal utility independent chain can
exist on the set of attributes X.
Definition. Let {Yl 'Y2' ... 'YR} be a maximal utility inde-
Y. for each
J
Yl Y2Y3 , 'fl Y2Y3,Thus, for instance, if R = 3, we havej < R.
pendent chain. Each Yj , j 2 R, partitions X - {Xl ,x2 , ... ,Xn} into
There are 2R possible subsets of X created byY. and Y ..
J J
taking intersections formed with either Y. or
J
R
Yl Y2Y3 , etc. Each intersection, except for nj=l
defined to be an element of the maximal utility
Y., is
J
independent
chain {Yl, ... ,YR} if it is not empty.
An example should help illustrate our definitions.
Example 6.4. Consider the set X = {x l ,x2 , ... ,xa}, and suppose
Y. is UI, j = 1,2, ... ,S, where
J
Yl - {Xl ,X2",x3 }, X2 == {X3 ,X 4 'XS}, Y3 - {X 2 ,X3 },
Y4 - {XS}, and YS == {X7 ,Xa}.
Note that Y2 overlaps Yl so {Yl ,Y2 } is a utility independent
chain. Now Y3 is contained in Yl but Y3 does overlap Y2 .
Thus, Y3 is added to {Yl ,Y2 } forming {Yl 'Y2 'Y3}' another
utility independent chain. Checking Y4 , we see it is com-
pletely contained in Y2 and distinct from both Yl and Y3 •
Thus, the attribute Y4 does not overlap any of Yl , Y2,or Y3 ,
so it does not enter the maximal utility independent chain
we are constructing. Also YS does not overlap any of Yl' Y2 '
or Y3 implying that the collection of sets {Yl ,Y2 ,Y3 } is a
maximal utility independent chain on X. In addition, YS is
itself another maximal utility independent chain on X.
To identify the elements of the maximal utility inde-
pendent chain {Yl ,Y2 ,Y3 },
::;:{X2 }'Yl Y2Y3 = {Xl}' Yl Y2Y3
and Yl Y2Y3 are empty. Thus
we note Yl Y2Y3 = {X3 }, Yl Y2Y3
= {X4 'XS}, and Yl Y2Y3 , Yl Y2Y3 ,
there are four elements of the
chain, namely Xl 'X2 'X3 ' and
independent chain YS ' there
{X4 ,XS}. For the maximal ｵ ｴ ｾ ｬ ｩ ｴ ｹ
is the one element {X7 ,Xa}. II
Let us return to the general case and state an important
result.
Theorem 6.8.* Each possible union of the elements in a
maximal utility independent chain defined on X = {XO,XI'.",Xn }
is utility independent of its complement in X.
The proof follows in three parts. Let us assume there
are L elements {WI, ... ,WL} of the maximal utility independent
R
chain {YI, .•. ,YR} and define Z = U Y., which can be thoughtj=l J
of either as a collection of the X. IS, which are members of
1
any Yj , j = 1, •.. ,R, or as the set of elements {WI, •.. ,WL}.
We first show the set Z is utility independent of its comple-
mente Next, each subset of L-I of the elements is shown to
be utility independent of its complement. Then, using the
intersection part of Theorem 6.7, it follows that each union
of the elements is utility independent of its complement in
X. The proof concerns maximal utility independent chains
with three or more elements. The only other possibility
involves chains with one element, in which case the theorem
is valid by definition.
*This result, which explores the implications of maximal
utility independent chains repeatedly invokes Theorem 6.7.
A similar construction, using Theorem 3.7 as a basic tool,
could have proven analogous implications for what we might
have referred to as maximal preferential independent chains
and their corresponding elements.
Proof. (Part 1) Let {Yl, •.. ,yR} be a maximal utility inde-
pendent chain. By the manner in which the chain was construc-
Y, and hence, using the union part
J
By inductionY. is UI.
J
k+l
n
j=l
Y. is UI.
J
R
nj=l
k
ted, Yk + l intersects .nJ=l
of Theorem 6.7, it follows that
we see that Z ==
(Part 2) To prove that each union of L-l elements of the
chain is UI, let us renumber the Y.'s so that the typical
J
r
will always be possible because of
Y.
Jnj=l
is not
R
n Y., where 1 < r
j=r+l J -
empty. This renumbering
element of the chain, call it w, is defined by W ==
r
t
-
1 ]:5. Rand U y. rlYt t -2, ••• ,R,j=l J )
the manner in which Z was constructed. We wish to prove
that Z-W is utility independent of its complement.
Y. must be equivalent to W or it must be
J
Either
equivalent
r
n
j=l
to {W,Ml, .•. ,Msl where Ml, .•. ,Ms designate other
elements. Allowing the MiS to be null sets, the general case
r
is n Y
J
' = {W,Ml, ... ,Msl. Consider two cases r > 2 and
j=l
r == 1.
For r > 2, define T. = (Y. U Y'+l) - (Y. n Y.+ l ), for
------ J J J J J
j = 1,2, ... ,r-l. By the symmetric difference part of
the union part of Theorem 6.7 implies
］ ｛ Ｌ ｾ Y, - {W,Ml , •.• ,Msl] is ｕ ｉ ｾJ=l J
Theorem 6.7, each T., j = 1,2, ..• ,r-l, is UI. Also, each
J
T j +l overlaps T j because of the way they are defined. Hence,
r-l
U T.
j=l J
5CO
If the M's are null sets clearly
r + 1, ... ,R contains
t+l
Yt +l is equal to Uj=l
Since no Y., j =
J
[c Y. - w] Uj=l J
t=r, ... ,R-l.
[ ｾ Y. - w] is ur.j=l J
W, the construction
Y. - W, for all
J
Taking successive unions in this manner and, since
t
U Y
J
. overlaps Yt +l , invoking the union part of theorem 6.7,j==l
we find that the final construction ｛ ｾ Y
J
. - w] is utility
j=l
independent of its complement.
If {Ml, ... ,M
s
} is not the null set, we again take suc-
cessive unions using the Yj'S, j = r + 1, ... ,R, beginning
with the original construction
collectively
R{W,Ml, ... ,Ms } n Yj,implyingj =r+l
since
- {W,M1 ,.·· Ｇ ｍ ｳ ｾ U ｙｾＫＱＧ
contain W. However
[
r
U Y.j=l J
j = r + 1, ... ,R canof the Y.' s,
J
R
Uj=r+l
R
Y. n Y. =
J j=r+l J
r
nj=l
None
W _
R
n Yj does not contain {MI, ... ,Ms }' Taking the successivej==r+l
unions as described, we will again find ｛ ｾ Y - w] is UI.j=l j
R
For r = 1, we have W = Yl n Y. and since Y. mustj=2 J J
contain at least two elements by the manner in which the
chain was constructed, the general case is where Yl
== {W,MI, ... ,M
s
}' Each element Mk , k == l, .•• ,s, must be
contained in some Y., j = 2, ... ,R. Otherwise, for instance,
J
R
Ml would only be in Yl so {W,Ml } = Yl n YJ' which impliesj-2
W is not an element.
Thus each element Mk , k = l, ... ,s, is in at least two
Y.'s, j = 1, ..• ,R, and we have shown for this case that
J
{Z - Mk } is UI, k = l, ... ,s. Using the intersection part
Now
s
{Z - Mk } = {Z - U Mk } is UI.k=l
s
of Theorem 6.7, n
k=l
s
{Z - U M} n Y = W, so by the symmetric difference part
k=l k 1
of Theorem 6.7, we find {Z - W} is UI since {z -
(Part 3) From Part 2, each subset of L-l of the elements
{Wl 'W2 ' ... 'WL } is utility independent of its complement in X.
Hence, any proper subset of these W's is identical to the
intersection of the appropriate sets of size L-l, and so
by the intersection part of Theorem 6.7, all subsets of
elements are utility independent of their complements. ｾ
The relevance of Theorem 6.8 in structuring multi-
attribute utility functions will be shown in the next section.
To illustrate the power of Theorem 6.8, let us use it to
prove Theorem 6.2 given in Section 6.3. For reference, the
result is repeated here.
Theorem 6.2. Given attributesxl ,x2 .•. ,xn , the following are
equivalent:
(I) attributesXl,x2, ... ;xn are mutually utility inde-
pendent,
(2) Xi is UI, i = 1,2, •.. ,n,
(3) {x, ,X'+l' ... 'X } is UI, i = 2,3, ... ,n andｾ ｾ n .
{x l ,x2 , ... ,xn_l } is UI,
. ,(4) {Xi'Xi + l } is DI, i = 1,2, ... ,n-l, n ｾ 3,
(5) Xl is DI and {Xl'Xi } is PI, i = 2, ... ,n, n > 3.
Proof. By definition, (1) implies (2) through (5). To
prove the converses, we wish to show that Xi 'X2 ' ... 'Xn are
each elements of a maximal utility independent chain
encompassing {xl, ... ,Xn} given any condition (2) through
(5). Then the result directly follows from Theorem 6.8.
(2) ｾ (1). Note that X. = X..
1 1
Then ( n x.)ｪｾｩ 1 n XI ==1 X.1 is an
(3) -> (1) • The collection of sets Y. = {X. ,X.+1' ... ,X },
. 1 1 1 n
i = 1,2, ..• ,n-l
independent chain.
= Y. 1 n Y.1- 1
=
cr;2 yj)n Y
j=l n-l
1 = 2,3, ... ,n-l and the set Y
n
= {Xl 'X2 ' ... ,Xn - l } make a
maximal utility independent chain. Note that
Ｈ ｾ y.)n (n;:/ ｙ Ｎ ｾ ny = X., i - 1,2, ....n-l, is an･ ｾ Ｚ ｾ ･ ｮ Ｚ Ｎ ａ ｬ ｾ Ｚ ｩ Ｚ ｬ ］ ｊ Ｈ ｮ ｾ ｬ :.) n 1 y is an element.
n j=2 J n
(4) .. (1). Let us define Y. = Lx. ,x.+l },1 1 1
so {Y l ,Y 2 , ... ,Yn- l } is a maximal utility
Then clearly Xl = Yl n Ｈｾｾｬ Y.), and X.J=2 J 1
n( (1 'Y.), i = 2,3, ... ,n-l, and X
nｪｾｩＬｩＭｬ J
are elements.
Then
6.6, {Xl X.} is DI, i = 2,3, ... ,n.
, 1
= 2, ... ,n, so that {Y2 ,Y3 , ..• ,Yn }
By Theorem(5) ::; (1).
Define Y. = {Xl X.}, i
1 , 1
is a maximal utility independent chain.
Y. and X.
1 1
n
n
i=2
of the chain.
= Y. n(n Y.), i =
1 '-J' 1Jr 1
2, .•. ,n, are elements
6.10. ADDITIONAL REPRESENTATION THEOREMS*
In the last three sections, we have looked at the impli-
cations of (i) a utility independence condition together
with a preferential independence condition, (ii) two over-
lapping utility independence conditions, and (iii) an
arbitrary number of utility independence conditions. Impli-
cations of (i) can be used to invoke (ii) or (iii) and
implications of (ii) can be utilized with (iii). In this
and the following sections, we'll try to integrate some of
these ideas, and present some special results which are
important. Proofs will usually not be given in detail since
they either follow directly from or are similar to-earlier
ones. First we will look at extensions of the multiplicative
and multilinear utility function.
6.10.1. Extension of the Multiplicative Form
The following is a straightforward extension of
Theorem 6.1.
Theorem 6.9. Given the set of attributes X = {Xo'Xl' ... 'Xn }
where X., i = 1,2, ••. ,n, are elements of a maximal utility
1
independent chain (this excludes X
o
!), then
u (x , X ) -0 [ -* -0 J o -= u(xo,xo ) + u(xo,xo ) u (x , x ) u(x,x ),o 0 o 0 o 0
n
and either (if L k. = 1) ,
i=l 1
n n
o - L -0 L k.u. (x.),u(x ,x ) = u(x.,x.) =o 0 i=l 1 1 i=l 111
*This section contains specialized results that can be omitted
at first reading.
or (if
n
I
i=l
k. :I 1)
1
o -1 + ku(x ,x ) =
o 0
where
n
II
i=l
[ -0 ]1 + ku(x"x.) =
1 1
n
II [1 + kk. u. (x. )] ,
i=l 1 1 1
-(1) xi = (x0' xl' ... , xi-1' xi+l' ... , x n ), i = 0, 1, .•. , n,
(2 )
(3) o *u.(x.) = 0, u.(x.) = 1, i = 1,2, ... ,n,
1 1 1 1
and
(4) k.
1
* -0
= u (x. , x. ), i =
1 1
1,2, .•. ,n,
(5) k is a scaling constantt which is a solution to
n
1 + k = II
i=l
(1 + kk.).
1
Proof. Using Theorem 6.1, plus the additional assumption that
{x l 'x2 ' ••• ,xn } is utility independent of xo '. implying
leads one directly to conclude either
u(x) = k u (x ) + [u(x ,x*) - u(x ,xo )]
0000000
or
k.u. (x.)]
1 1 1 .,
(6.89)
-*
u (x) = k u (x ) + [u (x , x )
00000
which is
ｻ ｾ ｬ ｛ ｩ ｾ ｬ [1 + kkiui (Xi)]1
the desired result. ｾ
(6.90)
tprocedures for choosing the correct value of k are given
in Appendix 6B at the end of this chapter.
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6.10.2. Extension of the Multilinear Form
Expressions (6.89) and (6.90) provide forms of the
utility function when there is one mFlxiH\8.1 utility indepen-
dent chain. However, there are ｳ ｩ Ｇ ｌ Ｑ ｊ ｡ ｴ ｩ ｯ ｮ ｾ ［ where more than
one maximal utility independent chain may exist among the
same set of attributes. For ｩ ｮ ｳ ｴ ｾ ｮ ｣ ･ Ｌ let X be partitioned
into {Zo,Zl,Z2} and suppose Zi is utility
n
1 :: 1,2. That is, for instancp, z. ::: Ij
.L • 1J'= .
independent of i.,
1
Yj and {Yl, ••• ,YR}
is a maximal utility independent chain. One can derive
functional forms of utility functiuns involving more than
one such chain by considering ｾ ･ ｴ ｳ of l1tility independence
assumptions over nonoverlapping at.tributes. With regard
to this, we have
Theorem 6.10. Let X == {X 1 ,x2 , •.. ,X } l.ll': partitioned inton .
{Zo,Z1, ... ,ZH} where Zm' m = J.,2, ... ,f'1, j:, l.1tility indepen-
dent. Then the ut.ili ty functir.,tI 11 (x) can bp. represented by
(6.91)
where urn' m ｾ 1,2, ... ,M,
The specific result is
is a utU i ty function over Z .
m
t1 ＨｾＩ = u (z ) +
o
M
L
m=l
m.: j .5.H
f . (z )u (z )U.(2 J·)ITlJ 0 m m oJ
where
(6.92)
f (z )
m 0
-0
= u(z ,z*,z )
o m om
o -0
- u(z ,Z,'6 ),
o m om
(6.93a)
f .(z ) = u(z Ｌ ｺ Ｊ Ｌ ｺ ｾ Ｌ ｺ ｯ .)
m] 0 0 m ] om] ( * 0-0u z ,z ,z.,z .)o m J om]
o -0 0 0-0
- u(z ,z Ｌ ｺ ｾ Ｌ ｺ .) + u(z ,z ,z.,z .), (6.93b)
om] om] 0 m ] om]
and
(6.93c)
M
I
m=l
m< j.:.M
u(z ,zo 0 0 *
o m,Zj,Zk,Zomjk)
o -*
u(z ,z,z ) +
o m om
M
L
m=l
o 0-*
u(z ,z ,z.,z .)-
om] om]
M
I
m=l
m<j<M
ｪ ＼ ｫ ｾ ｍ
( Moo+ ... + -1) u(zo,zl""'ZM)'
-*
= u(z ,z ) -
o 0
fez )
o
Theorem 6.10 is the natural extension of the multilinear
utility function. The distinction is that Zo is riot assumed
to be utility independent of its complement.
One of the important facts to remember about Theorems
6.9 and 6.10 is that they can be used repeatedly in simpli-
fying the expression for a multiattribute utility function.
That is, the attributes designated by X. in (6.89) and (6.90)
ｾ
and by Zm in (6.92) may be vector attributes and possess
utility independent properties among their respective com-
ponents. If this is the case, then of course Theorems 6.9
and 6.10 can be used in specifying the relevant utility
example should help illustrate this, in addition to clari-
fying our definitions.
Example 6.S. Suppose we are interested in assessing a utility
function u over the set of attributes X = {Xl 'X2 ' ... 'X9 }.
Furthermore, suppose that it has been verified that Y. is
J
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utility independent of Y.,
J
Yl = {X2 ,X 3 },
Y2 = {X4 ,XS ,X6 },
Y3 = {X S},
j = 1,2, ... ,6, where
Y4 = {X S ,X 6 ,X7 'X S},
YS = {X S},
Y6 = {X S ,X9 }.
By our definition, there are two maximal utility independent
chains in X which are {Y l } and {Y2 ,Y 4 ,Y6 }. Attributes Y3 and
Y5 are not in the chain Z2 because Y3 (\ Yj for j = 2,4,6 is
either Y3 itself or empty. The same is true for YS ' so by
the definition of a utility independent chain, Y3 and YS
are excluded. Thus, we can define Zl = Yl and Z2 = Y2
U Y4 U Y6 and use (6.92) to write
(6.94)
where u, u l ' and u 2 are scaled from zero to one.
There is clearly only one element {X2 'X 3} in Yl but
fY2 ,y4 ,Y6} has five elements: X4 ' {XS ,x6}, X7 ,X S ' and X9 .
We can use Theorem 6.9 to specify u 2 (z2) further. For this
purpose, we can assume X
o
= ｸｾ in (6.S9) and (6.90) so
u (x ) = 0 and c (x ) = 1, and either
o 0 0 0
or
u 2 (Z2) = k 4u4(x 4 ) + kS6uS6(xS,x6) + k 7u 7(x7 )
+ ｫＸｵｾＨｸＸＩ + k9U9(x9), (6.9S)
(6.96)
where
T = {4, (S,6), 7, 8, 9}.
Considering only the attributes {XS ,x6}, there is
another utility independent chain, namely Y3 = {XS}. Hence,
by Theorem 6.10,
(6.97)
which can be substituted back into (6.9S) or (6.96). The
original assumption that YS is utility independent of YS is
redundant for this problem since YS = {X7 } is an element in
the maximal utility independent chain {Y2 ,Y 4 ,Y6 }, and by
Theorem 6.8, each element of such a chain is utility inde-
pendent of its complement. Combining (6.94) through (6.97)
permits us to decompose ｵ Ｈ ｾ Ｉ as far as possible consistent
with the specified assumptions. E:I
6.10.3. Special Multilinear Forms of the Utility Function
As one might expect, there are many sets of assumptions
which are stronger than the utility independence assumptions
of Theorem 6.3 and yet weaker than mutual' utility independence
assumption of Theorem 6.1. Let us illustrate the usefulness
of exploring the additional restrictions placed on the
utility function by various assumptions. As we will show,
additional assumptions reduce the amount of empirical infor-
mation necessary to specify u. Related results follow in
Section 6.11 when we discuss preferences in hierarchical
structures of attributes.
Throughout this subsection, we will assume
x = {x l ,x2 , ... ,Xn } and each is UI, i = 1,2, ... n, so that
from Theorem 6.3, we know the utility function u(x l ,x2 ' ••• ,xn )
can be assessed from the n one-attribute utility functions
n
u. (x.) and 2 - 2 scaling constants. We could have been a
1 1
bit more general and looked at the effect of additional
assumptions used in connection with the assumptions of
Theorem 6.10. However, since the ideas are analogous to
that of adding additional assumptions to those of Theorem
6.3, and since the latter case is notationally more convenient,
we chose it for illustration.
Y is Utility Independent of Y. Let us assume Y = {x l ,x2 , ... ,Xm}.
If Y is utility independent of Y, then the attributes
Y, X
m
+ l , Xm+ 2 ' ... 'Xn are a set of attributes, each of which
is UI. Thus, Theorem 6.3 applies so the overall utility
function can be assessed from (n-m+l) one-attribute utility
functions: ( ) () () d 2n-m+l_2u Y y , um+ l xm+ l , ... ,un x n ' an
scaling constants. But uy(y) can be assessed by again
applying Theorem 6.3 since each of Xl ,X 2 , ... ,Xm is utility
independent. Therefore, the m utility functions
ul(x l ), u 2 (x2 ) , ... 'um(xm) and 2
m
- 2 scaling constants will
specify uy(y). Putting this together, the original utility
function of interest u(x l ,x2 ' ... ,xn ) is now specified by the
5(0
. n-m+l m
n one-attribute utility functlons and (2 + 2 - 4)
scaling constants.
The usefulness of the additional assumption should be
clear; it allows us to specify u with fewer scaling constants.
This is so, since the assumption that Y is UI puts a set of
consistency restrictions on the scaling constants of the
multilinear form.
Y and Yare Mutually Utility Independent. Using the same
notation as before, let us assume Y and Yare mutually
utility independent. From Theorem 5.2, we know the utility
function can be specified from uy(y) and uy(Y) and two
scaling constants. Then from Theorem 6.3, it follows that
uy(y) is specified by m one-attribute utility functions:
ul(x l ) , ... ,um(xm), and 2
m
- 2 scaling constants. Similarly,
uy(Y) can be expressed from um+l(x
m
+ l ) , ... 'Un(Xn ) and
n-m2 - 2 scaling constants. Therefore, subject to the
additional mutual utility independence assumption, the
utility function u(x I ,x2 ' ... 'xn ) is given by uI(Xlh u 2 (x2 ),
m n-m
... ,u (x ) and 2 + 2 - 2 scaling constants.
n n
With the mutliplicative and multilinear utility function,
as well as the two cases considered above, the utility
function u was specified by the n utility functions
u l ,u2 , .•. ,un and some number of scaling constants. The
additional assumptions above allowed us to assess u with
less constants than required in the multilinear case.
Table 6.3 compares the number of constants required with-
and without the additional assumptions for some represen-
51 J
tative values of nand ro, and thus gives an indication of
the additional simplification in the assessment of u
provided. In all cases we assume that X. is UI, i = 1,2, ... ,n.
1
Table 6.3
Number of Scaling Constants Required to Assess N-Attribute
Utility Functions Given X. is UI, i = 1,2, ... ,n
1-----'------'----.:.--"'---
No additional Assuming Y =.: {Xl'
Assuming Y == {Xl' Assuming Xl ,X2 ' ... ,Xn
X2 ' ... Ｌ ｾ ｽ and Yassumptions
X2 ' ... 'Xm} is UI are mutually utility(Multilmear are each UI independent (Multipli...,
Utility Function) m=2 m=3 m=4 m=-2 m=3 m=5 cative Utility Function)
2n -2 n-l Ｒ ｮ Ｍ ｾ ｴ Ｍ Ｔ Ｒ ｮ Ｍ ｾ Ｒ Ｘ 2n- 2:-2 ＲｮＭｾＶ 2n- 5+30n 2 n
- ---
-_..
-
3 6 4 4 3
4 14 8 8 6 8 4
5 30 16 12 10 10 5
6 62 32 20 32 18 14 32 6
7 126 64 36 36 34 22 34 7
8 254 128 68 44 66 38 38 8
9 510 256 132 60 130 70 46 9
10 1022 512 260 92 258 134 62 10
Other Sets of Assumptions. The additional assumptions which
we've considered so far are the ones which would necessarily
be "building blocks" for more involved sets of utility inde-
pendence assumptions. To give just one more illustration,
let us define Y as before and define Z as {Xr,xr+l, ... ,X
n
}.
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Now let us assume Y and Z are utility independent of their
complementary sets of attributes. There are three separate
cases to consider, namely those where r < m, r = m + 1, and
r > m + 1. We will just consider the most involved case
where r < m and there is some "overlapping" in our utility
independence assumptions. Let us define the following
notation to simplify our discussion:
Yl = {X l ,X 2 ,··· ,X r - l },-
Y2 - {X ,X +l' ... 'X }, andr r m
Y3
- {Xm+l'Xm+2,···,Xn}·=
In terms of this notation, we are assuming that
{Y l ,Y 2 } is utility independent of Y3 and {Y2 ,Y3 } is utility
independent of Yl , in addition to the original assumption
that Xi is UI, i = 1,2, ... ,n. When these assumptions hold,
it follows from Theorem 6.1 that the utility function
U(Yl'Y2'Y3) is either additive or multiplicative, and thus
one must assess utility functions over each of the Y.'s and]
assess three independent scaling constants. But the component
attributes of each of the Y. 's are each UI, so the u. (y.)
J J ]
terms can be assessed from a utility function for each
component X. in Y. and 2b j - 2 scaling constants, where b.
1 ] J
is the number of X. 's in Y..
1 ]
Example 6.6. To illustrate the power of this result, suppose
we have nine original attributes denoted by xl ,x2 , ... ,X g and
Yl - {Xl ,X 2 ,X3 }, Y2 = {X4 'X S ,X6 }, and Y3 = {x7 ,X S ,X g }. Then
when our assumptions hold, we need to assess u l (y1)' u 2 (y 2) ,
and u 3 (Y3) and three scaling constants.
requires
over the
But each u. (y . )
J J
we assess the respective three utility functions
respective X. 's and 2 3 - 2 = 6 scaling constants.
1
Therefore, the overall utility function u requires we assess
the nine component utility functions and 21 scaling constants.
This can be compared to the 510 scaling constants necessary
when only Xi is UI, i = 1,2, ... ,9. t:l
6.10.4. The Additive Value Function and Multiplicative
Utility Function*
It is interesting to relate the additive value function
of Section 3.6 to the multiplicative utility function of
Section 6.3 since necessary and sufficient conditions for the
additive value function are necessary for the multiplicative
utility function.
Theorem 6.11. Given:
(a) preferences over Xl x X2 x ... x Xn are compatible
with an additive value function v,
(b) some Xi is UI (let it be Xl) ,
(c) n ｾ 3,
then the utility function u must have one of the following
three forms:
u ＨｾＩ -cv(x) c > 0 (6.98a)ｾ -e -,
u (x) ｾ v(x) (6.98b)
u ＨｾＩ cv(x) c > 0 (6.98c)ｾ e -,
*The ideas of the result in this section were generated by
Richard F. Meyer and John W. Pratt.
[Note before proof: This result says that the utility func-
tion over the scalar attribute V, which measures value by v,
must have constant risk aversion.]
Proof: Let us write v as
(6.99)
and scale v by
ｶ Ｈ ｘ Ｊ ｬ Ｇ ｘ ｾ Ｌ ... ,x*) :., 1
ｾ Il
l) 0 0
v(x 1 ,x 2 , ... ,x n )- 0 (b.IOO)
and similarly scale the v. 's by1
V. Ｈ ｸ ｾ Ｉ 1 0 0= v. (x. ) =1 1 1 1
so of course
i = 1,2, ... ,n (6.101)
n
l.
i=l
A. - 1
1
(6.102)
The idea of the proof is simple: we deduce a utility
function for the V-attribute and show that it must have con-
stant risk aversion (see Theorem 4.15) from which the forms
(6.98) follow.
Let y ::: (x 2 ' .•• , xn ); in this notation we have x = (xl ,y)
d . f 'b "* 0 dan Xl 1S DI 0 Y. For attr1 ute Xl let xl - < xl,x l > an
therefore Ｈ ｾ ｬ Ｇ ｙ Ｉ - < (xI,y), Ｈ ｸ ｾ Ｌ ｹ Ｉ > for all y. In terms
of the V-attribute, this means that
(6.103)
where
n
v(y) = L
i=2
A. v.(x.).111
sr5
In other words, adding v(y) to the prizes of the lottery
< AI' 0 > increases the certainty equivalent by v(y), for
all v(y). This implies constant risk aversion for V has
to be shown. ｾ
Theorem 6.11 is interesting for two reasons:
(1) it provides for a simple procedure to obtain a
multiattribute utility function given the
necessary assumptions hold and given that an
additive value function has been assessed, and
(2) the analysts can independently assess both a
multiplicative (or additive) utility function
and an additive value function and use one as a
check against the other.
It is important to note that if the utility function is additive,
then (6.98b) must hold, whereas if the utility function is
multiplicative, either (6.98a) or (6.98c) must be valid.
Given v, the assessment of u is straightforward. Simply
assess the certainty equivalent ｾ ｬ for the lottery < ｸｩＧｸｾ >.
Then if
(6.104)
the utility function must be the additive case (6.98b). If
(6.105)
then (6. 98a) is the proper form if the left side of (6.105) is
less than the right side and case (6.98c) is the appropriate
utility function when the right side is smaller. In either
case, by setting the utility of xl equal to < ｸｩＧｸｾ > using
51(0
(6.98a) or (6.98c) and solving, the scaling constant c is
determined.
6.11. HIERARCHICAL STRUCTURES AND CONDITIONAL PREFERENCES
Suppose that the attributes for a particular problem have
been structured as shown in Figure 6.4. Furthermore, suppose
that Yl and Y2 are mutually utility independent. Then from
Theorem 5.2, we know
u(Yl'Y2) = klu l (Yl) + k 2u 2 (Y2) + k 12 u l (y l )u2 (y2 ),
(6.106)
(6.107)
Y2 , we find
o
u(Y l ,Y2 )
k 2
where all utility functions are scaled from zero to one. Note
o 0that by evaluating (6.106) at Y1 and at Y2' the respective
least preferable amounts of Yt and
The point is that u l and u 2 are actually conditional utility
functions over their respective domains given a fixed level
of the other attribute. Because of utility independence, the
conditional utility function over Yl , for example, is the same
regardless of the level of Y2 . That is why we only need one
conditional utility function for Yl in specifying U(Yl'Y2 ).
The logical next step in assessing u would be to try to
identify functions f l and f 2 such that
and
Figure 6.4. 1-\ ｾＱﾷ･ＮｲｾｲＨｾＱ o-{ ａｴｴｙＬＶｩａｔｾＮＮｳ -tc-< 0..
Hypo1l\Plf(t'I ｐｲｯｾｉｑＢＬ
'"SHoo...
where the u's are utility functions over their respective
domains. Using previous results, this could be done if
X. is UI, i = 1,2, ... ,5. However, because of the dimension-
1
ality, it might be difficult to verify such assumptions.
Fortunately, we don't need such strong assumptions. Because
Yl is utility independent of Y2 , we can just worry about
whether Xl is conditionally utility independent of X2 given
oY2 is set at Y2' for instance.
More generally, in all the formulations of the previous
two chapters, once we have determined that Y C X - {Xl ,x2 , ... ,Xn }
is utility independent of Y , we could then speak of preferences
and utility functions over subsets of attributes included in Y
without considering the levels of the attributes within Y .
The latter can be specified at some convenient level. With
this motivation, we can define a number of useful conditional
preference concepts.
6.11.1. Conditional Independence Assumptions
We are interested in concepts of conditional independence
for three reasons:
(1) simplifying the structure of a multiattribute
utility function provided certain conditional
independence assumptions are met;
(2) representing necessary conditions for indpendence
assumptions to hold, and thus, in some cases,
requiring less empirical questioning to find in
fact that they do not hold;
(3) representing sufficient conditions for independence
conditions to hold, thus providing for weaker assump-
tions, and consequently less verification, to
imply utility functions of particular forms.
After defining our terms, we will expand on each of these.
To formulize these ideas, consider the set of attributes
x = {Xl 'x2 ' ... ,Xn } which will be partitioned into three non-
empty subsets Yl , Y2 , and Y3 . We will say Yl is conditionally
preferentially independent of Y2 given y; if the preference
order for consequences -involving only changes of attribute
levels in Yl does not depend on the level of Y2 when Y3 is
fixed at y;. Mathematically this condition is
Vy 2 • ( 6 • 1 0 8 )
Similarly, we def ine Y1 to be conditionally utility independent
of Y2 given y; if the preference order for lotteries involving
only changes of attribute levels in Yl does not depend on the
+level of Y2 when Y3 is fixed at Y3. This condition can be
represented mathematically as
+ I +
u(Yl'Y2'Y3) = c(Y2) + d(Y2) u(Yl'Y2'Y3)' d(Y2) > 0 I
(6.109)
where Y:2 is arb'i.trarily chosen. These def initions follow
naturally from our original ones of preferential and utility
independence.
There is a generalization of each of these definitions.
We will say Yl is conditionally preferentially independent of
Y2 given Y3 if the preference order for consequences involving
only changes in attribute levels in Yl does not depend on the
level of Y2 when Y3 is fixed at any level. In the same manner,
we define Yl to be conditionally utility independent of Y2
given Y3 if the preference order for lotteries involving only
changes of attribute levels in Yl does not depend on the level
Y2 when Y3 is fixed at any level. These conditionaly preference
assumptions can be written respectively as
[u (y i ' y 2 ' Y3) .:- u (y i ' y 2 ' Y3) ] ='9 [u (yi ' Y2 ' Y3 ) > u (y1'Y2 ' YｾＩｊ '
and
u(Yl'Y2'Y3) = f(Y2'Y3) + g(Y2'Y3) u(Yl'Y2' Y3)' g(Y2'Y3) > 0,
(6.111)
where Y2 refers to an abitrary but fixed level of Y2 .
It is clear that (6.110) implies (6.108) and (6.111)
implies (6.109), so the latter conditional preference con-
ditions are stronger than the former. Note that the relative
preferences over Yl given Y3 need not be the same as the
relative preferences over Yl given Y3 for condition (6.111)
to hold. If Yl is conditionally utility independent of Y2
given Y3 and if the relative preferences over Yl are the same
for all values of Y3 , then we find in fact that Yl is utility
independent of {Y2 ,Y3 }. Hence for any Y2 and Y3'
(6.112)
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In Figure 6.5 we try to graphically illustrate how utility
independence and conditional utility independence relate to
each other. Condition (6.109), that Yl is conditionally
utility independent of Y2 given y;, means the relative
preferences over each of the heavy ｳ ｯ ｬ ｩ ｾ lines in Figure 6.5
are strategically equivalent. This means the conditional
utility functions over each of these solid lines are the same
except for positive linear transformations. This condition
does not mean the relative preferences over the heavy dashed
lines must be the same. However, they may be. The condition
(6.111) that Yl is conditionally utility independent of Y2 given
Y3 means, for instance, that the relative preferences over
each of the heavy solid lines must be the same, that the
relative preferences over each of the heavy dashed lines must
be the same, and that the relative preferences over each of
the dot-dash lines must be the same. It does not require that
the relative preferences over the solid lines be the same as
those over the dashed lines or the dot-dash lines. When in
fact, the relative preferences over each of the heavy lines--
solid, dashed, and dot-dash--are the same, then it is very
likely that Yl is utility independent of {Y2 ,Y3 }. "Very
likely" is used here since the condition must also hold for
all planes not drawn in the figure in addition to those where
Y3 is y;, Y3' or Y3 in order for Yl to be utility independent
of {Y2 ,Y3 }.
Finally let us define conditional additive independence.
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Attributes Yl and Y2 are conditionally additive independent
given Y3 if preferences over lotteries on Yl and Y2 given
that Y3 is fixed at Y3 depend only on their marginal con-
ditional probability distributions and not on their joint
conditional probability distribution. And similar to the
previous cases, we define attributes Yl and Y2 to be con-
ditionally additive independent given Y3 if preferences over
lotteries on Yl and Y2 , given any fixed level of Y3 , depend
only on their marginal conditional probability distributions
and not on their joint conditional probability distribution.
6.11.2. Simplifying the Structure of Multiattribute Utility
Functions
Now we can begin to look at the usefulness of the con-
ditional preference assumptions. For most of the theorems
using preferential, utility, or additive independence, analogous
results could be derived with the corresponding conditional
independence assumptions. We will state a few of these without
proofs since they are very similar to proofs found earlier in
the book. For example, corresponding to Theorem 5.2, we have the
Theorem 6.12. If Yl and Y2 are conditionally utility
oindependent of each other given Y3' then
(6.113)
000
where u(Yl'Y2'Y3) = 0 and k is an empirically evaluated constant.
The proof is analogous to that of Theorem 5.2.
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Aside from those results with direct analogies using
utility independence, additional results can be proven, such as
Theorem 6.13. If Yl and Y2 are conditionally utility independent
subject to consistent scaling of the
of each other given Y3 ,
o
assessing u l (Yl'Y2'Y3)'
b ' 0 * 0 *ar ltrary Yl'Yl'Y2'Y2'
then u(Yl'Y2 'Y3) can be specified by
u 2 Ｈｙｾ 'Y2 'Y3)' and u 3 (Yi ,Yi ,Y3 ) for
u .•
1
The result allows us to assess a three-attribute utility
function by assessing three conditional utility functions--one
with one attribute and two with two attributes. The reasoning
behind Theorem 6.13 is illustrated using Figure 6.6, where it
is assumed that Yl , Y2 , and Y3 are scalar attributes. The
consequences whose preferences must be assessed are shaded in
the figure. Suppose we want to get the utility of an arbitrary
point (Yi'Y2'Y3)' illustrated as point A. Since Yl is con-
ditionally utility independent of Y2 given Y3 , the utility of A
can be expressed in terms of the utilities of Band C since the
relative preferences between A, B, and C, are the same as those
between A', B', and C', and the latter are known. The utility
of C is also known, but the utility of B is not known. However,
since Y2 is conditionally utility independent of Yl given Y3'
the utility of B can be expressed in terms of the utilities of
B' and D since the relative preferences between B', B, and D
are the same as those between C', C, and D' and the latter are
known. Since the utilities of B' and D are assessed, we can
calculate the utility of B and hence the utility of an arbi-
trary consequence A.
:5 Z.Z_CA..
One more result indicative of the usefulness of con-
ditional independence concepts in specifying the structure of a
utility function is
Theorem 6.14. If Yl and Y2 are conditionally additive inde-
pendent given Y3 , then
o 0 0 0
u{Yl'Y2'Y3) = u{Yl'Y2'Y3) + u{Yl'Y2'Y3) - u{Yl'Y2'Y3)'
(6.114)
where
The proof is very similar to that of Theorem 5.1. This result
allows us to specify the three-attribute utility function from
two consistently scaled two-attribute utility functions. If
Yl , Y2 , and Y3 each represent scalar attributes, then (6.114)
says we only need to assess a utility function over the two
shaded planes of Figure 6.6 in order tooompletely specify u.
6.11.3. Necessary Conditions of Independence Assumptions
Let us go on to the second area in which conditional
independence assumptions are useful. The ideas discussed here
are trivial from an analytical point of view, but helpful
from a practical point of view, so they are included. It
may be quite difficult in some situations to determine whether
or not Yl is utility independent of {y2 ,Y3 }. However, if we
hold the value of Y3 fixed and check relative preferences
over Yl for various values of Y2 given y; and if these relative
preferences are not the same, then clearly the relative prefe-
rences over Yl cannot be the same for all (Y2,i3 ) pairs. Hence Yl
could not be utility independent of {Y2 ,Y3 }. To formalize
this, we state the mathematically trivial but useful
Theorem 6.15. A necessary condition for Yl to be utility
independent of {Y2 ,Y3 } is that Yl be conditionally utility
independent of Y2 given Y3 .
In a similar spirit, we state without proof
Theorem 6.16. A necessary condition for Yl , Y2 , and Y3 to be
additive independent is that Yl and Y2 be conditionally additive
independent given Y3 .
6.11.4. Sufficient Condtions for Independence Assumptions
A third use of conditional utility independence is that
it provides us with the tools to state sufficient sets of
assumptions about preference independence properties. Thus
less empirical validation is necessary to verify that a par-
ticular form of utility function is appropriate for a particular
problem. In this regard we prove
Theorem 6.17. If Yl is conditionally utility independent of Y2
given Y3 and if Yl is conditionally independent of Y3 given
ｹ ｾ Ｌ then Yl is utility independent of {Y2 ,Y3 }.
Proof: Since Yl is conditionally utility independent of Y2
given Y3 , from (6.111) for arbitrary Y2 , which we will choose
+
as Y2'
(6.115)
And since Yl is conditionally utility independent of Y3
given
+Y2' from (6.109)
(6.116)
Substituting (6.116) into (6.115), we find
(6.117)
where
rind
Equation (6.117) implies Yl is utility independent of ｻ ｙ Ｒ Ｇ ｙ Ｓ ｽ Ｎ ｾ
A particularly important class of problems concern those
with a hierarchical structure of attributes. Some useful
results pertaining to this follow.
Theorem 6.18. If {Yl ,Y 2 } is utility independent of Y3 and Yl
is conditionally preferentially independent of Y2 given Y:3'
then Yl is preferentially independent of {Y2 ,Y3 }.
Proof: The utility independent condition implies
(6.118)
and the conditional preferential independence assumption means
[ u (yi ' y 2'Y:3 ) ｾ u (y J> y 2' Y:3 jJ ｾｾ (y i 'Y2 ' Y:3) ｾ (y1' Y2 ' y3l
(6.119)
Evaluating the right side of (6.119) with (6.118) yields
(6.120)
(6.121)
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Hence, it follows by substituting (6.120) into (6.118) that
u(yi'Y2'Y3) > u(Yl'Y2'Y3)' VY2'Y3'
which means that Yl is preferentially independent of ｻ ｙ Ｒ Ｇ ｙ Ｓ ｽ Ｎ ｾ
There is the analogous result involving utility inde-
pendence.
Theorem 6.19. If {Yl 'Y2} is utility independent of Y3 and Yl
is conditionally utility independent of Y2 given Y3' then
Yl is utility independent of {Y2 ,Y3 }.
Proof: The assumptions mean
(6.122)
where Y3 is arbitrarily chosen, and
(6.123)
Setting Y3 = Y3, substituting (6.123) into the right-side of
(6.122), and rearranging terms yields
u(Yl'Y2'Y3) = f(Y3) + g(Y3) c(Y2) + g(Y3) d(y2 ) u(Yl,Yj).
(6.124)
Evaluating (6.124) at Ｈ ｙ ｬ Ｇ ｙ ｾ Ｇ ｙ ｾ Ｉ Ｇ solving for u(yl,Yj), and
substituting this result back into (6.124) proves the desired
result. ｾ
The previous two results allow us to independently focus
on the decision-maker's preferences over utility independent
chains and their elements without worrying about the levels
of the other attributes once they have been fixed at any
convenient level. For instance', in Example 6.5 of Section 6.10,
we did not need the condition that X5 was utility independent
of X5 in order to arrive at (6.97). By using Theorem 6.19,
we only needed that X5 was conditionally utility independent
of X given X was fixed at some convenient level x 6' This6 56 5
latter condition would be much easier to verify than the former.
Concerning additive independence, we have
Theorem 6.20. If (i) Yl and Y2 are conditionally additive
independent given Y3 , (ii) Yt and Y3 are conditionally additive
oindependent given Y2' and (iii) Y2 and Y3 are conditionally
o
additive independent given Yl' then Yl , Y2 , and Y3 are
additive independent.
Proof: Conditions (ii) and (iii) imply, respectively, that
(6.125)
and
(6.126)
where
Thus, sUbstituting (6.125) and (6.126) into (6.114), which
follows from condition (i), we find
o 0 0 0 0 0
= u(Yl'Y2'Y3) + u(Yl'Y2'Y3) + u(Yl'Y2'Y3)'
(6.127)
Expression (6.127) is the additive utility function from which
additive independence directly follows. ｾ
6.11.5. An Example Illustrating the Hierarchical Structure
We will propose a simplified version of a regulation
problem typical of those facing the various segments of govern-
ment to illustrate some of the ideas introduced here. In
particular, suppose a state is considering passing legislation
requiring that seat belts be worn by all state highway users.
The overall objective of such a program is state to "improve
the well-being" of motorists in the state. Subobjectives are
to minimize physical harm to motorists and to keep monetary
costs as low as possible. Thus we might define our overall
attribute X as "well-being," where Yl is "physical harm" and
Y2 is "monetary costs." Furthermore, suppose that Yl is
broken into attributes Xl and X2 representing deaths and
serious injuries, respectively, and that Y2 is broken into
attributes X3 and X4 representing costs to motorists and costs
to the state, respectively. The measures of effectiveness
which will be used for each of the attributes are listed in
Table 6.4. Figure 6.7 should be useful in illustrating the
hierarchical structure of the attributes.
Our next step in an analysis, and the step of interest
here, would be to assess a utility function u(x). Clearly
u(x) can also be written as u(Yl'Y2) or u(x l ,x2 ,x3 ,x 4). A
reasonable place to begin to structure u might be with the
additive independence assumption discussed in Section 5.3.
The first place we check is whether this condition holds for
attribute Yl and Y2 and suppose it does not. But we do verify
that Yl is preferentially independent of Y2 and that Xl is
utility independent of {x2 ,Y2 }. Then from Theorem 6.6, Yf
is utility independent of Y2 . Suppose we also find that Y2
X5IDotorist well-being
Xl;: motorist
deaths
X Ｒ［ｾ･ｾｩｯｾｳ I
ln urles, Ix 3=costs tomotorists ｾ 4:.costs to[ state
H,ero,.,-c\"; q. \ ｓＭｴｲ｜ａＨｾｾ of A-t-t.-'l l., ...-tQ..,£
-f-c-(' -nu... ｳｾｾ 'BQ\-t Probl(lyy\
is utility independent of Yl , so from Theorem 5.2,
o 0 0 0
= u(Yl'Y2) + u(Yl'Y 2) + kU(Y l 'Y2) u(Yl'Y2)'
(6.128)
------_. -- -------------- _. -. - -- - - - -----.-_ .. ｟ Ｍ ｾ Ｍ Ｍ Ｍ ----
Table 6.4
Attributes and Measures for the Seat Belt Problem
Attribute Measures of Effectiveness
Xl - motorist deaths annual number of highway deaths
in state
X2 - motorist serious
injuries
X3 - monetary costs to
motorists
X4 - monetary costs to state
annual number of highway serious
injuries
dollar cost to install seat
belts in a car
annual dollar cost to maintain
program
_._----------------._---------_._-----....,
From the fact Xl was utility independent of
ascertain Xl and X2 are
d . 0pen ent glven Y2 .
We wish to go further if possible and simplify both
o 0
u(Y l ,Y 2 ) and u(Y l ,Y2 ). Taking these in order, suppose we
conditionally mutually utility inde-
{X2 ,Y2}, we knew this held for Xl. It follows from Theorem 6.12
that
where the origin is still set by ｵ Ｈ ｹ ｾ Ｌ ｹ ｾ Ｉ
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Notice the scaling of u has not yet been specified.
oNow we go on to u(Yl'Y2)' which for purposes here will
obe written u(Yl'x 3 ,x 4). After checking, suppose we can con-
clude only X4 is conditionally utility independent of X3
ogiven Yl. This means a result analogous to Theorem 5.6 in
Section 5.6 is valid and
(6.130)
where the origin is set by ｵ Ｈ ｹ ｾ Ｌ ｸ ｾ Ｌ ｸ ｾ Ｉ = 0 and the scale by
( 0 0 I)u y l ,x3 ,x4 = 1.
Since the three utility functions of (6.128), (6.129),
and (6.130) all have the same origin and the scale is only
specified in (6.130), we can directly substitute (6.129) and
(6.130) into (6.128) to get an expression for u(x l ,x 2 ,x3 ,x 4 )
. 000 000 000ln terms of u(x l ,x2 ,x3 ,x 4 ), u(x l ,x 2 ,x 3 ,x4), u(x l ,x2 ,x 3 ,x4 ),
00000 I
u(x l ,x2 ,x3 ,x4 ), u(x l ,x2 ,x 3 ,x4 ), k, and k l where the origin
and scale of u are set by
and
respectively. Thus, in this example, by exploiting independence
and conditional independence conditions, the assessment of the
four-attribute utility function u has been simplified to tne
consistent assessment of five one-attribute conditional utility
53i
functions and two additional scaling constants. This means
seven scaling constants are required in all--one each to
specify a second point on each of the conditional utility
functions which already have the same origin plus k and k .
1
6.12. SUMMARY
This chapter develops representation theorems that are
suitable for a decision-maker's utility function given various
sets of assumptions about his basic preferences. Relation-
ships amongst various assumptions are investigated with two
purposes in mind: (1) to weaken the assumptions necessary to
imply particular forms of utility function, and (2) to
understand and exploit fully all the implications of an
arbitrary set of preference assumptions. An oversimplified
summary of the results of Chapters 3, 5, and 6 is given in
Table 6.5.
As one begins to generalize the two-attribute results of
Chapter 5 to more than two attributes, one fact is apparent.
In three or more dimensions, the richness of possible sets of
preferential and utility independence assumptions increases
greatly for two reasons: first, the existence of independence
conditions over overlapping attributes, and second, the
existence of ｣ ｯ ｮ ､ ｩ ｴ ｩ ｯ ｾ ｾ ｾ preferential and utility independence
assumptions. We have attempted to illustrate this richness by
the results stated.
For most real problems, we would expect that collectiyely,
the techniques presented in chapters 3 through 6 should
Table 6.5. Independence Assumptions in Multiattribute Utility Theory
Given: Consequences x = (x l ,x2 ' .•. ,xn) = (y,z)
AI i-s reflexiveｾ ｳ not ref:exive131PI is not reflexive; Y PI Z does not
imply Z PI Y
ｾｯｴＲＺ
ＡｾＧＭ
Assumption Preferential Independence (PI) Utility Independence (UI) I Additive Independence (AI)
I
Concerns Preferences for consequences (y,z) Preferences for lotteries over I Preferences for lotteries over
with z held fixed over (y,z) with z held fixed I (y,2) with both y and z varying
, I! Definition Y is PI of Z if preferences for con- y is DI of Z if preferences fer I Y and Z are AI if preferences for
I sequences (y,ZI) with Zl fixed don1t lotteries on (y,z') with z' fixed i lotteries (y,2) depend only on
! depend en the amount Zl don't depend on the amount z' i the marginal probability distri-I I but ions en y and z
! I I
I Matherrctical ｾ Ｈ ｹ ｡ Ｌ ｺ Ｇ ﾻ ｵ Ｈ ｹ ｢ Ｌ ｺ Ａ Ｉ ｝ Ｍ Ｋ ｛ Ｎ Ｎ ｬ Ｈ ｹ ｡ Ｌ ｺ ﾻ ｵ Ｈ ｹ ｢ Ｌ ｺ ｊ Ｌ :J(y,z) = fez) + g(z) u(y,zo),g>c i «yl ,z'),(yO,zo)),.,,«y, Ｌ ｺ ｯ Ｉ Ｌ Ｈ ｹ ｏ Ｌ ｺ Ｇ ｙ Ｇ ｾ
II Implication 11 ｾﾷｬ i all y' 70 1 If f ··· a z 0.1 z I J ,loDe lTIHwn !
: : I
, I
i
nI v.(x.) where v's are all
i=l ｾ ｾ
functions
If X. Dr X., i=1,2, ... ,n, then
ｾ ｾ
U(y,z) = kyuyCY) + kZuZ(z)
+ ｫｫｹｫｚｵｹＨｹＩｵｚＨｾＩ
, u (x) =)k. u. (x.) +Ik .. u. (x.) u. (x.)
ｾ ｾ ｾ ｾ Ｎ . ｾｊ ｾ ｾ J 1J>l ｾ
+... +k l u l (Xl) ••• u (x )"'n n n
then
If X. AI X., i=1,2, ... ,n, then
ｾ ｾ
n
u(x) = I k.u. (x.)
i=l ｾ ｾ ｾ
u(y,z) = kyuyCY) + kZuZ(z)
If Y and Z are AI,
I
I
thenIf Y DI Z and Z Dr Y,
theni=2.,3, ... ,n,OJ..t:..., ••
ｬ Ｎ ｾ Ｍ
value
vex) =
If iX, ,x.} PI
ｾ ｾ
I
, :lain Results:
Two attributes
rMain-Results: i
( n attributes
Combining 'PI
and UI
If {xl,Xi } PI Xli' i=2,3, .•. ,n and Xl DI Xl' then either
I,
\
I
n
(1) l+ku(x) = L [l+kk.u. (x.)] or
i=l ｾ ｾ ｾ
n
(2) u(x) = L k.u. (x.)
i=l ｾ ｾ ｾ
J I_ __---l.-__ ｾ ｾ ｾ L iI ill)ｉｾ
significantly help to specify a "reasonable" representation
of the decision-maker's preferences, provided that the problem
has been structured with meaningful objectives and attributes
in the sense discussed in Chapter 2. A number of researchers,
including Yntema and Torgerson [1961J, Fisher [1972 , 1973J,
von Winterfeldt and Edwards [1973a, 1973b], and Dawes and
Corrigan [1974J, have results which lend support to this claim.
The cases discussed in Chapters 7 and 8 provide additional
supporting evidence.
ｓｾＴ
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Appendix 6A
Generalization of Preferential Independence and Utilitl_Independence
Suppose that we have vector attributes Y and Z, and that
given Z is zO, there is a definite preference for different
levels of Y. If this is quantified by the value function
ｶ Ｈ ｹ Ｌ ｾ Ｉ Ｌ then if
we define Y to be preferentially independent of Z. Thus, given
a ｾＧ the conditional preference order of y is the same regard-
less of the z chosen. If the reverse order on Z occurs for
some ｾ Ｇ Ｌ that is
we will say conditional preferences on y given ZO and ｾ Ｇ are
reversals of each other. One could also have indifference on
Y given Z is some other level z". We will say that Y is
generalized preferentially ｩ ｮ ､ ･ ｅ ･ ｮ ､ ｾ ｾ ｾ of Z if, given any two
levels of Z, say ｾ Ｇ and ｾ Ｂ Ｌ the two orderings of Z given ｾ Ｂ
are either identical, reversals of each other, or indifference
exists among the y. A bit more mathematically, Y is
generalized preferentially independent of Z if,
where the only restriction on f(z) is that it is scalar valued.
If f > 0, we have the case where Y is preferentially indepen-
dent of Z.
In a similar manner, we can have reversals of preferences
among lotteries over Y for different amounts of Z.
generalized utility independent of Z, then
If Y is
where ZO is chosen so that there is a definite conditional
opreference on Y given z and h can be negative, zero, or
positive. If ｨ Ｈ ｾ Ｇ Ｉ is negative, then preferences over
lotteries on Y given z' are a reversal of the order on
athese lotteries given z. Of course, when h > 0, then we
have the utility independent case considered in detail in the
chapter.
In Fishburn and Keeney [1974, 1975J, it is shown that
results analogous to many in this chapter can be derived
using the weaker generalized preferential independence and
generalized utility independent condition rather than
preferential and utility independence. Some results, however,
do not follow due to the reversals of preferences.
Appendix 6B
Evaluating the Scaling Constant k in the Multiplicative
Utility Function
Taking x = x* in (6.14) yields
n
k + 1 = II
i=l
(1 + kk.) .
l.
(6B. 1)
By evaluat}ng (6.12) at ｸ ｾ and ｸ ｾ we have k. = u ＨｸｾＩ , and
l. 1 l. l.
ｫ ｵ Ｈ ｸ ｾ Ｉ + 1 II (1 + kk. ) k+l= =l. j1l J kk.+ll.
or
1 = k. + [1 + kk.J u ＨｸｾＩ .
l. l. l.
( 6B. 2 )
Since k. < 1 and the u-value above is positive, it follows
l.
from (6B.2) that
1 + kk. > o.
l.
(6B. 3)
Comparing the signs of the two sides of (6B.l), we infer
k > -1.
n
Now let S = I k. , and introduce the polynomial
i=l l.
n
f (q) = 1 + q - II (1 + k. q) , (-1 < q < (0) ,
i=l l.
(6B. 4)
(6B. 5)
so that (6B.l) says that f(k) = 0; note also that f(-l) < O.
Differentiating (6B.5) gives
n
l-f'= I k. II (l+k.q),
i=l 1 i1j J
(6B. 6)
which shows that l-f' is an increasing function and hence f'
is decreasing.
First suppose S = 1, i.e., f' (0) = O. Then since f'
is decreasing in (-1,00), it is positive in (-1,0) and nega-
tive in (0,00). Thus q = 0 is the only root of f(q) = 0 in
(-1,00 ), and so S = 1 implies k = 0 and corresponds only to
the additive utility function.
Next suppose S < 1, i.e., f' (0) > O. Then since f'
is decreasing, it is positive in (-1,0), so that f(q) = 0
has no root between (-1) and the root at O. It follows
from (6B.6) that f' (00) = _00 and so f' (q) = 0 has a unique
root q* in (0,00). Since f(O) = 0 and f' > 0 in (o,q*),
f(q) = 0 has no root in (O,q*). Since f(q*) > 0, and f'
is negative and decreasing to (_00) in (q*,oo), f(q) = 0 has
a unique root k in (q*,oo); moreover f > 0 in (O,k) and
f < 0 in (k,oo), so that the iterative method described in
the text works provided the search for k is confined to (0,00).
Finally, suppose S > 1, i.e., f' (0) < O. Since f' is
decreasing, it is negative in (0,00), so that f(q) = 0 can
have no root to the right of the root at q = O. Since f > 0
immediately to the left of this root, while f(-l) < 0, there
must be at least one root k of f(q) = 0 in (-1,0); since f'
is decreasing and f(O) = 0, there can be at most one such
root, and the iterative method described in the text is valid,
provided the search for k is confined to (-1,0).
Appendix 6C
An Interactive ｃ ｯ ｭ ｾ ｾ ｾ ｅ ｟ ｾ ｅ ｯ ｧ ｲ ｡ ｭ for Assessing and Using Multi-
attribute Utility Functions*
Section 6.6 discussed and illustrated the considerations
necessary for assessing multiattribute utility functions.
The task is difficult and the current state-of-the-art of
unaided empirical assessement (i.e., with the lack of direct
computer support) has some shortcomings. The most important
of these are as follows:
(1) the necessity to ask 'extreme value' questions
to keep the computational requirements for speci-
fying a utility function to a manageable level,
(2) the tedium of calculating the component utility
functions and scaling constants even in this case,
(3) the lack of immediate feedback to the decision-
maker of the implications of his preferences,
(4) the absence of an efficient procedure to 'update'
the decision-maker's preferences and conduct
sensitivity analysis.
This section describes the major features of a computer
package designed to alleviate the above shortcomings with
existing methods for the assessment and use of multiattribute
utility functions. The package is referred to by the
mnemcnic MUFCAP standing for "multiattribute utility function
*
This section was adapted from Keeney and Sicherman [1975].
In Section 9.7, an analogous 'interactive computer program
is described which is designed for intertemporal tradeoffs.
calculation and assessment package." At present, some of the
subroutines in the package are rather crude. However, the
package is operational, and as a first try, indicates a
worthwhile direction to proceed.
6e.l. Applicability of the Functional Forms
In terms of the required assessments and general robust-
ness, the additive and multiplicative utility functions
appear to be the practical ones for say n ｾ 4. Even when
the requisite assumptions do not precisely hold over the
domains of all the attributes, it may be a good approximation
(see von Winterfeldt and Edwards [197 3b]> to assume they do or
it may be reasonable to integrate different additive and
multiplicative utility functions over separate regions of
these attributes. Furthermore, by nesting one multiattribute
utility function inside another, a technique described in the
next paragraph, additional flexibility in the preference
structure can be aChieved.
The results of Theorem 6.1 (multiplicative utility
function) and Theorem 6.4 (additive utility function) are
valid regardless of whether the Xi's are scalar attributes
or vector attributes. This means that the x. 's can be
1
either scalars or vectors. In the former case, the component
utility functions u i are single-attribute utility functions,
whereas in the latter case, u. is itself a multiattribute
1
utility function. If Xi is a vector attribute, it is possible,
subject to satisfying the requisite assumptions, to reuse-
Theorem 6.1 or 6.4 in structuring u .•
1
In such a case, we
<)41
will say u. is a nested multiattribute utility function.
1
That is, u. is a multiattribute utility functicn nested within
1
the multiattribute utility function u.
Nesting multiplicative forms provides an extra degree
of freedom in the problem by having an extra independent
scaling constant. Without nesting, using the mUltiplicative
utility function, the number of independent scaling constants
is equal to the number n of attributes. However, suppose
the last single utility function u is a multiplicative
n
utility function nest.ed within the overall utility function
and that u has three single attributes. Then one would
n
need n scaling constants for the "outer multiplicative
utility function" and three for the "inner multiplicative
utility function" for a total of n + 3, even though there
are only n + 2 single attributes, Xl' ... 'X
n
_ l and the three
single attributes in u. The degree of freedom afforded by
n
the extra parameter permits tradeoffs between two attributes
to be dependent on a third. This allows for some violation
of the preferential independence conditions. By various
nesting schemes, enough extra constants could be provided
to model situations in which tradeoffs between many pairs
of attributes depend on the level of other attributes. The
additive and multiplicative utility functions are simple
enough to be tractable and yet, especially with nesting,
robust enough to adequately quantify preferences for many
problems. In practice, however, assessing and using these
multiattribute utility functions is "easier said than done."
In all that follows, we will assume that the assumptions
implying that the multiattribute utility function is either
additive or multiplicative have been verified. Also, since
the procedures for assessing the basic components, the u. 's
1
and k. IS, of both the multiplicative and additive utility
1
functions are essentially the same, there is no need to
consider the cases separately. Recall that the extra constant
k in the multiplicative form is calculated directly from the
k. IS. For illustration, the multiplicative form will be
1
used for both the overall utility function u and any nested
utility function. In the remainder of this section, we
summarize the MUFCAP package. Details and a listing of the
program are found in Sicherman [1975J. The abbreviation MUF
will mean a multiattribute utility function of either multi-
plicative or additive form.
6C. 2. Com"'TIancts to Structure the Uti 1 i ty Function
Structuring a utility function consists of specifying
a functional form, its attributes, and the ranges for each
of the attributes. MUFCAP has several commands for struc-
turing a utility functicn. The INPUT command requests a
name for the utility function and asks for the number of
attributes which are arguments of this function. The pack-
age then requests a name and a range for scalar attributes.
This consists of two numbers which bound the amounts to be
considered for each attribute. To specify a vector attri-
bute, one inputs a range with one bound equal to the other
bound such as 0, O. MUFCAP recognizes this as a signal for
a vector attribute and notes that the u. associated with that
1
attribute is a nested MUF. The package then requests the
number of attributes which are arguments of this nested MUF.
For each of these a name and range will be solicited. Further
levels of nesting could be specified if desired and the infor-
mation requested would be analogous to the material above.
After a nested MUF is completely specified, the program
returns to ask for the names and ranges for whatever attributes
have not yet been covered in the outer MUF. When all the
attributes have been input, the structure is complete and
MUFCAP requests a new command from the user.
The INPUT command provides for all the bookkeeping which
will be necessary for information to follow. Each k. and ｵ ｾ Ｌ
1 1
including those in a nested MUF, can be accessed using the
name of the attribute with which it is associated. The
INPUT command is quite flexible in having no limit to the
degree of nesting allowed.
In addition to INPUT, the package has commands for
adding or deleting attributes to or from the utility function.
It also has a command for switching the order of the attri-
butes in a utility function. In this way, attributes may be
conveniently "regrouped" to alter the model for the problem
in terms of different nesting schemes.
6C.3. Commands to Specify the Single Attribute Utility ｆ ｵ ｮ ｣ ｴ ｩ ｾ ｮ ｳ
The next step in assessing a MUF involves specifying the
u. 's for the single attributes. As noted in Chapter 4,
1
sophisticated computer programs do exist for assessing single
s44
(scalar) attribute utility functions. One could incorporate
these into MUFCAP. Initially, however, for simplicity in
the current package, a subroutine for assessing undimensional
utilty functions, referred to as UNIF was developed.
MUFCAP has available commands to specify conveniently
three types of unidimensional utilty functions: linear,
exponential, and piecewise linear. As indicated in Chapter
4, the linear utility function implies risk neutrality. This
form requires no more information than the range of the
attribute. The exponential forms implies constant risk
aversion or constant risk proneness. It requires the
specification of a certainty equivalent for a single lottery.
Given this, the exponential form is fitted and scaled auto-·
matically by the program. The piecewise linear utility
function is specified by providing the abscissa and ordinate
values for n points (3 2 n < 15) of the utility function.
This form can be used for non-monotonic or S-shaped utility
functions. These three types provide the user with the means
of conveniently specifying his preferences for many situ-
ations. More forms can easily be added to the package in the
future.
MUFCAP also has commands which enable a user to display
any assessed ucidimensional utility function to check its
appropriateness. The command UNICAL calculates the utility
for one or a series of attribute levels. INVERSE calculates
the attribute level corresponding to a given utility.
LOTTERY evaluates the certainty equivalent for any lottery
with n ｣ｯｮｳ･ｱｬｊ･ｮ｣Ｈｾｳ and their associated probabilities over
that attribute, where 2 ｾ n < 15. When there are two conse-
quences, LOTTERY can also calculate the probability which
will make the lottery indifferent to a given certainty
equivalent.
To summarize, MUFCAP has convenient commands to assess
u. 's which arp llni.c1imensional l1tilLty functions and to
1
examine their implications as a check on their reasonableness.
Using the ;:l.ttr:i rllte names as identif iers, MUFCAP allows
the user to set the scaling constants in the MUF corresponding
to each attribute. :ff X.
1
is a vector attribute, the u.
1
associated with ｩ ｾ ｪ ｾ 3 MUP ｗｪｾｬｬ its own internal scaling
constants. BV rni""ry;nq ｾ Ｈ Ｚ tho t\;:lUlE' of t.his vector attri-
bute, the user Ｈ ｾ ｡ ｮ ｾ ｾ ｰ ｰ Ｇ Ｎ ﾷ ｩ ｦ ｹ t'jvc> tnt'ernC11 scaling constants
for the associated nest MUF. When all the k. 's for a particu-
1
lar MUF have hr,en set-, the program automatically calculates
the correspondj.ng k (see Appendix GE).
Once u. Ｇ ｾ Ｑ Ｉ ｾ ｪ ｬ ｊ ･ heen eva Luated, t.he p.3.ckage has several
1
commands useful for c1 sc;E'ss:Lnq the k. 's in any particular MUF.
J -
The command Ji\1DIF2 takes as input two pairs of two indifference
consequences each. These consequpnces can vary only in terms
of the tW() att. r i.butes, say X. and X _ Their seal ing constants
'. J m
k. and k a.re the object of assessment. Using the MUF and
J m
the ｳ ｩ ｮ ｧ ｬ ･ Ｍ Ｍ ｡ ｴ Ｂ ｴ ｊ ｾ ｢ ｮ ｴ Ｚ ｣ ｾ utility functions, the program computes
the relative value of k. and k implied by the indifference
J m
pairs. With TNDIF2, the' user is not limited to choosing
consequences which have one attribute at a least desirable
level in order to determine the relative k. 'so
1
Given the information from INDIF2, indifference curves
over attributes X. and X can be calculated with the command
J m
IMAP. IMAP permits a user to get immediate feedback on
the implications of the relative k. 's which he has specified.
1
He can quickly see if the points "claimed" to be indifferent
really appear so to him. If not, the relative k. 's can be
1
changed until they represent the user's preferences for
tradeoffs between those attributes.
Once we know the relative k. 's, the command INDIFI takes
1
as input a single pair of indifference consequences and
computes the k and the absolute magnitude of the k. 's implied
1
by that pair and the relative k. 'so For consistency checks,
1
a new indifference pair of consequences can be input into
INDIFI, which then computes the factor by which the current
k. 's need to be multiplied to be consistent with the indif-
1
ference point just given. MUFCAP provides a routine which
allows the user to multiply the currently assigned k. 's for
1
any MUF by any factor. In this way, INDIFI enables the
calculation of the magnitude of the k. 's using an indif-
1
ference relation instead of a lottery over all the attributes
at once.
6C.5. Commands for Evaluating Alternatives and Sensitivity
Analysis
Once the u. 's and k. 's have been set, the utility
1 1
function is completely specified and can be used. To help
explore the implications of the utility function and to perform
'rough' analysis, MUFCAP has commands for specifying two kinds
of alternatives; those with certainty and those with uncer-
tainty. For 'certainty' alternatives, which are simply
consequences, uniattribute amounts are solicited until the
alternative is completely described. For 'uncertainty'
alternatives, at present, MUFCAP assumes probabilistic inde-
pendence and requests a probability distribution function
for each single attribute. The probability distribution
function currently used is a piecewise linear approximation
to the cumulative probabilty distribution for X.. The user
1.
supplies n abscissa-ordinate pairs, where 2 < n < 9 to
specify the cumulative distribution. Then MUFCAP calculates
the expected utilities for probabilistic alternatives. The
cumulative distribution was chosen rather than the probability
density function because the fractile method of assessing
probabilities (see Schlaifer [1969J) yields points of the
cumulative distribution. Other forms of probability distri-
butions such as the Gaussian as well as probabilistic depen-
dencies could be added to the package in the future.*
The specified alternatives are given names by the user.
With these names, the user may add, change,or delete alter-
*It is easy to use Monte Carlo techniques to find the expec-
ted utility values for dependent probability distributions.
The Monte Carlo routine would generate a sequence of
a. 1 T ct{x a = 1,2, ... } and one would then compute T L u(x)
a=l
for T large.
natives. He may also choose the ones which are to be evalu-
ated by listing their names with the appropriate commands
about to be described.
The command EVAL is used to evaluate (i.e. compute the
expected utility for) any alternative or group of alternatives.
By specifying a group of alternatives differing slightly in
in some feature, one can conduct a sensitivity analysis of
the probabilistic inputs. Also, EVAL will compute the
expected utilities for any multiattribute utility function
specified in the command. Thus, using EVAL, one can conduct
a sensitivity analysis of the preference structure by
varying parameters, such as the scaling constants, in the
multiattribute utility function. In this same way,
different utility functions of members of a decision-
making group can be used to evaluate and rank the
alternatives. This might help clarify differences of opinion
and suggest certain creative compromises if needed.
The command GRAD evaluates the gradient of a utility
function at any number of specified consequences. The
gradient is defined as the vector ｏ ｾ ｬ Ｇ ｾ ｾ Ｒ Ｇ .•.• ｾ ｾ ｮ Ｉ and
indicates the direction of the steepest increase in the
utility function at a specified point. The gradient com-
ponents tells us which attribute level changes would yield
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large increases in utility. This could be useful in gener-
ating worthwhile alternatives. Of course, one must keep in
mind the scales of the attributes in interpreting the gradient.
In addition to the gradient, GRAD also computes the
vector Ｈ ｾ ｾ ｬ Ｇ ｾ ｾ Ｒ Ｇ ... , ｾｾｮＩﾷ Each component represents the
rate of change of u with respect to a change in the utility
u .. These components reveal the attributes for which an
1
increase in its utility will yield the largest increase in u.
The advantage of calculating these quantities in addition
to the gradient components are (a) components can be calcu-
lated for MUF's as well as unidimensional utility functions,
and (b) the unit of measurement for a uniattribute does not
distort the magnitude of the component. Thus in some cases,
ｾ ｵ might better indicate possible improved alternatives
oU.
1 dUthan Ｍ ｾ Ｍ Ｍ Ｎ MUFCAP makes both available.
aX.
1
Summarizing, EVAL permits the evaluation of alternatives,
and along with routines which alter paramters, provides for
sensitivity analysis. GRAD makes use of the analytical
formulation of the problem to calculate quantities useful
in suggesting alternatives which might be better than the
ones currently specified.
ｾ Ｎ General Command Format and Commands for Facilitating
Use of the Package
MUFCAP has the facility for saving the current status
of the multiattribute utility structure and the current
alternatives in a file of the user's choosing to be read in
at a later time. This gives MUFCAP the capability for filing
away several different MUF models as well as a large number
of alternatives for the same problem. It also allows the
user to build up his model over many different sessions at
the terminal and restore any status he has saved away with
which he wishes to calculate at any particular time.
Another feature of MUFCAP is the supplying of default
settings when the INPUT command is used to structure the
MUF for the problem. After INPUT, the default for all MUF's
is the additive form, with all the k. 's equal to each other,
ｾ
and for all unidimensional utility functions, it is the
linear utility function. With these defaults, the user is
set to calculate immediately after input. Thus feedback
can begin right away without requiring the user to completely
specify everything first. Scaling constants and utility
functions can then be altered after observing some feedback
to refine the model for the problem.
Finally, MUFCAP provides commands to print out the
current status of the assessments. There are routines to
display the kits and k for any MUF, the range and type for
any single-attribute utility function, the probability distri-
bution of any attribute for any alternative, the multiattri-
bute utility function structure (i.e. nesting), and the
currently defined alternatives. Commands are also provided
for easily changing parameters such as individual k. 's or
ｾ
the components of any alternative.
6C.7. Summary
The current version of MUFCAP provides the basic features
necessary to assess and use multiattribute utility functions
on complex decision problems. In particular, it permits
one to use realistic and simple questions in assessing the
decision-maker's preferences, rather than the 'difficult to
think about' types of questions previously used for compu-
tational reasons. MUFCAP provides for (1) a variety of
immediate feedback of implications of the decision-maker's
responses, (2) evaluation of alternatives and sensitivity
analysis, and (3) analyzing differences of preferences and
judgments among various individuals in a decision-making
group.
The present MUFCAP should be considered a first edition,
a basis on which to improve. Some possible improvements of
existing routines have been suggested in this section such
as a more sophisticated single-attribute utility function
assessment technique and potential for evaluating alter-
natives where probabilistic independence need not be assumed.
The program could then be easily coupled with simulation
models producing such probability distributions. Other
important improvements would inlcude the addition of new
routines (1) to help in verifying preferential and utility
independence assumptions, (2) to simplify sensitivity analysis
and feedback, perhaps with the aid of graphical displays, and
(3) to conduct conflict analyses in problems involving
more than one decision-maker.
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CHAPTER 7
ILLUSTRATIVE APPLICATIONS
Certainly we are dealing in this book with a non-
vacuous problem: many difficult, real-world decision prob-
lems do involve multiple objectives. Consequently, many
of the concepts we have introduced are relevant and must
be applied in either a formal or informal analysis of the
alternatives. If one chooses to analyze multiple objec-
tives and value or utility tradeoffs in a formal manner,
then immodestly, we believe the ideas and procedures
discussed in this book can often be of considerable use.
The purpose of this chapter and Chapter 8 is to support
this contention by illustrating many cases where multi-
attribute preferences have been formalized. The present
chapter, in a variety of settings, focuses exclusively on
the preference assessments themselves whereas Chapter 8,
which concerns the site selection of an airport for Mexico
City, presents a complete case including probability
assessments, analysis of alternatives, interactions with
the decision makers, and so on, as well as multiattribute
preference assessments.
The applications discussed in this chapter cover the
range of topics presented in Chapter 2 through 6. Section
7.1 discusses the generation of objectives and the specif-
ication of measures of effectiveness for an air-pollution
problem. Section 7.2 discusses the allocation of re-
sources for an educational program and the value functions
of the members of a local school board and other local
education officials are formalized. Next, a five-attribute
utility function for response times of various fire trucks
is assessed. This problem typically arises in planning
operations of emergency services. Section 7.4 addresses
the problem of structuring corporate preferences. In
sections 7.5 and 7.6, we discuss preliminary work on the
quantification of multiattribute preferences concerning
decisions involving the selection of computer systems and
decisions about the siting and licensing of nuclear power
facilities.
The first six sections of this chapter relate in some
depth experiences that we and others have had in assessing
multiattribute preferences. The last section, 7.7, gives
brief surveys of a number of other problems where formal
analyses have explicitly considered multiple objectives
using concepts discussed in earlier chapters. These in-
clude: utilization of frozen blood, sewage sludge disposal,
safety of landing aircraft, choice of a job, shipments of
hazardous materials, medical and surgical treatment of
cleft lip and palate.
Our thesis is that the concepts and procedures intro-
duced in this book are not just of theoretical, but also
of operational interest and they can be--and have been--
utilized to make contributions in a variety of important
....:;:4!::··3
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contexts. Many analysts are currently applying decision
analysis to such crucial problems as those discussed in
this chapter and the inventory of case studies is growing
rapidly.
7.1 AIR POLLUTION CONTROL*
In New York City, the mayor must decide whether he
should approve a proposed major addition to Consolidated
Edison's electric power generating station in Astoria,
Queens. If this addition is approved, City residents would
be reasonably assured of receiving the growing quantity of
electricity they will demand over the next several years
at reasonable cost. However, approval would result in
increased air pollution, particularly in terms of sulfur
dioxide, particulates, and nitrogen oxides. Should this
addition be approved?
In both Boston and New York City, the respective City
Councils must decide whether to pass legislation that would
place stringent limits on the sulfur content of fuels
burned in the city. If passed, the legislation would lead
to a definite improvement in the city's air quality--espe-
cially in terms of the air pollutant: sulfur dioxide.
*This section draws heavily on the dissertation of Ellis
｛ Ｑ Ｙ Ｗ ｾ and adapts material from Ellis and Keeney [1972J.
A related dissertation by Mead ｛ Ｑ Ｙ Ｗ ｾ goes into more depth
on the Astoria problem. Both dissertations were supervised
in part by Raiffa.
However, passage of this legislation would require resi-
dents to incur added annual costs for heating and elec-
tricity to pay for the more expensive fuels with low
sulfur contents. Should these City Councils pass such
legislation?
In Washington, D.C., the u.S. Congress must decide
whether to establish very stringent emission standards
for carbon monoxide, hydrocarbons, and nitrogen oxides
for all motor vehicles manufactured and sold in the
United States. Establishment of these standards would
contribute toward improving the air quality. On the other
hand; they would require the public to pay significantly
more money for new automobiles. Should Congress adopt
these stringent standards?
Each of these decision problems is faced presently
or has been faced recently by public officials. Moreover,
they are representative of a host of similar problems that
public officials increasingly confront. The basic question
is: Should government adopt a specific, proposed program
intended to improve the air quality? With each such ｩ ｮ ｾ
vestigation there is the additional question: "What should
the air quality standard be?"
The major focus of this book has been to describe how
a decision maker--in this case a public official--can
utilize decision analysis to help make up his mind: how
to select a desirable cause of action amongst the myriad
of alternatives he confronts. In this section, we focus
our attention on the selection of a set of objectives and
measures of effectiveness for analyzing governmental pro-
grams designed to better control air pollution. We draw
heavily upon the concepts discussed in Chapter 2.
As a vehicle for illustrating or suggestions, focus
is placed on one specific problem faced by one particular
individual, the Mayor of New York City. Obviously, we
would not expect the Mayor of New York to spend his time
working on details of the air pollution problem. It
would be reasonable, however, to expect members of the
Mayor's staff in the Environmental Protection Administra-
tion and the Department of Air Resources to work on this
problem. These individuals and the Mayor might then re-
view the results and implications of such analyses in
formulating and supporting air-pollution control programs
for New York City.
In the next subsection, a brief overview of the air
pollution control problem in New York City is presented,
along with an introduction to the sulfur-dioxide problem.
Then, objectives and measures of effectiveness are gener-
ated for the analysis of the problem. To avoid leaving
the reader in midstream, the final subsection briefly
sketdhes other aspects of this problem that were examined.
7.1.1 The Air Pollution Control Problem of New York City
A general model of the process by which many air
pollution control programs are designed and evaluated is
shown in Figure 7.1. The main problem with the control
process as it is currently practiced in most municipal
governments is that the outputs are usually not explicit-
ly considered in choosing air pollution policy. The
reason is, of course, understandable. There are simply
too many complexities: the difficulties in defining ap-
propriate output measures, in establishing the relation-
ships between pollution concentrations and these measures,
and in specifying preferences for the various possible
outputs. But since action must be taken in most instances
the feed-back loop goes directly from the measured air
pollution concentrations to the control mechanism. In a
sense; the process can be thought of as being short-circuited
at the dashed line in Figure 7.1. \fuenever this occurs
the decision-making process excludes from formal analysis
the most important information necessary for rational con-
trol. The suggestions here are meant to eliminate the short-
circuit and include the outputs explicitly in the decision·
making process. Of course, we do admit that good informal
analysis often beats poor formal analysis. But our purpose
here is to improve formal analysis.
The Sulfur Decision Problem. A survey of air pollution
problems and current air pollution control programs in
New York is given in Eisenbud [1970J. In 1970 a major
decision still to be made in New York City's air pollution
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control program concerned sulfur dioxide. Table 7.1 pre-
sents a breakdown of the estimated 1972 emissions of sulfur
dioxide from sources within the City (as viewed from 1969).
These estimates accounted for all provisions of existing
laws enacted through mid-1971.
Table 7.1: Estimated 1972 Emissions of Sulfur
ｄ ｩ ｯ ｸ ｩ ､ ｾ inｾ ｾ ｾ ｾ ｟ ｾ ｾ ｾ ｾ ｟ ｾ ｴ ｹ [NYC
Depart_ment_ of Ai_:r:_ ｒ･ｳｯｬｬＺｲＺ｣ｾ＿Ｌ ｟ｬＹＶｾ
Source of Emissions Emissions of Sulfur Dioxide
(tons) (per cent of total)
Incineration of refuse 2,500 (0.6%)
Motor vehicles 20,400 (5.1%)
Industrial processes 9,900 (2.5%)
Space heating 195,300 (49.2%)
Power generation 169,500 (42.6%)
TOTAL 397,600 (100.0%)
Since over ninety per cent of these emissions arise
from the burning of fuels for space heating and power
generation and since the only current, practical way to
reduce emissions from these sources is to lower the sulfur
content of the fuels burned, one important decision faced
by the City was: "should the legal limit on the sulfur
content of fuels burned in the City (then one per cent)
be lowered?"
7.1.2 Identification of Major Objectives
In almost every decision problem faced by the Mayor
of New York City, his most fundamental objective is to
improve the well-being of his constituents. However, one
must spell out in more detail what is meant by this objec-
tive as it pertains to air pollution. Precisely what would
the Mayor like to accomplish by his actions concerning
air pollution? After some serious thought, an evolutionary
process led Ellis to divide the overall objective into five
major objectives:
1. Decrease the adverse effects of air
pollution on the health of New York City
residents.
2. Decrease the adverse economic effects of
air pollution on the residents.
3. Decrease the adverse effects of air
pollution on psychological well-being of
the residents.
4. Decrease the net costs of air pollution
to the city government.
5. Achieve as desirable a political "solution"
as possible.
These objectives require little justification. How·
ever, it should be noted that the second objective is
meant to include costs of the air pollution control
program in addition to costs of pollution itself. The
net costs alluded to in the fourth objective include all
the direct costs, such as the costs of an air pollution
control program, as well as indirect costs such as those
due to migration of businesses and industry from the city,
less tourism, and tax revenue losses resulting from employee
absences, due to sickness caused by air pollution.
Do these five objectives include all the issues of
importance to the Mayor? For instance, nothing has been
said about the overall consequences of the various alter-
natives on New York State, on the Federal government, on
businesses, or on non-residents of New York City. Should
these factors be included in a complete analysis of pro-
posed air pollution control programs? Of course, the
Mayor is concerned about these issues. However, note
that some aspects of these consequences, such as economic
effects due to tourism and businesses moving to the city,
are included in the objective "decrease the net costs of
air pollution to the city government." Benefits to non-
residents from any air pollution program, for example,
are probably highly correlated with the benefits to res-
idents, and therefore in a first approximation could be
ignored. All in all Ellis felt that explicit considera-
tion of any of these additional objectives would not alter
the optimal strategy, and therefore they were initially
excluded from his list of objectives. However, after a
preliminary analysis, he did reexamine these exclusions
--albeit in an informal manner.
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7.1.3 Assigning Attributes to Each Objective
The next task is to identify for each of the objec-
tives suitable attributes that unambiguously indicate the
degree to which the associated objective is achieved.
Health Effects on Residents. Several possible attri-
butes immediately corne to mind for the objective "decrease
the adverse effects of air pollution on the health of
residents." These include the annual number of deaths
attributable to air pollution, the annual number of man-
days of morbidity attributable to air pollution, and some
subjectively assessed health index that includes consider-
ation of both morbidity and mortality.
Important objections can be raised against each of
these. The annual number of deaths attributable to air
pollution is not comprehensive in that it does not account
at all for what is believed to be the more prevalent effect
of air pollution on health--narnely, its effect on morbidity.
Similarly, the annual number of man-days of morbidity does
not account at all for the extremely serious effect of air
pollution on health in terms of mortality.
Thus, it seems clear that no single measure of effec-
tiveness, aside from possibly a subjective health index,
can be identified for this objective. However, because
such an index lacks a physical interpretation, it is not
particularly desirable in terms of the measurability
criterion discussed in Chapter 2. Hence, the alternative
of specifying the major objective in more detail was chosen.
Health considerations were divided into two detailed objec-
tives, "decrease mortality" and "decrease morbidity."
For the first of these, two of the possible measures
of effectiveness are the "annual number of deaths attri-
butable to air pollution" and the inversely oriented scale,
"per capita increase in the number of days of remaining
lifetime due to improved air quality." The first equally
weighs the death of an old person and the death of a child;
whereas the second measure weighs the death of a young
person more heavily. The latter measure was chosen since
it was felt that in this case, it more adequately describes
the impact of a program alternative with respect to "de-
crease mortality."
For the objective "decrease morbidity," the "per
capita decrease in the number of days of bed disability
per year due to improved air quality" was chosen as the
attribute. Obviously, this does not include such effects
as sore eyes which would not force one to a bed. Part of
the consequence of sore eyes is psychological, which can
be accounted for by the third major objective. However,
the physical aspects of sore eyes intuitively seem impor-
tant enough to be formally included in the analysis. To
do this we would suggest calibrating a number of days of
bed disability per year which one would feel is equivalent
to having sore eyes of different levels of severity during
the year. Then for each program alternative, the effects
due to sore eyes would be included in the analysis by
adding an "equivalent number of bed-days disability" to
our measure of ths degree to which "decrease morbidity"
is met.
Economic Effects on Residents. No single attribute
could be identified for the objective "decrease the adverse
economic effects of air pollution on residents of New York
City," because the Mayor would want to consider the eco-
homic impact on residents at various income-levels. As
a compromise Ellis chose to consider a dichotomy: the
economic effects on low-income and on other residents.
Per capita annual net cost to residents was used as the
measure of effectiveness for each group.
Psychological Effects on Residents. There seems to be
no direct measure of effectiveness for the objective Ｂ ､ ･ ｾ
crease the adverse effects of air pollution on the psycho-
logical well-being of the reSidents." One could, however,
define some subjective index and perhaps interview res-
idents about their feelings for various levels of air
quality. But Ellis chose a simpler approach, which used
the daily concentration of sulfur dioxide as a proxy at-
tribute for "psychological well-being."* Since this
pollutant can easily be detected both visually and by
*It is important to emphasize that this concentration level
is to be viewed as a proxy for psychological well-being
only and not for the other objectives.
breathing, it seems reasonable to assume "psychological
well-being" is closely related to the concentration levels.
Economic Effects to the City. As a measure of effec-
tiveness for the fourth objective, "decrease the net costs
of air pollution to the City government" Ellis used "annual
net costs." As mentioned previously, this includes both
direct and indirect costs.
Political Implications. The fifth objective, "achieve
the best political solution to the air pollution problem,"
has no nice objective measure of effectiveness and a sub-
jective index was used. Many considerations must be in-
cluded in measuring the index, such as the possibility of
court suits brought by landlords or home-owners who are
forced to pay higher fuel ｰ ｲ ｩ ｣ ｾ ｳ for heating, the Mayor's
relations with the City Council and with Con Edison and
with any of the political groups in the city, and the
support of the general public for various program alter·
natives. All of these have a potential effect on the
Mayor's political future which also should be taken into
account.
7.1.4 The Final Set of Objectives and Attributes
Figure 7.2 exhibits the hierarchy of objectives and
their associated measures of effectiveness used by Ellis
in his study of air pollution control in New York City.
Of course, there may be important objectives which
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Ellis did not think about that are consequently not in-
cluded in his analysis. However, if one cannot identify
such omissions before utilizing the implications of the
analysis, the same omissions might have occurred if any
less formal procedure for guiding the decision making
process were followed. And in this case we would be no
worse off using formal analysis than not. Admittedly,
with an informal analysis one might think intuitively or
subconsciously about objectives that one might not be able
to articulate. And also admittedly, a formal analysis may
inhibit this mysteriously creative, gestalt way of thinking.
But on the other hand, this type of unstructured intro-
spective analysis is so very private that others cannot
share in the process and suggest additions or modifications
they deem appropriate.
7.1.5 Decision Analysis of the Sulfur-Dioxide Decision
Problem
Since the purpose of this section was to develop
objectives and attributes for the sulfur-dioxide decision
problem, the ensuing analysis will only be briefly men-
tioned. The interested reader may refer to Ellis [1970J
for details of the assessments or to Ellis and Keeney
[1972J for an overview.
Since Ellis' work was done as a doctoral thesis de-
signed to illustrate the methodology, only two alternatives
were explicitly evaluated. These were the status quo,
which entailed maintaining a one percent legal limit on
the sulfur content of oil and coal used in New York City,
and an alternative which lowered the legal limit to 0.37
percent for oil and 0.7 percent for coal. To analyze the
full range of alternatives would require a team of re-
searchers rather than one individual.
The alternatives were evaluated in terms of the seven
attributes defined as follows:
Xl - per capita increase in the number of days
of remaining lifetime,
X2 == per capita decrease in the number of days
of bed disability per year,
X3 - per capita annual net costs to low-income
residents,
X4 == per capita annual net costs to other residents,
Xs ::: daily sulfur-dioxide concentrations in
parts per million,
X6 == total annual net cost to the City government,
X7 ::: subjective index of political desirability.
Joint probability functions describing the possible
impact of the two alternatives were assessed exploiting
probabilistic independence, conditional probability as-
sessments, and a small simulation model. Exploiting some
utility independence assumptions which were deemed to be
appropriate on the basis of discussions with staff mem-
bers in the Department of Air Resources, a seven-attribute
utility function felt to parameterize the Mayor of New
York's preferences was structured.
It is interesting to note that Ellis' did not con-
clude that the Mayor of New York would view each attribute
as utility independent of its complement. The main reason
for this was the feeling that the Mayor would likely be
ncrerisk averse in terms of attributes Xl' X2 , X4 , and Xs
if the political effects were at an undesirable level than
he would given desirable political effects. From his inter-
action with the Department of Air Resources, Ellis did
conclude that for the ranges of the possible consequences,
the attributes X3 , X6 , and X7 were each individually utility
independent of their respective complement. Also, he felt
that given any fixed level of attributes X7 , the attributes
Xl' X2 , X4 , and Xs would each be conditionally utility in-
dependent of the remaining attributes. With these assump-
tions, the assessment of the complete utility function re-
quired (1) assessing seven one-attribute utility functions,
one over each effectiveness measure, and (2) assessing
eighteen scaling constants to insure the seven utility
functionS were properly scaled. No assessments of the
utility function were completed, although details about
the functional form of the utility function and the reason-
ableness of the utility independence are given in Ellis
[1970J. Appropriate techniques for performing each of
the necessary assessments are found in earlier chapters
of this book.
7.1.6 Impact of This Work
The ideas and results expressed in this section may
have had some influence on the thinking of individuals
responsible for air pollution control programs in New
York City. Although no claim can be made concerning
causality, the following events have occurred:
The results of this work, concerning the range of
possible effects of a program which lowered the legal
limits of oil and coal used in the city from the present
one percent to 0.37 and 0.7 percent respectively, were
made available to the New York City Environmental Protec-
tion Administration, which was in the process of preparing
a new air pollution control code for the City. This group
included, as one of the key provisions in its recommended
code to the City Council, a program which was essentially
the same program as the one Ellis analyzed.
These same results, as well as the methods of analysis
upon which these results are based, were presented by
Howard M. Ellis in testimony before the New York City
Council in its legislative hearings on the proposed new
air pollution control code. The code was approved by
the City Council and became law in 1971. Ellis continued
to consult with the City after his thesis was completed.
The present authors suspect that, as is the case with
many analyses of this type, the detailed quantitative
work involved in doing the full-scale study probably
helped the investigator to better understand the quali-
tative implications of the problem, and it was this
qualitative understanding which helped him influence the
governmental officials. Perhaps this level of sophistica-
tion could have come about through other means, but one
should not underestimate the important intellectual and
emotional impact that arises when one is forced to ex-
press vexing tradeoffs in unambiguous quantitative terms.
It forces one to think harder than one is ordinarily ac-
customed to ... especially if one then has to defend his
assessments in front of other experts.
7.2 PREFERENCE TRADEOFFS AMONG INSTRUCTIONAL ｐ ｒ ｏ ｇ ｒ ｦ ｵ ｾ ｓ
Roche* considers the problem faced by a decision
maker who has to choose among alternate budget allocations
to diverse activities which compete for the same scarce
resource. He is concerned about the role played by the
decision maker caught "in the middle." That is a decision
maker who is in the position where he must, on one hand,
obtain funds from some approving authority and, on the
other hand, approve the budgets for programs directed by
professionals in his employ. With a c?nstrained budget
he can increase the budget of one program only at the
*In this section, we summarize and review the work of
Roche [1971J. His doctoral thesis, which was supervised
by Raiffa, makes extensive use of the material in Chapter
3 on tradeoffs under certainty.
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expense of other programs. He must take from Peter to
pay Paul and do it in such a manner to convince his over-
seers of the reasonableness of it all. Roche was moti-
vated to see if formal preference analysis of the type we
are disucssing in this book could help such a man-in-the-
middle both to crystallize his own tradeoffs and to com-
municate this process to the body that controls the dis-
pensation of funds.
Roche chose to study the budget-allocation problem
in the context of a small school district. The school
superintendent was the decision maker lIin the middle,"
Roche's principal client; the people below the superin-
tendent were the school principal and the coordinators of
various educational programs; the people above the super-
intendent were the school board which acted as the funding
agency for the town. School boards in New England have
a great deal of fiscal autonomy and can impose financial
obligations on the town. But, of course, these school-
board members are themselves elected officials so that
the ultimate responsibility does reside in the ｣ ｯ ｬ ｬ ･ ｣ ｴ ｩ ｶ ｾ
ity of town citizenS.
Roche was indeed fortunate--but it was far from all
luck--to find a chairman of a school board and a super-
intendent who were initially interested in pursuing a
pilot test of Roche's ideas. It is a credit to Roche
that the initial curiosity of these cooperating individ-
uals bloomed into full-scale enthusiastic cooperation and, as
we shall see, he was skillful enough in his personal re-
lations to involve other individuals in the measurement
exercise. Roche, in his thesis, disguises the name of
the town, which he fictiously calls "Somerstown," and he
disguises as well the names of the characters that par-
ticipated in the exercise. However, we assure you that
many of the dialogues recorded in the thesis are verbatim
reports of actual measurement sessions.
7.2.1 Refining the Problem
Somers town began a program budgeting effort in
September 1969, a couple of years before Roche entered
the scene. One of the school board members was a.busi-
ness school professor, and it was through his intervention
that the superintendent recast the traditional line-item
budget into a program format. At the junior high-school
level, the basic program format was segregated according
to subject matter. The superintendent and the business
school professor alluded to above, admitted however,
that to their disappointment the program budgeting effort
had practically no effect whatsoever on the reallocation
of funds to different school-subject programs. Each year,
the funds were allocated like the year before except per-
haps for a uniform percentage increase. This background
may partially explain the receptive audience that Roche
received when he approached Somerstown authorities with
the idea of examining fundamental tradeoffs among the
$" -, I
funding of different subjects. We also point out, in the
way of background material, that Somerstown is a small
homogeneous community whose educational program was deemed
comparatively stable and free of the many frictions that
plagued other educational systems at that tumultuous time.
Roche concentrated on the allocation process for four
subject programs in the junior-high program:
i. English/Language Arts
ii. Science
iii. Mathematics
iv. Social Studies
The Somerstown Schools have a coordinator for each
of these programs and the coordinators prepare an 'annual
budget for their respective domains of responsibility.
Each feels a responsibility to do better each year than
the year before and each tries to get increases in funding
for his or her program--the usual advocacy procedure.
When Mr. A asks for an increase, he seldom feels obliged
--nor would it be considered good form--to argue that the
money he is seeking should come from Mr. B's program.
It is the task of the superintendent to juggle these re-
quests and to suggest a compromise among them in a fashion
that maintain the loyalty of his staff and at the same
time gains the acceptance of the school committee.
The first half of the thesis is concerned with the
creation of a suitable production function: the trans-
formation of financial and personnel inputs to educational
Ｕ Ｗ ｾ
outputs--no mean task! For a long time before Roche
started his probing, the Somerstown school authorities
worried about educational indices. Several indicators
could be chosen but many are highly correlated and for
convenience of the exercise, Roche and his collaborators
chose for each of the four subjects the index, "Percent-
age of students achieving at or above grade level on the
standardized achievement test."
In a later chapter of his thesis Roche does discuss
the inadequacy of this output measure. He defends his
use of it, however, on pragmatic grounds and he does dis-
cuss what other researchers might do if they were to choose
other output indices. We feel that the chosen index is
far from a good surrogate for educational performance and
we feel that it is not an elementary task to suggest how
Roche's analysis could proceed using a more sensitive set
of output indices. But for the time being we are stuck
with the index used and let us get on with the story even
though it is marred by the exclusive use of this over-
simplified output index.
7.2.2 Relating Program Costs to Output
Let us look at the process Roche followed in con-
fronting the science coordinator. The science budget for
the existing year was $81,000 and 59% of the students
performed at, or better than their specified grade level.
Roche first inquired about the effects of dropping the
science program altogether. The coordinator did concede
that many of the students would continue to perform at or
above the hurdle level. He then inquired about the effect
of a 10% increase, (i. e., an increase of $8,100). "What
'would I be allowed to do with the money?", Dave Flaherty
queried.
"It's up to you,ll responded Roche. liThe essential
point is, Dave, that none of us knows how to use an ad-
ditional $8,100 in science better than you do. Once you
decide what you would do with the $8,100 I will ask you
to assess what impact those additional funds would have
on the students in the same way we did before. That is,
we shall ask in turn: What would you do with the increased
funds? Which levels or sections in which grades would be
effected? What would you expect the effect would be along
the dimension of number of students achieving at or above
grade level in science?1I
Roche coached Dave Flaherty to think hard about the
questions posed. He encouraged the science coordinator
to steep himself in the past data, to think about the in-
creased money not in the abstract but in terms of what it
would buy in the form of additional teaching help or ad-
ditional audio-visual facilities, and so on, and to think
about the effect on individual students. He posed such
questions as: IIIf you do so-and-so, would this really
help Mary Jane over the hurdle?1I
The production function ideally should have been
probabilistically assessed but all Roche had the courage
and time to do was to elicit in each case a median value;
i.e. a value for which the assessor thought the true value
would be equally likely to fall above or below the ･ ｳ ｴ ｩ ｾ
mated value. He formalized the assessment procedure in
terms of a written protocol with several pages of work
sheets that the coordinator took many hours over a period
of days to answer.
The end product that Roche sought from the science
coordinator was a curve that plotted estimated performance
(% at or above grade level) on the vertical axis against
budgetary values on the horizontal axis. This curve, the
assessed production function, was meant to go through a
pivot point at the status quo level--i.e., a budget of
$81,000 produces a performance of 59%.
After Flaherty completed the work sheets prepared by
Roche, he was presented with the following task: II Now
that you (Flaherty) have completed the assessment questions,
we would like to probe your qualitative judgement about
the possible shapes of a performance function for the
Somerstown Junior High Science Program. II Roche then
showed Flaherty several shaped curves as shown in Figure
7.3 and they discussed the qualitative meaning of each.
After Flaherty seemed to understand the implications of
each shape he was asked to select one of the shapes pre-
sented or to invent a shape that reflected his true
feelings.
80%
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In a gentle manner Roche discussed with Flaherty
some of his responses and indicated some inconsistencies
amongst the answers he recorded--but he did this corrective
procedure with the supportive advice that Flaherty should
not be embarrassed at these inconsistencies, since anyone
put into his position would be equally inconsistent. The
important thing was to have Flaherty reflect and ponder
about these inconsistencies and then try to modify some
of his earlier assessments so that the revised set of
responses would be internally consistent. And what is
perhaps more important, the revised answers should be
felt to accurately portray the current best assessments
Flaherty could make in light of his new level of under-
standing.
All we can hope to do here in this summary is to give
the reader a flavor of the care that Roche took to gener-
ate a performance function from each of the four coordi-
nators. The superintendent, Dr. Nelson, had his own views
about these performance assessments and felt compelled in
some circumstances to modify the assessments of his ｳ ｵ ｢ ｾ
ordinates. Dr. Nelson remarked, however, that if this
assessment process were to be repeated year after year
then he would be able calibrate his coordinators on the
basis of a track record. The school committee, which
monitored the entire exercise felt that it was most ap-
propriate for the superintendent to modify these per-
formance functions in collaboration with his coordinators,
since the school committee superintendent had to take
full responsibility for the finally recorded performance
functions. The committee explicitly stated that their
deliberations would be based primarily on the super-
intendent's own assessments, which, in turn, would be
based in part on the inputs he received from his coordi-
nators.
7.2.3 Assessing a Value Function
Now let us turn to the second part of the thesis
dealing with preference structures. Roche investigated
the preference structures of several concerned indivuduals
for different performance profiles. A typical profile is
a four-tuple (xLA ' xs ' xM' x SS ) which refers to performance
scores on language-arts, science, mathematics, and social
sciences respectively, and where x LA ' for example, repre-
sents the percentage of students at or above grade level
in language/arts.
As is evident in Figure 7.4 each of the performance
ranges was restricted to a subinterval of the theoret-
ically feasible range from 0% to 100%. For example,
mathematics performance was restricted from the worst
case of 65% to the best case of 85%. These restricted
ranges were ample to accommodate budgetary changes that
could realistically be recommended. It was critical to
restrict these ranges so that one could adopt various
preferential independence assumptions. We shall expand
ＭＭＭＭＭＭＭＭＭＭＭＭＭＭｾＭＭＭＭＭＭ｟ .. _.- .. _-
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A typical
profile
on this point shortly.
Due to the considerable support Roche received from
Dr. Nelson, the superintendent, and Mrs. Humphrey the
chair-woman of the school committee, Roche was able to
field test preference assessments with every single ad-
ministrator and policy maker involved in the decision-
making process of the junior high school. These involved
the principal and assistant principal of the junior high
school, the superintendent and assistant superintendent,
and all five members of the Somerstown school committee.
Absent from this listing are the citizens and the parents
of school children. In addition, the preference pro-
cedure was also field tested on a group of 18 doctoral
students in educational administration.
It was surprisingly easy to verify the reasonableness
of pairwise preferential independence. For example, Roche
set xM and x ss at low levels of 70% and 55% respectively,
and then probed conditional preference tradeoffs between
XLA and XS . After he thoroughly engaged his subjects in
this problem he asked parenthetically whether any of the
tradeoff responses between XLA and Xs would be altered
if xM and xss were not set at 70% and 55% respectively.
Practically all of his subjects felt that these tradeoffs
would certainly not be influenced by such modifications
of the fixed levels of xM and x ss . Some subjects, in-
cluding the superintendent emphasized the point that the
tradeoffs would not depend on the fixed levels of XM and
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Xss Erovided that these levels were within the specified
bounds. He felt for example, that if xM were set at 30%
this would be such a shock to the system that his trade-
offs between XLA and Xs would be affected.
For all subjects, Roche felt that the necessary
pairwise preferential independence assumptions were sat-
isfied to legitimatize adopting a value function of the
form
(7.1)
where the component v's were normalized respectively at
o and 1 for the worst and best alternatives (e.g.
v LA (55) = O,vLA (75) = 1, etc.), where the k's were non-
negative/and where
(7 • 2 )
Roche followed the assessment procedure described in
Section 3.7. He assessed for each subject the component
value functions by the mid-value technique: for each com-
ponent function he first found the .50-value point, next
the .25 and the .75 points, then he checked the .50-point
against the .25 and .75 points, and finally he discussed
the general shape of the v-component functions. Next he
sought the k-weights. He asked such questions as: "Sup-
pose we consider a disastrous profile such as (55, 50, 65,50)
where all performance measures are at their worst levels.
Now suppose you could push one of these worst scores up
from the worst level to the best, which would you choose?
Would you prefer to push language/arts up from 55 to 75,
or science from 50 to 70, or mathematics from 65 to 85,
or social science from 50 to 70?" He thus probed each
respondent for rankings of the k's. Next, he followed
the technique discussed in Section 3.7 and determined
precise numerical values for the k-weights. Figure 7.5
depicts the assessments of Superintendent Nelson and his
assistant, Hr. Elliot. Table 7:2.. summarizes some salient
data collected from the nine principal actors involved in
the exercise. Roche not only obtained Nelson's assess-
ments but he had Nelson guess at what some of his associates
would record. It's fascinating to read how Nelson ration-
alized some of the recorded assessments of members of his
staff and the school committee members. There are striking
differences of opinion:
As regards the 18 students in the doctoral seminar
in educational administration, all of whom were subjected
to the same assessment procedure, we quote from Roche:
;'There is little to be gained at this point in the
study from exhibiting the eighteen structures. However,
the following summary information might be of interest.
1. With respect to the Language Arts program, 11
of the curves were concave, 6 were linear,
and 1 was S-shaped about the current
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TABLE 7.2
Assessed k -Values and .50 Mid-Value
Points of Principal Subj ects
k -Values ( .50)f1id-Value Points
Name LA S M SS LA S M SS
Administration:
(1) Mrs. Carter
(Principal) .20 .25 .22 .33 60.5 54.5 70 54
(2 ) Mrs. MacGregor
(Asst. Principal) .21 .24 .23 .32 61 54.5 68 53.5
( 3) Dr. Nelson
(Superintendent') .30 .21 .26 .23 60.5 55 71. 5 55
(4 ) Mr. Elliot
(Asst. Superintendent)
.33 .20 .27 .20 62 59 72 57
School Committee:
( 1) Mrs. Humphrey
(Chairwoman) . 36 .13 .30 .21 62 63 69 57.5
(2 ) Mrs. Clark .22 .26 .23 .29 65 59 67.5 57
( 3) Mr. Cowles .53 .10 .27 .10 65 62 70 63
( 4 ) Mrs. Oscar .47 .11 .35 .07 65 62 69 60
(5) Mr. MacMillan .29 .23 .28 .20 59 55 68 54.5
lowest mid-value point assessed: 59 54.5 67.5 53.5
highest mid-value point assessed: 65 63 72 63
Key: Each row contains (1) the scale factor for each program,
which indicates the sUbject's tradeoffs among programsj
and (2) the " global" mid-value point for each program,
which gives an indication of the subject's tradeoffs with-
in a program. A low mid-value point indicates a strong--
aversion to poor performance.
performance level.
2. In the Science program, 8 were concave, 2
were linear, 4 were S-shaped about current
performance, and 4 were convex. Thus,
there was much less concern with poor per-
formance in Science than in Language Arts.
3. Interestingly enough, all 18 of the curves
were concave in the Mathematics program.
That is, there was unanimous concern with
poor performance in Mathematics.
4. In the Social Studies program, 11 of the
curves were concave, 3 were linear, 2 were
S-shaped about current performance, and
2 were convex.
It is 0= interest to note that the doctoral
students, like the subjects in Somerstown, basically
fell into two groups: (1) the "educators" who were
essentially concave in all programs (eight of the
students fell into this group); and, (2) the "policy
makers" who were either concave or linear in Language
Arts, concave in Mathematics, and S-shaped or convex
in either/or Science and Social Studies (eight of
the students fell into this group). Only two of the
students did not fall into either of these groups.
This was because these two students were S-shaped
about current performance in Language Arts. It may
be coincidental, but one of the students whose
structure very closely approximated the typical school
committee member's structure in Somerstown, had just
recently run for election to the Boston School Com-
mittee.
Of even more interest to the analyst was the fact
that no student was linear in all the programs. There-
fore, without knowing it, the students demonstrated
that the typical "priority list" approach, i.e., the
constant linear form, would be inappropriate for
analyses of their preferences among programs. When
this evidence is added to the data generated in
Somerstown, it suggests that the analyst should be
extremely careful about using the constant linear form.
With respect to the determination of scale faotors
during the second part of the assessment procedure, the
vast majority of the students behaved as did the
Somerstown superintendent and a majority of the
Somerstown School Committee. That is, 15 out of the
18 students chose Language Arts as that program they
would want to "push-up" first. Science was picked by
2 students, and one chose the Social Studies program.
Although none of the students picked Mathematics as
the "base" program, 9 of them chose this program as
the second program they would like to see "pushed-up."
The remaining 9 students all chose Social Studies as
the second program."
After Roche obtained the full assessments from his
subjects he asked each of four of the School Board mem-
bers plus the assistant superintendent to suggest budget-
ary alternatives that would either be most appealing to
themselves and would have some chance of being accepted
by the group or be of a type that they would welcome
seeing evaluated. Five alternatives besides the no-change
position were thus generated. Again we quote from Roche:
"The "no-change" alternative for the Junior High
School Core Program was as follows: allocate $92,000
to the Language Arts program, $81,000 to the Science
program, $76,000 to the Mathematics program, and
$75,000 to the Social Studies program. The alternative
allocations (expressed as changed to the "no-change"
case), are listed below with the names of the individ-
uals who suggested them.
1. The Humphrey alternative. Take $6,000 from
Science, and $6,000 from Social Studies.
Increase Language Arts by $10,000 and in-
crease Mathematics by $2,000.
2. The Oscar alternative. Take $7,000 from
Science, and $2,000 from Social Studies.
Increase Language Arts by $6,000, and in-
crease Mathematics by $3,000.
3. The Elliot alternative. Take $7,000 from
Science, and $1,000 from Social Studies.
Increase Language Arts by $3,000, and
increase Mathematics by $5,000.
4. The Cowles alternative. Take $3,000 from
Language Arts, and $6,000 from Mathematics.
'Increase Science by $4,000, and increase
Social Studies by $5,000.
5. The Clark alternative. Take $2,000 from
Language Arts, $2,000 from Science, and
$1,000 from Mathematics. Apply all $5,000
to Social Studies. II
Using the performance functions as generated by the
program coordinators and modified by Superintendent Nelson,
and using the preferences of each of the four administra-
tors and five Board members, it was possible to evaluate
the six suggested proposals. These preferences are showrt
in Table 7.3 and comparative rankings are shown in Table
7.4. We can see readily that the Humphrey alternative
strictly dominates the II no- change" alternative and the
Elliot alternative. Furthermore when power realities are
also considered, the Humphrey alternative essentially
overpowers the Clark and Oscar alternatives as well.
This leaves a contest between the Humphrey and the Cowles
proposals. Again, however, looking at the personalities
and the strengths of preferences one would be tempted to
Single out the Humphrey proposal as the obvious winner.
Roche raises the question whether the above de-
scribed procedure could seriously be implemented for
group decision making. He writes:
TABLE 7.3
Preference of Each Individual for Each Budget-Alternative
Generated by the Educational Value Function
Alternative BUdget Allocations
- "No change II Humphrey Oscar Elliot Cowles Clark
rtJ' ---
ｾ
ｾ ｉ ｄ ｲ Ｎ Nelson .730 .743 .737 .743 .730 .727
e
ｾ Mr. Elliot .642 .650 .643 .646 .646 .637
'0
.778 .778 .785ｾ Mr. Carter .771 .777 .793
0
:::OIMr. MacGregor .765 .771 .771 .771 .784 .775
'0
s::
ro
lQlMrs. Humphrey .667 .697 .686 .686 .668 .667
ｾ
;;\Mrs. Clark .638 .647 .629 .628 .676 .632
ro
ｾ
+>IMr. Cowles .584 .647 .624 .608 .563 .570
rtJ
'M
ＮｾｉｍｲｳＮ Os car .608 .647 .650 .631 .588 .597
e
:gIMr. MacMillan .813 .816 .807 .809 .816 .809
Key: In each row, the preference or value number as determined by each sUbject's preference
structure is presented for each alternative budget allocation. .
J)
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TABLE 7.4
Rankings of the Alternatives for Each Individual
Developed from the Preference Numbers in Table 7.4
Alternative Budget Allocations
"No change 11 Humphrey Oscar Elliot Cowles Clark
ｾ ｉ ｄ ｲ Ｎ Nelson 3 I 2 I 3 4Q)
.0ｾ ｬ ｦ ｶ Ｑ ｲ Ｎ Elliot 4 I 3 2 2 5
:a:
'OIMr. Carter 5 3 3 4 I 2
ｾ
CI1 4olMr. MacGregor 3 3 3 I 2m
'0
c Humphrey 4 I 2 2 3 4CI1 Mrs.
flI8Mrs. Clark 3 2 5 6 I 4
+3
ｾｉｍｲＮ Cowles 4 I 2 3 6 5
+3
flI 4.nIMrs. Oscar 2 1 3 6 5I:::
·n
,gINr. ｍ ｡ ｣ ｲ ｾ ｉ ｩ llan 2 1 4 3 I 3
c:x:
v)
VI'
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"Under normal conditions, I donlt believe it
would be reasonable to expect that policy makers
would allow their own preference structures to be
communicated. Recall that Dr. Nelson said that he
would usually want to keep his own preference struc-
ture private. The administrators and policy makers
in Somerstown are rather unusual. They willingly
cooperated in this effort in order to further re-
search on decision making. Additionally, there are
no major educational problems in Somerstown. That
is, there are no sensitive issues at stake. There-
fore, no individual felt threatened by having his or
her preference structure recorded. In such a case,
decisions would be of the fine tuning variety, rather
than the sensitive policy decisions."
Roche developed a computer program that takes the
performance functions and the preference structure of a
single decision ｭ ｡ ｫ ･ ｲ Ｍ ｾ ｨ ･ used Nelson's as an example--
and generates the optimum allocation for a given overall
budget level. It is essentially a resource-allocation
type of dynamic program. Given this program it is easy
to generate the program implications of various overall
budget levels. Roche however, did not choose to form-
alize tradeoffs between money and the four indices of
scholastic performance. If he had chosen to do this,
undoubtedly the set of four scholastic attributes would
have been preferential independent of the monetary
attribute so that all of Roche's work would also be rel-
evant and appropriate in the extended framework. The
computer program also makes it relatively easy to in-
vestigate various sensitivity studies: for example,
dependence on the k-weights or on changes in performance
functions.
We conclude this section with a quote from Roche:
"Although this research demonstrates that these
new techniques could be used to examine budgetary al-
ternatives among programs, the demonstration was within
a very narrow context. There may be problems in at-
tempting to use these formal techniques elsewhere.
The local educational setting served as a 'laboratory'
for the investigation of these techniques. I believe
that this setting is representative of numerous non-
profit organizations. However, on the basis of this
research we cannot say that these formal techniques
should be used everywhere, but, rather, that they could
bs used somewhere."
7.3 FIRE DEPARTMENT OPERATIONS+
In any analysis of fire-department policy a classical
question is: "How much is a minute of response timet
worth? II Clearly the value for any particular fire depends
on the detailed circumstances of that fire. It is not
feasible to treat individually each of the several thou-
sand serious fires which the New York Fire Department ex-
tinguishes each year. Instead, we will focus on what will
be referred to as the "typical New York structural fire."
+The work discussed in this section was done for the New
York City-Rand Institute by Keeney employed as a con-
sultant. He wishes to thank Deputy Chief Francis J. Ronan
of the New York Fire Department and Edward H. Blum of the
New York City-Rand Institute for their important contrib-
utions to this work. The effort represents part of the
joint work by the New York Fire Department and the New
York City-Rand Institute to understand and improve the
bases for deploying fire department resources. This sec-
tion utilizes material originally published in Keeney
[1973Cl.
t The response time for a particular piece of equipment is
defined as the time elapsed between that apparatus's
leaving the fire house and its arrival at the location of
the incident.
A general formulation is developed which specifies the
value of response time to this "typical fire" as a func-
tion of the particular piece of equipment, the response
times of the other fire-fighting vehicles, and whether,
for example, it is the difference between a 2 and a 3
minute response or the difference between a 7 and an 8
minute response.
An approach to this inherently difficult problem
might include (1) engineering research on fire develop-
ment (e.g., how fast do different materials burn};
(2) analyses of data relating losses, damage, etc. to
fire department performance; and (3) analysis and distil-
lation of accumulated fire-fighting experience.
This section, by exploiting the concepts and results
of utility theory discussed in earlier chapters, presents
an initial attempt to quantify the experience of some New
York City Fire Department officials and to investigate
means of using this information for evaluating Fire Depart-
ment policies. This first step involves the preferences
of one deputy chief of the New York City Fire Department.
A five-attribute utility function is assessed for the
response times of the first three engines and first two
ladders arriving at a structural fire.
7.3.1 An Overview
Let us step back and try to get an overall picture
of where this work fits into Fire Department decision
making. It would be desirable to evaluate proposed Fire
Department policies and programs in terms of fundamental
objectives such as II maximize the quality of fire service
provided ll and "minimize its cost." Annual cost of the
Fire Department measured in dollars may be an appropriate
attribute for the second objective, but there is no clear
candidate for the first one. Thus, it may be necessary
to divide this objective into lower-level objectives sUch
as "minimize loss of life,1I "minimize injuries,1I Il mini-
mize property damage,1I "minimize psychological anxiety
of the citizens," etc. Reasonable attributes for these
first three objectives, are respectively the annual
number of deaths, the annual number of injuries caused
by fire, and the annual dollar value of lost property,
whereas a subjective index would likely be required for
the attribute dealing with psychological anxieties. How-
ever, these first three attributes are not exactly ideal.
It is very difficult to determine what fatalities, in-
juries, and damage is attributable to the service of the
Fire Department and what part is not. For example, an
individual who causes a fire by falling asleep while
smoking in bed might die before the fire is reported.
This and similar fatalities should not reflect on Fire
Department services. Such problems with the available
data, coupled with the fact that little is known quantita-
tively about the fire-fighting process, contribute to the
non-operational use of these measures. In addition, there
are problems about the relative seriousness of different
injuries and difficulties of directly placing a value on
the life of an individual which further complicates matters.
Fortunately, the response times of the various ap-
paratus responding to fires provide a natural set of proxy
attributes for evaluating the level of service for such
problems. Figure 7.6 is a simplified model of the fire
service system illustrating that response times are in-
puts to the fire-fighting process, whereas objectives
concerning loss of life and property dmnage relate to
outputs.
Firemen are accustomed to thinking in terms of re-
sponse times in informally evaluating their preferences
for various alternative courses of action. In doing this,
they use their experience in gauging both the likelihoods
of the various possible response times given a particular
policy and the effects these response times have on the
more fundamental service objectives of the department.
Aside from their interpretative appeal, data exist for
specifying the probabilities of the response times con-
ditional on a particular course of action. For nearly
a decade, the New York Fire Department has kept extensive
records on particular aspects of fire occurrence. These
data have been analyzed and they provide the necessary
input information for developing the simulation model
of Fire Department operations, an early version of which
is described in Carter and Ignall [1970J. This model is
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used to generate probability density functions for the
response times of any prescribed operational policy.
Our objective here is to relate the various possible
response times to the accomplishment of the Fire Depart-
ment's objectives for fundamental services. We want to
distill years of experience of some Fire Department of-
ficials by quantifying their subjective preferences for
response times to fires in a manner useful for improving
the fire-fighter's decision making process. Thus, we are
essentially asking the official to consider the implica-
tions of a particular set of response times (i.e., the
first engine responds in 3 minutes, the second in 5
minutes, ... , the first ladder responds in 2 minutes, •.. ,
etc.) on the outputs, and then to evaluate his preferences
for various sets of response times in light of the re-
spective implications. The result is a subjective model,
based on experience, for the fire-fighting process, its
consequences, and the relative undesirabilities of these
consequences.
Whose preferences should be assessed? By virtue of
their experience, it waS decided that the operating chiefs
were best suited to understand the multitude of implica-
tions of. various combinations of response times. As a
logical first step, the preferences discussed here are
those of one deputy chief of the New York Fire Department.
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7.3.2 Use of the Response Time Utility Function
The original motivation for assessing a utility
function for response times was to develop a model for
the escalation of fires. If the originally delegated
units cannot control a fire, additional units must be re-
quested, and it is said that the fire escalates. Since
such events are very important to the Fire Department's
performance, it would be useful to model the escalation
phenomenon and include it in the simulation model.
Specifically, we would like to know when poor Fire ｄ ･ ｾ
partment service leads to escalation. Since the prob-
ability of escalation is clearly related to the quality
of deployment and since this quality can be measured by
the response-time utility function, it may be desirable
to assess the conditional probability of escalation given
the quality of the response as summarized by its utility.
The utility function for response times can be use-
ful for guiding decisions concerning operational policy
of the department. Examples of such policies concern
variation in initial response patterns and dispatching
of vehicles, alteration of the areas of responsibility
between different pieces of equipment, introduction of
"special squads" during high demand hours, and temporary
relocation of equipment into areas where resources are
almost all working at fires. The simulation mentioned
earlier and other models generate, for any given policy,
probability distributions for response times. Thus,
given an appropriate utility function, one can evaluate
policies according to expected utility.
Let R = {T l ,T2 'Sl'S2'S3} denote the attribute com-
plex dealing with service levels and let C denote the
cost attribute. Let
be the overall utility for cost c and response vector r.
Assuming that R is utility independent of C, a most
reasonable assumption, we can define a utility function
u(E) = u(t l ,t2 ,sl,s2,s3) and from the results in Chapter 5,
(7 • 3 )
In our discussion, we shall confine our remarks to the
assessment of u(E).
Before proceeding to the assessment of the response-
time utility function, let us suggest that the general
ideas presented here are relevant to other emergency
services such as law enforcement agencies and emergency
ambulance systems. In such systems, as discussed and
used by Larson [1972J, Savas [1969J, and Stevenson [1972J
to name a few, response times are extensively used to
evaluate alternative proposed policies. In all such
cases, the question arises, "how much is a minute of
response time worth?" The work discussed here is an
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initial attempt to address such questions.
7.3.3 Assessing the Response-Time Utility Function
During 1970, Deputy Chief Francis J. Ronan of the
New York Fire Department and Keeney held a number of dis-
cussions to specify Chief Ronan's preferences for re-
sponse times to fires. These usually lasted between 1
and 2 hours each.
Historically the traditional "standard response " in
New York City has involved three engines and two ladders,
so it was decided to assess a utility function over five
attributes: the response times of the first and second
ladders arriving at a fire and the response times of the
first three arriving engines. Let us designate these
attributes respectively by Ti , i = 1,2, and Sj' j = 1 1 2 1 3,
and let tJ.' and s. represent specific amounts of T. andJ J.
S. respectively. Thus, we are interested in the response-
J
time utility function u(t l ,t 2 ,sl,s2,S3).
In discussing the assessment of Chief Ronan's utility
function, we will follow the guidelines for the assess-
ment procedure suggested in Chapter 5. Thus, the dis-
cussion differentiates into five activities:
(1) familiarization,
(2) verifying the assumptions,
(3) assessing conditional utility functions,
(4) evaluating scaling constants of u,
(5) checking for consistency.
The presentation here will illustrate how the response-
time utility function was assessed and what input ｩ ｮ ｾ
formation was necessary.
Familiarization. Before beginning on this problem,
Chief Ronan and Keeney had worked together on a very
simple decision-analytic model of a fire-response prob-
lem. Also, at an earlier time, Keeney had roughly
assessed Chief Ronan's utility function for the response
time of the first engine arriving at a fire. The main
purpose of this preliminary exercise was to check whether
it was reasonable simply to minimize the expected
response time of the first engine arriving at a fire.
In most analytical studies dealing with emergency ser-
vices, this linearity assumption (i.e., minimize expected
response time) is implicitly used. As a result of this
initial exposure, the Chief was introduced to the basic
concepts of utility theory. After the first two assess-
ment sessions, which turned out to be learning experiences
for both analyst and respondent, the discussions became
more productive.
Verifying the Assumptions. To exploit the theory
of Chapters 5 and 6, it was necessary to check whether
requisite utility independence assumptions were appro-
priate for this problem.
Specifically, it was verified that it was
reasonable* to assume:
(1 )
(2 )
(3 )
engine response times {Sl,S2,S3} and the
ladder response times {Tl ,T 2 } were utility
independent of each other,
first ladder response Tl and second ladder
response T2 were utility independent of each
other, and
th .th, S 'l't'e J englne response . was utl 1 y In-
J
dependent of the other engine responses,
for j = 1,2, and 3.
Because of Theorem 5.3 and (1), the assessment of u was
broken into two parts: assessments of an engine utility
function and a ladder utility function. Analogously,
these two utility functions could be broken down into
component parts because of (2) and (3).
Let us illustrate the verification procedure with
an example. To check if Tl was utility independent of
T2 , Chief Ronan was asked IIGiven that the response time
of the second arriving ladder is fixed at six minutes,
what response time t l for the first arriving ladder
would be indifferent to having a 50-50 chance that the
first ladder responds in either one or five minutes?1I
*The following independence assumptions were deemed to
be approximately valid after considerable probing. Some
of the dependencies were so slight--contrary to what was
first expected--that independence was taken as an
innocuous idealization.
Notice that if t 2 = 6, then t l < 6 and this restricts the
domain conveniently. A response that t l = 3.4 minutes
was eventually chosen using a ｉＧ｣ｯｮｶ･ｲｧ･ｮ｣･ｾ technique
discussed in Section 4.9.
Next we asked the same question only the second
ladder response time was fixed at eight rather than six
minutes. Again, the indifference response was 3.4 min-
utes, leading us to believe that the relative preferences
for changes in the response time of the first ladder did
not depend on the fixed response time of the second
ladder. By additional questioning similar to the above,
this speculation was confirmed. Thus, it seemed ap-
propriate to assume that Tl was utility independent of
Assessing Conditional Utility Functions. Given the
assumptions above, utility functions were needed for each
of the five response time attributes. Actually these
are conditional utility functions since they concern
preferences over a single response time given that the
other response times are held fixed. However, because
of the utility independence conditions, the particular
amounts of these other responses are not important, since
the utility function should be the same in any case.
TTo illustrate the approach, let US assess Ul tt), the
conditional utility function for the first arriving
ladder.
ｾ ｣ ｯ
Through the questioning, we found a 2.2 minute re-
sponse of the first arriving ladder was indifferent to
a 50-50 chance at either a one or three minute response.
Similarly, 4.2 minutes was indifferent to a 50-50 chance
at three or five minutes, and 6.2 minutes was indiffer-
ent to a 50-50 chance at 5 or 7 minutes. In general, a
50-50 chance at either a t or a (t + 2) minute response
was indifferent to a (t + 1.2) minute response for
certain. As indicated in Chapter 4, such preferences
imply the utility function must be of the form
(7.4)
where d and b, c > 0 are constants. Since utility func-
tions are unique up to positive linear transformations,
it was decided to scale uI from minus one to zero. In
addition, the response times ranged from zero to twenty
minutes, which implied
T
u l (0) = 0
and
T
u l (20) = ... 1
(7.5)
(7.6)
Next, a 4.5 minute response time for the first ladder
was found to be indifferent to a 50-50 lottery yielding
either one or seven minutes. THence u l must be such that
T T T
u l (4.5) = 1/2 u l (1) + 1/2 u l (7) (7 . 7 )
Substituting (7.4) into (7.5) through (7.7) yields three
equations with three unknowns which can easily be solved
to give
G,C L
T (e·12t)ul(t) = 0.0998 1 - (7.8)
Similar procedures were used to obtain the other four
conditional utility functions.
Evaluating Scaling Constants of u. Given the in-
dividual utility functions for the five response times,
the next step is to put them together in the appropriate
manner to obtain the overall utility function for re-
sponse times. This requires assessing the scaling con-
stants--that is, the k's--of Theorems 5.3 and 6.1 To
illustrate the method, let us use the ladder-response
utility function
(7 . 9 )
Chief Ronan was asked for the response time t 2 of
the second ladder such that he would be indifferent be-
tween the two ladders arriving in three and eight minutes
respectively, denoted by (3,8), and the response (4,t2 ).
His answer was t 2 = 5.7 indicating a willingness to give
up one minute of first ladder response in exchange for
decreasing second ladder response by 2.3 minutes, given
he started from (3,8). This implied
u L (3 , 8 ) = uL (4 , 5 • 7 ) (7.10)
Similarly, we found (2,6) indifferent to (3,4.2) 60
(7.11 )
Using (7.9) and the individual utility functions to
evaluate both sides of (7.10) and (7.11) gives us two
equations with two unknowns, the parameters k l and k 2 ,
which when solved yields
(7.12)
Other parameters of the overall utility function
were evaluated in similar ways as covered in Section 6.6.
The general idea is to ask questions to obtain equations
containing the unknown parameters, and then to solve the
set of equations for the parameter values.
Checking for Consistency. Checking the utility
function for consistency and reasonableness is obviously
very important--both because the assessment is ｩ ｮ ｨ ･ ｲ ･ ｮ ｴ ｾ
ly a subjective process and because the synthesis re-
qui red to obtain the overall utility function can result
in the introduction of "errors." It was important to
make sure the implications of the utility function agreed
with the chief's preferences.
The most important checks concern the conditional
utility functions and tradeoffs between the various
response times. This involved discussing the implica-
tions of the utility function and using the utility
function for providing answers to questions like those
asked in the assessment process. In all cases where
there was a major discrepancy between the implications
of the utility function and the chief's preferences,
part of the assessment procedure was repeated and his
utility function adjusted accordingly. Many parts of
the utility function were adjusted in light of consis-
tency checks. The final utility function appears to
represent Chief Ronan's responses quite closely.
7.3.4 The Response-Time Utility Function
In this section, we present the final form of the
"first-cut" utility function and discuss its implica-
tions. From our assessments, we found
(004
u ＨｾＬｾＩ :: O. 24tT. Ｈ ｾ Ｉ + ｏＮＱＶｾ ＨｾＩ - O. Ｖｾ ＨｾＩ ｾ ＨｾＩ
where
(7.13)
with
(7.14)
and
(7.15)
(7.16)
and where
(7.17)
with
(7.18)
(7.19)
and
(7.20)
For illustrative purposes, the utility function in
(7.15) is shown in Figure 7.7 and the indifference map
implied (7.14) is given in Figure 7.8.
It was decided to evaluate preferences in the unit
hypercube from (0,0,0,0,0) to (20,20,20,20,20). Thus,
for each of the equations above, the variables may only
range from zero to twenty minutes. Furthermore; by
Properties of the Utility Function. The utility
function u in (7.13) has several properties which are
intuitively appealing and which appear to represent Chief
Ronan's preferences. Some of these pertain to u as a
whole, some to the utility function for ladders uL or
the utility function for engines u E ' and some to the
\
utility functions of the individual units. Taking the
latter first, we have
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(1) u is decreasing in each t. and s .. This means
ｾ ]
the sooner a particular unit arrives, the
better, given the response times of other
units are fixed.
(2) Each minute of delay of the first arriving
engine is more important* than a corresponding
minute for the second arriving engine, which
in turn is more important than the correspond-
ing delay of the third arriving engine.
Similarly, each minute of delay of the first
ladder is more important than a corresponding
delay of the second ladder. These properties
are indicated by the relative values of the
coefficients of the u: terms in (7.14) and the
ｾ
ｵ ｾ terms in (7.17).]
*To clarify the meaning of more important, recall the
utility function (7.3) for cost and response times
u' Ｈ ｣ Ｌ ｾ Ｉ = u' (c,t l ,t2 ,sl,s2,s3) and assume the cost at-
tribute C and the set of response attributes
R ={T l ,T2 'Sl,S2,S3} are utility independent of each
other. Now select any base level cost Co and consider
ｾ
changes r' to ｾ Ｂ and ｾ to £, each of which will be as-
surned to be for the better. We will say the change I'
ｾ ｾ Ｎ
to I" is more important than the change ｾ to ｾ ｾ ｦ c l > c 2 '
where c l and c 2 are defined by u(co '£') = u(c l ,£") and
ｾｵ Ｈ ｣ ｯ Ｇ ｾ Ｉ = ｵＨ｣ＲＧｾＩＮ That is, one must be willing to pay
more in cost to make the more important change.
(3) The conditional utility function for each at-
tribute is risk averse regardless of the values
of the other attributes. This means, for in-
stance, that for Tl , a sure (t1 + ti)/2 minute
response is preferred to a 50-50 lottery yield-
ing either t 1 or ti. Said another way, the
average response time is preferred to the
lottery. When this is the case, for each unit,
each additional minute of delayed response is
more important than the former minute.
Concerning the utility function for ladders, we have:
(4) The relative importance of the response time
of the it;.h ladder increases as the response time
of the other ladder increases. Said loosely,
this means the slower the first ladder is in ar-
riving, the more important it is that the
second ladder arrive soon afterwards. This
property is accounted for by the fact that the
product term in (7.14) has a negative coefficient.
Similarly, for engines, there is an analogous property:
(5) The relative importance of the response time
f h .th .. tho t e J englne lncreases as e response
timeSof the other engines increase. This prop-
erty is accounted for by the negative coef-
ficients of the product terms in (7.17).
The last two properties concern the entire utility func-
tion. They are
(6 ) thA one minute delay in the arrival of the i
ladder is more important than the corresponding
minute delay on the i th engine. Thus, for
example, using two minutes responses for both
the first engine and the first ladder as a
base, we would prefer to have the" first ladder
respond in two minutes and the first engine in
three than to have the first engine respond in
two minutes and the first ladder in ｴ ｨ ｾ ･ ･ Ｌ
This property is indicated by the fact that
the coefficient of uL in (7.13) is larger than
the coefficient of uE •
(7) The relative importance of the response times
of ladders increases as the response times of
engines increase. This meanS the importance
of the first arriving engine is less when a
ladder has already arrived than it is when no
ladders have arrived. The negative coefficient
of the product term in (7.13) indicates this
property holds.
These properties, each of which is intuitively
reasonable, go a long way toward specifying the utility
function. That is, the manner in which the shape of the
utility function (7.13) can be altered without violating
one or more of the above conditions is severely restricted.
This fact lendS some additional confidence to our assess-
ments.
Although the complexity of assessing a multiattrib-
ute utility function increases rapidly as the number of
measures of effectiveness increase, the opportunity for
"consistency checks" involving properties such as those
above also greatly increases. In order to meaningfully
represent one's preferences in these complex situations,
it is important to exploit such intuitively appealing
attitudes toward preference to the fullest extent possible.
Ｗ Ｎ Ｓ Ｎ ｾ Conclusions
The main result of this work is a "first cut ll
utility function over five response-time attributes,
namely, those associated with the first two ladders and
the first three engines arriving at a fire. This gives
us some means for determining the relative values of a
minute of response time for the various pieces of equip-
ment. By looking at the coefficients of the single u i
terms of (7.13), one can get a very rough idea of the
relative values of a minute of response time for the
different pieces of apparatus. Doing this, if we set
the relative value for a minute of response time of the
first ladder at 10, the corresponding value for first
engine is 7, the second ladder is 3, the second engine
is 2, and the third engine is 1.
However, as we have mentioned, the worth of a min-
ute of response time on a specific vehicle depends on
the response times of the other pieces of equipment and
the time since the alarm was reported. So for instance,
using a (2,4:2,4,6) response* as a base, the partial
derivatives of u with respect to the five response times
are in a ratio of 10:4:5:3:2 implying that if the re-
lative value of a minute of response time of the first
ladder is set at 10, the corresponding value of the
second ladder is 4, the first engine is 5, the second
engine is 3, and the third engine is 2. The point is
that the relative values depend on the base response.
The assessment procedure was too time consuming and
too complex. Since it was impractical to develop a
computer program to help assess one utility function,
calculations were done by hand. Thus, there was'a lack
of immediate feedback to Chief Ronan concerning the
implications of his preferences. Often this caused
small differences in the chief's responses during dif-
ferent sessions due to the slight variation of his pref-
erences from time to time. But, of course, the in-
volvement over a considerable time span has its merits
too. We would like the assessed utility structure to
be somewhat stable over time. In the future, an inter-
active computer program, such as the one discussed in
*The first ladder responds in 2 minutes, the second
ladder in 4 minutes, the first, second, and third engines
in 2, 4, and 6 minutes, respectively.
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Appendix 6c, would likely help maintain interest as well
as assess the utility function much more quickly with
many more consistency checks.
By asking Chief Ronan about his preferences for
responses to the ｾ ｴ ｹ ｰ ｩ ｣ ｡ ｬ structural fire," we essential-
ly asked him to synthesize in his mind all the possible
implications of each response aggregated over the pos-
sible types of structural fires. This understandably
caused some discrepancies in the answers to our questions,
because of the tendency to focus on particular types of
incidents at different times. Since our major interest
in this particular work centers on the first broad cut,
rather than details relevant to particular ｦ ｩ ｲ ･ ｳ ｾ the
aggregation requirement may be reasonable.
Our ultimate objective is to obtain a utility func-
tion appropriate for the use of the New York Fire Depart-
ment. This section reports a first step: assessing a
utility function of one Deputy Chief of that department.
However, the Chief's preferences are his and not neces-
sarily those of the Fire Department, and they should not
be interpreted as such. Furthermore, although a serious
attempt was made not to lead the Chief to any specific
answers, his responses to questions could have in part
been shaped by the questioning process, and the results
should be interpreted with this possibility in mind.
This assessment exercise was done about five years
before the present monograph was sent to the press and
to I ,
if the exercise were to be repeated again, we probably
would now proceed somewhat differently. We would ｡ ｴ ｾ
tempt to establish some broad, basic, underlying prin-
ciples, which seemed to govern Chief Ronan's responses
and then to deduce more of the structure ,of his utility
function from these basic principles. Essentially we
would try to model, to some extent, his motivations based
on interviews which would probe more deeply on qualita-
tive matters. This, of course,.is easier said than done,
and we would like someday to be able to report a good
example of this technique. This is the trouble in
writing about a subject in its infancy.
7.4. STRUCTURING CORPORATE PREFERENCES FOR MULTIPLE OBJECTIVES·
Every corporation periodically asks itself: uHow
ｾｨｯｵｬ､ we run ciur business?" More specifically, this
raises such questions as: Given the complex social,
economic, technological, and political characteristics
of our society, which management policies should we
adopt now? Are these policies consistent with our personal
objectives, with the desires of our shareholders, and with our
social value structure? If we choose policy A, will it
*We would like to thank the Board of Directors of Wood-
ward-Clyde Consultants for its permission to discuss
this work in our book. The assistance of Dr. Keshavan
Nair of Woodward-Clyde in writing this section is great-
ly appreciated. MatE'.l"ial ·In ｩ ｨ ｬ ｾ seclioy\ is adaprq,c:\. froln'\ ｜ ＼ ｾ ･ Ｎ Ｂ Ｇ ｾ Ｔ ['97'5).
be possible to account for the contingencies which may
arise in the near future and adapt accordingly? How
can we best maintain the leadership position in our
field and simultaneously, keep the vitality of our ｯ ｲ ｾ
ganization? All of these are crucial questions which
deny the simple dollars and cents answers which are
mythically supposed to be appropriate for almost all
"business" decisions.
Since early 1972, Woodward-Clyde Consultants, a
holding firm for several professional-service consulting
firms has used some innovative approaches based on ideas
discussed in this book to help them examine questions
such as those raised above.* Although this effort is
still in progress, it is sufficiently interesting and
informative to include here. Two aspects of this effort
seem to be unique. First, multiattribute utility func-
tions over attributes measuring fundamental objectives
*In November, 1974, Woodward-Clyde made some very broad
organizational changes. It is no longer a holder firm
but rather one consulting firm with five regional divi-
sions. The work described in this section was done from
1972 through October, 1974, so the organizational ｳ ｴ ｲ ｵ ｣ ｾ
ture which prevailed during that period is described.
The subsequent organizational changes are briefly ｳ ｵ ｭ ｾ
marized at the end of the section.
of the corporation have been assessed for many ･ ｸ ･ ｣ ｾ
utives at Woodward-Clyde. Second, this work was done
not to evaluate a specific decision, but rather:
• to aid communication among the decision makers,
• to grapple with fundamental issues of the firm,
• to determine and examine differences of opinion
in a quantitative fashion, and
• to aid in generating creative alternatives in
solving corporate problems.
The affiliate consulting firms of Woodward-Clyde
Consultants operate mainly in the geotechnical engineer-
ing and environmental areas. Problems they examine in-
clude design of earth dams, siting and design of nuclear
power plants, geotechnical and environmental studies as-
sociated with pipeline systems (e.g., the Trans-Alaska
pipeline), and design of structures for earthquake-prone
regions. None of the affiliates build any products
(e.g. roads, dams, power plants); they are exclusively
professional-service consulting firms. Collectively;
their fees received in 1973 were approximately 25 million
dollars, and historically, this has increased at approx-
imately twenty percent annually. All the shareholders
of Woodward-Clyde must be senior professionals on the
staff of one of the affiliates.
In 1972, Richard J. Woodward, the Chairman of the
Board of Woodward-Clyde Consultants, appointed a long-
range planning committee whose assignment included "the
ｾ Ｇ Ｔ
development of a long-range plan for Woodward-Clyde
Consultants that includes quantified objectives and is
responsive to the Statement of Purpose and Standing
Policies." After this original committee reported, the
1973 and 1974 Long Range Planning Committees have suc-
cessively updated the objectives of Woodward-Clyde and
examined policy alternatives in terms of these objec-
tives. Douglas C. Moorhouse was the chairman of each of
these three committees. Dr. Keshavan Nair, a Vice
President of Woodward-Lundgren and Associates, one of
the affiliates of Woodward-Clyde was also a member of
these committees.
Much of the work discussed here, specifically Sec-
tions 7.4.2 through 7.4.5, was done jointly by Dr. Nair
and Ralph L. Keeney, working as a consultant to Wood-
ward-Clyde. Section 7.4.1 discusses the original Long-
Range Planning ·Committee's work, which has served as an
excellent basis on which to build. The final Section
7.4.6 surveys some of the specific uses being made of
Woodward-Clyde's utility function. We just remark here
that the purpose in assessing a utility function was not
to help management choose amongst action alternatives in
a formal manner--e.g., probabilistic analysis was not
done in accompaniment of utility analysis--but rather to
help management articulate some of its basic assumptions
and to facilitate communications amongst the executive
group. This, to a large extent, was, and is being,
accomplished via the formal assessment procedures de-
scribed below.
7.4.1 The 1972 Objectives and Measures of Effectiveness
The basic approach taken by the 1972 Long Range
Planning Committee to fulfill its mission was (1) to
establish the primary objective of the firm, (2) to
divide this into subobjectives, and (3) to conduct a
deficiency analysis indicating discrepancies between
present state and desired state on each objective. By
weighting the various objectives, the deficiencies ｷ ･ ｾ ･
ranked in order of importance and policies recommended
for eliminating these deficiencies.
The overall objective of Woodward-Clyde was pro-
vided by a sentence in their Statement ot Purpose: liThe
combined efforts of Woodward-Clyde Consultants and its
affiliates are directed toward the creation and mainte-
nance of an environment in which their employees can
realize their personal, professional, and financial
goals. II It waS felt that growth was essential in the
achievement of this objective.
The hierarchy of objectives developed by the 1972
Long Range Planning Committee is presented in Figure 7.9.
This hierarchy has been adaptively revised since that
time. The numbers in parentheses in the box with each
objective indicates the original division of weight among
subobjectives. More will be said about this later. In
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Table 7.5, the weights of each of the attributes associ-
ated with the lowest-level objectives and the range of
each attribute are identified.
It was implicitly assumed that an additive value
function
12
v(x l ,x2 ,···,x12 ) = Li=l
k.v. (x.)
ｾ ｾ ｾ
where the x. 's represent levels of the attributes, each
ｾ
vi is a value function over the i th attribute, v and the
v. 's are scaled zero to one, and the weights, that is
ｾ
the k. 's sum to one, was appropriate. For each attribute,
ｾ
component value functions were constructed and present
states and desired states, defined as the practical
maximum felt to be achievable, were identified. Defi-
ciency on each of these lowest-level objectives waS then
calculated by multiplying the weight of the objective
times the difference in the value of its present and
desired stateS.. This indicated "areas" where approvement
was heeded.
Four shortcomings of the 1972 "quantification of
objectives" might be categorized as follows:
(1) the weights were assigned to each objective
without explicitly considering the range of
the associated attributes,
(2) the component value functions were estimated
by a direct value estimation technique in-
dependent of each other,
TABLE '7.5
1972 ATTRIBUTES FOR WOODWARD-CLYDE CONSULTANTS
ATTRIBUTE MEASUREMENT UNIT RANGE
ATTRIBUTE
WEIGHT
Ability to attract
shareholders invest-
ment
Number of shares requested
fees
0-5 .08
Retained earnings % of fees 0-8 .12
Contribution to
retirement plan
% of fees 0-10 .045
Return on invest-
ment for retire-
ment plan
% o£ investment 0-20 .105
Base compensation % annual increase 0-20 .09
Incentive
compensation
% of fees ,0-8 .06
I
U.s. coverage IGeographic centers,
adequately covered
Centers where rele-
vant work can be
\ generated
25-100
ｾ ｵ ｭ ｢ ･ ｲ of
synergistic disciplines
required by society
ｎ ｯ ｲ ｴ ｾ ｕ Ｎ ｓ Ｌ coverage
Scope of services
offered
IGeographic centers
adequately covered
Centers where rele-
vant work can be
generated I
Number of
disciplines having
threshold capability
,
.025
.15
.12525-100Required man-years
experience
Ｈ ｅ ｘ ｩ ｳ ｴ ｾ ｮ ｧ man-year.s)exper1enceRelevant experi-ence
Formal training Number of degrees per
professional staff
member
.015
Professional
development % of fees 0-2 .05
(3) the overall objective function, being a value
function, was not appropriate for examining
policies with uncertain consequences,
(4) the additive value structure did not lend
itself to investigating overlap among the
objectives.
Even with these weaknesses, the Long Range Planning Com-
mittee and the Board of Directors felt this quantifica-·
tion of objectives was a big improvement over informally
articulated objectives. This set of objectives and
measures has proven to be an excellent basis for modifi-·
cation and improvement, the substance of which we begin
to describe in the next subsection.
Before proceeding, let us briefly remark on aspects
of the attributes and their measurement units which may
not be clear from Table 7.5. For the first attribute,
using the number of shares requested divided by fees im-
plicitly assumeS the cost of a share is known in order
to make the measure readily interpretable. The measure
of the scope of services offered is an index meant to
indicate breadth in handling the interdisciplinary pro-
jects increasingly requested by society. With relevant
experience, the idea is to have the staff available to
do quality work on those projects which the Woodward-
Clyde affiliates would like to do. For formal training,
the number of degrees per professional staff member is
defined as follows: a doctorate is three; a masters
degree two, and a bachelors one. Professional develop-
ment includes attending management or technical seminars,
holding in-house study sessions, etc.
7.4.2 Clarifying the Measures of Effectiveness
One of the first issues Drs. Nair and Keeney jointly
considered was whether the measures of effectiveness met
the comprehensiveness and measurability criteria discussed
in Chapter 2. For each objective, the question "Can a
better attribute be found?P was asked. In several cases,
the answer was "yes." Let us discuss some examples.
(a) Ability to Attract Shareholders Investment.
The measurement unit for this attribute was chang,ed to
the dollar value of shares requested divided by the fees.
Thus in interpreting trends, and simply in evaluating
various levels of the attributes, one does not need to
keep the value of the shares implicitly in mind.
(b) Scope of Non-U.S. Coverage. The 1974 Long Range
Planning Committee changed this measure to percentage of
the United States business in terms of fees received.
It was the Committee's viewpoint that the major reason
for expanding ｯ ｶ ･ ｲ ｳ ｾ ｡ ｳ was to reduce the consequences of
a possible recession in the United States and to take
advantage of current foreign opportunities. Since Wood-
ward-Clyde will remain primarily a U.S. operation in the
foreseeable future, the new measure both is more easily
quantifiable than the previous one and also more directly
(0'2.0
indicates vulnerability to domestic recessions.
(c) Relevant Experience and Professional Development.
As demand for ｗ ｯ ｯ ､ ｾ ｬ ｡ ｲ ､ Ｍ ｃ ｬ ｹ ､ ･ services increases, the need
to increase their relevant experience grows. The 1972
measure of relevant experience indicated the lev'el at any
given time, as opposed to focusing on the increase of
relevant experience. Increased relevant experience is
funded out of the Professional Development budget and
usually consists of opportunities for employees to work
on projects under experienced personnel at company ex-
pense and to take specialized courses in areas of their
practice. Because it is the increase in relevant ex-
perience which is currently important at Woodward-Clyde,
the measure was changed to percent of fees committed to
the relevant experience program.
This change of the relevant experience measure re-
quired a redefinition of the components of the profession-
al development measure. In 1972, the latter measure in-
cluded fees used for obtaining relevant experience.
However, with the new relevant experience measure, the
professional development measure must explicitly exclude
the fees used for acquiring relevant experience.
(d) Formal Training. The measure remained the same
for formal training but the desirability of particular
levels has greatly changed. The value function in this
case is interesting in that it is not monotonic. It is
low at a level of 1, since all professionals then only
Co 2.1
Table 7.6 An Aid for Evaluating Preferences for the
Attribute Formal Training as Measured by
the Degrees per Professional Staff Member.
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have a bachelors degree, and increases to a peak and then
falls rapidly as the level of degrees increases. With a
level of 3, the firm would consist entirely of profes-
sionals with doctorates. In 1972, the desired state was
identified as 2.25, the peak of the value function. On
further examination; this level seemed high. If just 25
percent of the professionals of Woodward-Clyde had only
a bachelors; a minimum of 50 percent would have to have
a ､ｯ｣ｴｯｲ｡ｴｾ to get the average level to the "desired
state" 2.25.
As an aid to thinking about the implications of dif--
ferent levels of "degrees per professional," Table 7.6
was constructed. For evaluating preferences over· average
degree levels, an individual is meant to select the best
distribution of degrees for each average level, and then
compare these "best" distributions.
J.4.3 Checking for Independence Conditions
To structure a utility function over the twelve
attributes of Table 7.S, modified as indicated in the
previous subsection, the process began by examining
whether pairs of attributes were preferentially ｩ ｮ ､ ･ ｰ ･ ｮ ｾ Ｌ
dent of their complements.* In most cases it seemed
ｾ ｉ ｮ ｩ ｴ ｩ ｡ ｬ assessments were done using Dr. Nair's prefer-
ences. Subsequently, Dr. Nair has assessed the preferenges
of other members of the Long Range Planning Committee.
Co Z.?,
ＮＺＺｾＮＧＢ
appropriate to assume preferential independence, but let
us indicate three situations where this was not so.
In examining preferential independence assumptions
involving the attribute "ability to attract shareholder
investment," the Long Range Planning Committee came to
the agreement that it was redundant based on present
policy. This attribute was meant to indicate the ability
and desirability for principals to invest in the corpora-
tion. The Committee felt the desirability aspect was
adequately captured by retained earnings. On the other
hand, the ability to invest was measured by both in-
centive compensation and base compensation. For these
reasons, the "ability to attract shareholder investment"
was dropped from the list of attributes.
In another case it at first seemed advantageous to
subdivide the objective concerning base compensation into
three groups: senior principals, junior principals and
associates, and associate candidates. In effect, the
current attribute "base compensation" would have been
replaced by three attributes, namely base compensation
for senior principals, base compensation for junior
principals and associates, and base compensation for
associate candidates. It was found that one of these
attributes taken together with a different attributet
say retained earnings, was not preferentially independent
of its complement. The reason was that the rate at which
one would substitute retained earnings for base compensation
(oL4
for associate candidates depended on the level of base
compensation increases to the principals and associates.
If these latter groups received large increases in base
compensation, it seemed reasonable to give up more re-
tained earnings to bring increases in base compensation
for associate candidates up to some comparable level,
than one would give up to make the same increase for
associate candidates if in fact the other groups received
low increases in base compensation. The concept of
equity among the three groups made it inappropriate to
assume preferential independence in this case.
There were two other possibilities investigated.
Each pair of the three base compensation attributes was
found to be conditionally preferentially independent of
the third given all other attributes are fixed at an
arbitrary level. This would have allowed uS to construct
an additive component value function over the three ｡ ｴ ｾ
tributes. The alternative was to use the original ag-
gregated base compensation attribute. It was felt that
members of the Long Range Planning Committee could keep
the equity considerations in mind when using the aggre-
gated attribute. Therefore, since it is simpler to use
one attribute than the three component attributes, the
former was chosen.
Base compensation and incentive compensation do have
some overlap in purpose and, because of this, the latter
paired with, for instance, retained earnings is not
exactly preferentially independent of its complement.
However, the overlap is not great since the function of
the former is to provide a solid salary for competent
work within the "normal" call of duty, whereas the func-
tion of the later is to provide motivation and reward
for efforts 'beyond
'
the call of duty. Hence after con-
siderable checking, it was decided that it was a reason-
able approximation to assume the preferential independence
condition. This "appropriateness" decision was taken in
conjunction with the decision to eliminate the attribute
"ability to attract shareholder .investment" from the list
in Table 7.5.
It was decided that the two attributes concerning
retirement plan should be aggregated into one called
hgrowth in retirement plan," since in fact both seemed
to meet the same fundamental objective. Woodward-Clyde
desires that any participant in their retirement plan
receive a combined amount from the plan and social secu-
rity equal to 50 percent of his or her last five years
average salary. The new measure for "growth of retire-
ment ｰ ｬ ｡ ｮ ｾ is the annual increase of assets in the ｲ ･ ｾ
tirement plan. Its range is zero to thirty percent, and
it should be clear that·thiS excludes the social security
benefits. In effect, this change is simply moving up
the objectives hierarchy of Figure 7.9 for a quantitative
assessment of retirement plan consequences.
7.4.4 The_1974 Objectives and Measures of Effectiveness
The objectives and attributes updated from the orig-
inal 1972 list are given in Table 7.7. After considerable
examination, Dr. Nair felt that it was appropriate to as-
sume that for the ranges given in the table, each pair
of attributes was preferentially independent of its
complement. The reasonableness of this assumption has
been preliminary accepted by each of the other members on
the 1974 Long Range Planning Committee.
7.4.5 Assessing the Utility Function
The preferential independence conditions imply that
an additive value function exists over the ten attributes
in Table 7.7. From Theorems 6.1 and 6.2, by verifying
that just one attribute is utility independent of its
complement, either a multiplicative or additive utility
function is appropriate to quantify preferences. It was
verified that retained earnings was in fact utility in-
dependent of its complement, and utility independence was
also verified for other attributes to serve as consistency
checks. For future reference, it turned out, the final
utility function over the attributes in Table 7.7 was
multiplicative, and thus expressible in the form
10
1 + ｫｵＨｾＩ = IT [1 + kkiui(xi )]i=l
(7.21)
where u and the u. 's are scaled zero to one, 0 < k < 1,
1 i
TABLE 7.7
1974 ATTRIBUTES FOR WOODWARD-CLYDE CONSULTANTS
Xl
X2
X3
XI+
Xs
X6
X7
Xe
Xg
XIO
ATTRIBUTE
Retained earnings
Growth in Retirement Plan
Base Compensation
Incentive Compensation
Scope--Geographic (U.S.)
Scope--Geographic (Outside U.S.)
Scope--Services Offered
Relevant Experience
(annual increment)
Formal Training
Professional Development
(excluding relevant experience)
MEASUREMENT UNIT
% of fees
% of existing assets
% annual ｾ ｮ ｣ ｲ ･ ｡ ｳ ･
% of fees
IGeographic centers,
adequately covered
Centers where rele-
\
vant work can be
generated
% of U. S. business
No. of disciplines
having threshold
capability
No. of synergistic
disciplines re-
quired by society
% of fees
No. of degrees per profes-
sional staff member
% of fees
RANGE
0-8
0-30
0-30
0-8
25-100%
0-50
25-100%
0-1
1.5-2.5
0-1 f)'
r-J
00
and k is a non-zero scaling constant greater than minus
one which can be evaluated from the k. IS.
1
The task remaining was to assess the component
utility functions, assess their scaling factors, and
then evaluate the k-value for the multiplicative form.
Assessing the Component Utility Functions. All the ten
utility functions were assessed on a zero to one scale
using the techniques discussed in Chapter 4. Let us
briefly consider those for retained earnings and formal
training, attributes Xl and Xg in Table 7.7.
The range of retained earnings is zero to eight
percent, so since preferences are monotonically increas-
ing, we set
u l (0) = 0 u l (8) = 1
where u l is the utility function for retained earnings.
Next, by checking certainty equivalents for a number of
lotteries, it was verified that Dr. Nair was risk averse
in terms of retained earnings. It was found that 2-<0,8>.
0.75-<0,2>, 4-<2,8>, 5.5-<4,8>, and for a check, that 4
for certain was indifferent to a 0.75 chance at 8 and a
0.25 chance at zero. The utility function consistent
with these assessments is shown in Figure 7.10.
The assessment of the utility function for formal
training led to some surprises. What was not a surprise
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o 8
Xl::: .. i'te\Y\q,d ･｡ｲｲ｜ＧｾＡｩ
, ;.
)(3;;' ｢ ｴ ｕ ｾ ･ Ｎ ｣ ｭ ｦ ｾ ＼ Ｑ ｴ ｩ ｾ
Ｐ Ｍ Ｍ Ｍ Ｍ Ｍ Ｍ Ｍ Ｍ Ｍ Ｍ Ｔ Ｍ ｾ
ZS' too
XsiU.4). C.Cl\It!rClCj....
｣ＭＭＭＭＭＭＭＭＭＭｬｬＭＭｾ
o
c ｏｾＭＭﾷﾷＢＭＭ｟ﾷﾷﾷＭＭＭＭＭｾ｣］Ｍﾭ
Xb =ｎｾ .. u. S. ｃＢｏｖｾＱＢＰｩｦＲＮＮ
b290..
o ---- ｬ ｾ
C 1
XIe. -p... ｯｦｾＮＮｳ S ;C'J'\l'1
ｄｃ＿ｾｉＨ｜ｲｭｴＧＧＧ［Ｍ
F'CJ\.\re. 7.10. ｗ ｯ ｯ ､ ｾ ｲ ｣ ｩ - ＼Ｚ｜ｾ､ｾＧｾ ｾｦｏＧｖ｜ｾｖ｜［ﾭ
utlHt'\ ｾ ･ ｴ ｬ ｾ
was that preferences for levels of this attribute are
not monotonic; they increase up to a maximum point and
then decrease. Originally, it was the thought to assess
preferences from 1 to 3 degrees per professional staff
member. However, once we began this task, it became
clear that with levels between 1 and 1.3 and 2.7 and 3,
Woodward-Clyde could not exist in a form similar to the
present. Hence our viable range was changed from 1.5
to 2.5, which were practical limits for the foreseeable
future.
Next, by using the Table 7.6, it became clear that
the previously felt optimum level of 2.25 was too high
and 2.1 was chosen as an alternative after some consider-
ation. It was also felt that the undesirability of 1.5
or 2.5 degrees per professional was about equally as
bad so u 9 , the utility function for formal training was
scaled by
Again with the aid of Table 7.6, it was concluded that
1.7-<1.5,2.1>, 1.8-<1.7,2.1>, and Ｒ Ｎ Ｓ ｾ Ｑ Ｎ Ｘ Ｎ The resulting
utility function is shown in Figure 7.10.
Assessing the Relative Scaling Factors. The ranking of
the ten attribute scaling constants of the multiplicative
utility function--that is, the k. 's in (7.21)--is given
1
in Table 7.6. To specify their relative magnitude,
Dr. Nair considered the relative desirability of con-
sequences with one attribute at its most preferred level
and all other attributes at their worst levels. He
decided that the one he would most like to have at its
best level was retained earnings. Thus the scaling fac-
tor associated with retained earnings is the largest.
The attribute he would next prefer to have alone at its
most desirable level was formal training so its scaling
factor is second largest. Repeating this procedure led
to the ranking of the scaling factors indicated in Table
7.8.
To quantitatively establish the relative values of
the scaling factors, tradeoffs between pairs of attri-
butes were explicitly assessed. Dr. Nair was asked, for
nine pairs of attributes, questions such as:
"Assume all attributes other than retained earnings
and retirement plan are fixed at convenient levels.
Now, how high would retained earnings have to be,
given the retirement plan is at its lowest level,
in order for you to be indifferent between this
option and an alternative option with the retire-
ment plan, at its most desirable level of 30 and
retained earnings fixed at its lowest level?"
The responses are shown in Table 7.8 in the column
labeled "indifference equivalent." Thus if we designate
the scaling factor of Xl as k l , the scaling factor for
to :5 i
Table 7.8 Evaluating the Scaling Factors in Woodward-Clyde's utility Function
Attribute
Ranking of
Scaling Factor Range Indifference Equivalent
Relative
Scaling
Factor
Scaling
Factor
Xl = retained earnings 1 O-S - k l .67
X2 = retirement plan 7 0- 30 30 of X2 ｾ 3 of Xl k - .66k l .442 -
X3 = base compensation 5 0-30 30 of X3 ｾ 4 of Xl k = .77k l .5173
X4 = incentive compensation 9 0- S S of X4 ｾ 2.5 of Xl k 4 = .5Sk l .3gl
X5 = u.S. coverage 6 25-100 100 of X5 ｾ 3.5 of Xl k = .72k1 .4S25
X6 = non-U.S. coverage 10 0-50 50 of X6 ｾ 50 of X5
k,,- = .5k 5 .241b
X7 = scope of services 3 25-100 55 of Xl ｾ 100 of X5 k = .75k 7 .6345
Xs = relevant experience 4 0-1 1 of Xs ｾ 50 of X5 k S =.5k 5 .241
Xg = formal training 2 1.5-2.5 2.1 of Xg ｾ 7 of Xl kg = .97k l .647
X10 = professional S 0-1 1 of X10 ｾ 50 of X5 k lO = .5k 5 .241development
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x2 ' for instance, must be .66k l since, using u l in
Figure 7.10, the utility of a retained earnings of 3
percent is 0.66. This follows since the utility of 3
percent retained earnings, with the growth in retirement
plan at its least desirable level, must equal the utili-
ty of 30 percent growth in retirement plan, with retained
earnings at its minimum level. Because of the preferen-
tial independence assumptions, the levels of the attri-
butes other than retained earnings and retirement plan do
not matter. The relative values of the scaling constants
are also shown in Table 7.8.
Selecting a Utility Function. We felt fairly confident
about the relative values of the scaling constants, but
to get their absolute magnitudes requires the answer to
a difficult question. Dr. Nair was asked:
"What probability TIl would you select such that you
would be indifferent between option 1 which retained
earnings at 8 percent and all other attributes at
their least desirable levels and an alternative
option 2 consisting of a lottery yielding all at-
tributes at their most desirable level with prob-
ability TIl or otherwise all attributes at their
least desirable level?"
Those two options are illustrated in Figure 7.11.
Using the "converging method" discussed in Section 4.9,
a value of 2/3 for TIl was selected. This implied that
Option I Option 2
Retailed earnings: 8%
all other attributes at
worst levels
vs.
all attributes at
best levels, x*
all attributes at
worst levels, XO
Figure. 7.11 Adjust ｾ to get indifference!
the scaling factor k l should be 0.67, from which the
values of the other scaling factors indicated* in Table
7.8 follow:
Since the sum of the scaling factors is 4.505, we
knew the multiplicative utility function (1) was appro-
priate to express Dr. Nair's preferences. Evaluating
(1) for the most desirable consequences one finds
10
1 + k = IT
i=l
(1 + kk.)
1
(7.22)
which was solved using the routine of Appendix 6B to yield
k = -.998. Such a low level for k (it must be greater
than -1) indicates a high level of complementarity among
preferences for the attributes. It is the general feel-
ing of the Long Range Planning Committee that if retained
earnings are at a high level, one can "take care ｯ ｦ ｾ the
other attributes if proper policies are implemented.
However, this feeling weakens as the time frame of ref-
erence increases. That is if our attributes represent
one-year levels, Woodward-Clyde could stand a bad year
with most attributes and make it up in the next year.
On the other hand, if the attributes of Table 7.8 desig-
nate five-year averages, the desirability of waiting
five years to "redistribute" high retained earnings to
attributes at their lowest levels is understandably much
*The sensitivity of the analysis to TI, is discussed shortly.
less. This situation, which became apparent during the
assessment process, is clearly important to recognize in
discussions of options affecting the future vitality of
Woodward-Clyde. The original preference assessments
were made using a one-year period. The results reported
here are made using annual averages over a three-year
period. *
Sensitivity Analysis. Because of the importance of the
probability TIl assessed to specify k l , a small sensiti-
vity analysis was made of this parameter using the same
relative values of the scaling constants in Table 7.8.
Recall that x* defines the consequence with all attri-
butes at their best levels and x O the consequence with
all attributes at their worst levels. To assist in
examining the implications of the various TIl values, let
us make two definitions:
TIl = the probability such that a lottery with a
oTIl chance at x* and a (1 - TIl) chance at x
is indifferent a consequence with retained
earnings and formal training at their best
levels and all other attributes at their worst
levels,
*For reference, the indifference probability TIl for the
options in Figure 7.11 was 0.75 when a one-year period
was considered, whereas it was 0.67 for the three-year
period.
TI_ the probability such that '" 0＼ｾＪＬｔｉＬｾ > is indif-
ferent to the sure consequence with each attri-
bute at its level of 0.5 utility.
The results, which were calculated using the computer
program discussed in Appendix 6e, are shown in Table 7.9,
where TIl is first specified. Then, using the relative
scaling factors from Table 7.8, the individual k. 's are
1
fixed. Using these, k, TIl, and TI were calculated.
Further reflection and examination of Table 7.9 led
Dr. Nair to stay with his original estimate of TIl = 0.67
for the three-year period. Thus, the final scaling con-
stants are those shown in the last column of Table 7.8.
Table 7.9 A Sensitivity Analysis of the Scaling Factor k
TIl l:k. k 'fT ' TI1
.87 5.86 -.999 .98 .973
.74 4.96 -.999 .925 .947
.67 4.5 -.998 .884 .928
.60 4.06 -.996 .836 .903
.47 3.15 -.979 .714 .835
.34 2.25 -.900 .561 .733
7.4.6 Uses of Woodward-Clyde's Utility Function
Since the original assessments, Dr. Nair has essen-
tially repeated the assessment procedure just described
with each of the members of the 1974 Long Range Planning
Committee. These assessments included verification of
assumptions, assessing single-attribute utility func-
tions, and specifying scaling constants. This resulted
in some minor changes to Dr. Nair's utility function
(already integrated into the previous subsections) to
achieve what may be referred to as a consensus corporate
utility function. This obviously does not mean the
Board of Woodward-Clyde will blindly make decisions with
this utility function. It is being used to facilitate
communication among officers of Woodward-Clyde and to
help professional intuition.
The assessment process forced individuals to be a
bit more precise in deciding why they felt certain levels
of specific attributes were important. As previously
mentioned, it also served to indicate how tradeoffs among
attributes depended on the time frame of reference. The
general feeling of ｴ ｾ ｯ ｳ ･ involved in the utility function
assessment may be summed up by the comment of one indi-
vidual, "I've had to make tradeoff decisions like this
all my life, but until now the process has always been
somewhat fuzzy and left me with the feeling that I didn't
completely comprehend all the implications of my sub-
jective judgements. The use of utility theory and
explicit tradeoffs helps considerably.1I With a better
understanding of one's own tradeoffs and preferences,
it is a small wonder that it becomes easier to communi-
cate these and discuss the issues with one's colleagues.
The process of assessing a utility function has
also led to minor, but important, modifications in the
overall evaluation process for long-range plans. Some
objectives have been deleted or aggregated, and in other
cases, several attributes have been altered to better
indicate the concerns of Woodward-Clyde. Changing the
attribute measure for relevant experience to reflect the
yearly increase in experience is one such example.
Since several of the attributes concern distribution
of income available (i.e., percent of fees), it is a
simple task to use the utility function to help select
the best distribution among salaries, retained earnings,
incentive compensation, professional development, relevant
experience, and contribution to retirement plan. With
any fixed percentage of fees available, the technically
feasible surface of fee distribution, as well as the
distribution with maximum utility, is easily specified.
As before, the component utility functions can still
be used to conduct a deficiency analysis by indicating
the difference between the present state and a desired
state, representing what is technically feasible in a
specified time span. A bit more broadly, by calculating
the gradient of the utility function in each attribute
for the present state position and combining this with
subjectively assessed changes in the state of each at-
tribute for an equivalent amount of effort (time and
money), one gets an indicator of policies which may be
particularly fruitful to pursue.
The utility function discussed here will no doubt
go through additional metamorphosis in the future years,
as needs and preferences of individuals at Woodward-Clyde
adjust to better reflect their position in society, the
external environment, and so on. For example, the
Pension Reform Act of 1974, because of certain provisions
with regard to the ability of Pension and Profit Sharing
Plan Trusts to invest in company stock, is likely to
alter the present relative value of the attribute "growth
in retirement plan" among the attributes. Woodward-Clyde
Consultants is presently examining the effect of this
and other external changes on the utility functions for
the various individual attributes and the tradeoffs be-
tween the attributes. This will be a continuing activity.
The current function does overcome the original
shortcomings on the 1972 quantification of objectives
outlined in Section 7.4.1. It is being used to examine
present decisions which effect the future existence of
the company. In addition, the Woodward-Clyde objectives
hierarchy partially provides an underlying and unifying
basis for evaluating long-range plans and operational
activities of the affiliated firms. It is not an
overstatement to say that several individuals at Wood-
ward"Clyde find the multiattribute utility concept inter-
esting and helpful. Perhaps more importantly, they are
enthusiastic about potential future uses. In this regard,
partially as a result of the work discussed here, a
special group within Woodward-Clyde Consultants has been
set up and funded to begin to transfer the concepts and
techniques of decision analysis into their professional
practice.
As an interesting anecdote, in 1974, Woodward-Clyde
Consultants reorganized its operations from that of a
holding company subsidiary relationship to an operating
company with five regional divisions, each division having
geotechnical and environmental capabilities. The more
significant reasons given for this reorganization were
to better serve its clients in terms of providing in-
tegrated geotechnical and environmental capability,
establish a one company image for improved marketing,
and increase-efficiencies by eliminating various sub-
sidiary management structures. In evaluating the de-
sirability of the organizational changes, many members
of the Board of Directors made a subjective determination
as to whether the changes would increase the companies
ability to improve their level of performance over the
various attributes. The explicit statement of attributes
made it possible to make this evaluation.
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7.5 EVALUATING COMPUTER SYSTEMS
How should management select a computer system?
How should the management of a computer facility evalu-
ate the quality of its service? When and how should a
time-sharing system be altered to provide better service
to its users and to attract additional users? These are
representative questions facing various participants;
including both managers and users in todays computer
industry. It seems that responsible answers to such
questions require the consideration of a number of fac-
tors: availability of the system, its reliability, re-
sponse times to different requests, costs, as well as
many less tangible aspects. These problems are inherent-
ly multidimensional.
In this section we will report on some work of Grochow
[1972,1973J, which deals with such questions using the
concepts and methodology discussed earlier in this book.
Grochow assessed a three-attribute utility function for
users of time-sharing systems. To illustrate the use-
fulness of such information for decision making by the
management of these systems, we first describe what Grochow
did and then discuss its relevance to the questions posed
at the beginning of this section.
7.5.1 Preferences of Systems Programmers
To begin, Grochow interviewed a number of users of
general time-sharing systems to determine their usage
to t I
patterns and objectives of importance. His subjects
were computer system programmers concerned mainly with
the input and editing of programs and the compilation
and testing of these. Their ratio of editing sessions
to compiling and testing sessions was approximately five
to one. Four attributes of the system important to this
class of users were
(1) Response time to trivial requests, i.e., editing,
(2) Response tinle to compute-bound requests,
i.e., compiling,
(3) Availability,
(4) Reliability.
Grochow assessed utility functions over the first
three of these attributes conditional on reliability
being at a high level.
Before beginning the assessment process, Grochow
discussed the basic ideas of utility theory with each
user and presented a scenario indicating the importance
of the three attributes and establishing that reliability
was at a high level. For measures of effectiveness he
used, for the first two attributes the average number of
seconds to satisfy requests, and for the third, the per-
centage of successful log-ins.
By assessing various conditional utility functions
over one attribute at a time given that the other two
attributes were held fixed, he established the appropri-
ateness of different utility independence conditions
and thus, restricted the form of the utility function.
Let us define attributes
x - average response time to trivial requests
in seconds,
Y - average reSponse time to compute-bound requests
in seconds, and
Z = percentage of successful log-ins.
In terms of this notation, the conditions that
Grochow verified as appropriate for the class of users
•
under consideration ｾ ･ ｲ ･
<.043
(i)
(ii)
(iii)
X is condi.tionally utility independent of
Y given Z,
X is conditionally utility independent of
Z given Y,
y is conditionally utility independent of
Z given X.
It follows directly from Theorem 6.17 in subsection
6.11.4 conditions (i) and (ii) imply that
(iv) X is utility independent of {Y,zl.
Using Theorem 5.6, from condition (iv), we know
o 0 0 0 0
u(x,y,z) :=! Ux(x,y ,z ) u(x*,y,z) + [1- U:x(x,y ,z )] ,u(x ,y,z)
(7.23)
Where u and Ux are staled from zero to one with super-
o
scripts and· indicating respectively the least and
moet desirable level of an attribute. Then using
condition (iii) and the analogous result to Theorem 5.6
for conditional utility functions, we can further break
down (7.23) to yield
o 0 0
u(x,y,z) = ｾＨｸＬｹ ,z ) [uy(x*,y,z ) u(x*,y*,z)
[ 0 OJ 1,0 0 0 0+ 1 - ｾＨｸＬｹ ,z) Llly(X ,y,z ) u(x ,y*,z)
o 0 0 0 0 -
+ {l - lly(x ,y,z )} u(x ,y ,z)J (7.24)
o
where ｵ ｾ and uy are also scaled from zero to one.
One can note that given these scaling conventions,
000
u y (x , y , z ) -
o 0
u(x,y ,z )
( * 0 0)u x ,y ,z
o 0
u(x ,y,z )
( 0 * 0)u x ,y ,z
(7.25a)
(7.25b)
* (* 0)uy x ,y,z
( * 0) (* 0 0)u x ,y,z - u x ,y ,z (7 25 )
- 0 0 O· • c
u(x*,y*,z ) - u(x*,y ,z )
If one plugs (7.25) into (7.24) we see that (x,y,z) is
completely specified by assessing the seven consistently
scaled one-attribute conditional utility functions il-
lustrated by heavy lines in Figure 7.12.
The actual verification of conditions (i), (ii),
and (iii) was iterative in nature. Each additional
conditional utility function contributes to a better
understanding of the overall structure of the utility
r--------.... -.._". '._--
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BGo A,uessQ.d 1"6
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function u(x,y,z). The implications of these were dis-
cussed with the user throughout the assessment procedure.
Whenever there were inconsistencies in the responses of
a user, they were pointed out and part of the procedure
redone. In all, the utility independence conditions
(i), (ii), and (iii) were verified for eight different
individuals in the class of users described earlier.
An actual utility function was assessed for only one
of these users. The general procedure discussed in
Chapters 5 and 6 was used for this purpose. The utility
function was assessed over the space 2 2 x < 9 (seconds),
2 < Y ｾ 120, and 10 < z < 100 (percent).
It turned out that Z was not utility independent of
{X,y} or conditionally utility independent of either X
or Y. Grochow states the reason for this: When either
response time is at an unfavorable value, for instance,
the programmer will be spending most of his or her time
contending with the slow response, and consequently will
not be as concerned about logging in as when response
times are at more desirable levels. The stated reason
why Y is not conditionally utility independent of X given
Z is that the users may set their relative preferences
for response time to compute-bound requests in terms of
the response time to trivial requests they are experienc-
ing.
Let us now consider how one might use Grochow's
results for making decisions in the computer industry.
Suppose our user was trying to choose among differ-
ent time sharing facilities which differed not only in
terms of X, Y, and Z, but also in terms of their relia-
bility R and their monthly subscription cost S. A proper
evaluation here would require a utility function
u' (r,s,x,y,z) for the user. However, if {X,Y,Z} is
utility independent of {R,S}, then of course, from
Theorem 5.6, u' can be expressed as a function of r, s,
and u so
u' (r,s,x,y,z) = ftr,s,u(x,y,z)]
The original utility function u can be used in a similar
fashion if {R,S} is utility independent of {X,Y,Z} and
{X,Y,Z} is not utility independent of {R,S}. Given this
assumption, Theorem 5.6 says u' may be expressed as a
function of one utility function over {R,S} and two utility
functions over {X,Y,Z} given different levels of {R,S}.
One of these utility functions can be u(x,y,z).
Going one step further, suppose our user (or firm)
must decide whether to buy a computer or rent such services.
If the choice is made to buy a computer, there may be
many options. Clearly, such a decision would involve a
time horizon of at least a few years. To remain simple,
let us assume that attributes X, Y and Z and a cost at-
tribute are sufficient for the decision. With a five-
year horizon, this cost attribute might be C = {C l ,c2 , ... ,C 5}
h C t t · h .th hwere . represen s cos s ln tel year. T en, as
1
before, with necessary utility independence assumptions
between C and {X,Y,Z}, the original utility function u
can be used.
Switching gears, suppose the management of a time-
sharing service has two objectives: maximize profits and
provide the best possible service to customers. A
reasonable measure of the quality of service to a user
may be its utility function over attributes X, Y, and Z.
Hence, given many users, the firm may select a utility
function which is a function of annual profits, for in-
stance, and the individual utility functions of its users.
By including potential user's utility functions as
arguments of its utility function, the firm may have a
tool to help select pricing and service policy. That is,
if prices are too high, TIlany users will select competitors
and thus reduce the firms profit. If the subscription
prices are too low, the firm will also do poorly financi-
ally. By maximizing its expected utility, the firm can
find the "optimal" price.*
lP47
*This brief discussion has neglected actions by competitors.
The utility functions discussed are applicable in con-
junction with ganle theory, a discipline concerned with
these competitive aspects. A basic introduction and
survey of game theory is Luce and Raiffa [1957J. A more
recent survey is Shakun [1972J.
7.6 SITING AND LICENSING OF NUCLEAR POWER FACILITIES
The siting of nuclear power facilities is an ex-
tremely complex process. There are many concerned inter-
est groups, each with their own set of multiple objectives,
trying to influence the decision making process. The
stakes are large, involving hundreds of millions of
dollars, possible energy shortages and "blackouts," the
possibilities of severe environmental damage, and in some
situations, heavy dependency on foreign fuels, to mention
a few of the relevant considerations.
In the United States the power company has to pre-
pare its case advocating a particular site or sites and
submit these plans for review by governmental regulatory
authorites (e.g. power, environmental impact) and by the
federal Atomic Energy Commission. These bodies try to
reach a decision by weighing the available data, con-
sidering the broad tradeoffs, and examining diverse view-
points: of the power company, of environmentalist groups,
of the public as energy consumers, and of local groups,
such as the communities near the suggested sites. How
can these governmental authorities rationally integrate
all the available information in a manner useful for
aiding their decision process?
The power companies themselves have difficulties in
dealing with the multiple objectives they face. They are,
however, mainly concerned with competitive business
positions and engineering factors, such as transmission
ｾＴＹ
facilities design and network reliability, which directly
affect their financial returns. But when a power company
is asked, by the regulatory boards, its position on
broader questions such as the impacts of its proposals
on the environment and local communities, it too must
address a broader set of objectives and often their anal-
yses depend on informal and intuitive reasoning. Perhaps
with a better understanding and presentation of the
fundamental tradeoffs among the conflicting objectives
necessitated by each of the alternatives under consider-
ation, the power company might be in better position to
select the best alternative in view of its economic
objectives, its public responsibility, and the public's
requirements. A formal analysis of these considerations
may contribute toward reducing the required time of the
now lengthy process necessary for approval of nuclear
power facilities. The big question is, what are the
characteristics of such an analysis and how does one get
it done? The literature on this general subject is
voluminous but of direct relevance to the techniques and
framework introduced in this book, we single out the
works by Gros [1974J, Papp et al. [1974J, Nair et al. [1975J,
and by Keeney and Nair [1975J.
In this section, we do two things:
(1) speculate on the appropriateness of multiattribute
utility theory for examining the questions raised
in the preceding paragraphs, and
(2) discuss the work of Jacques Gros, who attempts
to quantify preferences for nuclear siting prob-
lems using results discussed in this book.
The work described below is far from definitive--
perhaps it could more appropriately be described as
"suggestive research." We do not dwell on important
issues, such as: Is the attribute set complete? Whose
preferences should be assessed? How does one introduce
political relevancies? How does the analysis help (or
hinder) conflict resolution? Our purpose is merely to
focus on the concepts of the suggestions and to worry
little about their ｰ ｲ ｡ ｧ ｮ ｾ ｴ ｩ ｣ implementation. Our excuse
for speculating on possible uses of a theoretical nature
in a so-called "applications" chapter is that we feel the
ideas introduced here are important and the framework of
analysis may be appropriate to carry out in practice.
In this regard, we feel that Gros' accomplishments are
encouraging. At the time of this writing, Woodward-Clyde
Associates (see Section 7.4) is evaluating the siting and
design of nuclear power plants using these same concepts
and techniques.
7.6.1 Objectives For Nuclear Power Siting
Each party interested in siting nuclear power
facilities will have its own objectives. By and large,
however, in each case these objectives might fall under
the five categories: environmental, human safety, consumer
well-being, economic, and national interest. Let us
suppose that the set of objectives listed in Table 7.10
is sufficient for analysis by any of the interested
parties, although clearly, there is overlap in this crude
list and all of these objectives are not needed by all of
the parties. Those objectives of primary interest to the
concerned parties are indicated in the table. Also, for
future reference the associated attribute--possibly a
vector attribute--is designated notationally. No attempt
is made to specify specific attributes at this time.
Table 7.10 Some Objectives for Siting Nuclear Power
Facilities
Attribute Category
Xl Environmental
X2 Environmental
Human Safety
Parties
Primarily
Objective Concerned*
Minimize Pollution E,L
Provide Aesthetically E,L
Pleasing Facilities
Minimize Human Health E,L,P,S,F
Hazards
Consumer Well-Being Provide Necessary
Power
Consumer Well-Being Minimize Consumer
Power Costs
X6 Economic Maximize Economic
Benefits to Local
Community
X7 Economic Maximize Utility
Company Profits
Xa Economic Maximize State
Revenues
Xg Economic Improve Balance
of Payments
X10 National Interest Reduce Dependency on
Foreign Fuels
C,E,P,S
C,S
L
P
S
F
F
*C - consumers; E = environmentalists; L = local communities;
P _ power company; S = state agency; F = federal agency.
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7.6.2 A Conceptual Framework for Analyses by the Interested
Parties
The utility functions briefly discussed here are
mainly to suggest a conceptual framework for thinking
about crucial preference aspects of the nuclear power
siting problem and for communicating these preferences
to other interested parties. For brevity, we skip a
discusSion of the utility functions of the consumers,
environmentalists, and local community interests. These
are, in theory, more straight forward than the cases we
do consider.
The Power ｃ ｯ ｭ ｰ ｡ ｾ Ｇ ｳ Point of View. One might simply say
that a power company is concerned only with maximizing
its own profits. If such were the case, it would be ap-
propriate to assess the company's utility function u p (x7 )
over attribute X7 and use this in evaluating the power
company's alternatives. However, in this era of broader
corporate interest and responsibility, it is more likely
the case that the company is also interested in satisfy-
ing its consumers preferences for energy, minimizing the
detrimental environmental impact of its facilities, and
maximizing the net benefits of its facilities on local
communities in which facilities are to be built. Let us
designate attributes for these three additional objectives
as UC' UE ' and UL ' respectively, and note that they can
be measured by the respective utility functions uc ' uE '
and uL . The power company, at least informally, is con-
cerned with its utility function up(x7,uC,uE,uL) over the
four attributes x 7 ' uc ' uE ' and uL ' in order to analyze
which of its possible options is most attractive to
pursue. Conceptually, one might define utility uL to be
th
a function of ul, ... ,u£, ... ,uN' where u£ is the £ com-
munity's utility function and N communities are considered
as possible sites. The power company must weight its
subjective judgments about the relative desirability that
community 1 has for proposed plant A against the relative
desirability that community 2 has for proposed plant B.
Such tradeoffs, although terribly difficult, must be
formally or informally addressed by the power company.
The State Agency's Point of View. Let us oversimplify
once again and assume there is only one state agency con-
cerned with licensing nuclear power facilities, whose
main responsibility is nuclear safety. Thus, the objec-
tives of the agency might be to minimize danger due to
nuclear radiation, to provide state revenue, and to
satisfy the interested groups. Attributes X3 and Xs from
Table 7.11 may be useful for measuring the first two
objectives, whereas uc ' uE ' uL ' and up might do for
indicating interest group satisfaction. Thus, the state
agencies preferences might be conceptualized by
us(x3,xS,UC,UE,uL,up)' where ｵ ｾ is the state agencies
aggregation of the N communities' utility functions.
The Federal Agencies Point of View. The main federal
agency concerned with nuclear power plants in the United
States is the Atomic Energy Commission. Its problem is
quite similar to that of the state agency just outlined.
The major difference might be the federal concern for the
balance of payments, indicated by attribute x 9 ' and the
national dependency on foreign fuels, measured by attri-
bute XlO . It may be useful for the federal agency to
conceptualize its preferences with the utility function
uF(x3,x9,xlO,uC,uE'u£,uP)' where u£ measures the federal
agencies concern for the local community impact of nuclear
facilities.
7.6.3 Empirical Assessments of Gros
Gros [197 4J studies nuclear facili ty siting from a
slightly different viewpoint and in the process has
generated evidence that the utility functions postulated
in the proceeding section can be meaningfully assessed.*
Specifically Gros investigates the usefulness of what he
refers to as Paretian environmental analysis in nuclear
siting decisions. Generally stated, Paretian analysis
attempts to identify the benefits accruing to each of the
*Ovi's [1973J results using multiattribute decision anal-
ysis for evaluating nuclear versus fossil power plant
alternatives, and nuclear siting and decision studies in
progress at Woodward-Clyde Associates also lend support
to this contention.
various parties involved in a decision making process and
to illuminate the tradeoffs,amongthese groups. To il-
lustrate his approach, Gros examines the deployment of
1000 megawatt nuclear baseload units to possible sites
along the New England coast.
In the terminology of this book, Gros assessed multi-
attribute utility functions for four parties involved in
nuclear power plant siting in New England: power companies,
environmentalists, regulatory agencies, and local groups.
These utility functions were each assessed over four at-
tributes:
Yl = Capacity at a site, measured by the number of
1000 megawatt units at a coastal site,
Y2 - Incremental dollar costs, measured by the cost
of thermal abatement equipment plus transmission
costs expressed as a percent of the minimum
cost facility,
Y3 - Radiation hazard, measured by the population
within fifteen miles of the nuclear facility
times the number of units at the site, and
Y4 - Thermal pollution level, measured in degrees
Fahrenheit at the outfall of the nuclear
facility.
These attributes were generated after interviewing a
number of individuals who had previously participated in
siting controversies. Rather than focusing on questions
of whether or not this set of attributes is appropriate
for the problem considered, let us consider the assess-
ment procedure.
For each of the four interest groups, a knowledge-
able observer, who had an intimate knowledge of many of
the group members preferences, was chosen based on re-
commendations of group members. The knowledgeable
observer's utility function was assessed and his pref-
erences were used as those of the appropriate represen-
tative group. The results were verified for reasonable-
ness with other group members. For each of the four utility
functions, necessary utility independence conditions were
verified to invoke Theorem 6.1 implying the appropriate-
ness of either the multiplicative or additive utility
functions.
Gros was also interested in preferences over the
forty year design horizon. For each of the knowledgeable
observers he verified that preferences for lotteries in
any individual year were utility independent of preferences
for lotteries over the other years. Also he found pref-
erences in each pair of years to be preferentially
independent of preferences in other years. Hence the
forty-attribute utility function, representing the forty-
year period, was again either multiplicative or additive.
Because of the desire on the part of the knowledgeable
observers to spread risks over the years, the multiplic-
ative form was selected as appropriate.*
*Some interesting assessments of preferences over time
indicating some of these issues are found in Chapter 9.
Gros' efforts and empirical assessments help to
illustrate something that we firmly believe. Namely it
is possible to develop meaningful utility functions,
such as those postulated in the preceding subsection,
for the various participants in the complex decision
processes concerning the siting and licensing of nuclear
power facilities. The assessments briefly discussed
here are an important first step toward characterizing
utility functions directly useful in making nuclear power
siting decisions. The task is difficult and the effort
required to obtain these preferences is substantial.
However, to avoid these problems relegates the crucial
tradeoff issues and the preference evaluation of the
risks involved to informal analysis.
7.7 OTHER APPLICATIONS
Experience with formal quantification of preferences
in multiattribute contexts is growing. Let us briefly
mention a number of decision problems, in addition to
those in earlier sections in this chapter, where the
concepts of Chapters 2 through 6 were utilized.
7.7.1 The Safety of Landing Aircraft
The safety of landing an aircraft depends on many
factors: wind, visibility, ceiling, other aircraft in
the vicinity, etc. Yntema and Klem [1965J attempted to
quantify the safety of various situations which differed
in terms of ceiling, visibility, and amount of fuel that
would remain at touchdown given a normal landing. Other
relevant factors were fixed at a standard value.
The decision makers for this study consisted of
twenty Air Force pilots, each of whom had a good deal of
experience in landing aircraft under a wide variety of
situations. Using the form of the three-attribute quasi-
additive utility function discussed in Result 2 of
Section 6.2, utility functions over the attributes ceiling,
visibility, and remaining fuel were assessed. In the
attribute space, ceiling varied from 100 to 5,000 feet,
visibility from 0.25 to 5 miles, and remaining fuel from
15 to 250 gallons. Each decision maker was also presented
with forty pairs of consequences and asked to pick the
preferable one of each pair. These responses were compared
with the implications of each decision maker's utility
function. Yntema and Klem concluded liThe results were
satisfactory."
It should be pointed out that the utility independence
assumptions requisite for Result 2 of Section 6.2 were
not empirically verified. In fact, the assessments of
Yntema and Klem were completed a few years before the
formal theory was developed. In spite of this, the
resulting utility functions did seem appropriate to
represent the preferences of the pilots. Yntema and
Klem's pioneering effort gave some support to the con-
tention that it was reasonable and practical to quantify
preferences in multiattribute situations.
7.7.2 Strategic and Operational Policy Concerning Frozen
Blood
Should a hospital blood bank or system of blood banks
invest in expensive blood freezing equipment? And for
systems with such capabilities, what are the most desirable
proportions of frozen and non-frozen blood? These questions
were addressed in a thesis by Bodily [1974J. He also
conducted a preliminary investigation of national stra-
tegies in blood research and in the usage of frozen blood.
First, after considerable consultation with blood
bankers, objectives and measures of effectiveness were
specified for evaluating frozen blood issues. The re-
sulting list, given in Table 7.11, indicates the depth
at which preferences and probabilities were initially
going to be assessed. However, to help the respondent's
thinking about the implications of various levels of the
attributes, the objectives hierarchy was developed and
qualitatively extended as illustrated in Figure 7.13.
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Table 7.11 Objectives of a Hospital Blood Bank
Objectives
Meet all requests for blood
Provide high quality blood
Minimize disease
Minimize cost
Minimize transfusion
reactions
Minimize wastage
Provide bloods for special
uses
Measures of Effectiveness
Average delay or frequency of
delay above some acceptable
cutoff
Average age at transfusion
Rate of hepatitis
Cost/unit
Rate of transfusion reaction
Outdating plus processing loss
Fraction of special needs that
are met with frozen blood or
an equivalent unit.
In analyzing the problem of what proportion of frozen
blood should be selected for a particular blood bank and
the problem of whether or not such a bank should invest in
blood freezing equipment, Bodily used a variety of approaches
to obtain reasonable probability distributions over the
attributes for each alternative. These approaches included
utilizing empirical information from blood banks, projec-
tions using simple mathematical models of the operations
of such blood banks, judgmental estimation of experts,
and statistical data available in journal articles, etc.
Bodily tried to assess preferences over the six
attributes labelled X., i ｾ 1,2, ... ,6 in Figure 7.13 for
1
a number of individuals concerned with blood banking.
A first conclusion was that attribute X6 could be elimi-
nated in considering the question of proportion of blood
to freeze. The reasoning was that if a blood bank froze
any blood, it would certainly freeze enough to satisfy
special needs, and so, the objective "meet special needs"
would be equally satisfied with all the viable alternatives.
Hence, it could be dropped from the list.
Next attributes Xl' X2 , and X3 were aggregated since
each pair of these was preferentially independent of its
complement and substitution rates were constants. Wastage
and delay were translated into economic terms using a
simple additive value function
where d is the equivalent cost per unit of blood delayed
and w is the cost per unit wastage. If attribute Y is
defined as Xl + dX2 + WX 3 , then what is needed is a utility
function u(y,x4 ,xS ) over Y, X4 , and XS .
In the assessment process, it became clear that blood
bankers considered the possible range of the average age
transfused much less important than the ranges of economic
and purity considerations. Hence Xs was dropped and
utility functions u(y,x4 ) were completely assessed for
one blood banker and one individual with a public health
graduate degree and a knowledge of decision analysis.
In both cases Y and X4 were mutually utility independent
and so, from rrheorem 5.2, -the quasi-additive utility
function was appropriate. In addition, Bodily ascertained
that in a paired comparison of two simple lotteries with
identical marginal probability distributions, the blood
banker was indifferent. Thus from Theorem 5.4, it follows
that the respondent's utility function was additive.
Details of these assessments are found in Bodily [1974J.
Many of the concepts of Chapters 2 through 6 were
explicitly used in the overall assessment process. First,
a first-cut hierarchy of objectives was articulated as
discussed in Chapter 2, and one objective was then dropped
since it was not important enough to influence decisions.
Then using preferential independence conditions and the
concepts of Chapter 3, a value function over three of
the attributes was specified to achieve an aggregation
and reduction of dimensionality. Next quantitative con-
siderations led to the exclusion of attribute XS . Finally,
utility independence and the unidimensional aSSeSSTIlent
techniques surveyed in Chapter 4 were used to specify the
final utility functions.
This case illustrates well a typical evolutionary
process which starts from a listing of objectives--in
this case the specification of subobjectives extended
further down the hierarchy than the quantitative analysis--
and terminates with the quantification of the final utility
function.
7.7.3 Sewage Sludge Disposal in the Metropolitan Boston
Area
In Boston, the Metropolitan District Commission (MDC)
has responsibility for water and sewage works for the
forty-three cities and towns within its jurisdiction.
As of 1971, one hundred tons of sewage sludge was being
discharged daily into Boston Harbor by the treatment
plants of the MDC. Because of increasing public concern
and the interest of the u.S. Environmental Protection
Agency, the Division of Water Pollution Control of the
Massachusetts Department of Natural Resources requested
the MDC to make a comprehensive study of new and better
alternatives to the present sludge disposal practice.
The MDC organized a committee named the Boston Harbor
Pollution Task Force (BHPTF) to study the problem and
make recommendations. At the suggestion of the Massa-
chusetts Office of Environmental Affairs and with the
consent of the BHPTF, Dennis Horgan, then a graduate
student at M.I.T., worked with this task force and con-
ducted an independent decision analysis of the sludge
disposal alternatives. This subsection briefly surveys
Horgan's work.
The viable alternatives for Boston sludge disposal
could be categorized as being either marine disposal or
land disposal. In the former category one could either
barge sludge to a dumping ground ten miles offshore or
extend a submerged sludge line approximately seven miles
out to sea. In the latter category one could directly
spread the sludge on available land and till it into the
soil, or alternatively, the sludge could first be in-
cinerated--thus reducing its volume approximately seventy
percent and then disposed of at a land site. There are
variations of these four basic alternatives, such as dif-
ferent processes of incineration, etc., but, these were
felt to be second-order considerations and not explicitly
considered in the analysis.
The analysis by Horgan specified four major objectives:
minimize costs, minimize water pollution, minimize land
pollution, and minimize air pollution. Thus, the classic
question concerning tradeoffs of one kind of pollution
against another was explicitly addressed. The net present
value of costs was used as the measure of effectiveness
of the cost objective. Air pollution was measured in
tons of particulate matter and gases due to sludge in-
cineration and land pollution was measured in terms of
the total area required for sludge disposal sites. To
indicate water quality, Horgan defined a subjective index,
as discussed in Section 2.3, scaled from zero to ten,
based on state water quality standards.
Exploiting probabilistic independence properties
where appropriate, probability distributions were
specified over the four variables for each of the four
basic alternatives.* Concerning preferences, Horgan
verified with members of the BHPTF that each of the four
attributes was utility independent of its respective
complement, and also, that pairs of attributes were not
preferentially independent of their complements. Hence,
by Theorem 6.3, the multilinear utility function was
appropriate. The specific utility function and probabi-
lity assessments, as well as sensitivity analysis of the
results, are found in Horgan [1972J.
7.7.4 Selecting a Job or Profession
A critical decision facing each of us from time to
time concerns the selection of a job. This problem is
different in one important respect from many of the other
illustrations in this book in that it is essentially a
personal decision. Most of the other problems dealt with
a decision maker as representative of his company or as
representative of a branch of the government. Here we
will briefly summarize two philosophical approaches to
job selection, both of which utilize the general ideas
discussed in earlier chapters. The works of Miller
[1966,1970J and Teweles [1972J will serve as models for
our discussion.
*For an incineration alternative, air pollution and land
pollution, for example, were not probabilistically in-
dependent, since they both depend on the volume of sludge,
Horgan's model explicitly included such dependencies.
Miller developed and tested a procedure for evalua-
ting the "worth" of various situations described by
multiple attributes. One of the problems to which it
has been applied involved a graduate student faced with
numerous employment offers immediately following gradu-
ation. After preliminary analysis, this number was
reduced to four viable contenders. The objectives
hierarchy and attributes associated with each of the
lowest-level objectives which were identified by the
graduate student are illustrated in Figure 7.14.
An additive "worth" function,
w(x) = L k.w. (x.)
ill 1
(7.26)
where w. measures the worth of an amount x. of attribute
1 1
X., was used to evaluate the alternatives on a zero to
1
one scale. The scaling factors k. were determined using
1
conditional assessments as described in Section 3.7. For
instance, first weights of 0.33, 0.17, 0.17, and 0.33
were assigned to monetary compensation, geographical
location, travel requirements, and nature of work, re-
spectively. Then, for instance, of the monetary compen-
sation, a 0.7 weight went to immediate compensation and
0.3 to future compensation. Of the future compensation,
0.65 and 0.35 went to anticipated three-year salary and
anticipated five-year salary respectively. Then, the
total effective weight assigned to anticipated three-year
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*Direct worth est.i.mate: a subjective assessment.
salary was (0.33) (0.3) (0.65) or 0.064. These effective
weights were then adjusted to account for the degree to
which the attribute actually measured to ｡ ｣ ｨ ｾ ･ ｶ ･ ｭ ･ ｮ ｴ on
an objective. Finally for each of the fifteen attributes,
individual worth functions w. were determined.
1
The four alternatives were then each represented as
a fifteen-attribute vector and the worth of each calcula-
ted using (7.26). Uncertainties were not explicitly
considered in the problem.
Notice that all the attributes in Miller's problem
are in some sense proxy attributes. Presumably, they are
proxy for the quality of the decision maker's life.
Because of this it was possible to identify many 6bjec-
tive measures for these attributes.
Teweles' approach was very different in this respect.
He attempted to establish a more direct set of attributes
to indicate the desirability of various alternative careers
open. Teweles' objectives are given in Table 7.11 along
with a short description of the meaning of each.
Table 7.1l Teweles' Objectives for Evaluating Professions
Job Satisfaction--enjoyment derived from doing the
type of work you have chosen. Direct benefits of a job
such as the opportunity for travel, meeting interesting
people, and means of self-expression are included in this
factor.
Wealth--the financial remuneration which can be
expected from working and the accumulation of capital
which can be earned from investment of excess funds.
As money is, in a sense, a means of obtaining other
goods and services the utility of these products can be
substituted for wealth in determining its value.
Security--a condition of relative safety which
results from being able to continue your job if you wish
to do so. Also included in this factor is the risk to
one's health associated with a particularly dangerous
occupation.
ｆ ｡ ｾ ｭ ｩ ｬ ｹ considerations--this factor is an amalgamation
of the possible influence a particular career might have
on the other members of your family. A wife's attitude,
mother's sentiment, child's future, or other considera-
tions should be accounted for in career planning.
Independence--refers to the ｡ ｾ ｩ ｬ ｩ ｴ ｹ one has of being
his own boss and scheduling his own activities. Indepen-
dence also refers to the short-term flexibility to do
what is most important to the individual at a particular
time.
Self-esteem--is the self-respect one gains froIn his
own achievements. The self-esteem one could anticipate
from a job is very dependent on his ability to be suc-
cessful at his work.
Prestige--the reputation one acquires within a group
as the result of competence, character, power, wealth,
etc. The professional respect of one's colleagues may be
an important factor to some individuals.
For each of the objectives, except wealth, a sub-
jective index was defined, ranging from zero to one
hundred, which was used to indicate the degree to which
the corresponding objective was achieved.·
+The job alternatives evaluated by Dr. Teweles were
(1) a private general dentist, (2) a military dentist,
*Miller's and Teweles' work illustrates a tendency men-
tioned in Chapter 2. Namely, as the attributes become
more direct indicators of fundamental preferences--as
opposed to proxy attributes--it is more difficult to
identify suitable objective measures, and one must define
subjective indices.
+Dr. Teweles is a dentist, and at the time he wrote his
paper, he was completing a Masters of Science in Business
Administration and reaching the end of his initial military
commitment.
(3) an orthodontic dental specialist, (4) an investment
analyst, and (5) a management consultant. These five
occupations were evaluated using an additive utility
function. Using available data on various professions
in addition to personal judgment, Teweles was able to
assess probabilities about the degree to which each ob-
jective would be met conditional on each alternative.
Expected utilities were calculated for each alternative
and sensitivity analyses performed.
In Dr. Teweles' report, he states, "The major dif-
ficulty in all career planning decisions is for an in-
dividual to gain sufficient insight into his own future
goals and then learn enough about each alternative to
evaluate it objectively." Among Dr. Teweles' conclusions
are "As a result of my career analysis, I feel more
capable of making the proper career decision at this time.
There is no doubt that I understand the factors which
motivate me a little better than I did before the analysis."
The authors know of many eases where similar personal
analyses have been conducted. Some of these resulted in
similar conclusions as Dr. Teweles'; other self-analyses,
as you might expect, were abortive and useless. We also
know of one medical doctor who used this ｰ ･ ｲ ｾ ｯ ｮ ｡ ｬ self-
evaluation technique on a mental patient in a hospital and
he reported a surprising success. This doctor took our
vernacular phrase, "a framework, for straightening out
one's mind," quite literally.
7.7.5 Transporting Hazardous Substances
During the past decade there has been a large growth
in the type and the amount of hazardous materials trans-
ported within the United States. Shipment of such
materials is achieved via all ground modes--rail, highway,
water and pipeline. Private citizens, industry, and
governmental agencies have become increasingly concerned
about the risks associated with transporting these
hazardous materials. Aspects of the risk might be di-
vided into two factors:
(1) the likelihoods of various accidents occurring,
and
(2) the damage caused by an accident which does
occur.
Too often, one has a tendency to assume that "reducing
the risks" can always be accomplished by reducing the
probability of an accident occurring.* However, one must
clearly also include the possible consequences when at-
tempting to reduce risk. Said another way, the risk of
the circumstance: "There is one chance in 1,000,000 that
a gas leak will lead to a moderate-sized explosion in a
populated area next year" seems much greater intuitively
than the circumstance: "There are 4 chances ·in 1,000,000
*One can investigate "fail-safe" as well as "safe-fail"
techniques.
that a gas leak will lead to a large explosion in the
desert next year."
Some pioneering work of Brooks and Kalelkar at
Arthur D. Little is currently attempting to measure the
relative undesirability of the consequences of various
accidents which may result from transporting hazardous
materials. In addition, they are investigating which
modes of transport are safer for which specific substances.
The aspect of Brooks and Kalelkar's efforts of most
interest here concerns their attempts to assess a three
attribute utility function over the attributes: human
deaths, property damage, and environmental damage. The
first attribute ranged from zero to 1200, and the second
attribute ranged from zero to ten million dollars. The
third attribute was measured by a subjective index scaled
from 1 to 13, as defined in Table 7.l3.
Table 7.13. Environmental Effects from Hazardous Chemical
Spills
Note: This scale applies equally well to water and to
land.
1. No effect.
2. Residual surface accumulati.on of harmless material
such as sugar or grain.
3. Aesthetic pollution (odor-vapors).
4. Residual surface accumulation of removable material
such as oil.
5. Persistent leaf damage (spotting, discoloratLon) but
foliage remains edible for wildlife.
6. Persistent leaf damage (loss of foliage) but new
growth in following year.
7. Foliage remains poisonous to animals (indirect cause
of some death upon ingestion).
8. Animals become more susceptible to predators because
of direct exposure to chemicals and a resulting
physical debilitation.
9. Death to most smaller animals.
10. Short term (one season) loss of foliage with emigra-
tion of specific animals that eat the foliage.
Eventual reforestation.
11. Death to foliage and emigration of animals.
12. Death to foliage and animals.
13. Sterilization of total environment with no potential
for reforestation or immigration of species.
ｾ Ｑ Ｔ
The person whose preferences were assessed by Brooks
and Kalelkar was an experienced worker in the field of
safety who attempted to take the viewpoint of society as
a whole in indicating preferences. It was verified that
each of the single attributes were utility independent
of the remaining two. Hence, Theorem 6.3 held and the
three one-attribute utility functions and the requisite
scaling constants necessary for specifying the three-
attribute utility function were assessed. The three
utility functions are illustrated in Figure 7.15. Details
of these assessments are found in Kalelkar et ale ｛ Ｑ Ｙ Ｗ ｾ Ｎ
This analysis raises deep ethical concerns and
should be examined critically and constructively by
analysts concerned with such problems. At least Kalelkar
articulates a utility structure that others can criticize
and this is a step forward. Pious, vacuous rhetoric does
not help in making such horrendous tradeoffs. We feel
that in cases such as the one examined by Kalelkar, im-
plicitly used value and utility structures should be of
public concern and should not be suppressed.
7.7.6 Treatment for Cleft Lip and Cleft Palate*
Cleft lip and cleft palate is the second most common
congenital deformity in the United States. Treatment for
*Roughly speaking, a cleft lip is a failure of the upper
lip to grow together. It usually results in a gap in the
lip approximately below one nostril. Cleft palate refers
to a split in the palate at birth.
this condition is very involved: it requires many dif-
ferent medical specialists, coordinating from birth to
adulthood, not only to correct surgically the physiologic
defect, but also to address the child's psychological,
social, and mental development. The effects of the treat-
ment of clefts and the effects of the clefts themselves
are not completely distinguishable. Both are serious
and should be considered in selecting an approach for
treatment. With this, a critical issue surfaces, namely:
what is the best procedure for treatment in a given
situation? Value judgments are essential to answer this
question, but because survival of the child is not a
factor, various concerned individuals--parents and
professionals--often disagree more in their value structures
in this situation than in cases where survival is an issue.
The best treatment should depend on a number of character-
istics, such as the physical features of the child after
treatment, the cost, the effects on hearing and speech,
etc. Pathbreaking results of Jeffrey Krischer [1974J of
Harvard University constitute a very interesting attempt
to address some of the critical value issues concerning
treatment of cleft lip and cleft palate. Here, we briefly
describe his work.
In discussing the importance of cleft lip and cleft
palate, Krischer states, " Rarely are there defects so
handicapping to the child or so disturbing to the family,
yet so amenable to treatment." One major objective of
w77
treatment is to correct the physical deformities and
provide a normal-looking lip and nose. There are usually
uncertainties about the surgical success one will have
in this process and there is always the possibility of
resulting scars. Defective speech often accompanies those
with cleft palate, which can be attributed to both physic-
al and psychological factors. Another complication is
the possibility of hearing loss due to a variety of factors.
Thus, clearly two other important objectives of treatment
are to improve future speech skills and to improve hearing.
Krischer has quantified the preferences of over one
hundred people, including surgeons, orthodontists, speech
therapists, audiologists, pediatricians, and parents of
children with clefts, all of whom are actively involved
with individuals having clefts. The four objectives and
associated attributes which he explicitly considered are
given in Table 7.14 along with the range of these attributes.
One unique aspect of these assessments was the attribute
evaluating physical effects. Krischer had segments of
children's faces showing the nose and mouth area super-
imposed on a sketched face of a child. These pictures
illustrated various degrees of physical deformity after
treatment for the cleft. The individuals were asked to
assess subjectively their preferences for these pictoral
displays. Also note that the hearing attribute only had
two values. This, of course, could be generalized. For
speech, word intelligibility was measured as the percent
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of words accurately identified by a group of listeners
with normal hearing. Here 90% is completely adequate,
75% causes mild difficulty in understanding, 50% requires
frequent repetition, and 35% is unintelligible.
Once these objectives and attributes were specified,
Krischer, working with medical specialists concerned with
clefts, developed a questionnaire to assess preferences
over the four attributes. This was mailed to medical
specialists at numerous cleft-lip and cleft-palate treat-
ment facilities in the United States and through these
facilities to some parents of children with clefts. Part
of the questionnaire concerned utility independence as-
sumptions and the conditional utility functions for the
four attributes and another part concerned preferential
independence assumptions and tradeoffs among attributes.
Of the first one hundred twenty-five responses, approxima-
tely seventy-five percent appear to have accepted re-
quisite assumptions to invoke Theorem 6.1 in formalizing
ｰ ｲ ｾ ｦ ･ ｲ ･ ｮ ｣ ･ ｳ Ｎ Details of these assessments, a copy of the
questionnaire, and an interesting discussion of individ-
ual differences of preferences are found in Krischer [1974J.
Table 7.14. Krischer·s Objectives for Evaluating Cleft
Lip and Palate Treatment
Objective
Provide normal looking
lip and nose
Improve speech
Improve hearing
Minimize treatment
costs
Attribute
Pictoral
Percent word
intelligibility
Hearing aid required
Dollars
Range
(see text)
35 to 90
yes or no
o - 10,000
7.7.7 Development of Water Quality Indices
Recent work by O'Connor [1973J illustrates some
important considerations relevant to specifying and using
social indices. O'Connor utilized a modified Delphi
procedure (Dalkey [ 1969 J) to combine the judgments
of several experts in constructing two separate indices
of water quality. One concerned the quality of water to
be used as a public water supply and the other described
the quality of water for sustaining fish and wildlife
populations. Eight experts* were used to (1) specify
attributes that should be included in each of the water
quality indices and to (2) prescribe a value function
over these attributes that would indicate water quality.
Since these indices are value functions, they have the
property that higher values indicate higher water quality.
However, it is not necessarily appropriate to use the
expected value of these indices in making decisions when
uncertainty is involved.
O'Connor sent questionnaires to and personally
visited each of the experts to discuss the attributes
which should be explicitly included in some aggregate
water quality index and the form of this aggregation
function. An additive model was chosen for both the
public water supply and fish and wildlife indices.
O'Connor emphasizes that an additive model is not ap-
propriate for instance when certain toxic substances
enter the water at an unacceptable level or when some
of the other attributes, such as pH, reach extreme levels.
Thus O'Connor's models are meant to be valid subject to
*O'Connor describes the experts as follows: "Eight experts
were chosen from an initial set of 20 contacted. Two
experts were high-ranking members of The Environmental
Protection Agency. Two members were heads of state en-
gineering services departments, and four were university
professors in the areas concerned with environmental quality."
the condition that toxic substances are under recommended
limits and other attributes are within specified ranges.
However, many normal situations probably meet these re-
strictions. The final attributes used in the public
water supply index and in the fish and wildlife index
are given in Table 7.15. Details about procedures used
and the final value functions are in O'Connor [1973J.
Table 7.15. O'Connor's Final Attributes in the Water
Quality Indices
Public Water Supply
Fecal Coliforms
Phenols
Dissolved Solids
pH
Flourides
Hardness
Nitrates
Chlorides
Alkalinity
Turbidity
Dissolved Oxygen
Color
Sulfates
Fish and Wildlife
Dissolved Oxygen
Temperature
pH
Phenols
Turbidity
Ammonia
Dissolved Solids
Nitrates
Phosphates
7.7.8 Examining Foreign Policy
What are the advantages and disadvantages to the
u.s. of a Mideast agreement sought to ensure the con-
tinued availability of Mideast oil and an increased
production to meet the world demand? An exploratory
policy analysis done by Decisions and Designs, Inc.*
examined how a multiattribute deci.sion analysis might
clarify the reasoning and simplify the presentation of
conclusions for such a complex problem.
The first phase of the analysis produced a flexible
decision model and used it initially to evaluate three
sharply different negotiating strategies regarding a
possible Mideast agreement. A "base option" involving
no change now or later in U.S.-Mideast policies was used
primarily as a reference point for purposes of comparison.
A maximum option involved an agreement which went most
of the way toward what certain Mideast oil-producing
countries want. A moderate option was an intermediate
strategy reflecting a moderate change in u.s. policy,
Ｎ ｾ ..
*Decisions and Designs, Incorporated is an independent
research and development company located in McLean, Virginia
specializing in decision analysis for the United States
Government and industry. Much of their work is devoted
to problems involving multiple objectives.
which would be attractive to the Mideast oil-producing
countries but not politically difficult for the U.S.
The decision model evaluated the impact of various
negotiating postures on Mideastern oil supply and the
associated political and economic costs and gains to the
U.S. Specifically, the attributes concerned balance of
ｰ ｡ ｹ ｭ ･ ｮ ｾ Ｌ the way Western Europe and Japan would perceive
a Mideast agreement, the impact on U.S.-foreign relations,
the resulting public sentiment in the U.S., and finally,
the effect an agreement would have on other oil producers.
Various sub-models were used to elicit probabilistic
judgments and preference assessments at differing levels
of complexity and aggregation. The uncertainty side of
the analysis was based on judgments elicited from policy
makers and substantive experts. Alternative approaches
used direct unconditional assessments of oil volume, joint
assessments of volume and price, and indirect assessments
conditioned on possible political developments. Where
different approaches led to inconsistent results, those
inconsistencies were resolved by interacting with the
respondents.
The preferences used in the problem were solicited
from policy analysts charged with making recommendations.
For a first analysis, the utility function chosen was
additive. The single attribute utility functions for
attributes such as "oil volume" were constructed in the
manner described in Chapter 4. Tradeoffs were addressed
by eliciting statements like, "All other factors held
constant, an increase in Mideast oil supply to the u.s.
of from .5 to 2.5 million barrels a day at $12 a barrel
is indifferent to a gratuitous saving of $4 billion in
the federal budget (independent of its level)."
The next phase of the ongoing decision analysis used
the model developed, with several variations, to explore
a much richer set of realistic options and to update con-
tinually the inputs in the light of changing circumstances
or perceptions of individual decision makers. More
details can be found in Brown and Peterson [1975J.
7.7.9 Other Applications
As one can see from the examples described, there is
a wide variety of settings in which multiattribute value
or utility analysis is being employed. Still our collective
experience is not so large that the theory and 'art' of
such analyses is anywhere near standardized. Indeed,
practically each new analysis contributes to the 'art'
of assessing multiattribute preferences, if not to the
theory aspects also. For space considerations, we have
unfortunately not been able to review many such inter-
esting 'groundbreaking' analyses.
Some of these are Bauer and Wegener's [1975J exami-
nation of urban development plans; Gearing, Swart, and
Var's [1973,1974J measure of tourist attractiveness and
selection of touristic projects for the Turkish Ministry
of Tourism; Lorange and Norman1s [1973J investigation
of risk attitudes of Scandinavian shipowners; Gustafson
Feller, Crane, and Holloway's [1971J development of a
severity of pain index; Boyd, Howard, Matheson, and
North's [1971J decision of whether to seed hurricanes;
Dyer, Farrell, and Bradley's [1973J development of
curriculum planning information for elementary school
principles; and Collins [1975J evaluation of solid waste
disposal alternatives in Southeastern Michigan. Huber
[1974aJ reviews a number of studies that used multi-
attribute utility models. Two more general articles
which survey the applications of decision analysis in
industry are Brown [1970J and Longbottom and Wade [1973J.

CHAPTER 8
*AIRPORT DEVELOPMENT FOR MEXICO CITY: A CASE STUDY
This chapter describes the application of decision
analysis to a large scale public decision problem-
ｾ ｾ ･ ｬ ･ ｣ ｴ ｩ ｯ ｮ of a strategy for developing the major air-
port facilities of the Mexico City metropolitan area.
The purpose of discussing this study here is twofold.
First, many of the techniques and procedures developed
in earlier chapters of the book are utilized on a very
important "typical" problem. Of course, it's typical
of those one-of-a-kind strategic decisions which always
concern many atypical aspects. Second, although the
analysis stresses the value side of t.he multiattribute
problem, it also deals with structuring the problem,
aspects of modelling the possible impacts of various
alternatives, and the larger framework within which
the analysis occurred.
Many people contributed significantly to the study.
It was done in the summer of 1971 for the Government of
Mexico under the auspices of the Secretaria de Obras
Publicas (Ministry of Public Works) and directed by F.J.
* This chapter closely follows the development in, and at
t:imes takes sections almost verbatim from deNeufville and
Keeney [1972] and Keeney ｛ Ｑ Ｙ Ｗ Ｓ ｾ Ｎ
Jauffred, Director of the Center for Computation and
Statistics, and F. Dovali, Head of the Department of
Airports. Richard deNeufville of Massachusetts Institute
of Technology and the two of us were consultants assisting
SOP on the project. The total time spent by the con-
sultants on the project was fifty man-days.
8.1. THE PROBLEM
Rapid grow th in t.he demand f<n" air travel, combined
witll increasingly difficult operating conditions at the
exi.sting airport facilities compelled the Mexican Govern"""
ment to address the question: "How should the airport
facilities of Mexico City be developed to assure adequats
servlee for the region elu.t ing the period from now to the
year 2000?" This was the essential question addressed
by the study team.
Our initial problem was not this one however.. T\'io
previous studies for developing the airport ｦ ｡ ｣ ｩ ｬ ｩ ｴ ｩ ･ ｾ
of Mexico City had recommended very different alternatives.
One concluded that the current airport, five ｭ ｩ ｬ ･ ｾ from
*the city center should be grE!atly expaI1ded, whereas
the other suggested moving all aircraft operations to a
new airport to be built twenty-five miles north of the city.+
* See Ipesa Consultores and the Secretaria de Comrnunicaciones
y Transportes [1970].
+ See Secreta ria de Obras Publicas [1967] or Wilsey y Ham de
Our initial charter was to evaluate the various alternatives,
in light of this discrepancy, and to recommend the most
effective program for airport development.
For this more limited development decision, one
needed to be concerned with the following:
(1) the location of the airport (or airports);
(2) the operational policy defining which services
are to be performed and where they will be
located; and
(3) the timing for development of different airport
facilities.
Because of severe environmental constraints, the two
sites previously mentioned are the only ones adequate for
a large international airport in the Mexico City metro-
politan area. The configurations possible at either site,
with respect to the runways for example, were not really
significaht in this particular problem.
Many different ways of operating the airports -- with
sUbstantial differences in the quality of service provided -
- were possible, however. In particular, it was necessary
to decide what kinds of aircraft activity (international,
domestic, military or general) should be operating at
each of the two sites.
The question of timing is very important, since failure
to act at a given time may preclude future options. For
example, land available now may not be available in the
future when one might want to develop it. On the other
hand, premature Rction can significantly increase total
costs to the nation. The timing issue and operational
policies were the most important aspects of this initial
airport problem.
3.2. BACKGROUND INFORMATION
The existing airport is about five miles east of
the central part of Mexico City, but still within the
city limits on the edge of Lake Texcoco. The other
site is 25 miles north of the city in an undeveloped
farming area, near the village of Zumpango. The relative
location of the two feasible sites is irtdicated in
Figure 8.1.
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Mexico City is situated at an altitude of about
7 f 400 feet in a valley ringed with high ｭ ｯ ｵ ｮ ｴ ｡ ｩ ｮ ｾ ranging
to over 17,000 feet above sea level. The mountains are
very high in all directions except the northeast, where
the range lowers to around 10,000 feet. Most flights
entering or leaving the Mexico City area fly over these
lower mountains to the northeast, although some do proceed
through a smaller and higher pass to the south.
The ｾ ｡ ｮ ･ ｵ ｶ ･ ｲ ｡ ｢ ｩ ｬ ｩ ｴ ｹ of the aircraft at high altitudes
is low, especially in hot climates. This requires that
the flight patterns over Mexico City be broader than
usual and prevents aircraft from safely threading their
way through mountainous regions. Thus there are considerable
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restrictions on the usable airspace around Mexico City.
This constraint, which principally affects the capacity
of the Texcoco site, is serious since Mexico City already
handles over 2 million passengers a year and ranks among the
the busiest airports on the continent.
When the Texcoco Airport was organized in the 1930's,
it was out in the country, but the population of the metro-
politan area has grown at the rate of about 5% a year,
passing from five million in 1960, to eight million in
1970. During this time, Texcoco has been surrounded on
three sides by mixed residential and commercial sections.
This has created problems of noise, social disruption;
and safety.
Should a major accident occur on landing or takeoff
ｴ ｯ ｷ ｾ ｲ ､ the city it would likely ｣ ｾ ｾ ｳ ･ huhdreds of casualties.
The area is densely populated and, for example, a large school
is located under a flightpath only 500 feet from the end
of a runway. Since the approach pattern passes dirsctly
ｯ ｾ ･ ｲ the central ｰ ｡ ｲ ｴ ｾ of the city, high noise levels
affect many thousands of people. These noise levels are
bound to persist for at least the next 15 years until
"quiet" engines are'developed and installed on all aircraft.
In addition, major expansion at Texcoco could result in
displacements of up to 200,000 people. A compensating
advantage for the Texcoco site is that major facilities
already exist. However they do not meet the standards
found in the major airports of other large developed
countries.
The location of Mexico City on a former lake bed
makes construction especially expensive at Texcoco. Heavy
facilities such as runways not only sink rapidly, but at
different rates in different locations, depending on their
loads. Each of the two major existing runways at Texcoco
require levelling and resurfacing every two years. Such
repairs closed down half the airport for four months when
they were done in 1971. Because the Zumpango site is
on higher and firmer ground, it is not expected to have the
same kind of difficulties.
Access to the airport by ground transportation appears
to be reasonable for both sites. The Texcoco site is near
the main peripheral highway which can distribute traffic
around the suburbs. It is not, however, especially well
connected to the center of the City, to which one has to
proceed through congested city streetS. The Zumpango site
has the clear disadvantage of being further away, but it
can be linked directly to the tourist and business areas
via an existing north-south expressway.
8.2.2. The Institutional.Setting
The government of Mexico has been in the hands of a
single party, the Partido Revolucionario Institucional;
for almost forty years. Political power tends to be
concentrated in the federal government and, for major
decisions such as the location of the capital's airport;
in the President himself. Any decision about a new
airport during 1970-76 will require the approval of
President Luis Echeverria. The debate about this decision
has been carried on by three major governmental bodies:
(1) The Secretaria de Obras Publicas, SOP, (the
Ministry of Public Works) ｾ
(2) The Secret.aria de Communicaciones y Transportes,
SCT, (the Ministry of ｃ ｯ ｾ ｮ ｵ ｮ ｩ ｣ ｡ ｴ ｩ ｯ ｮ and Transport) ,
and
i(3) The Secretaria de la Presidencia, a body with
functions similar to those of the Office of
Management and Budget in the United states.
8.2.3. Previous Studies
Both SOP and SCT have commissioned rival ｬ ｡ ｲ ｧ ･ ｾ ｳ ｣ ｡ ｬ ･
studies of the airport problem within the past few years.
The SOP study (SOp [1967], Wilsey y Ham'de Mexico (1967])
done for its Department of Airports between 1965 and 1967,
recommended that a new airport be built at Zumpango and that
all commercial flights be shifted to this facility. The
master plan then proposed was not adopted at that time.
The study commissioned by SCT in 1970 (Ipesa Consultores
and SCT [1970n resulted in a master plan for expandirtg the
airport at Texcoco by adding new runway and terminal faci-
lities. Interestingly, this report assumed that aircraft
could take off away from the city toward the east, and
could land coming into the city from the east in opposing
streams of traffic aimed at adjacent parallel ｲ ｵ ｮ ｷ ｡ ｹ ｳ ｾ
While this proposal "solves" the noise and displacement
problems, its implications for safety are extremely
serious at any significant level of traffic, and are un-
likely to be acceptable for the expected volumes. This
report assumed that lIquiet" engines would completely
eliminate any noise problems outside the airport boundaries
by 1990. The SCT study was prepared and submitted during
the closing months of the 1964-1970 administration of the
previous President. It was not accepted in 1970. The
Government of Mexico did, however, wish to resolve the
issue. In early 1971 the new admiriistration committed
itself to a restudy. As stated by the President in his
State of the Union Message of Septembet 1, 1971, "Con-
struction of a new international airport in the metro-
politan area (of Mexico City) is also under study at
this time." The study referred to is the one presented
here.
8.3. EVOLUTION OF THE ANALYSIS
During the short three-month period --the summer of
1971-- in which we analysts were associated with the Ｂ ｡ ｩ ｲ ｰ ｯ ｲ ｴ ｾ
problem; it took on many forms. One might say that much of
the time was taken defining the problem, but it seemed to
be more than this. There wasn't a single problem, but many
interrelated problems: What is the best manner to provide
acceptable air service for Mexico City? How can one
contribute to a reconciliation of differences of judgement;
Ii facts", and opinion of independent government agencies
concerned with airport development, in order to improve
quality of information available to the decision makers?
What strategies for developing the airport facilities
are best in light of the financial and political realitiea
facing the goVernment? And so on. The focus of the
analysis shifted as the SOP became more sensitized to issues
we felt migt be importan t, as we becilme more familiar with
the total environment in which this analysis was situatedj
and as segments of the study felt to be important were
completed.
Because of the conflicting recommendations of previous
reports, the original directive given to our colleagues
in SOP was to evaluate various master plans for developing
TexcOco and Zumpango. Therefore, this aspect of the
problem had to be completed first. IBefore we entered the
scene, SOP had been formulating this problem for a few
months. The alternatives were specified and objectives
and preliminary measures of effectiveness were defined.
Our main effort concerned helping SOP (1) to synthesize
the volumes of relevant information in the previous
ｲ ･ ｰ ｯ ｲ ｴ ｳ ｾ as well as results from additlonal studies, and
to indicate the degree to which various alternatives met
objectives; (2) to meaningfully aggregate the effects
occurring in different time periods; (3) to quantify a
value structure appropriate for the problem; and (4) to
develop a system for doing sensitivity analysis and for
reporting results.
As this work progressed, the original problem began
to be "solved", thus meeting the original directive and
freeing the team to address other important issues. Per-
haps the most crucial one was to attempt to reconcile the
differences of viewpoint held by various parties, especially
SOP and SCT, involved in airport development and operation.
8.3.1. An Attempt at Reconciliation through Shared Analysis
It is expected that impartial experts might disagree
on many aspects of a complex analysis. It is cruciai to
know what aspects of the problem they agree or disagree on
and ｾ ｨ ｹ Ｎ For instance, there may be agreement on the
structuring of the problent, but disagreement on the possible
impacts of the various alternatives and disagreement on
the value structure. The reasons may simply be that
different experts have incomplete information or conflicting
information or that traditional viewpoints due to political
and professional orientation have been "cast in ｣ ｯ ｮ ｣ ｲ ･ ｴ ･ ｾ ｾ
The decision analysis model, along with a graphical input-
output display developed to assist in the analysis, seemed
to offer a useful framework for analyzing these differences
of opinion.
Input-output consoles were installed in offices of
the study team, the Secretary and Under-Secretary of SOP,
the Presidencia, and the President's own office. Our hope
was that both SOP and SCT would agree on the basic framework
for analyzing the airport problem and that this framework
could then help highlight just where fundamental dis-
｡ ｧ ｲ ･ ･ ｾ ･ ｮ ｴ ｳ lay. The Presidencia would then be in a
position to better understand the root causes of the
different viewpoints, hear the rationalizations of each
side, and then commission its own studies if required to
clarify critical aspects of the problem. The SOP felt
sure that if this reconciliation process were carried
out, they would be shown to be right and they were pre-
pared to be quite open -- even about their uncertainties
on some inputs. A major problem, of course, lay in the
fact that it was SOP who was suggesting the framework
(not the Presidencia) and understandably, but regretfully
from our point of view, the reconciliation process was
never engaged.
Henee SOP had to proceed on a new tack. Clearly
their minds were made up about the merits of Zumpango
and now their efforts turned to amassing art argUTIlent that
would convince the President and the Presidencia Ｍ ｾ dver
and above the objections of the SCT. We thus proceeded
in the preparation of an advocacy document that was meant
to be impressively scientific. SOTIle strange things happened.
8.4. THE STATIC MODEL
Becal1se of the history of the previous ｾ ｴ ｵ ､ ｩ ･ ｳ ｩ the
alternatives, objectives, and measures of effectiVeness
for the static analysis were firmly spedified by our dliehts,
the Secretaria de Obras Publicas.
8.4.1. The Alternatives
The alternatives specified what types of aircraft
would operate at each of the two possible sites over
the rest of the century. In abstracting these, because
of similarities in operating characteristics and functions,
SOP had categorized aircraft as follows: International (I),
domestic (D), general (G), and military (M). It was
assumed that at anyone time, each category of aircraft
could operate at. only one of the two sites.
To account for changes in operating arrangements over
the thirty-year horizon while keeping the problem manageable,
we decided to focus on the three years 1975, 1985, and 1995
as times when changes in the classes of aircraft operating
at a site could occur. Thus, an alternative might be
"develop the Zumpango site and move general aircraft to
it in 1975, shift international to Zumpango in 1985, and
operate all classes of aircraft at Zumpango by 1995."
Of course, this discretization into three time epochs
was done solely to keep the analysis tractable and the
actual timing of moves would not be so constained in
implementation. We are still discussing a rough-cut level
of analysis with presumably more refihed ｴ ｾ ｮ ｩ ｮ ｧ coming at
a later stage.
t, 3
Notice that this gives us (2 ) ｾ 4096 alternatives.
However, many of these were very similar in nature since,
for instance, military operations accounted for lesS than
five percent of the aircraft volume. Other alternatives
defined as above were unreasonable. One would not move
all operations from Texcoco to Zumpango in 1975 and back
again in 1985, for example. In the final ｡ ｮ ｡ ｬ ｹ ｳ ｩ ｾ ［ the
total number of alternatives which were evaluated was
approximately one hundred.
8.4.2. ｏ ｢ ｪ ･ ｣ ｴ ｾ ｶ ･ ｳ ｾ ｾ ､ Measures of Effectiveness
To evaluate the alternatives, one needs to specify
some measures of effectiveness which explicitly desdribe
their poSsible impacts on each of the important groups
concerned about the problem. For this problem, the groups
might be characterized as (1) the government, as builder
and operator of the airports, (2) users of the air facilities,
and (3) nonusers. Based on the previous reports of SOP
and SeT and lengthy discussions the following sik objectives
were selected by SOP.
(1) Minimize total construction and maintenance c6sts;
(2) Provide adequate capacity to meet the ait traffic
demands;
(3) Minimize the access time to the airport;
(4) Maximize the safety of the system;
(5) Minimize social disruption caused by the provision
of new airport facilities; and
(6) Minimize the effectS of noise pollution due to
air traffic.
Although there is obviously much overlap, the first
two objectives accOurit for the government's stake as operator;
objectives two, three, and four for the user's; and
the last three objectives for the nonusers. Measures
of effectiveness for these objectives were defined as
follows:
X1 ｾ total cost in millions of pesos: with Ｂ ｳ ｵ ｩ ｴ ｡ ｢ ｬ ･ ｾ
discounting:
X2 = the practical capacity in terms of the number
of aircraft operations per hour:
X3 ｾ aCcess time to and from the airport in minutes,
weighted by the number of travelers from each
zone in Mexico City;
X4 =number of people (including non-passengers)
seriously injured or killed per aircraft accident:
Xs e number of people displaced by airport development:
and
X6 e nnmber of people subjected to a high noise level,
. .. *ln thlS case to 90 CNR or more.
Clearly, these six measures of effectiveness are not unique
or completely comprehensive. For instance, air pollution
considerations are absent. However, SOP felt the list did
inClude all the important factors (other than political
factors, prestige, etc., which we will discuss later on in
* The Composite Noise Rating, CNR, is a standard index of
noise which combines decibel level and frequency of
occurence. The 90 level was selected by the SOP Department
of Airports.
this chapter) for evaluating effectiveness of the proposed
alternatives.
8.4.3. The Basic Decision Model
The basic model is illustrated by the decision tree
in Figure 8.2. An alternative is specified by defining
what classes of aircraft will operate at which site in
each of the three time epochs. As a result of the
alternative chosen and events which occur (e.g., demand
changes), a consequence (x 1 ,x2 ' ... ,x6 ) will eventually
result. However, at the time the decision must be madej
uncertainties about this cQnsequence for each possible
alternative must be quantified by a probability distribution
over the consequences.
The most important point to note about this model
is that the alternatives are master plans. They are ndt
designed to adapt to the unfolding of critical events
(e.g., demand changes, technological changes, ｩ ｮ ｣ ｲ ･ ｡ ｳ ｩ ｮ ｾ
environmental concerns of citizens, etc.) which might
occur over the thirty-year period formally considered
in the model. Clearly such considerations are essential
to any analysis purporting to assist the Government of
Mexico in deciding which actions to take in airport ､ ･ ｶ ･ ｬ ｯ ｰ ｾ
merit. This was done in the dynamic artalysis of options
available j.n 1971 described in Section 8.8. There were
two main t'easons for first. completing a formal analysis
of this static problem:
1975
Possible Actions to be Taken in
1985
I
I
I
1995
Possible
Consequences
(Chance Move)
Actual
Consequences
or-GMt Z-ID
Note:
(x1. x2., ••• , X6)
The notation T-GM, Z-ID means
operate ｾ ･ ｮ ･ ｲ ｡ ｬ and ｾ ｩ Ｑ ｩ ｴ ｡ ｲ ｹ
aircraft at Texcoco and Inter-
- -
national and Domestic aircraft
at ｾ ｵ ｭ ｰ ｡ ｮ ｧ ｯ Ｎ
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(1) the original request to study the hairport
problem" ｾ ･ ｱ ｵ ｩ ｲ ･ ､ identifying discrepancies
between previous studies, both of which were
static analyses, and
(2) without such a study, SOP was very vulnerable
to potential criticism of the analysis for ex-
cluding the details of such considerations.
The complete description of the probabilistic assess-
ments are given in Section 8.5 , the preference structure
is described in Section 8.6 , and the computer input-
output along with the results of the anlaysis are given
in Section 8.7.
8.5. SPECIFYING THE POSSIBLE IMPACTS OF EACH ALTERNATIVE
ｾｨ･ probabilistic assessments were made using the
ｖ ｯ ｬ ｵ ｾ ･ ｳ of relevant informatj.on from previous studies, the
results of parallel studies being conducted by SOP, and
the professional judgment of administration within the
Mexican Government connected with airport construction,
operation, and maintenance. Both reports for SOP (SOp
ｾＹＶＷＱＮｗｩｬｳ･ｹ y Ham de Mexico ｾ Ｙ Ｖ Ｗ ｝ Ｉ and SCT (Ipesa ConsultoreS
and SCT [1970]) contain many volumes including detailed
demand studies for future air travel, soil mechanics and
･ ｮ ｧ ｩ ｮ ｾ ･ ｲ ｩ ｮ ｧ studies at possible sites, pollution ｳ ｴ ｵ ｾ ｩ ･ ｓ
considering noise effects, analysis of ground traffic and
airport access interaction, cost estimates and projections
for Various consiiered airport alterations, etc.. To help
in the cost estimates, for each of the sixteen arrangements
for aircraft operation
7Cl
at the two possible sites, in each of 1975, 1985, and 1995,
general construction plans were outlined indicating where
runways, support facilities, and access facilities would
have to be built. These plans were used to translate the
feasible alternatives specified in Section 8.4 into
designs meaningful to airport planners and government
officials.
To gain insight on the impacts of alternatives, various
experiments were conducted by the SOP. One, designed to
gather data on access times, involved dividinq Mexico
City into ten zones on the basis of ｲ ･ ｳ ｩ ､ ･ ｮ ｴ ｾ Ｇ pattern of
airport patronage, and then studying the driving times
to the two airport sites from each zone in different weather
conditions at different times of day, etc. This data on
travel times and usage characteristics provided the in-
forma'tion necessary to assess reasonable distributions for
access times for the various alternatives.
In a similar way, detectors were located at various
spots in the city to determine the noise levelS caused by
aircraft. By analyzing current and projected flight paths,
superimposed on aerial photos of the city, and the population
densities of the affected areas, one acquired a good indication
of the noiSe impacts of various alternatives. These were used
in assessing distributions for the number of people subjected
to specified noise levels.
By superimposing the various plans for construction on
aerial photos of the city, one could easily identify the
areas in which people would have to be relocated given that
a particular alternative were adopted. The population of
those areas was tabulated providing information for assessing
the number of people who would be displaced.
The results of all the previous studies and the data
of the Concurrent experiments of SOP needed to be integrated
to provide meaningful estimates of the impacts of various
plans. This integration was done using the professional
ｪ ｵ ､ ｧ ｭ ･ ｾ and ･ ｸ ｰ ･ ｲ ｩ ･ ｮ ｣ ｾ of members of the Secretaria ds
ObraS PUblicas, including the Director of Airports , who
is responsible for building and maintaining all the ｡ ｩ ｲ ｾ
ports in the country of Mexico, the director of the Cehter
for Computation and Statistics, and members of their staffs.
The assessments were made in group sessions, where differences
in judgments were discussed -to arrive at a ｣ｯｮｳ･ｮｳｵｳｾ The
fact that there were no problems in reaching a consensus
can probably be attributed to a number of factors: all the
professionals had the same information available, ail had
similar technical training in engineering, they were
accustomed to working with each other and knew how each other
thought, and the subordinates tended to agree with their
sbperiors.
Having said how in general the probabilistic assess-
ments were conducted, let us get to the specifics. First,
the single year asseSSlnents will be described, and then
the time effects will be accounted for.
8.5.1. One-Year Assessments
The probability density functions were asSessed
using the fractile method described in Raiffa [1968].
Let us use Figure 8.3 to illustrate the method by
example. Consider the possible 1975 noise impact of
the operating arrangement "all classes of aircraft
at'I'excoco." First, the maximum and minimum number of
people subjected to 90 CNR or greater was specified as
800,000 and 400,000. Next to 0.5 fractile was evaluated
as Ｖ Ｑ ｾ ｏ Ｌ Ｐ Ｐ Ｐ Ｎ This meant, in the judgment of SOP, the
probability that the number of people impacted by 90+ CNR,
denoted by ｸ ｾ Ｕ Ｌ would be less than 640,000 is one-half.
Said another way, it is eqnally likely that the number of
people subjected to the high noise level will be less than
or greater than 640,000. The interval between 400,000 and
640,000 was then divided into equally likely parts by
choosing the 0.25 fractile as 540,000. The 0.75 fractile
waS 700,000. Finally, each of the quartiles were divided
into equally likely parts in a similar manner.
The fractiles which were assessed are indicated by
the dots on Figure 8.3. and the smoothed lines are the
cumulative probability distributions describing possible
noise impacts for the "all Texcoco" option in years 1975j
1985, and 1995. For any given ｹ ･ ｡ ｾ the probability that
the impact is between any two adjacent fractile points
should be the same, namely 0.125. Thus, to check con""
sistency of the assessments, we asked SOP if in fact their
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judgemental probabilities of falling into any of the eight
ranges of impact were the same. SOP adjusted their assess-
ments until no more discrepancies could be ｦ ｯ ｵ ｮ ､ ｾ Figure
8.3 indicates the final adjusted cUrves.
One might ask what are the basic uncertainties which
must be considered when assessing the possible noise in-
fluence of each airport. First, there is the uncertainty
of the population in the flight path area. Current population
is known rather accurately, but there is more uncertainty
about the population in the future. There is uncercainty
about when ndise suppressors for jet engines will become
operational and incorporated on most jets and about ｴ ｨ ｾ
level of impact of such suppressors. And there is uncertainty
about the volume of air traffic in future years. Previous
SOP and SCT studies, census figures, SOP experiments, etc.,
all provided useful information on these basic uncertainties.
This information was both formally and informally used by
SOP in making their combined assessments for the possible
noise impacts.
8.5.2. Incorporating Time Effects
Each of the measures of effectiveness needed to account
for the impact over the thirty-year period to the year 2000.
Different adjustments seemed appropriate for different
measures as indicated:
Costs. The costs that were considered in the model
included building and maintenance, but excluded operating
costs since it was felt these would be approximately
the same for any alternative. As is normal practice for
SOP, the present value of the costs was taken as the time
dependent attribute of importance. The discount rate used
was twelve percent, the standard for the Mexican ｇ ｯ ｶ ･ ｲ ｲ ｴ ｾ
ment. ｓ ･ ｮ ｾ ｩ ｴ ｩ ｶ ｩ ｴ ｹ analysis indicated the choice of a
discount rate was not critical for identifying effective
strategies.
Noise. For noise, the average number of people annually
subjected to aircraft noise levels above 90 CNR was used
as the measure of effectiveness. ｾ ｨ ｩ ｳ assumes that it is
equally ｵ ｮ ､ ･ ｾ ｩ ｲ ｡ ｢ ｬ ･ to have one person subjected to these
noise levels for two years or to have two different people
subjected in the different years. Furthermore, it assumes
the undesirability to an individual of a certairi noise level
in any year is the same.
safety. As previously mentioned, safety is measured
in terms of the number of people killed or seriously injured
per air crash. TO adapt this, we chose the average number
of people killed or seriously injured per crash averaged
over the thirty-year time period. Clearly this measure does
not account for the different likelihoods of crashes with
various arrangements. SOP was aware of this and of the
need to make adjustments to account for this factor. However,
they felt it was not prudent to formally include the ｬ ｩ ｫ ･ ｬ ｩ ｾ
hood of crashes in the model, and chose instead, to make
adjustments of the impact per crash in the sensitivity analysis
to indicate the effect of differential crash likelihoods.
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Access Time. For access time, an average of the
possible access times in the various years weighted by
the expected number of users in those years was used. This
assumes each trip to or from the airport by any individual
in ｾ ｮ ｹ year is as important as any other such trip and that
one's preferences for the various access times are stationary
over time.
Social ｄ ｩ ｳ ｲ ｵ ｅ Ａ ｩ ｯ ｾ Ｎ By reasoning that on the average it
wbuld be just as undesirable for a random individual to be
moved from his home due to airport development in one year
as any other year, we chose the total number of such people
displaced to be the measure of social disruption for the
analysis.
Capacity. Capacity <maximum possible operations/hour)
could not be aggregated in any reasonable way to combine
impacts in the different years. This is due mainly to the
fact that the relative desirability of various levels of
capacity would be very different in different years since
demand would probably be larger in later years. Increasing
capacity from 80 to 100 in 1975 may be worth very little,
since the additional capacity would rarely be needed. How-
ever; this same change in 1995 could be extremely important.
Thus in the thirty-year model, separate measures of effective-
ness for the capacity of 1975, 1985, and 1995 were included.
By aggregating the three yearly assessed impacts for
each measure of effectiveness, except capacity, in the
manner just described, we could calculate the probability
density functions over the measures to account for impact
over time. For instance, with noise, if we difine
(llo 1)
3
where xi is the number of people subjected to noise levels6
over 90 CNR in year i, then b'l using the probability dis-
tributions assessed for the xi for a particular strategy,6
it is straightforward to derive the probability distribution
for ｘ Ｖ ｾ This represents what we've taken to be the overall
impact of a particular strategy in terms of noise.
ｾ Ｎ Ｕ Ｎ Ｔ Ｎ Probabilistic Independence Assumptions
In conducting the assessments over one attribute at
a time, we were explicitly ｡ ｳ ｳ ｵ ｾ ｩ ｮ ｧ that for each alternativej
the six attributes were probabilistically independent. For
some of the attributeS; this aSSumption seems appropriate.
For instance, for any given alternative, noise and access time
considerations are probably independent of the other attributes.
On the other hand, safety considerations may be dependent on
capacity, for instance. The lower the capacity, the more
often the airport will be operating under hazardous conditions.
The more important assumption with regard td these aSSess-
ments was that impacts in separate yearS were probabilistlcally
independent conditional on the given alternative. This is
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clearly not true. For instance, for the "all Texcoco"
alternative, if we found that 800,000 people were sub-
jected to high noise levels in 1975, we would likely
feel that more people will be affected by noise in
1985 than we would have if 400,000 had high noise levels
in 1975.
Our analysis was designed in an iterative fashion.
First simplifying assumptions (es. probabilistic inde-
pendence) were adopted with the intention at a later
stage of recycling back with more realistic assumptions.
It turned out, however, that the delicacy taken in modelling
the probabilistic part of our analysis ｷ ｡ ｾ not a critical
factor since other considerations dominated, and if we
had more time, we would have dressed up the probabilistic
analysis to be more credible to the reader. But it would
have been mere "window dressing" because the action re-
commendations we finally suggested could not have been
ｲ ･ ｶ ･ ｲ ｾ ｇ ､ by acknowledging the joint dependence of the
random variables involved. It would not have been too
difficult to incorporate this complexity -- if not analytically,
at least through a simulation mode of analysis. It simply
was not worth it in this case.
One could argue that given the oversimplifying probabilistic
assumptions and the insensitivities, it might have been just
as accurate and simpler to use point estimates of the im-
pacts rather than probability distributions. In retrospect,
this seems quite reasonable. However, this does not avoid any
of the assumptions made in our analysis, and in addition,
no account is made for the possible uncertainty of impact
for the single attributes. Our approach forces an explicit
recognition of this uncertainty by the decision makers.
Also, before our analysis, the lack of sensitivity of the
types of effective strategies to the attribute levels was
not known. A sensitivity analysis using point estimates
Could have indicated this, however. The strongest reason
for maintaining the detail of using probability distributions
was that SOP wanted to avoid potential criticism of the
analysis due to exclusion of the uncertainties.
8.6 .. ASSESSING THE MULTIATTRIBUTE UTILITY FUNCT+ON
Once we had probability assessments which adequately
described the impact of alternate strategies in terms of
our six measures of effectiveness, the next step was to
assess a utility function u(x 1 ,x2 , .•. ,x6 ) ｾ u(x) over
these measures. proceeding as suggested in Section Ｖ ｾ Ｖ ,
we began by exploring the decision maker's preference
strudtute in a qualitative manner. This was to buila up
SOpi s arid our own experience in thinking diredtly about
(x1 ,x2 , ..• ,x6 ) consequences, but more importantly, to
ascertain whether any of the preferential independence
or utility independence assumptions discussed in ･ ｾ ｲ ｬ ｩ ･ ｲ
chapters were appropriate for this problem. Then we formally
verified a sufficient set of such assumptions which allowed
uS to defihe for each i, i=1,2, •.• ,e, a conditional utility
111
function u. over X. and then to construct u as a function
1 1
of the conditional utility functions. That is,
(8.2)
where f is scalar valued. To specify ｵ Ｈ ｾ Ｉ Ｌ the six tii'S
and necessary scaling factors were assessed.
The utility assessments incorporated the best ｰ ｲ ｯ ｾ
fessional judgments of both the SOP Director at Airports
and the SOP Director of the Center for Computation and
Statistics, and ｭ ･ ｭ ｢ ･ ｲ ｾ of their ｳ ｾ ｡ ｦ ｦ ｳ Ｎ A serious attempt
was made to analyze the problem from the point of view bf
the Government of Mexico.
8.6.1. The Assumptions
To refresh our memory, let us briefly and informally
review the concepts of preferential independence and utility
independence. Recali that preferential independence con-
cerns only ordinal preferences and no probabilistic elements
are involved. Partition the set of attributes into Y and Z.
If the rankings of consequences, which differ only in the
level of attribute Y, are the same regardless of the fixed
level of attribute Z, when Y is preferentially independent
of Z.
utility independence, on the other hand, concerns
the cardinal preferences of the decision maker. If the
rankings of all lotteries, which differ only in ｴ ｨ ｾ ｰ ｯ ｳ ｾ ｩ ｢ ｬ ･
levels of Y which may occur, are the same regardless
of the fixed levels of Z then Y is utility independent
of Z.
Let us illustrate how we verified the preferential
independence assumptions used in our work. As an example,
consider whether ｾ ｡ ｦ ･ ｴ ｹ Xq and noise X6 are preferentially
independent of the other attributes. First, we fixed the
other attributes at a desirable level and asked what
amount of safety x q was such that (xq ; 2,500) was indifferent
to (1;1,500,000). That is, x q people seriously injured or
killed given an accident and 2,500 people subjected to high
noise levels is indifferent to one person seriously injured
or killed and 1,500,000 subjected to a high noise level.
After "converging,h the amount of xq was chosen as 300.
The exact number is not important for verifying the
assumptions, but our interest is in whether it changes
as the other four attributes vary. So we next set these
four attributes at undesirable levels arid asked the same
question and again elicited 300 as response.
Then we asked ｾ ｦ this would in general be true for
ariy ｶ ｾ ｬ ｵ ･ ｳ of the bther four ｾ ｴ ｴ ｲ ｩ ｢ ｵ ｴ ･ ｳ Ｌ ahd the response
was "The answer would always be the same given the other
atttibutes were in ｾ static condition." In fact the
respondent stated this would be the case concerning any
tradeoffs between safety and noise. Hence, we concluded
safety and noise were preferentially independent of the
other attributes.
By going through identical procedures, we verified
that capacity and cost were preferentially independent
of the remaining attributes, as was displacement and
access time. By this time, the man answering the questions,
who was an assistant to the Director of Airports, was in
a position to state that ordinal preferences over any two
attributes did not depend on the amounts of the other
attributes. These conditions were then also verified
with other staff members of SOP, including the Director
of Airports.
The same general approach was used in verifying the
utility independence assumptions -- that X. was utility
1
independent of its complimentary set X. for all i = 1,2, ••• ,
L
6. AS an example, consider whether access time X3 was
utility independent of x3 . The other five attributes
were set at desirable levels, and the conditional utility
function over access time from 12 to 90 minutes (the range
originally speclfied by SOP) was assessed. We found 62
minutes indifferent to a 50-50 lottery yielding either 12 or
90 minutes. Then we changed the amounts of the X3 attributes
to less preferred amounts and repeated the question. Again;
an aCcess time of 62 minutes was indifferent to a ＵＰｾＵＰ
lottery yielding either 12 or 90 minutes. A general question
indicated this would be true for any fixed amounts of x3 .
We found that relative preferences for any consequences and
lotteries involving uncertainties only about access time
"7 ｾｉｾ
were indeed independent of the other five attributes.
This condition was verified for all six attributes
with both the Director of Airports and members of his
staff. In all of these verification procedures, an attempt
was made not to lead the respondent to answers he would
not have arrived at otherwise. Our opinion is that this
was done successfully. Since preferences may vary with
time, such questioning of the same people may lead to
different conclusions at another point in time. However,
the preferences indicated by the individuals questioned
appeared to represent their "true" preferences at that ｴ ｩ ｾ ･ Ｌ
and hence, the assumptions we made were deemed appropriate
for the problem.
8.6.3. Forms of the Utility Function
The main theoretical results used in obtaining the
utility function were ｾ ｨ ･ ｯ ｲ ･ ｭ ｳ 6.1 and 6.2 given in
Section 6.3. Informally, these results state that if
each pair of attributes is preferentially independent
of its complement and if each attribute is utility inde-
pendent of its complement, then u(x 1 ,x2 , ... ,x6 ) is either
an additive or a multiplicative function of the component
utility functions u 1 (x1 ) ,u2 (x2 ) ＬＮＢＮＬｵＶＨｾＶＩＮ Actually,
as indicated in Section 6.3 , this same result is implied
by a much weaker set of assumptions - i.e. only one attribute
X. needs to be utility independent of its complement and
1
each pair df attributes iriciuding X. needs to be preferentially
1
independent of its complement. Therefore, many of the
assumptions that were verified are redundant, and they
can be thought of as consistency checks on the appropriate-
ness of our results.
The exact form of the utility function u, scaled zero
to one, is
6
= L
i=1
k.u.(x.) +k
111
6
2:
i=1
2:
j>i
k.k.u. (x. )u. (x.)
1 J 1 1 J J
6
2: 2: 2:
i=1 j>i n>j
k.k.k u. (x.)u. (x.)u(x )
1 J n 1 1 J J n n
(8.3)
where u. is a utility function over X. scaled from zero to one;
1 1
k. is a scaling factor for u., and k is another scaling
1 1
Constant. Each k. must be between zero and one and can be
1
interpreted as the utility u assigned to a consequence with
all its attributes except X. set at their least preferable
1
amount and X. set at the most preferable amount.
1
The Value of k can be found from the values of the k!s.
1
When 2:k. = 1, then k = 0 and (8.3) reduces to the ｡ ､ ､ ｩ ｴ ｩ ｾ ･
1
form
6
2:
i=1
k.u. (x.).
111
(8.4)
When E k. ｾ 1, then k ｾ 0 so we can multiply each side of
1
(8.3) by k, add one to the results, and factor to ｧ ｾ ｴ the
multiplicate form
6
k U(X 1 'X2 ' •. Io,x6 )+1 ....n1=1
8.6.4. Assessing the u. 'sｾ Ｎ Ｎ Ｎ Ｎ Ｚ Ｎ Ｎ Ｎ Ｎ Ｎ ｣ Ｎ Ｎ Ｎ Ｎ Ｎ ｣ Ｎ Ｎ Ｎ Ｎ Ｚ Ｚ Ｍ Ｂ Ｇ Ｍ Ｚ Ｚ ｾ ｾ ｾ Ｍ Ｍ Ｍ ］ Ｇ Ｍ Ｍ Ｍ Ｍ Ｍ Ｑ Ｍ
[kk.u.(x.) + 1].
1. 1 1
ＷＧｾ
(8.5)
Each of the single attribute utility functions was
assessed using the techniques discussed in Chapter 4. Let
us illustrate this by assessing preferences for access time.
The first step i.nvolved obtaining maximum and minimum
values for access time. From probabilistic assessments of
SOP, we found that the range should go from 12 minutes to
90 minutes, where shorter access times were preferred to
longer ones. ThuS, to remain consistent with our scaling
convention where the utility functions ranged from zero
to one, we set
u 3 (90) = 0
and
u 3 ( 12) = 1.
(B.6)
(8.7)
From questions to check whether X3 was utility independent
of x3 ' recall that we found 62 minutes for sure was indifferent
to a lottery, which we will denote by <12,90> , yielding
either 12 or 90 minutes, each with probability 1/2. Hence,
the utility assigned to 62 minutes, the certainty equivalent
for the lottery, is
(8.8)
Since 62 is greater than the expected access time 51 of the
lottery <12,90>, this original assesSment indicated that
the utility function might exhibit risk aversion. In this
context, risk aversion means that the expected amount
of any lottery ＼ ｸ Ｓ Ｇ ｸ ｾ ＾ would be preferred to that
lottery. By asking a couple of questions including specific
lotteries and then one concerning the general case, we found
that the decision makers were risk averse in the attribute
access time. This implied the utility function would be
concave as indicated in Fig. 8.4.
By asking more questions to find certainty equivalents
of additional lotteries, other points on u 3 were specified.
For instance, we found 40 minutes indifferent to <12,62>
and 78 ｭ ｩ ｮ ｵ ｴ ･ ｾ indifferent to <62,90>, so
u 3 (40) -- 0.5u 3 (12) + 0.5u3 (62) = 0.75,
arid
(8.9)
(8.10)
Then an exponential utility curve was fitted to the empiti-
cally assessed points.
At this stage, we did not immediately try to ascertain
arid exploit ｾ ｨ ｩ ｧ ｨ ･ ｲ order" risk properties such as ､ ･ ｣ ｲ ｾ ｡ ｳ ｩ ｲ ｩ ｾ
risk ｡ ｶ ･ ｲ ｾ ｩ ｯ ｮ ｾ Such properties represent rather ｦ ｩ ｲ ｩ ｾ tunings
in a multiattribute utility function relative to the scaling
constants "weighting" the levels of the different attributes
and more basic properties such as monotonicity and risk
aversion of the separate u. 'so If later in the analysis,
1
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it had turned out that the precise form of some of the
tii'S ｾ ･ ｲ ･ important, we would have returned to this aspect
and reiterated our evaluation of alternatives. This did
not happen to be the case.
Procedures similar to those described above were
also used to assess utility functions for cost, saiety,
displacement, and noise. The results are illustrated
in rigure 8.5. However, as mentioned earlier, no single
measure was found to combine capacities in different yearS.
Thus, it was necessary to assess the capacity utility
function u 2 differently.
Although the general shapes of the utility functions
for access time, cost, and noise seem intuitive, the fact
that the curves for safety and displacement are linear
is not. For instance, concerning safety, one might expect
that since governments usually abhor large numbers of deaths
resulting from single tragedies the utility function for
safety would be risk averse. The reason for this attitude
is usually the political impact due to such tragedies.
However, our measure of effectiveness in this problem was
not meaht to capture these political factors. Roughly
speaking, if one SayS each life is equally important, then
al terriatives with the same expected number of people killed
or seriously injured should be equally undesirable in this
respect. This was the attitude taken by SOP in the asSess-
ments, and so u 4 is linear.
It was important, before proceeding, to do consistency
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checks on the reasonableness of the exponential and linear
utility functions. This was done by asking additional
questions about the decision maker's preferences, and
comparing his responses to the implications of the ijfit«
utility function. When they were consistent with each
other, we developed more confidence in the utility function,
When they were inconsistent, the inconsistencies were
discuSsed, and part or all of the assessment repeated.
8.6.5. The Capacity Utility Function
75 85 95 75Capacity x 2 is a vector (x2 ' x 2 ' x 2 ), where x 2
is the capacity in 1975, etC.
The first step in assessing u 2 was to identify the
miniwtm and maximum possible airport capacities for each
year: 1975, 1985, and 1995. There were 50, 80, 100 and
130, 200, 250 operations per hour respectively. Clearly
more capacity in any given year was preferred to less
capacity, so to scale u 2 from zero to one, we set
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u 2 (50,80,100) = 0
and
u 2 (130,200,250) - 1.
(8.in
(8.12)
It was verified that each pair of capacity attributes
was preferentially independent of the third, and that each
attribute was utility independent of ｴ ｨ ｾ other two.
Thus, we know from Theorems 6.1. and 6.2. that either
or
ｾ j j)
= ｾ c j u 2 (x2
j=75,8S,95
(8.13)
(8.14)
where the ｵ ｾ are the utility functions over ｸ ｾ assessed on a
zero to one scale as illustrated in Fig. 8.5 and c and
the C. are scaling constants. Notice that the forms of
J
(8.13) and (8.14) are analogous to the utility ｦ ｵ ｮ ｣ ｴ ｩ ｯ ｮ ｾ
expressed in Ｈ Ｘ ｾ Ｔ Ｉ and (8.5). Since the following ､ ｩ ｳ ｾ
cussion concerns how the k.'s and k in (8.5) are assessed t1
we will not indicate the assessment of the c. 's and c in
J
(8.14) as the procedures are indentical.
8.6.6. Assessing the k i Scaling Factors
To illustrate the technique for assessing the kl
1
scaling factors, let uS take cost X1 as an example. We
asked the decision makers to compare a consequence with
cost at its most preferred amount, and all the attributes
at their least preferred amount, to a lottery yielding
the consequences with all attributes at their most pre-
ferred amount with probability p or the consequence with
all attributes at their least preferred amount with
probability l-p. The object is to find the value of Pi
call it P1' such that the decision maker is indifferent be-
tWeen the lottery and the consequence. Then, as shown in
Section 6.6, by using u(x) from either (8.4) or (8.5)
and equating expected utilities, k 1 must equal P1.
Using this procedure involving questions concerning
lotteries, we arrived at an initial estimate for the ki
values. Then we used nonprobabilistic questions as
consistency checks. For example, we set all attributes
at their least desirable level and asked, "Would yeti
prefer to have capacity or cost changed to its most de-
sirahle level?" Capacity was the response implying k 2 ,
the coeffidient of capacity utility, had to be greater than
k 1 , the coefficient of cost utility. Then we found a
level of capacity, call it ｾ ｾ Ｌ which was indifferent to
the best level of cost, denoted by x t *. Then using either
. . I(8.4) or (8.5), we see that ｫ Ｒ ｵ Ｒ Ｈ ｾ Ｒ Ｉ must equal ｫ Ｑ ｾ Since
we have u 2 assessed, this gives us a relationship between
k 1 and k 2 . Pairwise comparison of the kits in this manner
provided many consistency checks, redundant with others;
and forced a readjustment of the kivalues. After several
iterations, we ended up using the valuesof k. indicated
1
in Table 8.1.
B.6.1. Assessing Parameter k.
Since the sum of the k. is 1.89, we know the utility
1
function is multiplicative rather than additive: it is
additive only if Ek. = 1. Therefore the value of k in
1
(8.5) must be determined by evaluating (8.5) at (xt, ｸ ｾ Ｌ ...... ; x6)
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where x, is the most preferred amount of x..
1 1
This gives us
6IT [kk. u. (x'!') + 1],
i= 1 1 1 1 (8.15)
but from our scaling conventions, we know both ｵ Ｈ ｸ ｬ Ｌ ｸ Ｒ Ｂ Ｂ Ｇ ｘ ｾ Ｉ
is 1 and the ｵ Ｎ Ｈ ｸ ｾ Ｉ are all one so
1 1
k + 1 = (k le1 + 1) (k k 2 + 1) •••
Since the k. are known, parameter k can be evaluated by
1
solving (8.16). As shown in the Appendix 6B, since Ek.>1,
1
!
the value which k must assume is the solution to (8.16)
such that -1<k<0. Using the k. values from Table 8.1, we
1
found Ie = -0.877. Of course, if this were ｲ ･ ､ ｯ ｮ ｾ from scratch
a new Ie would be found. But it would probably fall closer
to ｾ Ｎ Ｘ Ｐ (say) than to .00 or to +.80. In the final analysis,
it is important to do sensitivity studies on k and the k. 'so
1
Table 8.1 SCALING FACTORS FOR THE MEXICO CITY AIRPORT STUDY
Attribute X. Scaling Factor k i1
Xl ::= Cost 0.48
X2 = Capacity 0.6
X3 = Access Time 0.10
X4
::= Safety 0.35
Xs = Displacement 0.18
X6 = Noise 0.18
a.6.8. The Utility Function
Procedures identical to those just illustrated were
used to evaluate the c. and c in (8.14). It was found that
J
c l = 0.3, c 2 = 0.5, c 3 = 0.4, and c = -0.46. These param-
eters, together with Table 8.1 and k = -0.877 and the
utility functions illustrated in Figures 8.4 and 8.5
represent the information necessary to specify the utility
function u(x l ,x2 , ... ,x6 ). The next section describes how
it was used.
S.? THE ANALYSIS
A computer was programmed to assist in evaluating the
-7 -, 7_
i.- . ｾ
alternatives. Computat.ionally, the program was quite simple:
given any set of probability distributions and a utility
function, it calculated the expected utility for specified
alternatives.
To keep the calculations at a reasonable number, as
mentioned earlier, many alternatives were eliminated before
going through expected utility calculations. For instance,
since military aircraft represent a relatively insignificant
amount of the total air traffic, most alternatives differing
only in terms of the airport for military operations were
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not considered separately. Secondly, alternatives which
shifted certain types of aircraft from the Texcoco site
to Zumpango and back again at a later date were excluded.
8.7.1. The Input-Output ｄ ｩ ｳ ｰ ｬ ｾ
Graphical ｩ ｮ ｰ ｵ ｴ ｾ ｯ ｵ ｴ ｰ ｵ ｴ consoles were used as an efficient
and accessible system for sensitivity analyses and comrnuni-
cating results of the study. This capability was used
daily by the SOP, and could also be used by the other
interested parties to examine the relative merits of
alternative developmental policies. The input-output system
allowed any user to use his own probability and utility
estimates for evaluating any specified alternatives. There
I
were two options for doing this. Option 1 provided the
standard estimates that SOP used in evaluating the alter-
natives on the console screen. ｾ ｯ change these, one just
typed in the changes over the SOP estimates. This option
was particularly uSeful for sensibivity analyses. Optiori
2 allowed the user to enter his own estimates without seeing
any others.
ｾ ｨ ･ probabilistic estimates of possible impact could
be altered by changing the upper and lower bounds on these
impacts. For instance, as illustrated in Figure 8.3, SOpis
lower and upper bounds on the possible number of people
subjected to noise above 90 CNR in 1975 were 400,000 and
800,000, respectively. Merely by typing on the console;
One could look at the overall effect on strategy if these
were 600,000 and 1,200,000.
To alter the utility function, one changed the scaling
factors listed in Table 8.1. Because the meaning of these
constants can be easily misunderstood (as discussed in
section 5.9) and because of the difficulty in specifying
a consistent set of estimates, a short subroutine was
developed to assist the user. This routine essentially
asked the user ort the screen the same questions that we
asked SOP in initially assessing the scaling ｣ ｯ ｮ ｳ ｴ ｡ ｮ ｴ ｳ ｾ
Once a reasonable consistency was achieved among the k. is,
1
the constant k in (8.3) was calculated. If k=Ot ｴｨｾ additive
form (8.4) was used, and if lefO, the multiplicative utility
function was used to evaluate strategies. As was the case
with the general shape of the probability densities, the
individual utility functions u. could not be changed by
1
graphical input-output, These changes required adjustments
in ·the programs. However, although important, these changes
represent fine tunings relative to the options provided
for graphically.
Another particularly useful feature of the computer
ｰ ｲ ｯ ｧ ｾ ｡ ｭ was a routine which calculated certainty equivalents.
Using this routine, the overall possible impact of any
alternative could be reduced to an equivalent impact des-
cribed by a vector of certainty equivalents. Since we assumed
*probabilistic indepencence and first-order utility
independence (i.e.; each X. is utility independent of its
1
complementary set), from the marginal probability distribution
of X. and the component utility function u., it is possible
1 1
to define the certain ･ ｾ ｵ ｩ ｶ ｡ ｬ ･ ｮ ｴ xi by
u.(SL) ='E[u.(x.)], i = 1,2, ••• ,6.
1 1 1 1
(8.17)
Notice that the certainty equivalent X. is independent df
1
the possible impacts on other attributes. Also notice
that the certainty equivalent vector! = ＨＲＱＧＮｾＮＧｘＶＩ ､ｯ･ｾ
not commit one to any determination of the scaling constants
k. I S or k.
1
If two alternatives A and B are reduced to certainty
equivalent vector impacts xi\. and ｾ ｂ Ｇ it is easy to check
for dominance. Also, for example, one could investigate
exactly how large a change in the impact on attribute X.
1
of alternative A would be required before it would be less
preferred than alternative B.
* If k=O (or close to ｺ ｾ ｲ ｯ Ｉ Ｌ ｴ ｨ ｾ ｮ u can be taken to be
(approximately) additive and only the marginal probability
distributionS are of releVance. If ｫ ｾ ｏ Ｌ and joint
probabilistic dependence is warranted, then ｴ ｨ ｾ analysis
by certainty equivalents must be considerably modified.
One could, however, employ the notion of "conditional
certainty equivalence" to some advantage. This waS not
done.
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8.7.2. Bffective Strategies
Of the alternatives we did evaluate using expected
utility, the top ten according to SOP are indicated in
Table 8.2. In the table, the expected utilities are
calculated on a scale from zero to one-hundred, where
zero utility was assigned to a hypothetical alternative
generated by taking the least desirable probability
dis"tribution for each attribute from the set of all
alternatives. The utility value of one hundred units
was assigned to a hypothetical alternative generated by
taking the most desirable probability distribution for
each attribute from the set of all alternatives. On this
scale, the alternative of keeping all aircraft in. TexCoco
in all three years has an expected utility 5.20.
By looking at Table 8.2, it is clear that two types
of strategies are effective. One type might be categorized
as the "all Zumpango" alternative and represents building
a major new airport at Zumpango as soort as ｰ ｯ ｳ ｳ ｩ ｢ ｬ ･ ｾ The
alternatives in the table involving both International
and Domestic aircraft operating at Zumpango in all three
years make up this category. The other type of effective
strategy is the "phased development at Zumpango" character-
ized by either International or Domestic aircraft operating
in Zumpango in 1975 and then both by 1985 and 1995. All
strategies which included keeping a part of the International
or Domestic traffic operating out of Texcoco through 1985
did not appear competitive in terms of effectiveness with
Table 8.2 THE BEST TEN ALTERNATIVES
Expected
Alternative Utility Rank
--
1975 1985 1995 .
Z T Z T Z T
- - - - - -
i 0 IMG ID MG ID MG 91. 23 1
i IDMG ... IDMG - IDMG ... 90.90 2I
I I DMG ID MG ID MG 90.79 3
I ID MG ID MG ID MG 89.30 4
I ID f.1G IDMG
.... IbMG - 88.10 5
ID DMG ID MG IDMG ... 86.75 6
I DM IDMG - IpMG - 86.55 ) 1
IG 1M IDMG I 86.19 8- IDMG ...LIMG IDMG .... IpMG ... 86.17 9
ｉｄｾｇ - IDMG ... 85.60 10
----_.-\.-.---.. -_.
ｾｯ help read the table, the alternative ranked 1 is Qomestic
aircraft at ｾ ｵ ｭ ｰ ｡ ｮ ｧ ｯ with International, ｾ ｩ ｬ ｩ ｴ ｡ ｲ ｹ Ｌ and ｾ ･ ｮ ･ ｲ ｡ ｬ
!
aircraft at !excoco in 1975: and! International and Domestic
i
at ｾ ｵ ｭ ｰ ｡ ｮ ｧ ｯ with ｾ ｩ ｬ ｩ ｴ ｡ ｲ ｹ and ｇ ･ ｮ ｾ ｲ ｡ ｬ at TexcoGo irt 1985 and
1995.
the two types of strategies outlined above. Of course,
these expected utility evaluations depend on two types
of judgmental inputs: probability and utility assessments.
The ones we used were those of officials of SOP and pre-
sumably, if the same analysis were to be made with inputs
from officials of the SCT,another ranking of strategic
alternatives would result. But more about these
reconciliation problems later.
8.7.3. Use of the Analysis
As we indicated earlier in the chapter, the original
purpose of the work described here was to identify effective
strategies - as measured by our six measures of effective-
ness - for developing the airport facilities of Mexico
City. It was not to indicate what action should be taken
by the Government of Mexico in 1971 to meet its needs.
OnCe the "effective strategies II had been identifiedi the
problem shifted to this second question: What action
should be initially implemented?
So far, the formal analysis has included only master
plans defining actions for a thirty year period. A more
appropriate course would seem to be to make some initial
decision'and then, based on subsequent ･ ｶ ･ ｮ ｴ ｾ Ｌ to revise
strategies as necessary. Furthermore, any study which is
designed to aid in the selection of an airport development
policy for Mexico City must include factors such as
political preferences and community priorities. This was
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the task undertaken in a dynamic analysis of development
strategies to be discussed in the next section.
8.8. 'rHE DYNAMIC ANALYSIS
The purpose of the dynamic model was to decide what
governmental action should be taken in 1971 which would
best serve the overall objective of providing quality
air service to Mexico City for the remainder ot the
century. This model assumed the second step in the decision
process could be taken in 1975 or 1976; at the end of the
current PreSident's six-year term. The adtion taken
then would depend both on the action taken ｮ ｯ ｾ and the
critical events which might occur in thE! interim'. ' Oui"
analysis of the dynamid model was much less formal than the
one developed for the static model, primarily because of
time pressures and the general complexity of the situation.
8.B.1. Alternatives for 1971
We first identified (ueing common sense) the reasonable
alternatives available to the government in 1971. These
al ternatives differ'sd in the d(::!grees of commitment to
immediate construction at the two sites. We chose only four
levels of commitment (minimum, lOYI, moderate, and high)
giving uS the 16 alternatives exhibited in Figure 8.6.
ａ ｣ ｴ ｵ ｡ ｬ ｬ ｹ ｾ each nominal case in the figure represents
a class of specific alternatives. The idea waS to do a
7300...
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Figure 8.6: THE 16 NOMlNAL DYNAMIC. ALTERNNI.'IVES FOR 1971
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ｦｩｲｳｴｾ｣ｵｴ analysis to decide which classes of alternatives
were sufficiently viable to be examined in more detail.
It should be noted that the two strategies defined by the
static analysis could be compatible with all the nominal
dynamic options except 11,12,15,and 16.
The next step involved defining what was meam by the
alternatives in some greater detail. Briefly summarized,
the alternatives at Texcoco (for the period 1971-1975)
were defined as follows:
Minimum - maintenance and introduction of safety
equipment only;
Low - extend the runways, upgrade support facilities
such as terminals, do all routine maintenance
and introduce new safety equipment;
Moderate- in addition to that done with a low strategy,
buy ann ｲ ｲ ｲ ｾ ｾ ｲ ･ land for building a new runway
and expand passenger facilities;
High - build a new runway and passenger facilities;
improve the airport access - in short, build
a totally new airport at Texcoco.
Similarly, for Zumpango, we defined the commitment levels:
Minimum - at m?st, buy land at Zumpango;
Low - buy land, build one jet runway and very modest
passenger facilities;
Moderate- buy land, build a first jet runway and plan
others, build major passenger facilities, and
construct an access road connection to the
main Mexico City highway;
High
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- build multiple jet runways, major passenger
facilities, and access roads - that is,
build a large new airport at Zumpango.
B.8.2. Objectives
We identified four major objectives that were important
in choosing a strategy for airport development: effective-
ness, political consequences, externalities, and flexibility
of the various al"ternatives. The components of the
"effectiveness" attributes are indicated by the six measures
of effectiveriess covered in the static model. The political
consequences were those important to the President - since
he was the principal decision maker - involving the political
effects which would be felt by SOP, by SCT, and by the
Presidencia. Flexibility concerned the range of options open
to the President at the second stage of the decision-making
process: what freedom would he realistically have at the
end of his tenure in modifying his earlier 1971 stance
after learning about the intervening uncertain events.
Finally, all other important considerations were lumped
together as Ijexternalities. " These included the amount of
access roads needed, the distribution of federal expenditures
between the Mexico City region and the rest of the couhtry,
the distribution of expenditures for airports and other
uses, regional development away from central Mexico City;
and the national prestige associated with new airport facilities.
8.8.3. possible Scenarios
To gain insight into the meanings and implications
of each of the classes of alternatives, detailed scenarios
were outlined for each. These included: (1) the oon-
sideration of important and critical events which could
occur in the period 1971-1976, and possibly affect the
best strategy in 1976; (2) the likelihood of their
occurrences; (3) the strategic reaction to each inter-
vening event-complex; and (4) the possible eventual
consequences for each act-event-reaction path. The
events involved safety factors and air disasters; shifts
in demand in termS of both ｰ ｡ ｾ ｳ ･ ｮ ｧ ･ ｲ ｳ and aircraft;
technological innovations, such as noise ｳ ｵ ｰ ｰ ｲ ･ ｾ ｳ ｯ ｲ ｳ Ｌ
better runway construction on marshy ground, etc.; changes
in citizen attitudes ｴ ｯ ｾ ｡ ｲ ､ the environment; and changes
in priorities, such as national willingness to have
government funds used for major airport construction.
Figure ｡ ｾ Ｗ depicts a schematic representation of one possible
scenario.
In each of the scenarios, the manner in which the
1971 strategy should be altered in 1976 to account for the
critical events listed above was defined. For instance,
if one originally chose strategy six, then a reasonable
response to increased numbers of landings and thus decreased
safety, in addition to increased consideration about the
impact of noise and air pollution in Mexico City, would
be to hasten the building at Zumpango and make it the
ＷＳＳ｣ｾ
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Mexico City International Airport. On the other hand,
response to a rather constant demand on the Texcoco
facilities and a shift in public priorities toward more
medical and educational support from the government,
might be to postpone additional construction at Zumpango
until a later date.
Suppose that strategy thirteen was initially chosen
in 1971, and that air demand greatly increased, ･ ｮ ｶ ｩ ｲ ｯ ｮ ｾ
mental concerns of citizens grew, and no technological
innovations were developed favorable to Texcoco Ｈ ･ Ｎ ｧ ｾ Ｌ
runway technology). Then in 1976, the Government could
either easily switch to a two airport option or continue
to develop and expand Zumpango. However, if strategy
thirteen were chosen and demand didn't increase as pre-
dicted, etc., the Government might find by 1976 that it
had a "white elephant" in that a new airport existed but
was not needed or uSed. The political effects might be
very bad and little flexibility would be available for
ricorrecting" the situation.
The main purpose of these exercises was to indicate
better what the overall impact of the 1971 decision might
be. This was very important before beginning the evaluation
process described next. It should be obvious that certain
options in 1971 eliminate the possibility of other options
in 1976, regardless of the events which occur in the
interim.
8.8.4. First Evaluation of Nominal Alternatives
The sixteen alternatives, defined in Figure 8.6,
were evaluated in a series of extensive discussions among
the Directors of the Department of Airports and of the
Center for Computation and Statistics, other staff members
ih SOP, and ourselves.
A preliminary evaluation indicated that seven of the
sixteen alternatives could be discarded. Alternative
1 did not provide for maintaining the present service
levels due to anticipated increases in demand. Alternatives
7, 8, 11, 12, 15, and 16 were undesirable because a high-
level of commitment to Texcoco in 1971 would make it the
major airport for the near future and remove the 'need for
simultaneous construction at Zumpango. Finally, since the
location of the new runway specified by the moderate Texcoco
commitment would require new passenger facilities, there
was not much difference between the options 3 and 4, so
they were coalesced into a single alternative, which we
label [3=4].
The next stage of the analysis involved having the
members of SOP rank the remaining broadly defined alternatives
on the attributes of flexibility, political effects,
externalities and effectiveness, as described before. The
particular rankings, which were reached by open discussions,
represent the consensus judgment. When some alternatives
were "indistinguishable" on a particular attribute, they
were assigned the same ranking. For the political ｣ ｯ ｮ ｾ
Table 8.3: PRELnIlw.RY EVALUATION OF PLAuSIBLE GOVERN.MENTAL
OPTI01'iS FOR 1971 BY RANK ORDER
ALTERNATIVE ATI'RIBUTES
Flexibility Political Effects on Externalities due to
Presi- SOP SeT Overall Pres- Reg. Bal. of Roads o-verall Effectiveness
dencia tige Dev. Fed Exp.
2 1. -1 8 2 3 4 4 1 1 3 T
3=4* 7 4 ｾ 1 4 1 4 6 3 7 8"'.
e: 2 3 6 4 3 3 3 2 1 , 3.) ...
6 3 2 7 3 2 3 3 3 1 I 3 1
9* 4 6 3 6 5 2- 2 4 2 I 2 410 5 5 4 5 1 2 2 5 2 4 t:;...
13* 6 8 1 8 7 1 1 6 4 t:; 2...
14* 8 7 2 7 6 1 1 7 4 6 6
*Alternatives dominated by 2, 51. 6, or 10 on overall ranking of four major attributes
'-J
v"J
ｾ
siderations and externalities, the assessments on the
components were first carried out, and then the overall
ranking for these attributes was established. The ranking
of the alternatives according to effectiveness was pro-
vided directly by results of the static model.
'I'he results of the first ranking effort are shown in
Table 8.3, where the smaller numbers represent the better
rankings. From this table it Can be seen that alternatives
3=4, 9, 13, and 14 are each dominated by others on the
basis of their overall rankings for the four main measures
of effectiveness. Alternative 6, for instance, is better
than alternative 14 in terms of all four of the measures.
Hence alternative 14 - and likewise alternatives 3=4, 9,
and 13 -- can be dropped from further consideration. The
alternatives which were not dominated are those represented
by the nominal cases 2, 'J, G, aud 10. It is important to
note here, however, that before we actually discarded
dominated alternatives we engaged in a devil's advocate
procedure: we tried to give the benefit of reasonable
doubt to the impending noncontenders to see whether they
could be resurrected to a place of contention. They could
not.
8.8.5. Final Analysis of Dynamic Options
To refine the analysis of the possible governmental
decisions, it was necessary to define the remaining ｣ ｯ ｮ ｾ
tending alternatives more precisely. This was done as
foilows:
2 - At Zumpango, do no more than buy land for an
airport. At Texcoco, extend the two main runways
and the aircraft apron; construct freight and
parking facilities, and a new control tower. Do
not build any new passenger terminals.
SA - Build one jet runway, some terminal facilities
and a minor access road connection at Zumpango.
Buy enough land for a major international airport.
At Texcoco, perform only routine maintenance and
make safety improvements.
SB ｾ Same as alternative SA, except buy just enough
land for the current Zumpango construction.
6 - Extend one runway at Texcoco and make other
improvements enumerated in alternative 2. Buy
land for a rnu J01." lnte:tJlational airport at Zumpango;
and construct one runway with some passenger and
access facilities.
10 - Same implications for Texcoco as alternative 6.
Build two jet runways with major passenger facilities
and access roads to Zumpartgo.
These five alternatives were ranked in the manner
previously described. The results are given irt Table 8.4.
Proceeding as before, we can quickly see that alternative 6
dominates 10, and alternatives 2, SA and 6 all dominate
SB. Thus the three remaining viable alternatives are 2, SA,
and 6.
Table 8. I,: FINAL EVALUATION OF GOVERNMENTAL OPTIONS FOR 1971
AL'l'ERNATlVE ATTRIBUTES
Flexi- Political Exter- Effec-
bility Effects nalities tiveness
----
2 1 4 4 3
5A 2 3 3 2
513* 4 5 5 4
6 3 1 1 1
let 5 2 2 1
*Alternatives dominated by 2, SA, or 6 on overall
ranking of four major ｡ ｴ ｌ ｾ ｩ ｢ ｵ ｴ ･ ｳ Ｎ
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The relative advantages of these three options were,
fidally, subjectively weighed by the SOP personnel as
follows. Alternative 6 ranks better on effectiveness,
externalities, and political considerations than either
2 or SA. Although it is worse in terms of relative
flexibility, it does allow the President to react effectively
to all the ｣ ｲ ｩ ｴ ｩ ｣ ｡ ｾ events which might occur between 1971
ahd 1976, when the second stage of the airport decision
could be made. Hence, in the opinion of the members of
SOP ｾｯｲｫｩｮｧ on this problem, altetnative 6 was chosen as
I
,
the best strategy.
8.9. IMPACT OF THE RESULTSＮＺＮＭ［ＮＮＺＭＭＭｾ
Based on the 1965-1967 study by SOP which recommended
moving the International Airport to Zumpango as soon as
ｰ ｯ ｾ ｳ ｩ ｢ ｬ ･ Ｌ ｡ ｾ well as ｩ ｮ ､ ｩ ｣ ｡ ｴ ｩ ｯ ｮ ｾ early in this studYt it
was clear that some members of SOP held the opinion that
a major move to Zumpango was still the most effective
strategy. The static analysis, using SOP's own estimates
and preferences, indicated a phased development involving
a gradual shift toward Zumpango appeared equally as good.
Once political considerations, flexibility of the policy;
and externalities were accounted for along with effectiveness
in the dynamic analysis of alternatives open to the ｧ ｯ ｶ ･ ｲ ｮ ｾ
rrient in 1971, it was evident that the "phased development
at Zumpango" policy was better than an "all Zumpango"
policy.
Looking at the implications of their evaluations,
the SOP staff was very surprised and bewildered. Using
their own preferences over measures of effectiveness
they knew were relevant for a realistic set of options,
they agreed that the two alternatives, thirteen and four-
teen, which were most consistent with their so strongly
held position, were completely dominated. Note also
that the position of SeT, being most consistent with
alternative 3=4 was also dominated.
This glaring inconsistency had a profound impact
on many individuals within SOP. They rethought their
position, analyzing in their own minds how this "strange"
implication came about. As they understood the implication
better, they gained some confidence in the result Ii With
the final analysis of non-dominated alternatives and
additional group discussions of the dynamic analysis t SOP
adopted a new flexible position, exemplified by an initial
choice of option six in 1971. Thus a very strange thing
happened: an analysis undertaken for unabashedly advocacy
purposes (i.e., to justify going all-out to Zumpango) turned
out to convince the sponsors of the analysis that perhaps
a more flexible stance was really in the best interest of
Mexico.
8.9.1. The Ensuing Political Process
SOP recommended a "phased development" strategy to
the President in December 1971. Specifically, it was
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suggested that land be acquired at Zumpango, that a major
runway and modest terminal facilities be planned for
construction during President Echeverria's term. It was
also proposed that he reserve until 1976 a more detailed
decision on how the airport facilities for Mexico City
should be developed. This recommendation represented a
major change in SOP'S posture from the 1967 study. The
previous recommendations of SOP were for master plans
specifying what should be done at various points iri time
over the next thirty years without regard to the unfolding
of relevant uncertain events. Thinking in terms of adaptive
dynamic strategies rather than in terms of master plans
played a pivotal role in our analysis.
As the last stage of our consulting activities, we; in
collaboration with our clients, examined in some detail
the steps that had to be taken in order to implement the
newly developed stance of SOP. This required developing
a strategy for the planning of technical documents, for
informal presentations to key government agencies, for
private meetings, and for possible announcements. Since we
were not certain of the reactions of SCT and the Presidencia
we mapped out SOIne contingency plans which themselves were
more in the spirit of an adaptive dynamic analysis than
of a master plan. We are sure that you will understand that
this chapter, however, is not the place to discuss the
details of these politically sensitive considerations.
The analyses described in this chapter were completed
in ｾ ｡ ｲ ｬ ｹ September, 1971. In late 1971, Ing. Jauffred and
Ing. Dovali, together with Secretary Bracamontes of SOP
presented the basic ideas of this study to the President
of Mexico. Members of SC'l' and the Presidencia, including
the respective secretaries of these ministries, were
also present at this meeting.
'l'he meeting, perhaps needless to say, did not
eliminate all differences of opinion concerning the two
basic points of view--remain at Texcoco or more to Zumpango-
-positions that had long been established. After the meeting,
the ｐ ｲ ･ ｳ ｩ ､ ･ ｲ ｾ requested that SOP, SCT, and the Presidencia
work out philosophical disagreements on the airport issue,
as well as technical and financial details of further
developing the airport facilities of the Mexico City ｾ ｲ ･ ｡ Ｎ
Because of its complexity and importance, the process of
'working out the details' is very time consuming. By
mid-1974, no cone cete ｣ ｬ ｣ Ｇ ｲ Ｇ ｩ ｾ i.l)t\ L ,,1 been made. However,
the winds seemed to blow a bit differently in 1974 than
in 1971. In the earlier year, the basic issue was whether
the main Mexico City Airport should be at Texcoco or
Zumpango. In 1974, the issue seemed to involve when the
Zumpango site would be the majn airport--next year, in
five years, or twenty. Support for this came from the
fact that land for an airport at Zumpango was exappropriated
by SOP, who holds this authority, ill early 1974. Presumably,
whatever decision evolves by the Government of Mexico will
be done with greater awar"eness of the relative influence
of the different attributes and of the dynamic issues.
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CHAPTER 7
ILLUSTRATIVE APPLICATIONS
Certainly we are dealing in this book with a non-
vacuous problem: many difficult, real-world decision prob-
lems do involve multiple objectives. Consequently, many
of the concepts we have introduced are relevant and must
be applied in either a formal or informal analysis of the
alternatives. If one chooses to analyze multiple objec-
tives and value or utility tradeoffs in a formal manner,
then immodestly, we believe the ideas and procedures
discussed in this book can often be of considerable use.
The purpose of this chapter and Chapter 8 is to support
this contention by illustrating many cases where multi-
attribute preferences have been formalized. The present
chapter, in a variety of settings, focuses exclusively on
the preference assessments themselves whereas Chapter 8,
which concerns the site selection of an airport for Mexico
City, presents a complete case including probability
assessments, analysis of alternatives, interactions with
the decision makers, and so on, as well as multiattribute
preference assessments.
The applications discussed in this chapter cover the
range of topics presented in Chapter 2 through 6. Section
7.1 discusses the generation of objectives and the specif-
ication of measures of effectiveness for an air-pollution
problem. Section 7.2 discusses the allocation of re-
sources for an educational program and the value functions
of the members of a local school board and other local
education officials are formalized. Next, a five-attribute
utility function for response times of various fire trucks
is assessed. This problem typically arises in planning
operations of emergency services. Section 7.4 addresses
the problem of structuring corporate preferences. In
sections 7.5 and 7.6, we discuss preliminary work on the
quantification of multiattribute preferences concerning
decisions involving the selection of computer systems and
decisions about the siting and licensing of nuclear power
facilities.
The first six sections of this chapter relate in some
depth experiences that we and others have had in assessing
multiattribute preferences. The last section, 7.7, gives
brief surveys of a number of other problems where formal
analyses have explicitly considered multiple objectives
using concepts discussed in earlier chapters. These in-
clude: utilization of frozen blood, sewage sludge disposal,
safety of landing aircraft, choice of a job, shipments of
hazardous materials, medical and surgical treatment of
cleft lip and palate.
Our thesis is that the concepts and procedures intro-
duced in this book are not just of theoretical, but also
of operational interest and they can be--and have been--
utilized to make contributions in a variety of important
contexts. Many analysts are currently applying decision
analysis to such crucial problems as those discussed in
this chapter and the inventory of case studies is growing
rapidly.
7.1 AIR POLLUTION CONTROL*
In New York City, the mayor must decide whether he
should approve a proposed major addition to Consolidated
Edison's electric power generating station in Astoria,
Queens. If this addition is approved, City residents would
be reasonably assured of receiving the growing quantity of
electricity they will demand over the next several years
at reasonable cost. However, approval would result in
increased air pollution, particularly in terms of sulfur
dioxide, particulates, and nitrogen oxides. Should this
addition be approved?
In both Boston and New York City, the respective City
Councils must decide whether to pass legislation that would
place stringent limits on the sulfur content of fuels
burned in the city. If passed, the legislation would lead
to a definite improvement in the city's air quality--espe-
cially in terms of the air pollutant: sulfur dioxide.
*This section draws heavily on the dissertation of Ellis
[1970J and adapts material from Ellis and Keeney [1972J.
A related dissertation by Mead [1973J goes into more depth
on the Astoria problem. Both dissertations were supervised
in part by Raiffa.
However, passage of this legislation would require resi-
dents to incur added annual costs for heating and elec-
tricity to pay for the more expensive fuels with low
sulfur contents. Should these City Councils pass such
legislation?
In Washington, D.C., the U.S. Congress must decide
whether to establish very stringent emission standards
for carbon monoxide, hydrocarbons, and nitrogen oxides
for all motor vehicles manufactured and sold in the
United States. Establishment of these standards would
contribute toward improving the air quality. On the other
hand, they would require the public to pay significantly
more money for new automobiles. Should Congress adopt
these stringent standards?
Each of these decision problems is faced presently
or has been faced recently by public officials. Moreover,
they are representative of a host of similar problems that
public officials increasingly confront. The basic question
is: Should government adopt a specific, proposed program
intended to improve the air quality? With each such ｩ ｮ ｾ
vestigation there is the additional question: "What should
the air quality standard be?"
The major focus of this book has been to describe how
a decision maker--in this case a public official--can
utilize decision analysis to help make up his mind: how
to select a desirable cause of action amongst the myriad
of alternatives he confronts. In this section, we focus
our attention on the selection of a set of objectives and
measures of effectiveness for analyzing governmental pro-
grams designed to better control air pollution. We draw
heavily upon the concepts discussed in Chapter 2.
As a vehicle for illustrating or suggestions, focus
is placed on one specific problem faced by one particular
individual, the Mayor of New York City. Obviously, we
would not expect the Mayor of New York to spend his time
working on details of the air pollution problem. It
would be reasonable, however, to expect members of the
Mayor's staff in the Environmental Protection Administra-
tion and the Department of Air Resources to work on this
problem. These individuals and the Mayor might then re-
view the results and implications of such analyses in
formulating and supporting air-pollution control programs
for New York City.
In the next subsection, a brief overview of the air
pollution control problem in New York City is presented,
along with an introduction to the sulfur-dioxide problem.
Then, objectives and measures of effectiveness are gener-
ated for the analysis of the problem. To avoid leaving
the reader in midstream, the final subsection briefly
sketChes other aspects of this problem that were examined.
7.1.1 The Air Pollution Control Problem of New York City
A general model of the process by which many air
pollution control programs are designed and evaluated is
shown in Figure 7.1. The main problem with the control
process as it is currently practiced in most municipal
governments is that the outputs are usually not explicit-
ly considered in choosing air pollution policy. The
reason is, of course, understandable. There are simply
too many complexities: the difficulties in defining ap-
propriate output measures, in establishing the relation-
ships between pollution concentrations and these measures,
and in specifying preferences for the various possible
outputs. But since action must be taken in most instances
the feed-back loop goes directly from the measured air
pollution concentrations to the control mechanism. In a
sense; the process can be thought of as being short-circuited
at the dashed line in Figure 7.1. ｾ ｦ ｵ ･ ｮ ･ ｶ ･ ｲ this occurs
the decision-making process excludes from formal analysis
the most important information necessary for rational con-
trol. The suggestions here are meant to eliminate the short-
circuit and include the outputs explicitly in the decision-
making process. Of course, we do admit that good informal
analysis often beats poor formal analysis. But our purpose
here is to improve formal analysis.
The Sulfur Decision Problem. A survey of air pollution
problems and current air pollution control programs in
New York is given in Eisenbud [1970J. In 1970 a major
decision still to be made in New York City's air pollution
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control program concerned sulfur dioxide. Table 7.1 pre-
sents a breakdown of the estimated 1972 emissions of sulfur
dioxide from sources within the City (as viewed from 1969).
These estimates accounted for all provisions of existing
laws enacted through mid-1971.
Table 7.1: Estimated 1972 Emissions of Sulfur
Dioxide in ｎ ･ ｾ ｟ Ａ ｾ Ｚ Ｍ ｾ ｾ ｩ ｟ ｴ ｹ [NYC
ｄ･ｰ｡ｲｾ｟ｭ･ｮｴＺ __ｾｦｾ｟ａｩ｟ｲ｟ ｒ･ｳＨＺＩ｜ＮｬｬＺＺ｣｟ｾ＿｟Ｌ ｟ＱＹＶｾ
Source of Emissions Emissions of Sulfur Dioxide
(tons) (per cent of total)
Incineration of refuse 2,500 (0.6% )
Motor vehicles 20,400 (5.1%)
Industrial processes 9,900 (2.5%)
Space heating 195,300 (49.2%)
Power generation 169,500 (42.6%)
TOTAL 397,600 (100.0%)
Since over ninety per cent of these emissions arise
from the burning of fuels for space heating and power
generation and since the only current, practical way to
reduce emissions from these sources is to lower the sulfur
content of the fuels burned, one important decision faced
by the City was: "should the legal limit on the sulfur
content of fuels burned in the City (then one per cent)
be lowered?"
7.1.2 Identification of Major Objectives
In almost every decision problem faced by the Mayor
of New York City, his most fundamental objective is to
improve the well-being of his constituents. However, one
must spell out in more detail what is meant by this objec-
tive as it pertains to air pollution. Precisely what would
the Mayor like to accomplish by his actions concerning
air pollution? After some serious thought, an evolutionary
process led Ellis to divide the overall objective into five
major objectives:
1. Decrease the adverse effects of air
pollution on the health of New York City
residents.
2. Decrease the adverse economic effects of
air pollution on the residents.
3. Decrease the adverse effects of air
pollution on psychological well-being of
the residents.
4. Decrease the net costs of air pollution
to the city government.
5. Achieve as desirable a political "solution"
as possible.
These objectives require little justification. ｈ ｯ ｷ ｾ
ever, it should be noted that the second objective is
meant to include costs of the air pollution control
program in addition to costs of pollution itself. The
net costs alluded to in the fourth objective include all
the direct costs, such as the costs of an air pollution
control program, as well as indirect costs such as those
due to migration of businesses and industry from the city,
less tourism, and tax revenue losses resulting from employee
absences, due to sickness caused by air pollution.
Do these five objectives include all the issues of
importance to the Mayor? For instance, nothing has been
said about the overall consequences of the various alter-
natives on New York State, on the Federal government, on
businesses, or on non-residents of New York City. Should
these factors be included in a complete analysis of pro-
posed air pollution control programs? Of course, the
Mayor is concerned about these issues. However, note
that some aspects of these consequences, such as economic
effects due to tourism and businesses moving to the city,
are included in the objective "decrease the net costs of
air pollution to the city government." Benefits to non-
residents from any air pollution program, for example,
are probably highly correlated with the benefits to res-
idents, and therefore in a first approximation could be
ignored. All in all Ellis felt that explicit considera-
tion of any of these additional objectives would not alter
the optimal strategy, and therefore they were initially
excluded from his list of objectives. However, after a
preliminary analysis, he did reexamine these exclusions
--albeit in an informal manner.
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7.1.3 Assigning Attributes to Each Objective
The next task is to identify for each of the objec-
tives suitable attributes that unambiguously indicate the
degree to which the associated objective is achieved.
Health Effects on Residents. Several possible attri-
butes immediately come to mind for the objective "decrease
the adverse effects of air pollution on the health of
residents." These include the annual number of deaths
attributable to air pollution, the annual number of man-
days of morbidity attributable to air pollution, and some
subjectively assessed health index that includes consider-
ation of both morbidity and mortality.
Important objections can be raised against each of
these. The annual number of deaths attributable to air
pollution is not comprehensive in that it does not account
at all for what is believed to be the more prevalent effect
of air pollution on health--namely, its effect on morbidity.
Similarly, the annual number of man-days of morbidity does
not account at all for the extremely serious effect of air
pollution on health in terms of mortality.
Thus, it ｳ ･ ･ ｭ ｾ clear that no single measure of effec-
tiveness, aside from possibly a subjective health index,
can be identified for this objective. However, because
such an index lacks a physical interpretation, it is not
particularly desirable in terms of the measurability
criterion discussed in Chapter 2. Hence, the alternative
of specifying the major objective in more detail was chosen.
Health considerations were divided into two detailed objec-
tives, "decrease mortality" and "decrease morbidity."
For the first of these, two of the possible measures
of effectiveness are the "annual number of deaths attri-
butable to air pollution" and the inversely oriented scale,
"per capita increase in the number of days of remaining
lifetime due to improved air quality." The first equally
weighs the death of an old person and the death of a child,
whereas the second measure weighs the death of a young
person more heavily. The latter measure was chosen since
it was felt that in this case, it more adequately describes
the impact of a program alternative with respect to "de-
crease mortality."
For the objective "decrease morbidity," the "per
capita decrease in the number of days of bed disability
per year due to improved air quality" was chosen as the
attribute. Obviously, this does not include such effects
as sore eyes which would not force one to a bed. Part of
the consequence of sore eyes is psychological, which can
be accounted for by the third major objective. However,
the physical aspects of sore eyes intuitively seem impor-
tant enough to be formally included in the analysis. To
do this we would suggest calibrating a number of days of
bed disability per year which one would feel is equivalent
to having sore eyes of different levels of severity during
the year. Then for each program alternative, the effects
due to sore eyes would be included in the analysis by
adding an "equivalent number of bed-days disability" to
our measure of the degree to which "decrease morbidity"
is met.
Economic Effects on Residents. No single attribute
could be identified for the objective "decrease the adverse
economic effects of air pollution on residents of New York
City," because the Mayor would want to consider the eco-
homic impact on residents at various income-levels. As
a compromise Ellis chose to consider a dichotomy: the
economic effects on low-income and on other residents.
Per capita annual net cost to residents was used as the
measure of effectiveness for each group.
Psychological Effects on Residents. There seems to be
no direct measure of effectiveness for the objective "de-
crease the adverse effects of air pollution on the psycho-
logical well-being of the reSidents." One could, however,
define some subjective index and perhaps interview res-
idents about their feelings for various levels of air
quality. But Ellis chose a simpler approach, which used
the daily concentration of sulfur dioxide as a proxy at-
tribute for "psychological well-being."* Since this
pollutant can easily be detected both visually and by
*It is important to emphasize that this concentration level
is to be viewed as a proxy for psychological well-being
only and not for the other objectives.
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breathing, it seems reasonable to assume "psychological
well-being" is closely related to the concentration levels.
Economic Effects to the City. As a measure of effec-
tiveness for the fourth objective, "decrease the net costs
of air pollution to the City government ll Ellis used lIannual
net costs. 1I As mentioned previously, this includes both
direct and indirect costs.
Political Implications. The fifth objective, "achieve
the best political solution to the air pollution problem,1I
has no nice objective measure of effectiveness and a sub-
jective index was used. Many considerations must be in-
cluded in measuring the index, such as the possibility of
court suits brought by landlords or home-owners who are
forced to pay higher fuel ｰ ｲ ｩ ｣ ｾ ｳ for heating, the Mayor's
relations with the City Council and with Con Edison and
with any of the political groups in the city, and the
support of the general public for various program alter-
natives. All of these have a potential effect on the
Mayor's political future which also should be taken into
account.
7.1.4 The Final Set of Objectives and Attributes
Figure 7.2 exhibits the hierarchy of objectives and
their associated measures of effectiveness used by Ellis
in his study of air pollution control in New York City.
Of course, there may be important objectives which
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Ellis did not think about that are consequently not in-
cluded in his analysis. However, if one cannot identify
such omissions before utilizing the implications of the
analysis, the same omissions might have occurred if any
less formal procedure for guiding the decision making
process were followed. And in this case we would be no
worse off using formal analysis than not. Admittedly,
with an informal analysis one might think intuitively or
subconsciously about objectives that one might not be able
to articulate. And also admittedly, a formal analysis may
inhibit this mysteriously creative, gestalt way of thinking.
But on the other hand, this type of unstructured intro-
spective analysis is so very private that others cannot
share in the process and suggest additions or modifications
they deem appropriate.
7.1.5 Decision Analysis of the Sulfur-Dioxide Decision
Problem
Since the purpose of this section was to develop
objectives and attributes for the sulfur-dioxide decision
problem, the ensuing analysis will only be briefly men-
tioned. The interested reader may refer to Ellis [1970J
for details of the assessments or to Ellis and Keeney
[1972J for an overview.
Since Ellis' work was done as a doctoral thesis de-
signed to illustrate the methodology, only two alternatives
were explicitly evaluated. These were the status quo,
which entailed maintaining a one percent legal limit on
the sulfur content of oil and coal used in New York City,
and an alternative which lowered the legal limit to 0.37
percent for oil and 0.7 percent for coal. To analyze the
full range of alternatives would require a team of re-
searchers rather than one individual.
The alternatives were evaluated in terms of the seven
attributes defined as follows:
Xl - per capita increase in the number of days
of remaining lifetime,
X2 ::: per capita decrease in the number of days
of bed disability per year,
X3 - per capita annual net costs to low-income
residents,
X4 ::: per capita annual net costs to other residents;
Xs ::: daily sulfur-dioxide concentrations in
parts per million,
X6 ::: total annual net cost to the City government,
X7 ::: subjective index of political desirability.
Joint probability functions describing the possible
impact of the two alternatives were assessed exploiting
probabilistic independence, conditional probability as-
sessments, and a small simulation model. Exploiting some
utility independence assumptions which were deemed to be
appropriate on the basis of discussions with staff mem-
bers in the Department of Air Resources, a seven-attribute
utility function felt to parameterize the Mayor of New
York's preferences was structured.
It is interesting to note that Ellis t did not ｣ ｯ ｮ ｾ
elude that the Mayor of New York would view each attribute
as utility independent of its complement. The main reason
for this was the feeling that the Mayor would likely be
more risk averse in terms of attributes Xl' X2 , X4 , and Xs
if the political effects were at an undesirable level than
he would given desirable political effects. From his inter-
action with the Department of Air Resources, Ellis did
conclude that for the ranges of the possible consequences,
the attributes X3 , X6 , and X7 were each individually utility
independent of their respective complement. Also, he felt
that given any fixed level of attributes X7 , the attributes
Xl' X2 , X4 , and Xs would each be conditionally utility ｩ ｮ ｾ
dependent of the remaining attributes. With these assump-
tions, the assessment of the complete utility function re-
quired (1) assessing seven one-attribute utility functions,
one over each effectiveness measure, and (2) assessing
eighteen scaling constants to insure the seven utility
functions were properly scaled. No assessments of the
utility function were completed, although details about
the functional form of the utility function and the reason-
ableness of the utility independence are given in Ellis
[1970J. Appropriate techniques for performing each of
the necessary assessments are found in earlier chapters
of this book.
7.1.6 Impact of This Work
The ideas and results expressed in this section may
have had some influence on the thinking of individuals
responsible for air pollution control programs in New
York City. Although no claim can be made concerning
causality, the following events have occurred:
The results of this work, concerning the range of
possible effects of a program which lowered the legal
limits of oil and coal used in the city from the present
one percent to 0.37 and 0.7 percent respectively, were
made available to the New York City Environmental Protec-
tion Administration, which was in the process of preparing
a new air pollution control code for the City. This group
included, as one of the key provisions in its recommended
code to the City Council, a program which was essentially
the same program as the one Ellis analyzed.
These same results, as well as the methods of analysis
upon which these results are based, were presented by
Howard M. Ellis in testimony before the New York City
Council in its legislative hearings on the proposed new
air pollution control code. The code was approved by
the City Council and became law in 1971. Ellis continued
to consult with the City after his thesis was completed.
The present authors suspect that, as is the case with
many analyses of this type, the detailed quantitative
work involved in doing the full-scale study probably
helped the investigator to better understand the quali-
tative implications of the problem, and it was this
qualitative understanding which helped him influence the
ｧ ｯ ｶ ･ ｲ ｮ ｮ ｾ ｮ ｴ ｡ ｬ officials. Perhaps this level of sophistica-
tion could have come about through other means, but one
should not underestimate the important intellectual and
emotional impact that arises when one is forced to ex-
press vexing tradeoffs in unambiguous quantitative terms.
It forces one to think harder than one is ordinarily ac-
customed to ... especially if one then has to defend his
assessments in front of other experts.
7.2 PREFERENCE TRADEOFFS AMONG INSTRUCTIONAL ｐｒｏｇｒｦｵｾｓ
Roche* considers the problem faced by a decision
maker who has to choose among alternate budget allocations
to diverse activities which compete for the same scarce
resource. He is concerned about the role played by the
deciSion maker caught "in the middle." That is a decision
maker who is in the position where he must, on one hand,
obtain funds from some approving authority and, on the
other hand, approve the budgets for programs directed by
professionals in his employ. With a c?nstrained budget
he can increase the budget of one program only at the
*In this section, we summarize and review the work of
Roche [1971J. His doctoral thesis, which was supervised
by Raiffa, makes extensive use of the material in Chapter
3 on tradeoffs under certainty.
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expense of other programs. He must take from Peter to
pay Paul and do it in such a manner to convince his over-
seers of the reasonableness of it all. Roche was moti-
vated to see if formal preference analysis of the type we
are disucssing in this book could help such a man-in-the-
middle both to crystallize his own tradeoffs and to com-
municate this process to the body that controls the dis-
pensation of funds.
Roche chose to study the budget-allocation problem
in the context of a small school district. The school
superintendent was the decision maker "in the middle,"
Roche's principal client; the people below the superin-
tendent were the school principal and the coordinators of
various educational programs; the people above the super-
intendent were the school board which acted as the funding
agency for the town. School boards in New England have
a great deal of fiscal autonomy and can impose financial
obligations on the town. But, of course, these school-
board members are themselves elected officials so that
the ultimate responsibility does reside in the collectiv-
ity of town citizens.
Roche was indeed fortunate--but it was far from all
luck--to find a chairman of a school board and a super-
intendent who were initially interested in pursuing a
pilot test of Roche's ideas. It is a credit to Roche
that the initial curiosity of these cooperating individ-
uals bloomed into full-scale enthusiastic cooperation and, as
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we shall see, he was skillful enough in his personal re-
lations to involve other individuals in the measurement
exercise. Roche, in his thesis, disguises the name of
the town, which he fictiously calls "Somerstown," and he
disguises as well the names of the characters that par-
ticipated in the exercise. However, we assure you that
many of the dialogues recorded in the thesis are verbatim
reports of actual measurement sessions.
7.2.1 Refining the Problem
Somerstown began a program budgeting effort in
September 1969, a couple of years before Roche entered
the scene. One of the school board members was a.busi-
ness school professor, and it was through his intervention
that the superintendent recast the traditional line-item
budget into a program format. At the junior high-school
level, the basic program format was segregated according
to subject matter. The superintendent and the business
school professor alluded to above, admitted however,
that to their disappointment the program budgeting effort
had practically no effect whatsoever on the reallocation
of funds to different school-subject programs. Each year,
the funds were allocated like the year before except per-
haps for a uniform percentage increase. This background
may partially explain the receptive audience that Roche
received when he approached Somerstown authorities with
the idea of examining fundamental tradeoffs among the
funding of different subjects. We also point out, in the
way of background material, that Somerstown is a small
homogeneous community whose educational program was deemed
comparatively stable and free of the many frictions that
plagued other educational systems at that tumultuous time.
Roche concentrated on the allocation process for four
subject programs in the junior-high program:
i. English/Language Arts
ii. Science
iii. Mathematics
iv. Social Studies
The Somers town Schools have a coordinator for each
of these programs and the coordinators prepare an 'annual
budget for their respective domains of responsibility.
Each feels a responsibility to do better each year than
the year before and each tries to get increases in funding
for his or her program--the usual advocacy procedure.
When Mr. A asks for an increase, he seldom feels obliged
--nor would it be considered good form--to argue that the
money he is seeking should come from Mr. Bls program.
It is the task of the superintendent to juggle these re-
quests and to suggest a compromise among them in a fashion
that maintain the loyalty of his staff and at the same
time gains the acceptance of the school committee.
The first half of the thesis is concerned with the
creation of a suitable production function: the trans-
formation of financial and personnel inputs to educational
Ｕ Ｗ ｾ
outputs--no mean task! For a long time before Roche
started his probing, the Somerstown school authorities
worried about educational indices. Several indicators
could be chosen but many are highly correlated and for
convenience of the exercise, Roche and his collaborators
chose for each of the four subjects the index, "Percent-
age of students achieving at or above grade level on the
standardized achievement test."
In a later chapter of his thesis Roche does discuss
the inadequacy of this output measure. He defends his
use of it, however, on pragmatic grounds and he does dis-
cuss what other researchers might do if they were to choose
other output indices. We feel that the chosen index is
far from a good surrogate for educational performance and
we feel that it is not an elementary task to suggest how
Roche's analysis could proceed using a more sensitive set
of output indices. But for the time being we are stuck
with the index used and let us get on with the story even
though it is marred by the exclusive use of this over-
simplified output index.
7.2.2 Relating Program Costs to Output
Let us look at the process Roche followed in con-
fronting the science coordinator. The science budget for
the existing year was $81,000 and 59% of the students
performed at, or better than their specified grade level.
Roche first inquired about the effects of dropping the
science program altogether. The coordinator did concede
that many of the students would continue to perform at or
above the hurdle level. He then inquired about the effect
of a 10% increase, (i.e., an increase of $8,100). "What
would I be allowed to do with the money?", Dave Flaherty
queried.
"It's up to you," responded Roche. "The essential
point is, Dave, that none of us knows how to use an ad-
ditional $8,100 in science better than you do. Once you
decide what you would do with the $8,100 I will ask you
to assess what impact those additional funds would have
on the students in the same way we did before. That is,
we shall ask in turn: What would you do with the increased
funds? Which levels or sections in which grades would be
effected? What would you expect the effect would be along
the dimension of number of students achieving at or above
grade level in science?"
Roche coached Dave Flaherty to think hard about the
questions posed. He encouraged the science coordinator
to steep himself in the past data, to think about the in-
creased money not in the abstract but in terms of what it
would buy in the form of additional teaching help or ad-
ditional audio-visual facilities, and so on, and to think
about the effect on individual students. He posed such
questions as: "If you do so-and-so, would this really
help Mary Jane over the hurdle?"
The production function ideally should have been
probabilistically assessed but all Roche had the courage
and time to do was to elicit in each case a median value,
i.e. a value for which the assessor thought the true value
would be equally likely to fall above or below the esti-
mated value. He formalized the assessment procedure in
terms of a written protocol with several pages of work
sheets that the coordinator took many hours over a period
of days to answer.
The end product that Roche sought from the science
coordinator was a curve that plotted estimated performance
(% at or above grade level) on the vertical axis against
budgetary values on the horizontal axis. This curve, the
assessed production function, was meant to go through a
pivot point at the status quo level--i.e., a budget of
$81,000 produces a performance of 59%.
After Flaherty completed the work sheets prepared by
Roche, he was presented with the following task: "Now
that you (Flaherty) have completed the assessment questions,
we would like to probe your qualitative judgement about
the possible shapes of a performance function for the
Somerstown Junior High Science Program. II Roche then
showed Flaherty several shaped curves as shown in Figure
7.3 and they discussed the qualitative meaning of each.
After Flaherty seemed to understand the implications of
each shape he was asked to select one of the shapes pre-
sented or to invent a shape that reflected his true
feelings.
80%
Performance 70%
("at or above
grade level")
60%
50%
40%
Pivot Point
($81K, 59%)
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Figure 7.3
In a gentle manner Roche discussed with Flaherty
some of his responses and indicated some inconsistencies
amongst the answers he recorded--but he did this corrective
procedure with the supportive advice that Flaherty should
not be embarrassed at these inconsistencies, since anyone
put into his position would be equally inconsistent. The
important thing was to have Flaherty reflect and ponder
about these inconsistencies and then try to modify some
of his earlier assessments so that the revised set of
responses would be internally consistent. And what is
perhaps more important, the revised answers should be
felt to accurately portray the current best assessments
Flaherty could make in light of his new level of under-
standing.
All we can hope to do here in this summary is to give
the reader a flavor of the care that Roche took to gener-
ate a performance function from each of the four coordi-
nators. The superintendent, Dr. Nelson, had his own views
about these performance assessments and felt compelled in
some circumstances to modify the assessments of his ｳ ｵ ｢ ｾ
ordinates. Dr. Nelson remarked, however, that if this
assessment process were to be repeated year after year
then he would be able calibrate his coordinators on the
basis of a track record. The school committee, which
monitored the entire exercise felt that it was most ap-
propriate for the superintendent to modify these per-
formance functions in collaboration with his coordinators,
since the school committee superintendent had to take
full responsibility for the finally recorded performance
functions. The committee explicitly stated that their
deliberations would be based primarily on the super-
intendent's own assessments, which, in turn, would be
based in part on the inputs he received from his coordi-
nators.
7.2.3 Assessing a Value Function
Now let us turn to the second part of the thesis
dealing with preference structures. Roche investigated
the preference structures of several concerned indivuduals
for different performance profiles. A typical profile is
a four-tuple (xLA ' xs ' xM' xSS ) which refers to performance
scores on language-arts, science, mathematics, and social
sciences respectively, and where xLA ' for example, repre
w
sents the percentage of students at or above grade level
in language/arts.
As is evident in Figure 7.4 each of the performance
ranges was restricted to a subinterval of the theoret-
ically feasible range from 0% to 100%. For example,
mathematics performance was restricted from the worst
case of 65% to the best case of 85%. These restricted
ranges were ample to accommodate budgetary changes that
could realistically be recommended. It was critical to
restrict these ranges so that one could adopt various
preferential independence assumptions. We shall expand
--------------------_•...•._... _-
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Figure 7.4
A typical
profile
on this point shortly.
Due to the considerable support Roche received from
Dr. Nelson, the superintendent, and Mrs. Humphrey the
chair-woman of the school committee, Roche was able to
field test preference assessments with every single ad-
ministrator and policy maker involved in the decision-
making process of the junior high school. These involved
the principal and assistant principal of the junior high
school, the superintendent and assistant superintendent,
and all five members of the Somerstown school committee.
Absent from this listing are the citizens and the parents
of school children. In addition, the preference pro-
cedure was also field tested on a group of 18 doctoral
students in educational administration.
It was surprisingly easy to verify the reasonableness
of pairwise preferential independence. For example, Roche
set xM and x ss at low levels of 70% and 55% respectively,
and then probed conditional preference tradeoffs between
XLA and XS . After he thoroughly engaged his subjects in
this problem he asked parenthetically whether any of the
tradeoff responses between XLA and Xs would be altered
if xM and xss were not set at 70% and 55% respectively.
Practically all of his subjects felt that these tradeoffs
would certainly not be influenced by such modifications
of the fixed levels of xM and x SS . Some subjects, in-
cluding the superintendent emphasized the point that the
tradeoffs would not depend on the fixed levels of XM and
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Xss Erovided that these levels were within the specified
bounds. He felt for example, that if xM were set at 30%
this would be such a shock to the system that his trade-
offs between XLA and Xs would be affected.
For all subjects, Roche felt that the necessary
pairwise preferential independence assumptions were sat-
isfied to legitimatize adopting a value function of the
form
(7.1)
where the component v's were normalized respectively at
o and 1 for the worst and best alternatives (e.g.
v LA (55) = 0,vLA (75) = 1, etc.), where the k's were non-
negative/and where
(7.2)
Roche followed the assessment procedure described in
Section 3.7. He assessed for each subject the component
value functions by the mid-value technique: for each com-
ponent function he first found the .50-value point, next
the .25 and the .75 points, then he checked the .50-point
against the .25 and .75 points, and finally he discussed
the general shape of the v-component functions. Next he
sought the k-weights. He asked such questions as: Ｂ ｓ ｵ ｰ ｾ
pose we consider a disastrous profile such as (55, 50, 65,50)
where all performance measures are at their worst levels.
Now suppose you could push one of these worst scores up
from the worst level to the best, which would you choose?
Would you prefer to push language/arts up from 55 to 75,
or science from 50 to 70, or mathematics from 65 to 85,
or social science from 50 to 70?" He thus probed each
respondent for rankings of the k's. Next, he followed
the technique discussed in Section 3.7 and determined
precise numerical values for the k-weights. Figure 7.5
depicts the assessments of Superintendent Nelson and his
assistant, Mr. Elliot. Table 7.2. sununarizes some salient
data collected from the nine principal actors involved in
the exercise. Roche not only obtained Nelson's assess-
ments but he had Nelson guess at what some of his associates
would record. It's fascinating to read how Nelson ration-
alized some of the recorded assessments of members of his
staff and the school committee members. There are striking
differences of opinion:
As regards the 18 students in the doctoral seminar
in educational administration, all of whom were subjected
to the same assessment procedure, we quote from Roche:
;/There is little to be gained at this point in the
study from exhibiting the eighteen structures. However,
the following summary information might be of interest.
1. With respect to the Language Arts program, 11
of the curves were concave, 6 were linear,
and 1 was S-shaped about the current
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TABLE 7.2
Assessed k -Values and .50 Mid-Value
Points of Principal Subjects
k -Values ( .50)r1id-Value Points
Name LA S M SS LA S M SS
Administration:
(1) Mrs. Carter
(Principal) .20 .25 .22 .33 60.5 54.5 70 54
(2 ) Mrs. MacGre gor
(Asst. Principal) .21 .24 .23 .32 61 54.5 68 53.5
( 3) Dr. Nelson
(Superintendent l ) .30 .21 .26 .23 60.5 55 71. 5 55
( 4 ) Mr. Elliot
(Asst. Superintendent)
.33 .20 .27 .20 62 59 72 57
School Committee:
(1) Mrs. Humphrey
(Chairwoman) . 36 .13 .30 .21 62 63 69 57.5
(2 ) Mrs. Clark .22 .26 .23 .29 65 59 67.5 57
(3) Mr. Cowles .53 .10 .27 .10 65 62 70 63
( 4 ) Mrs. Oscar .47 .11 .35 .07 65 62 69 60
(5) Mr. MacMillan .29 .23 .28 .20 59 55 68 54.5
lowest mid-value point assessed: 59 54.5 67.5 53.5
highest mid-value point assessed: 65 63 72 63
Key: Each row contains (1) the scale factor for each program,
which indicates the sUbject's tradeoffs among programs;
and (2) the " global" mid-value point for each program,
which gives an indication of the sUbject's tradeoffs with-
in a program. A low mid-value point indicates a strong:-
aversion to poor performance.
performance level.
2. In the Science program, a were concave, 2
were linear, 4 were S-shaped about current
performance, and 4 were convex. Thus,
there was much less concern with poor per-
formance in Science than in Language Arts.
3. Interestingly enough, all 18 of the curves
were concave in the Mathematics program.
That is, there was unanimous concern with
poor performance in Mathematics.
4. In the Social Studies program, 11 of the
curves were concave, 3 were linear, 2 were
S-shaped about current performance, and
2 were convex.
It is 0: interest to note that the doctoral
students, like the subjects in Somerstown, basically
fell into two groups: (1) the "educators" who were
essentially concave in all programs (eight of the
students fell into this group); and, (2) the "policy
makers" who were either concave or linear in Language
Arts, concave in Mathematics, and S-shaped or convex
in either/or Science and Social Studies (eight of
the students fell into this group). Only two of the
students did not fall into either of these groups.
This was because these two students were S-shaped
about current performance in Language Arts. It may
be coincidental, but one of the students whose
structure very closely approximated the typical school
committee member's structure in Somerstown, had just
recently run for election to the Boston School Com-
mittee.
Of even more interest to the analyst was the fact
that no student was linear in all the programs. There-
fore, without knowing it, the students demonstrated
that the typical "priority list" approach, i.e., the
constant linear form, would be inappropriate for
analyses of their preferences among programs. When
this evidence is added to the data generated in
Somerstown, it suggests that the analyst should be
extremely careful about using the constant linear form.
With respect to the determination of scale factors
during the second part of the assessment procedure, the
vast majority of the students behaved as did the
Somerstown superintendent and a majority of the
Somerstown School Committee. That is, 15 out of the
18 students chose Language Arts as that program they
would want to "push-up" first. Science was picked by
2 students, and one chose the Social Studies program.
Although none of the students picked Mathematics as
the "base" program, 9 of them chose this program as
the second program they would like to see "pushed-up."
The remaining 9 students all chose Social Studies as
the second program. II
After Roche obtained the full assessments from his
subjects he asked each of four of the School Board mem-
bers plus the assistant superintendent to suggest budget-
ary alternatives that would either be most appealing to
themselves and would have some chance of being accepted
by the group or be of a type that they would welcome
seeing evaluated. Five alternatives besides the no-change
position were thus generated. Again we quote from Roche:
II The "no-change" alternative for the Junior High
School Core Program was as follows: allocate $92,000
to the Language Arts program, $81,000 to the Science
program,. $76,000 to the Mathematics program, and
$75,000 to the Social Studies program. The alternative
allocations (expressed as changed to the "no-change"
case-) are listed below with t·he names of the individ-
uals who suggested them.
1. . The Humphrey alternative. Take $6,000 front
Science, and $6,000 from Social Studies.
Increase Language Arts by $10,000 and in-
crease Mathematics by $2,000.
2." The Oscar alternative. Take $7,000 from
Science, and $2,000 from Social Studies.
Increase Language Arts by $6,000, and in-
crease Mathematics by $3,000.
3. The Elliot alternative. Take $7,000 from
Science, and $1,000 from Social Studies.
Increase Language Arts by $3,000, and
increase Mathematics by $5,000.
4. The Cowles alternative. Take $3,000 from
Language Arts, and $6,000 from Mathematics.
'Increase Science by $4,000, and increase
Social Studies by $5,000.
5. The Clark alternative. Take $2,000 from
Language Arts, $2,000 from Science, and
$1,000 from Mathematics. Apply all $5,000
to Social Studies."
Using the performance functions as generated by the
program coordinators and modified by Superintendent Nelson,
and using the preferences of each of the four administra-
tors and five Board members, it was possible to evaluate
the six suggested proposals. These preferences are showrt
in Table 7.3 and comparative rankings are shown in Table
7.4. We can see readily that the Humphrey alternative
strictly dominates the "no-change" alternative and the
Elliot alternative. Furthermore when power realities are
also considered, the Humphrey alternative essentially
overpowers the Clark and Oscar alternatives as well.
This leaves a contest between the Humphrey and the Cowles
proposals. Again, however, looking at the personalities
and the strengths of preferences one would be tempted to
Single out the Humphrey proposal as the obvious winner.
Roche raises the question whether the above de-
scribed procedure could seriously be implemented for
group decision making. He writes:
TABLE 7.3
Preference of Each Individual for Each BUdget-Alternative
Generated by the Educational Value Function
Alternative Budget Allocations
- IlNo change II Humphrey Oscar Elliot Cowles Clark
l/)' ---
H
ｾｉｄｲＮ Nelson .730 .743 .737 .743 .730 .727
E
£ Mr. Elliot .642 .650 .643 .646 .646 .637
'0
.rrB .785ｾ Mr. Carter .771 .778 .777 .793
0(l:lIMr. MacGregor .765 .771 .771 .771 .784 .775
'0
s::
cO
IIIIMrs . Humphrey .667 .697 .686 .686 .668 .667
ｾ
.EIMrs. Clark .638 .647 .629 .628 .676 .632
cO
ｾ
+:lIMr. Cowles .584 .647 .624 .608 .563 .570
til
.r-i
Ｎ ｾ ｉ ｍ ｲ ｳ Ｎ Os car .608 .647 .650 .631 .588 .597
E
ｾｉｍｲＮ MacMillan .813 .816 .807 .809 .816 .809
Key: In each row, the preference or value number as determined by each subject's preference
structure is presented for each alternative budget allocation. .
JI
C(\
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TABLE 7.4
Rankings of the Alternatives for Each Individual
Developed from the Preference Numbers in Tab Ie 704
Alternative Budget Allocations
"No change 11 Humphrey Oscar Elliot Cowles Clark
ｾ ｉ ｄ ｲ Ｎ Nelson 3 1 2 1 3 4
Q)
.0ｾ ｉ ｍ ｲ Ｎ Elliot 4 1 3 2 2 5
:::
'01J\1r. Carter 5 3 3 4 1 2
ｾ
(1j
4olMr. MacGregor 3 3 3 1 2
r:Q
'0
C Humphrey 4 1 2 2 3 4(1j Mrs.
Cfl8Mrs. Clark 3 2 5 6 1 4
+>
ｾｉｍｲＮ Cowles 4 1 2 3 6 5
+>
Cfl 4o ..... IMrs. Oscar l 1 3 6 5c
......
.aI Nr . ｍ｡｣ｲｾｉｩｬｬ｡ｮ 2 1 4 3 1 3
<
v\
ｾ
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"Under normal conditions, I don't believe it
would be reasonable to expect that policy makers
would allow their own preference structures to be
communicated. Recall that Dr. Nelson said that he
would usually want to keep his own preference struc·
ture private. The administrators and policy makers
in Somerstown are rather unusual. They willingly
cooperated in this effort in order to further re-
search on decision making. Additionally, there are
no major educational problems in Somerstown. That
is, there are no sensitive issues at stake. There-
fore, no individual felt threatened by having his or
her preference structure recorded. In such a case;
decisions would be of the fine tuning variety, rather
than the sensitive policy decisions."
Roche developed a computer program that takes the
performance functions and the preference structure of a
single decision maker--he used Nelson's as an example--
and generates the optimum allocation for a given overall
budget level. It is essentially a resource-allocation
type of dynamic program. Given this program it is easy
to generate the program implications of various overall
budget levels. Roche however, did not choose to form-
alize tradeoffs between money and the four indices of
scholastic performance. If he had chosen to do this;
undoubtedly the set of four scholastic attributes would
have been preferential independent of the monetary
attribute so that all of Roche's work would also be rel-
evant and appropriate in the extended framework. The
computer program also makes it relatively easy to in-
vestigate various sensitivity studies: for example,
dependence on the k-weights or on changes in performance
functions.
We conclude this section with a quote from Roche:
"Although this research demonstrates that these
new techniques could be used to examine budgetary al-
ternatives among programs, the demonstration was within
a very narrow context. There may be problems in at-
tempting to use these formal techniques elsewhere.
The local educational setting served as a 'laboratoryi
for the investigation of these techniques. I believe
that this setting is representative of numerous non-
profit organizations. However, on the basis of this
research we cannot say that these formal techniques
should be used everywhere, but, rather, that they could
be used somewhere."
7.3 FIRE DEPARTMENT OPERATIONS+
In any analysis of fire-department policy a classical
question is: "How much is a minute of response timet
worth?" Clearly the value for any particular fire depends
on the detailed circumstances of that fire. It is not
feasible to treat individually each of the several thou-
sand serious fires which the New York Fire Department ex-
tinguishes each year. Instead, we will focus on what will
be referred to as the "typical New York structural fire."
+The work discussed in this section was done for the New
York City-Rand Institute by Keeney employed as a con-
sultant. He wishes to thank Deputy Chief Francis J. Ronan
of the New York Fire Department and Edward H. Blum of the
New York City-Rand Institute for their important contrib-
utions to this work. The effort represents part of the
joint work by the New York Fire Department and the New
York City-Rand Institute to understand and improve the
bases for deploying fire department resources. This sec-
tion utilizes material originally published in Keeney
[1973Cl.
+The response time for a particular piece of equipment is
defined as the time elapsed between that apparatus's
leaving the fire house and its arrival at the location of
the incident.
A general formulation is developed which specifies the
value of response time to this "typical fire" as a func-
tion of the particular piece of equipment, the response
times of the other fire-fighting vehicles, and whether,
for example, it is the difference between a 2 and a 3
minute response or the difference between a 7 and an 8
minute response.
An approach to this inherently difficult problem
might include (1) engineering research on fire develop-
ment (e.g., how fast do different materials burn);
(2) analyses of data relating losses, damage, etc. to
fire department performance; and (3) analysis and distil-
lation of accumulated fire-fighting experience.
This section, by exploiting the concepts and results
of utility theory discussed in earlier chapters, presents
an initial attempt to quantify the experience of some New
York City Fire Department officials and to investigate
means of using this information for evaluating Fire Depart·
ment policies. This first step involves the preferences
of one deputy chief of the New York City Fire Department.
A five-attribute utility function is assessed for the
response times of the first three engines and first two
ladders arriving at a structural fire.
7.3.1 An Overview
Let us step back and try to get an overall picture
of where this work fits into Fire Department decision
making. It would be desirable to evaluate proposed Fire
Department policies and programs in terms of fundamental
objectives such as " maximize the quality of fire service
provided" and "minimize its cost." Annual cost of the
Fire Department measured in dollars may be an appropriate
attribute for the second objective, but there is no clear
candidate for the first one. Thus, it may be necessary
to divide this objective into lower-level objectives such
as "minimize loss of life," "minimize injuries," "mini-
mize property damage," "minimize psychological anxiety
of the citizens," etc. Reasonable attributes for these
first three objectives, are respectively the annual
number of deaths, the annual number of injuries caused
by fire, and the annual dollar value of lost property,
whereas a subjective index would likely be required for
the attribute dealing with psychological anxieties. ｈ ｯ ｷ ｾ
ever, these first three attributes are not exactly ideal.
It is very difficult to determine what fatalities, in-
juries, and damage is attributable to the service of the
Fire Department and what part is not. For example, an
individual who causes a fire by falling asleep while
smoking in bed might die before the fire is reported.
This and similar fatalities should not reflect on Fire
Department services. Such problems with the available
data, coupled with the fact that little is known quantita-
tively about the fire-fighting process, contribute to the
non-operational use of these measures. In addition, there
<"-02-Ｍ ｾ -;
are problems about the relative seriousness of different
injuries and difficulties of directly placing a value on
the life of an individual which further complicates matters.
Fortunately, the response times of the various ap-
paratus responding to fires provide a natural set of proxy
attributes for evaluating the level of service for such
problems. Figure 7.6 is a simplified model of the fire
service system illustrating that response times are in-
puts to the fire-fighting process, whereas objectives
concerning loss of life and property damage relate to
outputs.
Firemen are accustomed to thinking in terms of re-
sponse times in informally evaluating their preferences
for various alternative courses of action. In doing this,
they use their experience in gauging both the likelihoods
of the various possible response times given a particular
policy and the effects these response times have on the
more fundamental service objectives of the department.
Aside from their interpretative appeal, data exist for
specifying the probabilities of the response times con-
ditional on a particular course of action. For nearly
a decade, the New York Fire Department has kept extensive
records on particular aspects of fire occurrence. These
data have been analyzed and they provide the necessary
input information for developing the simulation model
of Fire Department operations, an early version of which
is described in Carter and Ignall [1970J. This model is
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used to generate probability density functions for the
response times of any prescribed operational policy.
Our objective here is to relate the various possible
response times to the accomplishment of the Fire Depart-
ment's objectives for fundamental services. We want to
distill years of experience of some Fire Department of-
ficials by quantifying their subjective preferences for
response times to fires in a manner useful for improving
the fire-fighter's decision making process. Thus, we are
essentially asking the official to consider the implica-
tions of a particular set of response times (i.e., the
first engine responds in 3 minutes, the second in 5
minutes, ... , the first ladder responds in 2 minutes, •.. ,
etc.) on the outputs, and then to evaluate his preferences
for various sets of response times in light of the re-
spective implications. The result is a subjective model,
based on experience, for the fire-fighting process, its
consequences, and the relative undesirabilities of these
consequences.
Whose preferences should be assessed? By virtue of
their experience, it was decided that the operating chiefs
were best suited to understand the multitude of implica-
tions of various combinations of response times. As a
logical first step, the preferences discussed here are
those of one deputy chief of the New York Fire Department.
ｾ Ｙ Ｔ
7.3.2 Use of the Response Time Utility Function
The original motivation for assessing a utility
function for response times was to develop a model for
the escalation of fires. If the originally delegated
units cannot control a fire, additional units must be re-
quested, and it is said that the fire escalates. Since
such events are very important to the Fire Department's
performance, it would be useful to model the escalation
phenomenon and include it in the simulation model.
Specifically, we would like to know when poor Fire De-
partment service leads to escalation. Since the prob-
ability of escalation is clearly related to the quality
of deployment and since this quality can be measured by
the response-time utility function, it may be desirable
to assess the conditional probability of escalation given
the quality of the response as summarized by its utility.
The utility function for response times can be use-
ful for guiding decisions concerning operational policy
of the department. Examples of such policies concern
variation in initial response patterns and dispatching
of vehicles, alteratipn of the areas of responsibility
between different pieces of equipment, introduction of
"special squads" during high demand hours, and temporary
relocation of equipment into areas where resources are
almost all working at fires. The simulation mentioned
earlier and other models generate, for any given policy,
probability distributions for response times. Thus,
given an appropriate utility function, one can evaluate
policies according to expected utility.
Let R = {T l ,T2 'Sl,S2'S3} denote the attribute com-
plex dealing with service levels and let C denote the
cost attribute. Let
be the overall utility for cost c and response vector r.
Assuming that R is utility independent of C, a most
reasonable assumption, we can define a utility function
u(E) = u(t l ,t2 ,sl,s2,s3) and from the results in Chapter 5,
(7 • 3 )
In our discussion, we shall confine our remarks to the
assessment of u(E).
Before proceeding to the assessment of the response-
time utility function, let us suggest that the general
ideas presented here are relevant to other emergency
services such as law enforcement agencies and emergency
ambulance systems. In such systems, as discussed and
used by Larson [1972J, Savas [1969J, and Stevenson [1972J
to name a few, response times are extensively used to
evaluate alternative proposed policies. In all such
cases, the question arises, "how much is a minute of
response time worth?" The work discussed here is an
initial attempt to address such questions.
7.3.3 Assessing the Response-Time Utility Function
Thus, we are interested in the response-
During 1970, Deputy Chief Francis J. Ronan of the
New York Fire Department and Keeney held a number of dis-
cussions to specify Chief Ronan's preferences for re-
sponse times to fires. These usually lasted between 1
and 2 hours each.
Historically the traditional "standard response" in
New York City has involved three engines and two ladders,
so it was decided to assess a utility function over five
attributes: the response times of the first and second
ladders arriving at a fire and the response times ·of the
first three arriving engines. Let us designate these
attributes respectively by Ti , i = 1,2, and Sj' j = 1,2,3,
and let t i and Sj represent specific amounts of Ti and
S. respectively.]
time utility function u(t l ,t2 ,sl,s2,s3).
In discussing the assessment of Chief Ronan's utility
function, we will follow the guidelines for the assess-
ment procedure suggested in Chapter 5. Thus, the dis-
cussion differentiates into five activities:
(1) familiarization,
(2) verifying the assumptions,
(3) assessing conditional utility functions,
(4) evaluating scaling constants of u,
(5) checking for consistency.
The presentation here will illustrate how the response-
time utility function was assessed and what input in-
formation was necessary.
Familiarization. Before beginning on this problem,
Chief Ronan and Keeney had worked together on a very
simple decision-analytic model of a fire-response ｰ ｲ ｯ ｢ ｾ
lem. Also, at an earlier time, Keeney had roughly
assessed Chief Ronan's utility function for the response
time of the first engine arriving at a fire. The main
purpose of this preliminary exercise was to check whether
it was reasonable simply to minimize the expected
response time of the first engine arriving at a fire.
In most analytical studies dealing with emergency ser-
vices, this linearity assumption (i.e., minimize expected
response time) is implicitly used. As a result of this
initial exposure, the Chief was introduced to the basic
concepts of utility theory. After the first two assess-
ment sessions, which turned out to be learning experiences
for both analyst and respondent, the discussions became
more productive.
Verifying the Assumptions. To exploit the theory
of Chapters 5 and 6, it was necessary to check whether
requisite utility independence assumptions were appro-
priate for this problem.
Specifically, it was verified that it was
(3 )
reasonable* to assume:
(1) engine response times {Sl,S2,S3} and the
ladder response times {Tl ,T2 } were utility
independent of each other,
(2) first ladder response Tl and second ladder
response T2 were utility independent of each
other, and
th ,th, S t'l't'e J englne response j was u 1 1 Y In-
dependent of the other engine responseS,
for j = 1,2, and 3.
Because of Theorem 5.3 and (1), the assessment of u was
broken into two parts: assessments of an engine utility
function and a ladder utility function. Analogously,
these two utility functions could be broken down into
component parts because of (2) and (3).
Let us illustrate the verification procedure with
an example. To check if Tl was utility independent of
T2 , Chief Ronan was asked "Given that the response time
of the second arriving ladder is fixed at six minutes;
what responSe time t l for the first arriving ladder
would be indifferent to having a 50-50 chance that the
first ladder responds in either one or five minutes?"
*The following independence assumptions were deemed to
be approximately valid after considerable probing. Some
of the dependencies were so slight--contrary to what was
first expected--that independence was taken as an
innocuous idealization.
"'--0<:"'
=-> ;./:/
Notice that if t 2 = 6, then t l < 6 and this restricts the
domain conveniently. A response that t l = 3.4 minutes
was eventually chosen using a "convergence" technique
discussed in Section 4.9.
Next we asked the same question only the second
ladder response time was fixed at eight rather than six
minutes. Again, the indifference response was 3.4 min-
utes, leading us to believe that the relative preferences
for changes in the response time of the first ladder did
not depend on the fixed response time of the second
ladder. By additional questioning similar to the above,
this speculation was confirmed. Thus, it seemed ap-
propriate to assume that Tl was utility independent of
Assessing Conditional Utility Functions. Given the
assumptions above, utility functions were needed for each
of the five response time attributes. Actually these
are conditional utility functions since they concern
preferences over a single response time given that the
other response times are held fixed. However, because
of the utility independence conditions, the particular
amounts of these other responses are not important, since
the utility function should be the same in any case.
TTo illustrate the approach, let us assess Ul tt), the
conditional utility function for the first arriving
ladder.
(ceo
Through the questioning, we found a 2.2 minute re-
sponse of the first arriving ladder was indifferent to
a 50-50 chance at either a one or three minute response.
Similarly, 4.2 minutes was indifferent to a 50-50 chance
at three or five minutes, and 6.2 minutes was indiffer-
ent to a 50-50 chance at 5 or 7 minutes. In general, a
50-50 chance at either a t or a (t + 2) minute response
was indifferent to a (t + 1.2) minute response for
certain. As indicated in Chapter 4, such preferences
imply the utility function must be of the form
(7 • 4 )
where d and b, c > a are constants. Since utility func-
tions are unique up to positive linear transformations,
it was decided to scale ｵ ｾ from minus one to zero. In
addition, the response times ranged from zero to twenty
minutes, which implied
T
u l (0) = a
and
T
u l (20) = -1
(7 • 5)
(7. 6 )
Next, a 4.5 minute response time for the first ladder
was found to be indifferent to a 50-50 lottery yielding
either one or seven minutes. THence u l must be such that
T T1/2 u l (1) + 1/2 u l (7) (7.7)
Substituting (7.4) into (7.5) through (7.7) yields three
equations with three unknowns which can easily be solved
to give
G,c L
Similar procedures were used to obtain the other four
conditional utility functions.
Evaluating Scaling Constants of u. Given the in-
dividual utility functions for the five response times,
the next step is to put them together in the appropriate
manner to obtain the overall utility function for re-
sponse times. This requires assessing the scaling ｣ ｯ ｮ ｾ
stants--that is, the k's--of Theorems 5.3 and 6.3. To
illustrate the method, let us use the ladder-response
utility function
(7. 9 )
Chief Ronan was asked for the response time t 2 of
the second ladder such that he would be indifferent be-
tween the two laddets arriving in three and eight minutes
respectively, denoted by (3,8), and the response (4,t2 ).
His answer was t 2 = 5.7 indicating a willingness to give
up one minute of first ladder response in exchange for
decreasing second ladder response by 2.3 minutes, given
he started from (3,8). This implied
\ ,.
(7.10)
(0(\ .'
Similarly, we found (2,6) indifferent to (3,4.2) so
(7.11 )
Using (7.9) and the individual utility functions to
evaluate both sides of (7.10) and (7.11) gives us two
equations with two unknowns, the parameters k l and k 2 ,
which when solved yields
(7.12)
Other parameters of the overall utility function
were evaluated in similar ways as covered in Section 6.6.
The general idea is to ask questions to obtain equations
containing the unknown parameters, and then to solve the
set of equations for the parameter values.
Checking for Consistency, Checking the utility
function for consistency and reasonableness is obviously
very important--both because the assessment is inherent-
ly a subjective process and because the synthesis re-
qUired to obtain the overall utility function can result
in the introduction of "errors." It was important to
make sure the implications of the utility function agreed
with the chief's preferences.
The most important checks concern the conditional
utility functions and tradeoffs between the various
response times. This involved discussing the implica-
tions of the utility function and using the utility
function for providing answers to questions like those
asked in the assessment process. In all cases where
there was a major discrepancy between the implications
of the utility function and the chief's preferences,
part of the assessment procedure was repeated and his
utility function adjusted accordingly. Many parts of
the utility function were adjusted in light of consis-
tency checks. The final utility function appears to
represent Chief Ronan's responses quite closely.
7.3.4 The Response-Time Utility Function
In this section, we present the final form of the
"first-cut" utility function and discuss its implica-
tions. From our assessments, we found
(004
(7.13)
where
(7.14)
with
(7.15)
and
(7.16)
and where
(7.17)
with
(7.18)
(7.19)
and
(7.20)
For illustrative purposes, the utility function in
(7.15) is shown in Figure 7.7 and the indifference map
implied (7.14) is given in Figure 7.8.
It was decided to evaluate preferences in the unit
hypercube from (0,0,0,0,0) to (20,20,20,20,20). Thus,
for each of the equations above, the variables may only
range from zero to twenty minutes. Furthermore; by
Properties of the Utility Function. The utility
function u in (7.13) has several properties which are
intuitively appealing and which appear to represent Chief
Ronan's preferences. Some of these pertain to u as a
whole, some to the utility function for ladders uL or
the utility function for engines u E ' and some to the
\
utility functions of the individual units. Taking the
latter first, we have
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This means(1) u is decreasing in each t. and s ..
ｾ J
the sooner a particular unit arrives, the
better, given the response times of other
units are fixed.
(2) Each minute of delay of the first arriving
engine is more important* than a corresponding
minute for the second arriving engine, which
in turn is more important than the correspond-
ing delay of the third arriving engine.
Similarly, each minute of delay of the first
ladder is more important than a corresponding
delay of the second ladder. These properties
are indicated by the relative values of the
coefficients of the ｵ ｾ terms in (7.14) and the
ｾ
ｵ ｾ terms in (7.17).
*To clarify the meaning of more important, recall the
utility function (7.3) for cost and response times
u' (c,f) = u' (c,t l ,t2 ,sl,s2,s3) and assume the cost at-
tribute C and the set of response attributes
R ={T l ,T2 'Sl'S2,S3} are utility independent of each
other. Now select any base level cost Co and consider
ｾ
changes t' to r" and g to f, each of which will be as-
surned to be for the better. We will say the change f'
ｾ ｾ Ｎ
to ｾ Ｂ is more important than the change r to ｾ ｾ ｦ c l > c 2 '
where c 1 and c 2 are defined by U(CO,£I) = u(c l ,£") and
ｾ
u(co,g) = u(c2 ,[). That is, one must be willing to pay
more in cost to make the more important change.
(3) The conditional utility function for each at-
tribute is risk averse regardless of the values
of the other attributes. This means, for in-
stance, that for Tl , a sure (ti + ti)/2 minute
response is preferred to a 50-50 lottery yield-
ing either ti or tie Said another way, the
average response time is preferred to the
lottery. When this is the case, for each unit,
each additional minute of delayed response is
more important than the former minute.
Concerning the utility function for ladders, we have:
(4) The relative importance of the response time
f th .th 1 dd ' th t'o e ｾＮ a er ｾ ｮ ｣ ｲ ･ ｡ ｳ ･ ｳ as e response ｾ ｭ ･
of the other ladder increases. Said loosely,
this means the slower the first ladder is in ar-
riving, the more important it is that the
second ladder arrive soon afterwards. This
property is accounted for by the fact that the
product term in (7.14) has a negative coefficient.
Similarly, for engines, there is an analogous property:
(5) The relative importance of the response time
f th ,th ,. tho e J ･ｮｧｾｮ･ ｾｮ｣ｲ･｡ｳ･ｳ as e response
timeSof the other engines increase. This prop-
erty is accounted for by the negative coef-
ficients of the product terms in (7.17).
The last two properties concern the entire utility func-
tion. They are
(6) A one minute delay in the arrival of the i th
, f
ladder is more important than the corresponding
minute delay on the i th engine. Thus, for
example, using two minutes responses for both
the first engine and the first ladder as a
base, we would prefer to have the" first ladder
respond in two minutes and the first engine in
three than to have the first engine respond in
two minutes and the first ladder in three,
This property is indicated by the fact that
the coefficient of uL in (7.13) is larger than
the coefficient of uE •
(7) The relative importance of the response times
of ladders increases as the response times of
engines increase. This meanS the ｩ ｭ ｰ ｯ ｲ ｴ ｡ ｲ ｴ ｣ ｾ
of the first arriving engine is less when a
ladder has already arrived than it is when no
ladders have arrived. The negative coefficient
of the product term in (7.13) indicates this
property holds.
These properties. each of which is intuitively
reasonable, go a long way toward specifying the utility
function. That is, the manner in which the shape of the
utility function (7.13) can be altered without violating
one or more of the above conditions is severely restricted.
This fact lends some additional confidence to our asseBS-
ments.
Although the complexity of assessing a multiattrib-
ute utility function increases rapidly as the number of
measures of effectiveness increase, the opportunity for
"consistency checks" involving properties such as those
above also greatly increases. In order to meaningfully
represent one's preferences in these complex situations,
it is important to exploit such intuitively appealing
attitudes toward preference to the fullest extent possible.
Ｗ Ｎ Ｓ Ｎ ｾ Conclusions
ｾ ｨ ･ main result of this work is a "first cut"
utility function over five response-time attributes,
namely, those associated with the first two ladders and
the first three engines arriving at a fire. This gives
us some means for determining the relative values of a
minute of response time for the various pieces of equip-
ment. By looking at the coefficients of the single u i
terms of (7.13), one can get a very rough idea of the
relative values of a minute of response time for the
different pieces of apparatus. Doing this, if we set
the relative value for a minute of response time of the
first ladder at 10, the corresponding value for first
engine is 7, the second ladder is 3, the second engine
is 2, and the third engine is 1.
However, as we have mentioned, the worth of a min-
ute of response time on a specific vehicle depends on
the response times of the other pieces of equipment and
the time since the alarm was reported. So for instance,
using a (2,4;2,4,6) response* as a base, the partial
derivatives of u with respect to the five response times
are in a ratio of 10:4:5:3:2 implying that if the re-
lative value of a minute of response time of the first
ladder is set at 10, the corresponding value of the
second ladder is 4, the first engine is 5, the second
engine is 3, and the third engine is 2. The point is
that the relative values depend on the base response.
The assessment procedure waS too time consuming and
too complex. Since it was impractical to develop a
computer program to help assess one utility function,
calculations were done by hand. Thus, there was'a lack
of immediate feedback to Chief Ronan concerning the
implications of his preferences. Often this caused
small differences in the chief's responses during dif-
ferent sessions due to the slight variation of his pref-
erences from time to time. But, of course, the in-
volvement over a considerable time span has its merits
too. We would like the assessed utility structure to
be somewhat stable over time. In the future, an inter-
active computer program, such as the one discussed in
*The first ladder responds in 2 minutes, the second
ladder in 4 minutes, the first, second, and third engines
in 2, 4, and 6 minutes, respectively.
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Appendix 6c, would likely help maintain interest as well
as assess the utility function much more quickly with
many more consistency checks.
By asking Chief Ronan about his preferences for
responses to the ｾ ｴ ｹ ｰ ｩ ｣ ｡ ｬ structural fire," we essential-
ly asked him to synthesize in his mind all the possible
implications of each response aggregated over the pos-
sible types of structural fires. This understandably
caused some discrepancies in the answers to our questions,
because of the tendency to focus on particular types of
incidents at different times. Since our major interest
in this particular work centers on the first broad cut,
rather than details relevant to particular ｦ ｩ ｲ ･ ｳ ｾ the
aggregation requirement may be reasonable.
Our ultimate objective is to obtain a utility func-
tion appropriate for the use of the New York Fire Depart-
ment. This section reports a first step: assessing a
utility function of one Deputy Chief of that department.
However, the Chief's preferences are his and not neces-
sarily those of the Fire Department, and they should not
be interpreted as such. Furthermore, although a serious
attempt was made not to lead the Chief to any specific
answers, his responses to questions could have in part
been shaped by the questioning process, and the results
should be interpreted with this possibility in mind.
This assessment exercise was done about five years
before the present monograph was sent to the press and
ｾ I ,
CD 12.
if the exercise were to be repeated again, we probably
would now proceed somewhat differently. We would ｡ ｴ ｾ
tempt to establish some broad, basic, underlying prin-
ciples, which seemed to govern Chief Ronan's responses
and then to deduce more of the structure ?f his utility
function from these basic principles. Essentially we
would try to model, to some extent, his motivations based
on interviews which would probe more deeply on qualita-
tive matters. This, of course, is easier said than done,
and we would like someday to be able to report a good
example of this technique. This is the trouble in
writing about a subject in its infancy.
7.4. STRUCTURING CORPORATE PREFERENCES FOR MULTIPLE OBJECTIVES·
ｾ ｶ ･ ｲ ｹ corporation periodically asks itself: II How
Should we run 6ur business?" More specifically, this
raises such questions as: Given the complex social,
ｾ ｣ ｯ ｮ ｯ ｭ ｩ ｣ Ｌ technological, and political characteristics
of our society, which management policies should we
adopt now? Are theSe policies consistent with our personal
objectives, with the desires of our shareholders, and with our
social value structure? If we choose policy A, will it
·We would like to thank the Board of Directors of Wood-
ward-Clyde Consultants for its permission to discuss
this work in our book. The assistance of Dr. Keshavan
Nair of Woodward-Clyde in writing this section is great-
ly appreciated. Mat€-. ... ia! .," ,h,"} seC:hoy\ is ｡ ､ ｡ ｰ Ｑ ｾ Ｎ ｣ Ｑ Ｎ fyoW\ ｜ ＼ ｾ ･ Ｎ Ｂ Ｇ ｑ Ｎ Ｇ Ｔ [IQ7'5).
be possible to account for the contingencies which may
arise in the near future and adapt accordingly? How
can we best maintain the leadership position in our
field and simultaneously, keep the vitality of our ｯ ｲ ｾ
ganization? All of these are crucial questions which
deny the simple dollars and cents answers which are
mythically supposed to be appropriate for almost all
"business" decisions.
Since early 1972, Woodward-Clyde Consultants, a
holding firm for several professional-service consulting
firms has used some innovative approaches based on ideas
discussed in this book to help them examine questions
such as those raised above.* Although this effort is
still in progress, it is sufficiently interesting and
informative to include here. Two aspects of this effort
seem to be unique. First, multiattribute utility func-
tions over attributes measuring fundamental objectives
*In ｾ ｯ ｶ ･ ｭ ｢ ･ ｲ Ｌ 1974, Woodward-Clyde made some very broad
organizational changes. It is no longer a holder firm
but rather one consulting firm with five regional divi-
sions. The work described in this section was done from
1912 through October, 1974, so the organizational struc-
ture which prevailed during that period is described.
The subsequent organizational changes are briefly ｳ ｵ ｭ ｾ
marized at the end of the section.
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of the corporation have been assessed for many exec-
utives at Woodward-Clyde. Second, this work was done
not to evaluate a specific decision, but rather:
• to aid communication among the decision makers,
• to grapple with fundamental issues of the firm,
• to determine and examine differences of opinion
in a quantitative fashion, and
• to aid in generating creative alternatives in
solving corporate problems.
The affiliate consulting firms of Woodward-Clyde
Consultants operate mainly in the geotechnical engineer-
ing and environmental areas. Problems they examine in-
clude design of earth dams, siting and design of nuclear
power plants, geotechnical and environmental studies as-
sociated with pipeline systems (e.g., the Trans-Alaska
pipeline), and design of structures for earthquake-prone
regions. None of the affiliates build any products
(e.g. roads, dams, power plants); they are exclusively
professional-service consulting firms. Collectively,
their fees received in 1973 were approximately 25 million
dollars, and historically, this has increased at approx-
imately twenty percent annually. All the shareholders
of Woodward-Clyde must be senior professionals on the
staff of one of the affiliates.
In 1972, Richard J. Woodward, the Chairman of the
Board of Woodward-Clyde Consultants, appointed a long-
range planning committee whose assignment included lithe
ｾ Ｑ Ｔ
development of a long-range plan for Woodward-Clyde
Consultants that includes quantified objectives and is
responsive to the Statement of Purpose and Standing
Policies." After this original committee reported, the
1973 and 1974 Long Range Planning Committees have suc-
cessively updated the objectives of Woodward-Clyde and
examined policy alternatives in terms of these objec-
tives. Douglas C. Moorhouse was the chairman of each of
these three committees. Dr. Keshavan Nair, a Vice
President of Woodward-Lundgren and Associates, one of
the affiliates of Woodward-Clyde was also a member of
these committees.
Much of the work discussed here, specifically Sec-
tions 7.4.2 through 7.4.5, was done jointly by Dr. Nair
and Ralph L. Keeney, working as a consultant to Wood-
ward-Clyde. Section 7.4.1 discusses the original Long-
Range Planning ·Committee's work, which has served as an
excellent basis on which to build. The final Section
7.4.6 surveys some of the specific uses being made of
Woodward-Clyde's utility function. We just remark here
that the purpose in assessing a utility function was not
to help management choose amongst action alternatives in
a formal manner--e.g., probabilistic analysis was not
done in accompaniment of utility analysis--but rather to
help management articulate some of its basic assumptions
and to facilitate communications amongst the executive
group. This, to a large extent, was, and is being,
accomplished via the formal assessment procedures de-
scribed below.
7.4.1 The 1972 Objectives and Measures of Effectiveness
The basic approach taken by the 1972 Long Range
Planning Committee to fulfill its mission was (1) to
establish the primary objective of the firm, (2) to
divide this into subobjectives, and (3) to conduct a
defJ.ciel\"Y analysj s indicating discrepancies between
present state and desired state on each objective. By
weighting the various objectives, the deficiencies were
ranked in order of importance and policies recommended
for eliminating these deficiencies.
The overall objective of Woodward-Clyde was pro-
vided by a sentence in their Statement of Purpose: liThe
combined efforts of Woodward-Clyde Consultants and its
affiliates are directed toward the creation and mainte-
nance of an environment in which their employees can
realize their personal, professional, and financial
goals." It was felt that growth was essential in the
achievement of this objective.
The hierarchy of objectives developed by the 1972
Long Range Planning Committee is presented in Figure 7.9.
This hierarchy has been adaptively revised since that
time. The numbers in parentheses in the box with each
objective indicates the original division of weight among
subobjectives. More will be said about this later. In
(l.0)
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Table 7.5, the weights of each of the attributes associ-
ated with the lowest-level objectives and the range of
each attribute are identified.
It was implicitly assumed that an additive value
function
12
v(x l ,x2 ,···,x12 ) = Li=l k.v.(x.)111
where the x. 's represent levels of the attributes, each
1
v. is a value function over the i th attribute, v and the
1
v. 's are scaled zero to one, and the weights, that is
1
the k. 's sum to one, was appropriate. For each attribute,
1
component value functions were constructed and present
states and desired states, defined as the practical
maximum felt to be achievable, were identified. Defi-
ciency on each of these lowest-level objectives was then
calculated by multiplying the weight of the objective
times the difference in the value of its present and
desired states. This indicated "areas" where approvement
was needed.
Four shortcomings of the 1972 "quantification of
objectives" might be categorized as follows:
(1) the weights were assigned to each objective
without explicitly considering the range of
the associated attributes,
(2) the component value functions were estimated
by a direct value estimation technique in-
dependent of each other,
TABLE 7.S
1972 ATTRIBUTES FOR WOODWARD-CLYDE CONSULTANTS
ATTRIBUTE MEASUREMENT UNIT RANGE
ATTRIBUTE
WEIGHT
ALility to attract
shareholders invest-
ment
Number of shares requested
fees
% 0-5 .08
Retained earnings % of fees 0-8 .12
Contribution to
retirement plan
% of fees 0-10 .045
Return on invest-
ment for retire-
ment plan
% of investment 0-20 .105
Base compensation % annual increase 0-20 .09
Incentive
compensation
U.S. coverage
Non-U.S. coverage
% of fees
I Geographic centersl
adequately covered
Centers where rele-
vant work can be
,generated
I Geographic centers ,
adequately covered
Centers where rele-
vant work can be
generated
%
%
,0-8
25-100
0-50
.06
.075
.025
Scope of services
offered
Number of
disdiplines having
threshold capability
Number of
synergistic disciplines
required by society
% 25'""100 .15
.12525-100%Required man-years
experience
Ｈ ｅ ｘ ｩ ｳ ｴ ｾ ｮ ｧ man-years)exper1.enceRelevant experi-ence
Formal training Number of degrees per
professional staff
member
1-3 .075
Professional
development % of fees 0-2 .05
(3) the overall objective function, being a value
function, was not appropriate for examining
policies with uncertain consequences,
(4) the additive value structure did not lend
itself to investigating overlap among the
objectives.
Even with these weaknesses, the Long Range Planning Com-
mittee and the Board of Directors felt this quantifica-
tion of objectives was a big improvement over informally
articulated objectives. This set of objectives and
measures has proven to be an excellent basis for modifi-
cation and improvement, the substance of which we begin
to describe in the next subsection.
Before proceeding, let us briefly remark on aspects
of the attributes and their measurement units which may
not be clear from Table 7.S. For the first attribute,
using the number of shares requested divided by fees im-
plicitly assumes the cost of a share is known in order
to make the measure readily interpretable. The measure
of the scope of services offered is an index meant to
indicate breadth in handling the interdisciplinary pro-
jects increasingly requested by society. With relevant
experience, the idea is to have the staff available to
do quality work on those projects which the Woodward-
Clyde affiliates would like to do. For formal training,
the number of degrees per professional staff member is
defined as follows: a doctorate is three, a masters
degree two, and a bachelors one. Professional develop-
ment includes attending management or technical seminars,
holding in-house study sessions, etc.
7.4.2 Clarifying the Measures of Effectiveness
One of the first issues Drs. Nair and Keeney jointly
considered was whether the measures of effectiveness met
the comprehensiveness and measurability criteria discussed
in Chapter 2. For each objective, the question "Can a
better attribute be found?" was asked. In several cases,
the answer was I, yes." Let us discuss some examples.
(a) Ability to Attract Shareholders Investment.
The measurement unit for this attribute was changed to
the dollar value of shares requested divided by the fees.
Thus in interpreting trends, and simply in evaluating
various levels of the attributes, one does not need to
keep the value of the shares implicitly in mind.
(b) Scope of Non-U.S. Coverage. The 1974 Long Range
Planning Committee changed this measure to percentage of
the United States business in terms of fees received.
It was the Committee's viewpoint that the major reason
for expanding overseas was to reduce the consequences of
a possible recession in the United States and to take
advantage of current foreign opportunities. Since Wood-
ward-Clyde will remain primarily a U.S. operation in the
foreseeable future, the new measure both is more easily
quantifiable than the previous one and also more directly
(02.0
indicates vulnerability to domestic recessions.
(c) Relevant Experience and Professional Development.
As demand for Woodward-Clyde services increases, the need
to increase their relevant experience grows. The 1972
measure of relevant experience indicated the level at any
given time, as opposed to focusing on the increase of
relevant experience. Increased relevant experience is
funded out of the Professional Development budget and
usually consists of opportunities for employees to work
on projects under experienced personnel at company ex-
pense and to take specialized courses in areas of their
practice. Because it is the increase in relevant ex-
perience which is currently important at Woodwar6-Clyde,
the measure was cha.nged to percent of fees committed to
the releva.nt experience program.
This change of the relevant experience measure re-
quired a redefinition of the components of the profession-
al development measure. In 1972, the latter measure in-
cluded fees used for obtaining relevant experience.
However, with the new relevant experience measure, the
professional development measure must explicitly exclude
the fees used for acquiring relevant experience.
(d) Formal Training. The measure remained the same
for formal training but the desirability of particular
levels has greatly changed. The value function in this
case is interesting in that it is not monotonic. It is
low at a level of 1, since all professionals then only
Co 2.1
Table 7.6 An Aid for Evaluating Preferences for the
Attribute Formal Training as Measured by
the Degrees per Professional Staff Member.
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have a bachelors degree, and increases to a peak and then
falls rapidly as the level of degrees increases. With a
level of 3, the firm would consist entirely of profes-
sionals with doctorates. In 1972, the desired state was
identified as 2.25, the peak of the value function. On
further examination, this level seemed high. If just 25
percent of the professionals of Woodward-Clyde had only
a bachelors, a minimum of 50 percent would have to have
a doctorate to get the average level to the "desired
state" 2.25.
As an aid to thinking about the implications of dif-
ferent levels of "degrees per professional," Table 7.6
was constructed. For evaluating preferences over average
degree levels, an individual is meant to select the best
distribution of degrees for each average level, and then
compare these "best" distributions.
7.4.3 Checking for Independence Conditions
To structure a utility function over the twelve
attributes of Table 7.5, modified as indicated in the
previous subsection, the process began by examining
whether pairs of attributes were preferentially ｩ ｮ ､ ･ ｰ ･ ｮ ｾ Ｎ
dent of their complements.* In most cases it seemed
*Initial assessments were done using Dr. Nair's prefer-
ences. Subsequently, Dr. Nair has assessed the preferences
of other members of the Long Range Planning Committee.
appropriate to assume preferential independence, but let
us indicate three situations where this was not so.
In examining preferential independence assumptions
involving the attribute "ability to attract shareholder
investment.," the Long Range Planning Committee came to
the agreement that it was redundant based on present
policy. This attribute was meant to indicate the ability
and desirability for principals to invest in the corpora-
tion. The Committee felt the desirability aspect was
adequately captured by retained earnings. On the other
hand, the ability to invest was measured by both in-
centive compensation and base compensation. For these
reasons, the "ability to attract shareholder investment"
was dropped from the list of attributes.
In another case it at first seemed advantageous to
subdivide the objective concerning base compensation into
three groups: senior principals, junior principals and
associates, and associate candidates. In effect, the
current attribute "base compensation" would have been
replaced by three attributes, namely base compensation
for senior principals, base compensation for junior
principals and associates, and base compensation for
associate Gandidates. It was found that one of these
attributes taken together with a different attribute,
say retained earnings, was not preferentially independent
of its complement. The reason was that the rate at which
one would substitute retained earnings for base compensation
lb1.4
for associate candidates depended on the level of base
compensation increases to the principals and associates.
If these latter groups received large increases in base
compensation, it seemed reasonable to give up more re-
tained earnings to bring increases in base compensation
for associate ｣ ｾ ｮ ､ ｩ ､ ｡ ｴ ･ ｳ up to some comparable level,
than one would give up to make the same increase for
associate candidates if in fact the other groups received
low increases in base compensation. The concept of
equity among the three groups made it inappropriate to
assume preferential independence in this case.
There were two other possibilities investigated.
Each pair of the three base compensation attributes was
found to be conditionally preferentially independent of
the third given all other attributes are fixed at an
arbitrary level. This would have allowed us to construct
an additive component value function over the three at-
tributes. The alternative was to use the original ag-
gregated base compensation attribute. It was felt that
members of the Long Range Planning Committee could keep
the equity considerations in mind when using the aggre-
gated attribute. Therefore, since it is simpler to use
one attribute than the three component attributes, the
former was chosen.
Base compensation and incentive compensation do have
some overlap in purpose and, because of this, the latter
paired with, for instance, retained earnings is not
exactly preferentially independent of its complement.
However, the overlap is not great since the function of
the former is to provide a solid salary for competent
work within the "normal" call of duty, whereas the func-
tion of the later is to provide motivation and reward
for efforts 'beyond' the call of duty. Hence after con-
siderable checking, it was decided that it was a reason-
able approximation to assume the preferential independence
condition. This "appropriateness" decision was taken in
conjunction with the decision to eliminate the attribute
"ability to attract shareholder investment" from the list
in Table 7.5.
It was decided that the two attributes concerning
retirement plan should be aggregated into one called
l'growth in retirement plan," since in fact both seemed
to meet the same fundamental objective. Woodward-Clyde
desires that any participant in their retirement plan
receive a combined amount from the plan and social secu-
rity equal to 50 percent of his or her last five years
average salary. The new measure for "growth of retire-
ment plan" is the annual increase of assets in the re-
tirement plan. Its range is zero to thirty percent, and
it should be clear that this excludes the social security
benefits. In effect, this change is simply moving up
the objectives hierarchy of Figure 7.9 for a quantitative
assessment of retirement plan consequences.
7.4.4 The 1974 Objectives and Measures of Effectiveness
The objectives and attributes updated from the orig-
inal 1972 list are given in Table 7.7. After considerable
examination, Dr. Nair felt that it was appropriate to as-
sume that for the ranges given in the table, each pair
of attributes was preferentially independent of its
complement. The reasonableness of this assumption has
been preliminary accepted by each of the other members on
the 1974 Long Range Planning Committee.
7.4.5 Assessing the Utility Function
The preferential independence conditions imply that
an additive value function exists over the ten attributes
in Table 7.7. From Theorems 6.1 and 6.2, by verifying
that just one attribute is utility independent of its
complement, either a multiplicative or additive utility
function is appropriate to quantify preferences. It was
verified that retained earnings was in fact utility in-
dependent of its complement, and utility independence was
also verified for other attributes to serve as consistency
checks. For future reference, it turned out, the final
utility function over the attributes in Table 7.7 was
multiplicative, and thus expressible in the form
10
1 + kU(25) = IT
i=l
[ 1 + kk.u. (x. )J-111 (7.21)
where u and the ui's are scaled zero to one, 0 < k i < 1,
TABLE 7.7
1974 ATTRIBUTES FOR WOODWARD-CLYDE CONSULTANTS
Xl
X2
X3
Xl+
ATTRIBUTE
Retained earnings
Growth in Retirement Plan
Base Compensation
Incentive Compensation
MEASUREMENT UNIT
% of fees
% of existing assets
% annual increase
% of fees
RANGE
0-8
0-30
0-30
0-8
IGeographic centers,
adequately covered
Xs Scope--Geographic (U.S.)
Centers where
\
vant work can
generated
rele-
be
25-100%
X6
X7
Xe
Xg
X lO
Scope--Geographic (Outside U.S.)
Scope--Services Offered
Relevant Experience
(annual increment)
Formal Training
Professional Development
(excluding relevant experience)
% of U. S. business
No. of disciplines
having threshold
capability
No. of synergistic
disciplines re-
quired by society
% of fees
No. of degrees per profes-
sional staff member
% of fees
0-50
25-100%
0-1
1.5-2.5
0-1 ｾ
r"l
0(\
and k is a non-zero scaling constant greater than minus
one which can be evaluated from the k. 'so
1
The task remaining was to assess the component
utility functions, assess their scaling factors, and
then evaluate the k-value for the multiplicative form.
Assessing the Component Utility Functions. All the ten
utility functions were assessed on a zero to one scale
using the techniques discussed in Chapter 4. Let us
briefly consider those for retained earnings and formal
training, attributes Xl and Xg in Table 7.7.
The range of retained earnings is zero to eight
percent, so since preferences are monotonically increas-
ing, we set
u l (8) = 1
where u l is the utility function for retained earnings.
Next, by checking certainty equivalents for a number of
lotteries, it was verified that Dr. Nair was risk averse
in terms of retained earnings. It was found that 2-<0,8>.
0.75-<0,2>, 4-<2,8>, 5.5-<4,8>, and for a check, that 4
for certain was indifferent to a 0.75 chance at 8 and a
0.25 chance at zero. The utility function consistent
with these assessments is shown in Figure 7.10.
The assessment of the utility function for formal
training led to some surprises. What was not a surprise
b290..
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was that preferences for levels of this attribute are
not monotonic; they increase up to a maximum point and
then decrease. Originally, it was the thought to assess
preferences from 1 to 3 degrees per professional staff
member. However, once we began this task, it became
clear that with levels between 1 and 1.3 and 2.7 and 3,
Woodward-Clyde could not exist in a form similar to the
present. Hence our viable range was changed from 1.5
to 2.5, which were practical limits for the foreseeable
future.
Next, by using the Table 7.b, it became clear that
the previously felt optimum level of 2.25 was too high
and 2.1 was chosen as an alternative after some consider-
ation. It was also felt that the undesirability of 1.5
or 2.5 degrees per professional was about equally as
bad so u g , the utility function for formal training was
scaled by
u g (2.1) = 1
Again with the aid of Table 7.6, it was concluded that
1.7-<1.5,2.1>, 1.8-<1.7,2.1>, and 2.3"'1.8. The resulting
utility function is shown in Figure 7.10.
Assessing the Relative Scaling Factors. The ranking of
the ten attribute scaling constants of the multiplicative
utility function--that is, the k. 's in (7.21)--is given
1
in Table 7.8. To specify their relative magnitude,
Dr. Nair considered the relative desirability of con-
sequences with one attribute at its most preferred level
and all other attributes at their worst levels. He
decided that the one he would most like to have at its
best level was retained earnings. Thus the scaling fac-
tor associated with retained earnings is the largest.
The attribute he would next prefer to have alone at its
most desirable level was formal training so its scaling
factor is second largest. Repeating this procedure led
to the ranking of the scaling factors indicated in Table
7.8.
To quantitatively establish the relative values of
the scaling factors, tradeoffs between pairs of attri-
butes were explicitly assessed. Dr. Nair was asked, for
nine pairs of attributes, questions such as:
"Assume all attributes other than retained earnings
and retirement plan are fixed at convenient levels.
Now, how high would retained earnings have to be,
given the retirement plan is at its lowest level,
in order for you to be indifferent between this
option and an alternative option with the retire-
ment plan, at its most desirable level of 30 and
retained earnings fixed at its lowest level?"
The responses are shown in Table 7.8 in the column
labeled "indifference equivalent." Thus if we designate
the scaling factor of Xl as k l , the scaling factor for
Table 7.8 Evaluating the Scaling Factors in Woodward-Clyde's Utility Function
Attribute
Ranking of
Scaling Factor ｒ ｡ ｾ Indifference Equivalent
Relative
Scaling
Factor
Scaling
Factor
Xl :: retained earnings 1 O-S - k l .67
X2 :: retirement plan 7 0- 30 30 of X2 ｾ 3 of Xl k = .66k l .442
X3 :: base compensation S 0-30 30 of X3 ｾ 4 of Xl k 3 = .77k l .S17
X4 :: incentive compensation 9 O-S S of X4 ｾ 2.S of Xl k 4 = .SSk l . 391
Xs :: U.S. coverage 6 2S-100 100 of Xs ｾ 3.S of Xl k = .72k1 .4S2S
X6 :: non-U.S. coverage 10 O-SO 50 of X6 ｾ SO of Xs ｫｾ = .SkS .241b
X7 :: scope of services 3 25-100 SS of Xl ｾ 100 of Xs k = .7Sk 7 .634S
Xs :: relevant experience 4 0-1 1 of Xs ｾ SO of Xs k S =.Sk S .241
X9 :: formal training 2 1.S-2.S 2.1 of Xg ｾ 7 of Xl kg = .97k l .647
XIO :: professional S 0-1 1 of XIO ｾ SO of Xs k lO = .Sk S .241development
4.505 6"I,N
f'.l
x2 ' for instance, must be .66k l since, using u l in
Figure 7.10, the utility of a retained earnings of 3
percent is 0.66. This follows since the utility of 3
percent retained earnings, with the growth in retirement
plan at its least desirable level, must equal the utili-
ty of 30 percent growth in retirement plan, with retained
earnings at its minimum level. Because of the preferen-
tial independence assumptions, the levels of the attri-
butes other than retained earnings and retirement plan do
not matter. The relative values of the scaling constants
are also shown in Table 7.8.
Selecting a Utility Function. We felt fairly confident
about the relative values of the scaling constants, but
to get their absolute magnitudes requires the answer to
a difficult question. Dr. Nair was asked:
"What probability TIl would you select such that you
would be indifferent between option 1 which retained
earnings at 8 percent and all other attributes at
their least desirable levels and an alternative
option 2 consisting of a lottery yielding all at-
tributes at their most desirable level with prob-
ability TIl or otherwise all attributes at their
least desirable level?"
Those two options are illustrated in Figure 7.11.
Using the "converging method" discussed in Section 4.9,
a value of 2/3 for TIl was selected. This implied that
Option 1 Option 2
Retailed earnings: 8%
all other attributes at
worst levels
vs.
all attributes at
best levels, x*
all attributes at
worst levels, XO
Figure 7.11 Adj us t 7r:l to get indifference!
Co34
the scaling factor k l should be 0.67, from which the
values of the other scaling factors indicated* in Table
7.8 follow:
Since the sum of the scaling factors is 4.505, we
knew the multiplicative utility function (1) was appro-
priate to express Dr. Nair's preferences. Evaluating
(1) for the most desirable consequences one finds
10
1 + k = IT
i=l
(1 + kk.)
1
(7.22)
which was solved using the routine of Appendix 6B to yield
k = -.998. Such a low level for k (it must be greater
than -1) indicates a high level of complementarity among
preferences for the attributes. It is the general feel-
ing of the Long Range Planning Committee that if retained
earnings are at a high level, one can "take care of ll the
other attributes if proper policies are implemented.
However, this feeling weakens as the time frame of ref-
erence increases. That is if our attributes represent
one-year levels, Woodward-Clyde could stand a bad year
with most attributes and make it up in the next year.
On the other hand, if the attributes of Table 7.8 desig-
nate five-year averages, the desirability of waiting
five years to "redistribute" high retained earnings to
attributes at their lowest levels is understandably much
*The sensitivity of the analysis to TI, is discussed shortly.
less. This situation, which became apparent during the
assessment process, is clearly important to recognize in
discussions of options affecting the future vitality of
Woodward-Clyde. The original preference assessments
were made using a one-year period. The results reported
here are made using annual averages over a three-year
period. *
Sensitivity Analysis. Because of the importance of the
probability TIl assessed to specify k l , a small sensiti-
vity analysis was made of this parameter using the same
relative values of the scaling constants in Table 7.8.
Recall that x* defines the consequence with all attri-
obutes at their best levels and x the consequence with
all attributes at their worst levels. To assist in
examining the implications of the various TIl values, let
us make two definitions:
TIl = the probability such that a lottery with a
oTIl chance at x* and a (1 - n l ) chance at x
is indifferent a consequence with retained
earnings and formal training at their best
levels and all other attributes at their worst
levels,
*For reference, the indifference probability TIl for the
options in Figure 7.11 was 0.75 when a one-year period
was considered, whereas it was 0.67 for the three-year
period.
the probability such that
-", 0
ｾＪＬｔｉＬｾ > is indif-
ferent to the sure consequence with each attri-
bute at its level of 0.5 utility.
The results, which were calculated using the computer
program discussed in Appendix 6C, are shown in Table 7.9 J
where TIl is first specified. Then, using the relative
scaling factors from Table 7.8, the individual k. 's are
1
fixed. Using these, k, TI', and TI were calculated.
Further reflection and examination of Table 7.9 led
Dr. Nair to stay with his original estimate of TIl = 0.67
for the three-year period. Thus, the final scaling con-
stants are those shown in the last column of Table 7.8.
Table 7.9 A Sensitivity Analysis of the Scaling Factor k
TIl L:k. k 1f ' TI1
.87 5.86 -.999 .98 .973
.74 4.96 -.999 .925 .947
.67 4.5 -.998 .884 .928
.60 4.06 -.996 .836 .903
.47 3.15 -.979 .714 .835
.34 2.25 .... 900 .561 .733
7.4.6 Uses of Woodward-Clyde's Utility Function
Since the original assessments, Dr. Nair has essen-
tially repeated the assessment procedure just described
with each of the members of the 1974 Long Range Planning
Committee. These assessments included verification of
assumptions, assessing single-attribute utility func-
tions, and specifying scaling constants. This resulted
in some minor changes to Dr. Nair's utility function
(already integrated into the previous subsections) to
achieve what may be referred to as a consensus corporate
utility function. This obviously does not mean the
Board of Woodward-Clyde will blindly make decisions with
this utility function. It is being used to facilitate
communication among officers of Woodward-Clyde and to
help professional intuition.
The assessment process forced individuals to be a
bit more precise in deciding why they felt certain levels
of specific attributes were important. As previously
mentioned, it also served to indicate how tradeoffs among
attributes depended on the time frame of reference. The
general feeling of ｴ ｾ ｯ ｳ ･ involved in the utility function
assessment may be summed up by the comment of one indi-
vidual, "I've had to make tradeoff decisions like this
all my life, but until now the process has always been
somewhat fuzzy and left me with the feeling that I didn't
completely comprehend all the implications of my sub-
jective judgements. The use of utility theory and
explicit tradeoffs helps considerably." With a better
understanding of one's own tradeoffs and preferences,
it is a small wonder that it becomes easier to communi-
cate these and discuss the issues with one's colleagues.
The process of assessing a utility function has
also led to minor, but important, modifications in the
overall evaluation process for long-range plans. Some
objectives have been deleted or aggregated, and in other
cases, several attributes have been altered to better
indicate the concerns of Woodward-Clyde. Changing the
attribute ｭ ･ ｡ ｳ ｵ ｲ ｾ for relevant experience to reflect the
yearly increase in experience is one such example.
Since several of the attributes concern distribution
of income available (i.e., percent of fees), it is a
simple task to use the utility function to help select
the best distribution among salaries, retained earnings,
incentive compensation, professional development, relevant
experience, and contribution to retirement plan. With
any fixed percentage of fees available, the technically
feasible surface of fee distribution, as well as the
distribution with maximum utility, is easily specified.
As before, the component utility functions can still
be used to conduct a deficiency analysis by indicating
the difference between the present state and a desired
state, representing what is technically feasible in a
specified time span. A bit more broadly, by calculating
the gradient of the utility function in each attribute
for the present state position and combining this with
subjectively assessed changes in the state of each at-
tribute for an equivalent amount of effort (time and
money), one gets an indicator of policies which may be
particularly fruitful to pursue.
The utility function discussed here will no doubt
go through additional metamorphosis in the future years,
as needs and preferences of individuals at Woodward-Clyde
adjust to better reflect their position in society, the
external environment, and so on. For example, the
Pension Reform Act of 1974, because of certain provisions
with regard to the ability of Pension and Profit Sharing
Plan Trusts to invest in company stock, is likely to
alter the present relative value of the attribute ｾ ｧ ｲ ｯ ｷ ｴ ｨ
in retirement plan" among the attributes. Woodward-Clyde
Consultants is presently examining the effect of this
and other external changes on the utility functions for
the various individual attributes and the tradeoffs be-
tween the attributes. This will be a continuing activity.
The current function does overcome the original
shortcomings on the 1972 quantification of objectives
outlined in Section 7.4.1. It is being used to ･ ｸ ｡ ｾ ｭ ｩ ｮ ･
present decisions which effect the future existence of
the company. In addition, the Woodward-Clyde objectives
hierarchy partially provides an underlying and unifying
basis for evaluating long-range plans and operational
activities of the affiliated firms. It is not an
overstatement to say that several individuals at Wood-
ward-Clyde find the multiattribute utility concept inter-
esting and helpful. Perhaps more importantly, they are
enthusiastic about potential future uses. In this regard,
partially as a result of the work discussed here, a
special group within Woodward-Clyde Consultants has been
set up and funded to begin to transfer the concepts and
techniques of decision analysis into their professional
practice.
As an interesting anecdote, in 1974, Woodward-Clyde
Consultants reorganized its operations from that of a
holding company subsidiary relationship to an operating
company with five regional divisions, each division having
geotechnical and environmental capabilities. The more
significant reasons given for this reorganization were
to better serve its clients in terms of providing in-
tegrated geotechnical and environmental capability,
establish a one company image for improved marketing,
and increase-efficiencies by eliminating various sub-
sidiary management structures. In evaluating the de-
sirability of the organizational changes, many members
of the Board of Directors made a subjective determination
as to whether the changes would increase the companies
ability to improve their level of performance over the
various attributes. The explicit statement of attributes
made it possible to make this evaluation.
7.5 EVALUATING COMPUTER SYSTEMS
How should management select a computer system?
How should the management of a computer facility evalu-
ate the quality of its service? When and how should a
time-sharing system be altered to provide better service
to its users and to attract additional users? These are
representative questions facing various participants;
including both managers and users in todays computer
industry. It seems that responsible answers to such
questions require the consideration of a number of fac-
tors: availability of the system, its reliability, re-
sponse times to different requests, costs, as well as
many less tangible aspects. These problems are inherent-
ly multidimensional.
In this section we will report on some work of Grochow
[1972,1973J, which deals with such questions using the
concepts and methodology discussed earlier in this book.
Grochow assessed a three-attribute utility function for
users of time-sharing systems. To illustrate the use-
fulness of such information for decision making by the
management of these systems, we first describe what Grochow
did and then discuss its relevance to the questions posed
at the beginning of this section.
7.5.1 Preferences of Systems Programmers
To begin, Grochow interviewed a number of users of
general time-sharing systems to determine their usage
£0 t I
patterns and objectives of importance. His subjects
were computer system programmers concerned mainly with
the input and editing of programs and the compilation
and testing of these. Their ratio of editing sessions
to compiling and testing sessions was approximately five
to one. Four attributes of the system important to this
class of users were
(1) Response tinle to trivial requests, i.e., editing,
(2) Response tinle to compute-bound requests,
i.e., compiling,
(3) Availability,
(4) Reliability.
Grochow assessed utility functions over the first
three of these attributes conditional on reliability
being at a high level.
Before beginning the assessment process, Grochow
discussed the basic ideas of utility theory with each
user and presented a scenario indicating the importance
of the three attributes and establishing that reliability
was at a high level. For measures of effectiveness he
used, for the first two attributes the average number of
seconds to satisfy requests, and for the ｴ ｨ ｩ ｲ ｾ Ｌ the per-
centage of successful log-ins.
By assessing various conditional utility functions
over one attribute at a time given that the other two
attributes were held fixed, he established the appropri-
ateness of different utility independence conditions
and thus, restricted the form of the utility function.
Let us define attributes
x _ average response time to trivial requests
in seconds,
Y _ average response time to compute""'bound requests
in Seconds, and
Z = percentage of successful log-ins.
In terms of this nota·tion, the conditions that
Grochow verified as appropriate for the class of users
•
under consideration were
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(i)
( ii)
(iii)
X is conditionally utility independent of
y given Z,
X is conditionally utility independent of
Z given Y,
'1 is conditionally utility independent of
Z given X.
It follows directly from Theorem 6.17 in subsection
6.11.4 conditions (i) and (ii) imply that
(iv) X is utility independent of {Y,Z}.
Using Theorem 5.6, from condition (iv), we know
. 0 0 . [ ° OJ 0u(x,y,z) =Ux(x,y ,z ) ｵＨｸＪＬｹｾｺＩ + 1 - ｾＨｸＬｹ ,z) .u(x ,y,z)
(7.23)
Where u and Ux are scaled from zero to one with super-
scripts ° and - indicating respectively the least and
most desirable level of an attribute. Then using
condition (iii) and the analogous result to Theorem 5.6
for conditional utility functions, we can further break
down (7.23) to yield
o 0 0
u(x,y,z) = ｾＨｸＬｹ ,z ) ｛ｾＨｸＪＬｹＬｺ ) u(x*,y*,z)
[ 0 OJ -0 0 0 0+ 1 - ｾＨｸＬｹ ,z) [Uy(x ,y,z ) u(x ,y*,z)
o 0 0 0 0 -
+ {l - Uy(x ,y,z )} u(x ,y ,z)] (7.24)
o
where uy and u y are also scaled from zero to one.
One can note that given these scaling conventions,
o 0
U
x
(x, y , z ) -
000
u y (x , y , z ) _
o 0
u(x,y ,z )
( * 0 0)u x ,y ,z
o 0
u (x , y, z )
( 0 * 0)u x ,y ,z
(7.25a)
(7.25b)
* (* 0)u y x ,y,z
( * 0) (* 0 0)u x ,y,z - u x ,y ,z (7 25 )
- 0 0 O· . c
u(x*,y*,z ) - u(x*,y ,z )
If one plugs (7.25) into (7.24) we see that (x,y,z) is
completely specified by assessing the seven consistently
scaled one-attribute conditional utility functions il-
lustrated by heavy lines in Figure 7.12.
The actual verification of conditions (i), (ii),
and (iii) was iterative in nature. Each additional
conditional utility function contributes to a better
understanding of the overall structure of the utility
y
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function u(x,y,z). The implications of these were dis-
cussed with the user throughout the assessment procedure.
Whenever there were inconsistencies in the responses of
a user, they were pointed out and part of the procedure
redone. In all, the utility independence conditions
(i), (ii), and (iii) were verified for eight different
individuals in the class of users described earlier.
An actual utility function was assessed for only one
of these users. The general procedure discussed in
Chapters 5 and 6 was used for this purpose. The utility
function was assessed over the space 2 2 x < 9 (seconds),
2 < Y ｾ 120, and 10 < z < 100 (percent).
It turned out that Z was not utility independent of
{X,y} or conditionally utility independent of either X
or Y. Grochow states the reason for this: When either
response time is at an unfavorable value, for instance,
the programmer will be spending most of his or her time
contending with the slow response, and consequently will
not be as concerned about logging in as when response
times are at more desirable levels. The stated reason
why Y is not conditionally utility independent of X given
Z is that the users may set their relative preferences
for response time to compute-bound requests in terms of
the response time to trivial requests they are experienc-
ing.
Let us now consider how one might use Grochow's
results for making decisions in the computer industry.
Suppose our user was trying to choose among differ-
ent time sharing facilities which differed not only in
terms of X, Y, and Z, but also in terms of their relia-
bility R and their monthly subscription cost S. A proper
evaluation here would require a utility function
u ' (r,s,x,y,z) for the user. However, if {X,Y,Z} is
utility independent of {R,S}, then of course, from
Theorem 5.6, u ' can be expressed as a function of r, s,
and u so
u ' (r,s,x,y,z) = f[r,s,u(x,y,z)]
The original utility function u can be used in a similar
fashion if {R,S} is utility independent of {X,Y,Z} and
{X,Y,Z} is not utility independent of {R,S}. Given this
assumption, Theorem 5.6 says u ' may be expressed as a
function of one utility function over {R,S} and two utility
functions over {X,Y,Z} given different levels of {R,S}.
One of these utility functions can be u(x,y,z).
Going one step further, suppose our user (or firm)
must decide whether to buy a computer or rent such services.
If the choice is made to buy a computer, there may be
many options. Clearly, such a decision would involve a
time horizon of at least a few years. To remain simple,
let us assume that attributes X, Y and Z and a cost at-
tribute are sufficient for the decision. With a five-
year horizon, this cost attribute might be C = {C l ,c2 , ... ,C5 }
where C. represents costs in the i th year. Then, as
J.
before, with necessary utility independence assumptions
between C and {X,Y,Z}, the original utility function u
can be used.
Switching gears, suppose the management of a time-
sharing service has two objectives: maximize profits and
provide the best possible service to customers. A
reasonable measure of the quality of service to a user
may be its utility function over attributes X, Y, and Z.
Hence, given many users, the firm may select a utility
function which is a function of annual profits, for in-
stance, and the individual utility functions of its users.
By including potential user's utility functions as
arguments of its utility function, the firm may have a
tool to help select pricing and service policy. That is,
if prices are too high, many users will select competitors
and thus reduce the firms profit. If the subscription
prices are too low, the firm will also do poorly financi-
ally. By maximizing its expected utility, the firm can
find the "optimal" price.*
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*This brief discussion has neglected actions by competitors.
The utility functions discussed are applicable in con-
junction with game theory, a discipline concerned with
these competitive aspects. A basic introduction and
survey of game theory is Luce and Raiffa [1957J. A more
recent survey is Shakun [1972J.
7.6 SITING AND LICENSING OF NUCLEAR POWER FACILITIES
The siting of nuclear power facilities is an ex-
tremely complex process. There are many concerned inter-
est groups, each with their own set of multiple objectives,
trying to influence the decision making process. The
stakes are large, involving hundreds of millions of
dollars, possible energy shortages and "blackouts," the
possibilities of severe environmental damage, and in some
situations, heavy dependency on foreign fuels, to mention
a few of the relevant considerations.
In the United States the power company has to pre-
pare its case advocating a particular site or sites and
submit these plans for review by governmental regulatory
authorites (e.g. power, environmental impact) and by the
federal Atomic Energy Commission. These bodies try to
reach a decision by weighing the available data, con-
sidering the broad tradeoffs, and examining diverse view-
points: of the power company, of environmentalist groups,
of the public as energy consumers, and of local groups,
such as the communities near the suggested sites. How
can these governmental authorities rationally integrate
all the available information in a manner useful for
aiding their decision process?
The power companies themselves have difficulties in
dealing with the multiple objectives they face. They are,
however, mainly concerned with competitive business
positions and engineering factors, such as transmission
ｾＴＹ
facilities design and network reliability, which directly
affect their financial returns. But when a power company
is asked, by the regulatory boards, its position on
broader questions such as the impacts of its proposals
on the environment and local communities, it too must
address a broader set of objectives and often their anal-
yses depend on informal and intuitive reasoning. Perhaps
with a better understanding and presentation of the
fundamental tradeoffs among the conflicting objectives
necessitated by each of the alternatives under consider-
ation, the power company might be in better position to
select the best alternative in view of its economic
objectives, its public responsibility, and the public's
requirements. A formal analysis of these considerations
may contribute toward reducing the required time of the
now lengthy process necessary for approval of nuclear
power facilities. The big question is, what are the
characteristics of such an analysis and how does one get
it done? The literature on this general subject is
voluminous but of direct relevance to the techniques and
framework introduced in this book, we single out the
works by Gros [1974J, Papp et al. [1974J, Nair et al. [1975J,
and by Keeney and Nair [1975J.
In this section, we do two things:
(1) speculate on the appropriateness of multiattribute
utility theory for examining the questions raised
in the preceding paragraphs, and
(2) discuss the work of Jacques Gros, who attempts
to quantify preferences for nuclear siting prob-
lems using results discussed in this book.
The work described below is far from definitive--
perhaps it could more appropriately be described as
"suggestive research." We do not dwell on important
issues, such as: Is the attribute set complete? Whose
preferences should be assessed? How does one introduce
political relevancies? How does the analysis help (or
hinder) conflict resolution? Our purpose is merely to
focus on the concepts of the suggestions and to worry
little about their pragmatic implementation. Our excuse
for speculating on possible uses of a theoretical nature
in a so-called "applications" chapter is that we feel the
ideas introduced here are important and the framework of
analysis may be appropriate to carry out in practice.
In this regard, we feel that Gros' accomplishments are
encouraging. At the time of this writing, Woodward-Clyde
Associates (see Section 7.4) is evaluating the siting and
design of nuclear power plants using these same concepts
and techniques.
7.6.1 Objectives For Nuclear Power Siting
Each party interested in siting nuclear power
facilities will have its own objectives. By and large,
however, in each case these objectives might fall under
the five categories: environmental, human safety, consumer
well-being, economic, and national interest. Let us
suppose that the set of objectives listed in Table 7.10
is sufficient for analysis by any of the interested
parties, although clearly, there is overlap in this crude
list and all of these objectives are not needed by all of
the parties. Those objectives of primary interest to the
concerned parties are indicated in the table. Also, for
future reference the associated attribute--possibly a
vector attribute--is designated notationally. No attempt
is made to specify specific attributes at this time.
Table 7.10 Some Objectives for Siting Nuclear Power
Facilities
Attribute Category
Xl Environmental
X2 Environmental
Human Safety
Parties
Primarily
Objective Concerned*
Minimize Pollution E,L
Provide Aesthetically E,L
Pleasing Facilities
Minimize Human Health E,L,P,S,F
Hazards
Consumer Well-Being Provide Necessary
Power
Consumer Well-Being Minimize Consumer
Power Costs
X6 Economic Maximize Economic
Benefits to Local
Community
X7 Economic Maximize Utility
Company Profits
Xs Economic Maximize State
Revenues
Xg Economic Improve Balance
of Payments
XlO National Interest Reduce Dependency on
Foreign Fuels
C,E,P,S
C,S
L
P
S
F
F
*C - consumers; E = environmentalists; L = local communities;
P _ power company; S = state agency; F = federal agency.
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7.6.2 A Conceptual Framework for Analyses by the Interested
Parties
The utility functions briefly discussed here are
mainly to suggest a conceptual framework for thinking
about crucial preference aspects of the nuclear power
siting problem and for communicating these preferences
to other interested parties. For brevity, we skip a
discussion of the utility functions of the consumers,
environmentalists, and local community interests. These
are, in theory, more straight forward than the caseS we
do consider.
The Power ｃ ｯ ｭ ｰ ｡ ｾ Ｇ ｳ Point of View. One might simply say
that a power company is concerned only with maximizing
its own profits. If such were the case, it would be ap-
propriate to assess the company's utility function up (x7 )
over attribute X7 and use this in evaluating the power
company's alternatives. However, in this era of broader
corporate interest and responsibility, it is more likely
the case that the company is also interested in satisfy-
ing its consumers preferences for energy, minimizing the
detrImental environmental impact of its facilities, and
maximizing the net benefits of its facilities on local
communities in which facilities are to be built. Let us
designate attributes for these three additional objectives
as UC' UE' and UL ' respectively, and note that they can
be measured by the respective utility functions uc ' uE '
and uL . The power company, at least informally, is con-
cerned with its utility function up(x7,uC,uE,uL) over the
four attributes x 7 , uc ' uE ' and uL ' in order to analyze
which of its possible options is most attractive to
pursue. Conceptually, one might define utility uL to be
f t ' f h' the nth com-a unc lon 0 ul, ... ,uQ,' ... ,uN' were UQ, lS N
munity's utility function and N communities are considered
as possible sites. The power company must weight its
subjective judgments about the relative desirability that
community 1 has for proposed plant A against the relative
desirability that community 2 has for proposed plant B.
Such tradeoffs, although terribly difficult, must be
formally or informally addressed by the power company.
The State Agency's Point of View. Let us oversimplify
once again and assume there is only one state agency con-
cerned with licensing nuclear power facilities, whose
main responsibility is nuclear safety. Thus, the objec-
tives of the agency might be to minimize danger due to
nuclear radiation, to provide state revenue, and to
satisfy the interested groups. Attributes X3 and Xs from
Table 7.11 may be useful for measuring the first two
objectives, whereas uc ' uE ' uL ' and up might do for
indicating interest group satisfaction. Thus, the state
agencies preferences might be conceptualized by
uS(x3,xS,UC,UE,uL,up)' where ｵ ｾ is the state agencies
aggregation of the N communities' utility functions.
The Federal Agencies Point of View. The main federal
agency concerned with nuclear power plants in the United
States is the Atomic Energy Commission. Its problem is
quite similar to that of the state agency just outlined.
The major difference might be the federal concern for the
balance of payments, indicated by attribute x 9 ' and the
national dependency on foreign fuels, measured by attri-
bute XIO . It may be useful for the federal agency to
conceptualize its preferences with the utility function
uF(x3,x9,xIO,uC,uE'u£,uP)' where u£ measures the federal
agencies concern for the local community impact of nuclear
facilities.
7.6.3 Empirical Assessments of Gros
Gros [1974J studies nuclear facility siting from a
slightly different viewpoint and in the process has
generated evidence that the utility functions postulated
in the proceeding section can be meaningfully assessed.*
Specifically Gros investigates the usefulness of what he
refers to as Paretian environmental analysis in nuclear
siting decisions. Generally stated, Paretian analysis
attempts to identify the benefits accruing to each of the
*Ovi's [1973J results using multiattribute decision anal-
ysis for evaluating nuclear versus fossil power plant
alternatives, and nuclear siting and decision studies in
progress at Woodward-Clyde Associates also lend support
to this contention.
various parties involved in a decision making process and
to illuminate the tradeoffs,amongthese groups. To il-
lustrate his approach, Gros examines the deployment of
1000 megawatt nuclear baseload units to possible sites
along the New England coast.
In the terminology of this book, Gros assessed multi-
attribute utility functions for four parties involved in
nuclear power plant siting in New England: power companies,
environmentalists, regulatory agencies, and local groups.
These utility functions were each assessed over four at-
tributes:
Yl = Capacity at a site, measured by the number of
1000 megawatt units at a coastal site,
Y2 - Incremental dollar costs, measured by the cost
of thermal abatement equipment plus transmission
costs expressed as a percent of the minimum
cost facility,
Y3 - Radiation hazard, measured by the population
within fifteen miles of the nuclear facility
times the number of units at the site, and
Y4 - Thermal pollution level, measured in degrees
Fahrenheit at the outfall of the nuclear
facility.
These attributes were generated after interviewing a
number of individuals who had previously participated in
siting controversies. Rather than focusing on questions
of whether or not this set of attributes is appropriate
for the problem considered, let us consider the assess-
ment procedure.
For each of the four interest groups, a knowledge-
able observer, who had an intimate knowledge of many of
the group members preferences, was chosen based on re-
commendations of group members. The knowledgeable
observer's utility function was assessed and his pref-
erences were used as those of the appropriate represen-
tative group. The results were verified for reasonable-
ness with other group members. For each of the four utility
functions, necessary utility independence conditions were
verified to invoke Theorem 6.1 implying the appropriate-
ness of either the multiplicative or additive ｵ ｴ ｾ ｬ ｩ ｴ ｹ
functions.
Gros was also interested in preferences over the
forty year design horizon. For each of the knowledgeable
observers he verified that preferences for lotteries in
any individual year were utility independent of preferences
for lotteries over the other years. Also he found pref-
erences in each pair of years to be preferentially
independent of preferences in other years. Hence the
forty-attribute utility function, representing the forty-
year period, was again either multiplicative or additive.
Because of the desire on the part of the knowledgeable
observers to spread risks over the years, the multiplic-
ative form was selected as appropriate.*
*Some interesting assessments of preferences over time
indicating some of these issues are found in Chapter 9.
Gros' efforts and empirical assessments help to
illustrate something that we firmly believe. Namely it
is possible to develop meaningful utility functions,
such as those postulated in the preceding subsection,
for the various participants in the complex decision
processes concerning the siting and licensing of nuclear
power facilities. The assessments briefly discussed
here are an important first step toward characterizing
utility functions directly useful in making nuclear power
siting decisions. The task is difficult and the effort
required to obtain these preferences is substantial.
However, to avoid these problems relegates the crucial
tradeoff issues and the preference evaluation of the
risks involved to informal analysis.
7.7 OTHER APPLICATIONS
Experience with formal quantification of preferences
in multiattribute contexts is growing. Let us briefly
mention a number of decision problems, in addition to
those in earlier sections in this chapter, where the
concepts of Chapters 2 through 6 were utilized.
7.7.1 The Safety of Landing Aircraft
The safety of landing an aircraft depends on many
factors: wind, visibility, ceiling, other aircraft in
the vicinity, etc. Yntema and Klem [1965J attempted to
quantify the safety of various situations which differed
in terms of ceiling, visibility, and amount of fuel that
would remain at touchdown given a normal landing. Other
relevant factors were fixed at a standard value.
The decision makers for this study consisted of
twenty Air Force pilots, each of whom had a good deal of
experience in landing aircraft under a wide variety of
situations. Using the form of the three-attribute quasi-
additive utility function discussed in Result 2 of
Section 6.2, utility functions over the attributes ceiling,
visibility, and remaining fuel were assessed. In the
attribute space, ceiling varied from 100 to 5,000 feet,
visibility from 0.25 to 5 miles, and remaining fuel from
15 to 250 gallons. Each decision maker was also presented
with forty pairs of consequences and asked to pick the
preferable one of each pair. These responses were compared
with the implications of each decision maker's utility
function. Yntema and Klem concluded "The results were
satisfactory."
It should be pointed out that the utility independence
assumptions requisite for Result 2 of Section 6.2 were
not empirically verified. In fact, the assessments of
Yntema and Klem were completed a few years before the
formal theory was developed. In spite of this, the
resulting utility functions did seem appropriate to
represent the preferences of the pilots. Yntema and
Klem's pioneering effort gave some support to the con-
tention that it was reasonable and practical to quantify
preferences in multiattribute situations.
7.7.2 Strategic and Operational Policy Concerning Frozen
Blood
Should a hospital blood bank or system of blood banks
invest in expensive blood freezing equipment? And for
systems with such capabilities, what are the most desirable
proportions of frozen and non-frozen blood? These questions
were addressed in a thesis by Bodily [1974J. He also
conducted a preliminary investigation of national stra-
tegies in blood research and in the usage of frozen blood.
First, after considerable consultation with blood
bankers, objectives and measures of effectiveness were
specified for evaluating frozen blood issues. The re-
sulting list, given in Table 7.11, indicates the depth
at which preferences and probabilities were initially
going to be assessed. However, to help the respondent's
thinking about the implications of various levels of the
attributes, the objectives hierarchy was developed and
qualitatively extended as illustrated in Figure 7.13.
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Table 7.11 Objectives of a Hospital Blood Bank
Objectives
Meet all requests for blood
Provide high quality blood
Minimize disease
Minimize cost
Minimize transfusion
reactions
Minimize wastage
Provide bloods for special
uses
Measures of Effectiveness
Average delay or frequency of
delay above some acceptable
cutoff
Average age at transfusion
Rate of hepatitis
Cost/unit
Rate of transfusion reaction
Outdating plus processing loss
Fraction of special needs that
are met with frozen blood or
an equivalent unit.
In analyzing the problem of what proportion of frozen
blood should be selected for a particular blood bank and
the problem of whether or not such a bank should invest in
blood freezing equipment, Bodily used a variety of approaches
to obtain reasonable probability distributions over the
attributes for each alternative. These approaches included
utilizing empirical information from blood banks, projec-
tions using simple mathematical models of the operations
of such blood banks, judgmental estimation of experts,
and statistical data available in journal articles, etc.
Bodily tried to assess preferences over the six
attributes labelled X., i = 1,2, ... ,6 in Figure 7.13 for
1
a number of individuals concerned with blood banking.
A first conclusion was that attribute X6 could be elimi-
nated in considering the question of proportion of blood
to freeze. The reasoning was that if a blood bank froze
any blood, it would certainly freeze enough to satisfy
special needs, and so, the objective "meet special needs"
would be equally satisfied with all the viable alternatives.
Hence, it could be dropped from the list.
Next attributes Xl' X2 ' and X3 were aggregated since
each pair of these was preferentially independent of its
complement and substitution rates were constants. Wastage
and delay were translated into economic terms using a
simple additive value function
where d is the equivalent cost per unit of blood delayed
and w is the cost per unit wastage. If attribute Y is
defined as Xl + dX 2 + WX 3 ' then what is needed is a utility
function u(y,x4 ,xS ) over Y, X4 ' and XS '
In the assessment process, it became clear that blood
bankers considered the possible range of the average age
transfused much less important than the ranges of economic
and purity considerations. Hence Xs was dropped and
utility functions u(y,x4 ) were completely assessed for
one blood banker and one individual with a public health
graduate degree and a knowledge of decision analysis.
In both cases Y and X4 were mutually utility independent
and so, from Theorem 5.2, the quasi-additive utility
function was appropriate. In addition, Bodily ascertained
that in a paired comparison of two simple lotteries with
identical marginal probability distributions, the blood
banker was indifferent. Thus from Theorem 5.4, it follows
that the respondent's utility function was additive.
Details of these assessments are found in Bodily [1974J.
Many of the concepts of Chapters 2 through 6 were
explicitly used in the overall assessment process. First,
a first-cut hierarchy of objectives was articulated as
discussed in Chapter 2, and one objective was then dropped
since it was not important enough to influence decisions.
Then using preferential independence conditions and the
concepts of Chapter 3, a value function over three of
the attributes was specified to achieve an aggregation
and reduction of dimensionality. Next quantitative con-
siderations led to the exclusion of attribute x5 . Finally,
utility independence and the unidimensional assessment
techniques surveyed in Chapter 4 were used to specify the
final utility functions.
This case illustrates well a typical evolutionary
process which starts from a listing of objectives--in
this case the specification of subobjectives extended
further down the hierarchy than the quantitative analysis--
and terminates with the qualltification of the final utility
function.
7.7.3 Sewage ｓ ｬ ｵ ､ ｾ ｩ ｳ ｰ ｯ ｳ ｡ ｬ in the Metropolitan Boston
Area
In Boston, the Metropolitan District Commission (MDC)
has responsibility for water and sewage works for the
forty-three cities and towns within its jurisdiction.
As of 1971, one hundred tons of sewage sludge was being
discharged daily into Boston Harbor by the treatment
plants of the MDC. Because of increasing public concern
and the interest of the U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency, the Division of Water Pollution Control of the
Massachusetts Department of Natural Resources requested
the MDC to make a comprehensive study of new and better
alternatives to the present sludge disposal practice.
The MDC organized a committee named the Boston Harbor
Pollution Task Force (BHPTF) to study the problem and
make recommendations. At the suggestion of the Massa-
chusetts Office of Environmental Affairs and with the
consent of the BHPTF, Dennis Horgan, then a graduate
student at M.I.T., worked with this task force and con-
ducted an independent decision analysis of the sludge
disposal alternatives. This subsection briefly surveys
Horgan's work.
The viable alternatives for Boston sludge disposal
could be categorized as being either marine disposal or
land disposal. In the former category one could either
barge sludge to a dumping ground ten miles offshore or
extend a submerged sludge line approximately seven miles
out to sea. In the latter category one could directly
spread the sludge on available land and till it into the
soil, or alternatively, the sludge could first be in-
cinerated--thus reducing its volume approximately seventy
percent and then disposed of at a land site. There are
variations of these four basic alternatives, such as dif-
ferent processes of incineration, etc., but, these were
felt to be second-order considerations and not explicitly
considered in the analysis.
The analysis by Horgan specified four major objectives:
minimize costs, minimize water pollution, minimize land
pollution, and minimize air pollution. Thus, the classic
question concerning tradeoffs of one kind of pollution
against another was explicitly addressed. The net present
value of costs was used as the measure of effectiveness
of the cost objective. Air pollution was measured in
tons of particulate matter and gases due to sludge in-
cineration and land pollution was measured in terms of
the total area required for sludge disposal sites. To
indicate water quality, Horgan defined a subjective index,
as discussed in Section 2.3, scaled from zero to ten,
based on state water quality standards.
Exploiting probabilistic independence properties
where appropriate, probability distributions were
specified over the four variables tor each of the four
basic alternatives.* Concerning preferences, Horgan
verified with members of the BHPTF that each of the four
attributes was utility independent of its respective
complement, and also, that pairs of attributes were not
preferentially independent of their complements. Hence,
by Theorem 6.3, the multilinear utility function was
appropriate. The specific utility function and probabi-
lity assessments, as well as sensitivity analysis of the
results, are found in Horgan [1972J.
7.7.4 Selecting a Job or Profession
A critical decision facing each of us from time to
time concerns the selection of a job. This problem is
different in one important respect from many of the other
illustrations in this book in that it is essentially a
personal decision. Most of the other problems dealt with
a decision maker as representative of his company or as
representative of a branch of the government. Here we
will briefly summarize two philosophical approaches to
job selection, both of which utilize the general ideas
discussed in earlier chapters. The works of Miller
[1966,1970J and Teweles [1972J will serve as models for
our discussion.
*For an incineration alternative, air pollution and land
pollution, for example, were not probabilistically in-
dependent, since they both depend on the volume of sludge,
Horgan's model explicitly included such dependencies.
Miller developed and tested a procedure for evalua-
ting the "worth" of various situations described by
multiple attributes. One of the problems to which it
has been applied involved a graduate student faced with
numerous employment offers immediately following gradu-
ation. After preliminary analysis, this number was
reduced to four viable contenders. The objectives
hierarchy and attributes associated with each of the
lowest-level objectives which were identified by the
graduate student are illustrated in Figure 7.14.
An additive "worth II function,
(7.26)
where w. measures the worth of an amount x. of attribute
1 1
X., was used to evaluate the alternatives on a zero to
1
one scale. The scaling factors k. were determined using
1
conditional assessments as described in Section 3.7. For
instance, first weights of 0.33, 0.17, 0.17, and 0.33
were assigned to monetary compensation, geographical
location, travel requirements, and nature of work, re-
spectively. Then, for instance, of the monetary compen-
sation, a 0.7 weight went to immediate compensation and
0.3 to future compensation. Of the future compensation,
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salary was (0.33) (0.3) (0.65) or 0.064. These effective
weights were then adjusted to account for the degree to
which the attribute actually measured to achievement on
an objective. Finally for each of the fifteen attributes,
individual worth functions w. were determined.
1.
The four alternatives were then each represented as
a fifteen-attribute vector and the worth of each calcula-
ted using (7.26). Uncertainties were not explicitly
considered in the problem.
Notice that all the attributes in Miller's problem
are in some sense proxy attributes. Presumably, they are
proxy for the quality of the decision maker's life.
Because of this it was possible to identify many 6bjec-
tive measures for these attributes.
Teweles' approach was very different in this respect.
He attempted to establish a more direct set of attributes
to indicate the desirability of various alternative careers
open. Teweles' objectives are given in Table 7.11 along
with a short description of the meaning of each.
Table 7.1l Teweles' Objectives for Evaluating Professions
Job Satisfaction--enjoyment derived from doing the
type of work you have chosen. Direct benefits of a job
such as the opportunity for travel, meeting interesting
people, and means of self-expression are included in this
factor.
Wealth--the financial remuneration which can be
expected from working and the accumulation of capital
which can be earned from investment of excess funds.
As money is, in a sense, a means of obtaining other
goods and services the utility of these products can be
substituted for wealth in determining its value.
Security--a condition of relative safety which
results from being able to continue your job if you wish
to do so. Also included in this factor is the risk to
one's health associated with a particularly dangerous
occupation.
Family considerations--this factor is an amalgamation
of the possible influence a particular career might have
on the other members of your family. A wife's attitude,
mother's sentiment, child's future, or other considera-
tions should be accounted for in career planning.
Independence--refers to the ｡ ｾ ｩ ｬ ｩ ｴ ｹ one has of being
his own boss and scheduling his own activities. Indepen-
dence also refers to the short-term flexibility to do
what is most important to the individual at a particular
time.
Self-esteem--is the self-respect one gains from his
own achievements. The self-esteem one could anticipate
from a job is very dependent on his ability to be suc-
cessful at his work.
Prestige--the reputation one acquires within a group
as the result of competence, character, power, wealth,
etc. The professional respect of one's colleagues may be
an important factor to some individuals.
For each of the objectives, except wealth, a sub-
jective index was defined, ranging from zero to one
hundred, which was used to indicate the degree to which
the corresponding objective was achieved.*
+The job alternatives evaluated by Dr. Teweles were
(1) a private general dentist, (2) a military dentist,
*Miller's and Teweles' work illustrates a tendency men-
tioned in Chapter 2. Namely, as the attributes become
more direct indicators of fundamental preferences--as
opposed to proxy attributes--it is more difficult to
identify suitable objective measures, and one must define
subjective indices.
+Dr. Teweles is a dentist, and at the time he wrote his
paper, he was completing a Masters of Science in Business
Administration and reaching the end of his initial Inilitary
commitment.
(3) an orthodontic dental specialist, (4) an investment
analyst, and (5) a management consultant. These five
occupations were evaluated using an additive utility
function. Using available data on various professions
in addition to personal judgment, Teweles was able to
assess probabilities about the degree to which each ob-
jective would be met conditional on each alternative.
Expected utilities were calculated for each alternative
and sensitivity analyses performed.
In Dr. Teweles' report, he states, "The major dif-
ficulty in all career planning decisions is for an in-
dividual to gain sufficient insight into his own future
goals and then learn enough about each alternative to
evaluate it objectively." Among Dr. Teweles' conclusions
are "As a result of my career analysis, I feel more
capable of making the proper career decision at this time.
There is no doubt that I understand the factors which
motivate me a little better than I did before the analysis."
The authors know of many eases where similar personal
analyses have been conducted. Some of these resulted in
similar conclusions as Dr. Teweles'; other self-analyses,
as you might expect, were abortive and useless. We also
know of one medical doctor who used this ｰ ･ ｲ ｾ ｯ ｮ ｡ ｬ self-
evaluation technique on a mental patient in a hospital and
he reported a surprising success. This doctor took our
vernacular phrase, "a framework, for straightening out
one's mind," quite literally.
7.7.5 Transporting Hazardous Substances
During the past decade there has been a large growth
in the type and the amount of hazardous materials trans-
ported within the United States. Shipment of such
materials is achieved via all ground modes--rail, highway,
water and pipeline. Private citizens, industry, and
governmental agencies have become increasingly concerned
about the risks associated with transporting these
hazardous materials. Aspects of the risk might be di-
vided into two factors:
(1) the likelihoods of various accidents occurring,
and
(2) the damage caused by an accident which does
occur.
Too often, one has a tendency to assume that "reducing
the risks" can always be accomplished by reducing the
probability of an accident occurring.* However, one must
clearly also include the possible consequences when at-
tempting to reduce risk. Said another way, the risk of
the circumstance: "There is one chance in 1,000,000 that
a gas leak will lead to a ｭｯ､ｾｲ｡ｴ･Ｍｳｩｺ･､ explosion in a
populated area next year" seems much greater intuitively
than the circumstance: "There are 4 chances ·in 1,000,000
*One can investigate "fail-safe" as well as "safe-fail"
techniques.
that a gas leak will lead to a large explosion in the
desert next year."
Some pioneering work of Brooks and Kalelkar at
Arthur D. Little is currently attempting to measure the
relative undesirability of the consequences of various
accidents which may result from transporting hazardous
materials. In addition, they are investigating which
modes of transport are safer for which specific substances.
The aspect of Brooks and Kalelkar's efforts of most
interest here concerns their attempts to assess a three
attribute utility function over the attributes: human
deaths, property damage, and environmental damage. The
first attribute ranged from zero to 1200, and the second
attribute ranged from zero to ten million dollars. The
third attribute was measured by a subjective index scaled
from 1 to 13, as defined in Table 7.13.
Table 7.13. Environmental Effects from Hazardous Chemical
Spills
Note: This scale applies equally well to water and to
land.
1. No effect.
2. Residual surface accumulation of harmless material
such as sugar or grain.
3. Aesthetic pollution (odor-vapors).
4. Residual surface accumulation of removable material
such as oil.
5. Persistent leaf damage (spotting, discoloration) but
foliage remains edible for wildlife.
6. Persistent leaf damage (loss of foliage) but new
growth in following year.
7. Foliage remains poisonous to animals (indirect cause
of some death upon ingestion).
8. Animals become more susceptible to predators because
of direct exposure to chemicals and a resulting
physical debilitation.
9. Death to most smaller animals.
10. Short term (one season) loss of foliage with emigra-
tion of specific animals that eat the foliage.
Eventual reforestation.
11. Death to foliage and emigration of animals.
12. Death to foliage and animals.
13. Sterilization of total environment with no potential
for reforestation or immigration of species.
ｾ Ｑ Ｔ
The person whose preferences were assessed by Brooks
and Kalelkar was an experienced worker in the field of
safety who attempted to take the viewpoint of society as
a whole in indicating preferences. It was verified that
each of the single attributes were utility independent
of the remaining two. Hence, Theorem 6.3 held and the
three one-attribute utility functions and the requisite
scaling constants necessary for specifying the three-
attribute utility function were assessed. The three
utility functions are illustrated in Figure 7.15. Details
of these assessments are found in Kalelkar et ale ｛ Ｑ Ｙ Ｗ ｾ Ｎ
This analysis raises deep ethical concerns and
should be examined critically and constructively by
analysts concerned with such problems. At least Kalelkar
articulates a utility structure that others can criticize
and this is a step forward. Pious, vacuous rhetoric does
not help in making such horrendous tradeoffs. We feel
that in cases such as the one examined by Kalelkar, im-
plicitly used value and utility structures should be of
public concern and should not be suppressed.
7.7.6 Treatment for Cleft Lip and Cleft Palate*
Cleft lip and cleft palate is the second most common
congenital deformity in the United States. Treatment for
*Roughly speaking, a cleft lip is a failure of the upper
lip to grow together. It usually results in a gap in the
lip approximately below one nostril. Cleft palate refers
to a split in the palate at birth.
this condition is very involved: it requires many dif-
ferent medical specialists, coordinating from birth to
adulthood, not only to correct surgically the physiologic
defect, but also to address the child's psychological,
social, and mental development. The effects of the treat-
ment of clefts and the effects of the clefts themselves
are not completely distinguishable. Both are serious
and should be considered in selecting an approach for
treatment. With this, a critical issue surfaces, namely:
what is the best procedure for treatment in a given
situation? Value judgments are essential to answer this
question, but because survival of the child is not a
factor, various concerned individuals--parents and
professionals--often disagree more in their value structures
in this situation than in cases where survival is an issue.
The best treatment should depend on a number of character-
istics, such as the physical features of the child after
treatment, the cost, the effects on hearing and speech,
etc. Pathbreaking results of Jeffrey Krischer [1974J of
Harvard University constitute a very interesting attempt
to address some of the critical value issues concerning
treatment of cleft lip and cleft palate. Here, we briefly
describe his work.
In discussing the importance of cleft lip and cleft
palate, Krischer states, " Rarely are there defects so
handicapping to the child or so disturbing to the family,
yet so amenable to treatment." One major objective of
w77
treatment is to correct the physical deformities and
provide a normal-looking lip and nose. There are usually
uncertainties about the surgical success one will have
in this process and there is always the possibility of
resulting scars. Defective speech often accompanies those
with cleft palate, which can be attributed to both physic-
al and psychological factors. Another complication is
the possibility of hearing loss due to a variety of factors.
Thus, clearly two other important objectives of treatment
are to improve future speech skills and to improve hearing.
Krischer has quantified the preferences of over one
hundred people, including surgeons, orthodontists, speech
therapists, audiologists, pediatricians, and parents of
children with clefts, all of whom are actively involved
with individuals having clefts. The four objectives and
associated attributes which he explicitly considered are
given in Table 7.14 along with the range of these attributes.
One unique aspect of these assessments was the attribute
evaluating physical effects. Krischer had segments of
children's faces showing the nose and mouth area super-
imposed on a sketched face of a child. These pictures
illustrated various degrees of physical deformity after
treatment for the cleft. The individuals were asked to
assess subjectively their preferences for these pictoral
displays. Also note that the hearing attribute only had
two values. This, of course, could be generalized. For
speech, word intelligibility was measured as the percent
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of words accurately identified by a group of listeners
with normal hearing. Here 90% is completely adequate,
75% causes mild difficulty in understanding, 50% requires
frequent repetition, and 35% is unintelligible.
Once these objectives and attributes were specified,
Krischer, working with medical specialists concerned with
clefts, developed a questionnaire to assess preferences
over the four attributes. This was mailed to medical
specialists at numerous cleft-lip and cleft-palate treat-
ment facilities in the United States and through these
facilities to some parents of children with clefts. Part
of the questionnaire concerned utility independence as-
sumptions and the conditional utility functions for the
four attributes and another part concerned preferential
independence assumptions and tradeoffs among attributes.
Of the first one hundred twenty-five responses, approxima-
tely seventy-five percent appear to have accepted re-
quisite assumptions to invoke Theorem 6.1 in formalizing
preferences. Details of these assessments, a copy of the
questionnaire, and an interesting discussion of individ-
ual differences of preferences are found in Krischer [1974J.
Table 7.14. Krischer's Objectives for Evaluating Cleft
Lip and Palate Treatment
Objective
Provide normal looking
lip and nose
Improve speech
Improve hearing
Minimize treatment
costs
Attribute
Pictoral
Percent word
intelligibility
Hearing aid required
Dollars
Range
(see text)
35 to 90
yes or no
o - 10,000
7.7.7 Development of Water Quality Indices
Recent work by O'Connor [1973J illustrates some
important considerations relevant to specifying and using
social indices. O'Connor utilized a modified Delphi
procedure (Dalkey [ 1969 J) to combine the judgments
of several experts in constructing two separate indices
of water quality. One concerned the quality of water to
be used as a public water supply and the other described
the quality of water 'for sustaining fish and wildlife
populations. Eight experts* were used to (1) specify
attributes that should be included in each of the water
quality indices and to (2) prescribe a value function
over these attributes that would indicate water quality.
Since these indices are value functions, they have the
property that higher values indicate higher water quality.
However, it is not necessarily appropriate to use the
expected value of these indices in making decisions when
uncertainty is involved.
O'Connor sent questionnaires to and personally
visited each of the experts to discuss the attributes
which should be explicitly included in some aggregate
water quality index and the form of this aggregation
function. An additive model was chosen for both the
public water supply and fish and wildlife indices.
O'Connor emphasizes that an additive model is not ap-
propriate for instance when certain toxic substances
enter the water at an unacceptable level or when some
of the other attributes, such as pH, reach extreme levels.
Thus O'Connor's models are meant to be valid subject to
*O'Connor describes the experts as follows: "Eight experts
were chosen from an initial set of 20 contacted. Two
experts were high-ranking members of The Environmental
Protection Agency. Two members were heads of state en-
gineering services departments, and four were university
professors in the areas concerned with environmental quality."
the condition that toxic substances are under recommended
limits and other attributes are within specified ranges.
However, many normal situations probably meet these re-
strictions. The final attributes used in the public
water supply index and in the fish and wildlife index
are given in Table 7.15. Details about procedures used
and the final value functions are in O'Connor [1973J.
Table Ｗ Ｎ Ｑ ｾ O'Connor's Final Attributes in the Water
Quality Indices
Public Water SupplX
Fecal Coliforms
Phenols
Dissolved Solids
pH
Flourides
Hardness
Nitrates
Chlorides
Alkalinity
Turbidity
Dissolved Oxygen
Color
Sulfates
Fish and Wildlife
Dissolved Oxygen
Temperature
pH
Phenols
Turbidity
Ammonia
Dissolved Solids
Nitrates
Phosphates
7.7.8 Examining Foreign Policy
What are the advantages and disadvantages to the
u.s. of a Mideast agreement sought to ensure the con-
tinued availability of Mideast oil and an increased
production to meet the world demand? An exploratory
policy analysis done by Decisions and Designs, Inc.*
examined how a multiattribute decision analysis might
clarify the reasoning and simplify the presentation of
conclusions for such a complex problem.
The first phase of the analysis produced a flexible
decision model and used it initially to evaluate three
sharply different negotiating strategies regarding a
possible I"lideast agreement. A "base option" involving
no change now or later in U.S.-Mideast policies was used
primarily as a reference point for purposes of comparison.
A maximum option involved an agreement which went most
of the way toward what certain Mideast oil-producing
countries want. A moderate option was an intermediate
strategy reflecting a moderate change in U.S. policy,
*Decisions and Designs, Incorporated is an independent
research and development company located in McLean, Virginia
specializing in decision analysis for the United States
Government and industry. Much of their work is devoted
to problems involving multiple objectives.
which would be attractive to the Mideast oil-producing
countries but not politically difficult for the U.S.
The decision model evaluated the impact of various
negotiating postures on Mideastern oil supply and the
associated political and economic costs and gains to the
U.S. Specifically, the attributes concerned balance of
ｰ ｡ ｹ ｭ ･ ｮ ｾ Ｌ the way Western Europe and Japan would perceive
a Mideast agreement, the impact on U.S.-foreign relations,
the resulting public sentiment in the U.S., and finally,
the effect an agreement would have on other oil producers.
Various sub-models were used to elicit probabilistic
judgments and preference assessments at differing levels
of complexity and aggregation. The uncertainty side of
the analysis was based on judgments elicited from policy
makers and substantive experts. Alternative approaches
used direct unconditional assessments of oil volume, joint
assessments of volume and price, and indirect assessments
conditioned on possible political developments. Where
different approaches led to inconsistent results, those
inconsistencies were resolved by interacting with the
respondents.
The preferences used in the problem were solicited
from policy analysts charged with making recommendations.
For a first analysis, the utility function chosen was
additive. The single attribute utility functions for
attributes such as "oil volume" were constructed in the
manner described in Chapter 4. Tradeoffs were addressed
by eliciting statements like, "All other factors held
constant, an increase in Mideast oil supply to the u.s.
of from .5 to 2.5 million barrels a day at $12 a barrel
is indifferent to a gratuitous saving of $4 billion in
the federal budget (independent of its level)."
The next phase of the ongoing decision analysis used
the model developed, with several variations, to explore
a much richer set of realistic options and to update con-
tinually the inputs in the light of changing circumstances
or perceptions of individual decision makers. More
details can be found in Brown and Peterson [1975J.
7.7.9 Other Applications
As one can see from the examples described, there is
a wide variety of settings in which multiattribute value
or utility analysis is being employed. Still our collective
experience is not so large that the theory and 'art' of
such analyses is anywhere near standardized. Indeed,
practically each new analysis contributes to the 'art'
of assessing multiattribute preferences, if not to the
theory aspects also. For space considerations, we have
unfortunately not been able to review many such inter-
esting 'groundbreaking' analyses.
Some of these are Bauer and Wegener I s [1975J exami-
nation of urban development plans; Gearing, Swart, and
Var's [1973,197 4J measure of tourist attractiveness and
selection of touristic projects for the Turkish Ministry
of Tourism; Lorange and Norman's [1973J investigation
of risk attitudes of Scandinavian shipowners; Gustafson
Feller, Crane, and Holloway's [1971J development of a
severity of pain index; Boyd, Howard, Matheson, and
North's [1971J decision of whether to seed hurricanes;
Dyer, Farrell, and Bradley's [1973J development of
curriculum planning information.for elementary school
principles; and Collins [1975J evaluation of solid waste
disposal alternatives in Southeastern Michigan. Huber
[1974aJ reviews a number of studies that used multi-
attribute utility models. Two more general articles
which survey the applications of decision analysis in
industry are Brown [1970J and Longbottom and Wade [1973J.

CHAPTER 8
*AI RPORT DEVELOPMEN'l' FOR MEXICO CITY: A CASE STUDY
This chapter describes the application of decision
analysis to a large scale public decision problem-
-selection of a strategy for developing the major air-
port facilities of the Mexico City metropolitan area.
The purpose of discussing this study here is twofold.
First, many of the techniques and procedures developed
in earlier chapters of the book are ｵ ｴ ｩ ｬ ｩ ｾ ･ ､ on a very
important "typical" problem. Of course, it's typical
of those one-of-a-kind strategic decisions which always
concern many atypical aspects. Second, although the
cmalysis stresses the value side of the multiattribute
problem, it also deals with structuring the problem,
aspects of modelling the possible impacts of various
alternatives, and the larger framework within which
the analysis occurred.
Many people contributed significantly to the study.
It was done in the summer of 1971 for the Government of
Mexico under the auspices of the Secretaria de Obras
Publicas (Ministry of Public Works) and directed by F.J.
* This chapter closely follows the development in, and at
times takes sections almost verbatim from deNeufville and
Keeney [1972] and Keeney ｛ Ｑ Ｙ Ｗ Ｓ ｾ Ｎ
Jauffred, Director of the Center for Computation and
Statistics, and F. Dovali, Head of the Department of
Airports. Richard deNeufville of Massachusetts Institute
of Technology and the two of us were consultants aSsisting
SOP on the project. The total time spent by the con-
sultants on the project was fifty man-days.
8.1. THE PROBLEM
Rapid growth in t.he demand ｦ ｯ ｾ Ｇ air travel, combined
with increasingly difficult operating conditions at the
existing airport facilities compelled the Mexican Govern"""
ment to address the question: "How should the airport
facilities of Mexico City be developed to assure adequate
service for the region during the period from now to the
year 2000?" This was the essential question addressed
by the study team.
Our initial problem was not this one however. Two
previous studies for developing the airport facilities
of Mexico City had recorrmended very different alternatives.
One concluded that the current airport, five miles from
*the city cen"ter should be greatly expanded, whereas
the other suggested moving all aircraft operations to a
new airport to be built twenty-five miles north of the city.+
* See lpesa Consultores and the Secretaria de Communicaciones
y Transportes [1970].
+ See Secretaria de Obras Publicas [1967] or Wilsey y Ham de
Our initial charter was to evaluate the various alternatives;
in light of this discrepancy, and to recommend the most
effective program for airport development.
For this more limited development decision, one
needed to be concerned with the following:
(1) the location of the airport (or airports);
(2) the operational policy defining which services
are to be performed and where they will be
located; and
(3) the timing for development of different airport
facilities.
Because of severe environmental constraints, the two
sites previously mentioned are the only ones adequate for
a large international airpor"t in the Mexico City metro-
politan area. The configurations possible at either site,
with respect to the runways for example, were not really
significant in this particular problem.
Many different ways of operating the airports -- with
substantial differences in the quality of service provided -
- were possible, however. In particular, it was necessary
to decide what kinds of aircraft activity (international,
domestic, military or general) should be operating at
each of the two sites.
The question of timing is very important, since failure
to act at a given time may preclude future options. For
example, land available now nBy not be available in the
future when one ｾ ｩ ｧ ｨ ｴ want to develop it. On the other
l.t \S' .. .J
hand, premature action can significantly increase total
costs to the nation. The timing issue and operational
policies were the most important aspects of this initial
airport problem.
3.2. BACKGROUND INFORMATION
The existing airport is about five miles east of
the central part of Mexico City, but still within the
city limits on the edge of Lake Texcoco. The other
site is 25 miles north of the city in an undeveloped
farming area, near the village of Zumpango. The relative
location of the two feasible sites is indicated in
Figure 8.1.
Mexico City is situated at an altitude of about
7 t 400 feet in a valley ringed with high mountains rangihg
to over 17,000 feet above sea level. The mountains ｾ ｲ ･
very high in all directions except the northeast, where
the range lowers to around 10,000 feet. Most flights
entering or leaving the Mexico City area fly over these
lower. mountains to the northeast, although some do proceed
through a smaller and higher pass to the south.
The ｾ ｡ ｮ ･ ｵ ｶ ･ ｲ ｡ ｢ ｩ ｬ ｩ ｴ ｹ of the aircraft at high altitudes
is low, especially in hot climates. This requires that
the flight patterns over Mexico City be broader than
usual and prevents aircraft from safely threading their
way through mountainous regions. Thus there are considerable
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restrictions on the usable airspace around Mexico City.
This constraint, which principally affects the capacity
of the Texcoco site, is serious since Mexico City already
handles over 2 million passengers a year and ranks among the
the busiest airports on the continent.
When the Texcoco Airport was organized in the 1930's,
it was out in the country, but the population of the metro-
politan area has grown at the rate of about 5% a year,
passing from five million in 1960, to eight million in
1970. During this time, Texcoco has been surrounded on
three sides by mixed residential and commercial sections.
This has created problems of noise, social disruption;
and safety.
Should a major accident occur on landing or takeoff
toward the city it would likely ｣ ｾ ｵ ｳ ･ huhdreds of ｣ ｡ ｳ ｵ ｾ ｬ ｴ ｩ ･ ｳ Ｎ
The area is densely populated and, for example, a large school
is located ｵ ｮ ､ ｾ ｲ a flightpath only 500 feet from the end
of a runway. Since the approach pattern ｰ ｾ ｳ ｳ ･ ｳ ､ ｩ ｲ ｾ ｣ ｴ ｴ ｬ ｾ
ｯ ｶ ｾ ｲ the central ｰ ｡ ｲ ｴ ｾ of the city, high noise levels
affect many thousands of people. These noise levels are
bound to persist for at least the next 15 years until
"quiet" engines are'developed and installed on all ｡ ｩ ｲ ｣ ｲ ｡ ｦ ｴ ｾ
In addition, major expansion at Texcoco could result in
displacements of up to 200,000 people. A compensating
advantage for the Texcoco site is that major facilities
already exist. However they do not meet the standards
found in the major airports of other large developed
countries.
The location of Mexico City on a former lake bed
makes construction especially expensive at Texcoco. Heavy
facilities such as runways not only sink rapidly, but at
different rates in different locations, depending on their
loads. Each of the two major existing runways at TexCoco
require levelling and resurfacing every two years. Such
repairs closed down half the airport for four months when
they were done in 1971. Because the Zumpango site is
on higher and firmer ground, it is not expected to have the
same kind of difficulties.
Access to the airport by ground transportation appears
to be reasonable for both sites. The Texcoco site is near
the main peripheral highway which can distribute traffic
around the suburbs. It is not, however, especially well
connected to the center of the City, to which one haS to
proceed through congested city streetS. The Zumpango site
has the clear disadvantage of being further away, but it
can be linked directly to the tourist and business areas
via an existing north-south expressway.
8.2.2. The Institutional Setting
The government of Mexico has been in the hands of a
single party, the Partido Revolucionario Institucional,
for almost forty years. Political power tends to be
concentrated in the federal government and, for major
decisions such as the location of the capital's airport,
in the President himself. Any decision about a new
airport during 1970-76 will require the approval of
President Luis Echeverria. The debate about this decision
has been carried on by three major governmental bodies:
(1) The Secretaria de Obras Publicas, SOP, (the
Ministry of Public Works) ;
(2) The Secretaria de Communicaciones y Transportes,
SCT, (the Ministry of Communication and Transport),
and
I(3) The Secretaria de·la ｐ ｲ ･ ｳ ｩ ､ ･ ｾ ｣ ｩ ｡ Ｌ a body with
functions similar to those of the Office of
Management and Budget in the: United States.
8.2.3. Previous Studies
Both SOP and SCT have commissioned rival ｬ ｡ ｲ ｧ ･ ｾ ｳ ｣ ｡ ｬ ･
studies of the airport problem within the past few years.
The SOP study (SOp ｾ Ｙ Ｖ Ｗ ｝ Ｉ ｗ ｩ ｬ ｳ ･ ｹ y Ham de Mexico ｾ Ｙ Ｖ Ｗ Ｉ
dorie for its Department of Airports between 1965 and 1967,
recommended that a new airport be built at Zumpango and that
all commercial flights be shifted to this facility. The
master plan then proposed was not adopted at that time.
The study commissioned by SCT in 1970 (Ipesa Consultores
and SCT [1970)) resulted in a master plan for ･ ｸ ｰ ｡ ｮ ､ ｩ ｮ ｾ the
airport at Texcoco by adding new runway and terminal faci-
lities. Interestingly, this report assumed that aircraft
could take off away from the city toward the east, and
could land coming into the city from the east in opposing
streamS of traffic aimed at adjacent parallel runways.
While this proposal "solves" the noise and displacement
problems, its implications for safety are extremely
serious at any significant level of traffic, and are un-
likely to be acceptable for the expected volumes. This
report assumed that I'quiet" engines would completely
eliminate any noise problems outside the airport boundaries
by 1990. The SCT study was prepared and submitted during
the closing months of the 1964-1970 administration of the
previous President. It was not accepted in 1970. The
Government of Mexico did, however, wish to resolve the
issue. In early 1971 the new admirtistration committed
itself to a restudy. As stated by the President iri his
State of the Union Message of September 1, 1971; "Con....
struction of a new international airport in the metro-
politan area (of Mexico City) is also Under study at
this time." The study referred to is the one presented
here.
8.3. EVOLUTION OF THE ANALYSIS
During the short three-month period --the summer of
1971-- in which we analysts were associated with the Ｂ ｡ ｩ ｲ ｰ ｯ ｲ ｴ ｾ
problem, it took on many forms. One might say that much of
the time waS taken defining the problem, but it seemed to
be more than this. There wasn't a single problem, but many
interrelated problems: What is the best manner to provide
acceptable air service for Mexico City? How can one
contribute to a reconciliation of differences of judgementj
Ii facts h, and opinion of independent government agencies
concerned with airport development, in order to improve
quality of informatwl1 available to the decision makers?
What strategies for developing the airport facilities
are best in light of the financial and political realities
facing the government? And so on. The focus of ｴ ｨ ｾ
analysis shifted as the SOP became more sensitized to issues
we felt migt be important, as we became more familiar with
the total environment in which this analysis was situated;
and as segments of the study felt to be important were
completed.
Because of the conflicting recommendations of previous
reports, the original directive given to our colleagues
in SOP was to evaluate various master plans for developing
Texcaco and Zumpango. Therefore, this aspect of the
problem had to be completed first. Befbre we entered the
scene, SOP had been formulating this problem for a few
months. The alternatives were specified and objectives
and preliminary measures of effectiveness were defined.
Our main effort concerned helping SOP (1) to synthesize
the volumes of relevant information in the previous
ｲ ･ ｰ ｯ ｲ ｴ ｳ ｾ as well as results from additional studiesj and
to indicate the degree to which various alternatives met
objectives; (2) to meaningfully aggregate the ｾ ｦ ｦ ･ ｣ ｴ ｳ
occurring in different time periods; (3) to quantify a
value structure appropriate for the problem; and (4) to
develop a system for doing sensitivity analysis and for
reporting results.
As this work progressed, the original problem began
to be "solved", thus meeting the original directive and
freeing the team to address other important issues. Per-I
haps the most crucial one was to attempt to reconcile the
differences of viewpoint held by various parties, especially
SOP and SCT, involved in airport development and operation.
8.3.1. An ａ ｴ ｾ ･ ｭ ｰ ｴ at Reconciliation through Shared Analysis
It is expected that impartial experts might disagree
on many aspects of a complex analysis. It is crucial to
know what aspects of the problem they agree or disagree on
and why_ For instance, there may be agreement on the
structuring of the problem, but disagreement on the possible
impacts of the various alternatives and disagreement on
the value structure. The reasons may simply be that
different experts have incomplete information or conflicting
information or that traditional viewpoints due to political
and professional orientation have been "cast in ｣ ｯ ｮ ｣ ｲ ･ ｴ ･ Ｂ ｾ
The decision analysis modelt along with a graphical input-
output display developed to assist in the analysis, seemed
to offer a useful framework for analyzing these differences
of opinion.
Input-output consoles were installed in offices of
the study team, the Secretary and Under-Secretary of SOP,
the Presidencia, and the President's own office. Our hope
was that both SOP and SCT would agree on the basic framework
for analyzing the airport problem and that this framework
could then help highlight just where fundamental dis-
agreements lay. The Presidencia would then be in a
position to better understand the root causes of the
different ｶ ｩ ･ ｷ ｰ ｯ ｩ ｮ ｴ ｳ ｾ hear the rationalizations of each
side, and then commission its own studies if required to
clarify critical aspects of the problem. The SOP felt
sure that if this reconciliation process were carried
out, they would be shown to be right and they were pre-
pared to be quite open -- even about their uncertainties
on some inputs. A major problem, of course, lay in the
fact that it was SOP who was suggesting the ｦ ｲ ｡ ｭ ･ ｾ ｯ ｲ ｫ
(not the Presidencia) and understandably, but regretfully
from our point of view, the reconciliation process was
never engaged.
ｈ ｾ ｮ ｣ ･ SOP had to proceed on a new tack. Clearly
their minds were made up about the merits of Zumpango
and now their efforts turned to amassing art argument that
would convince the President and the Presidencia -- over
and above the objections of the SCT. We thus ｰ ｲ ｯ ｣ ･ ｾ ､ ･ ､
in the preparation of an advocacy doculnent that was meant
to be impressively scientific. Sonle strange things ｨ ｡ ｰ ｰ ･ ｮ ｾ ､ Ｎ
8.4. THE STATIC MODEL
Because of the history of the previous studies, the
｡ ｬ ｴ ･ ｲ ｮ ｡ ｴ ｩ ｾ ･ ｳ Ｌ objectives, and measures of ･ ｦ ｦ ･ ｣ ｴ ｩ ｾ ･ ｮ ･ ｳ ｳ
for the static analysis were firmly specified by our clients,
the Secretaria de Obras Publicas.
8.4.1. The Alternatives
The alternatives specified what types of aircraft
would operate at each of the two possible sites over
the rest of the century. In abstracting these, because
of similarities in operating characteristics and functions,
SOP had categorized aircraft as follows: International (I),
domestic (D), general (G), and military (M). It was
assumed that at anyone time, each category of aircraft
could operate at only one of the two sites.
To account for changes in operating arrangements over
the thirty-year horizon while keeping the problem manageable;
we decided to focus on the three years 1975, 1985, and 1995
as times when changes in the classes of aircraft operating
at a site could occur. Thus, an alternative might be
"develop the Zumpango site and move general aircraft to
it in 1975, shift international to Zumpango in 1985, and
operate all classes of aircraft at Zumpango by 1995. 11
Of course, this discretization into three time epochs
was done solely to keep the analysis tractable and the
actual timing of moves would not be so constained in
implementation. We are still discussing a rough-cut level
of analysis with presumably more refit1ed tuning coming at
a later stage.
If 3
Notice that this gives us (2 ) ｾ 4096 alternatives.
However, many of these were very similar in nature since,
for instance, military operations accounted for less than
five percent of the aircraft volume. Other alternatives
defined as above were unreasonable. One would not move
all operations from Texcoco to Zumpango in 1975 and back
again in 1985, for example. In the final analysis, the
total number of alternatives which were evaluated was
approximately one hundred.
8.4.2. Objectives and Measures of_Effectiveness
To evaluate the alternatives, one needs to specify
some measures of effectiveness which explicitly describe
their possible impacts on each of the important groups
concerned about the problerrl. For this problem, the groups
might be characterized as (1) the government, as builder
and operator of the airports, (2) users of the air facilities;
and (3) nonusers. Based on the previous reports of SOP
and SeT and lengthy discussions the following six objectives
were selected by SOP.
(1) Minimize total construction and maintenande costs;
(2) Provide adequate capacity to meet the air traffic
demands:
(3) Minimize the access time to the airport;
(4) Maximize the safety of the system;
(5) Minimize social disruption caused by the provision
of new airport facilities; and
(6) Minimize the effects of noise pollution due to
air traffic.
Although there is obviously much overlap, the first
two objectives account for the government's stake as operator;
objectives two, three, and four for the user's; and
the last three objectives for the nonusers. Measures
of effectiveness for these objectives were defined as
follows:
x, ｾ total cost in millions of ｰ ･ ｳ ｯ ｳ ｾ with Ｂ ｳ ｵ ｩ ｴ ｡ ｢ ｬ ･ ｾ
discounting;
X2 _ the practical capacity in terms of the number
of aircraft operations per ｨ ｯ ｵ ｲ ｾ
X3 ｾ access time to and from the airport in minutes,
weighted by the number of travelers from each
zone in Mexico City;
X4 - number of people (including non-passengers)
seriously injured or killed per aircraft accident;
Xs e number of people displaced by airport ､ ･ ｶ ･ ｬ ｯ ｰ ｭ ･ ｮ ｴ ｾ
and
X6 e number of people subjected to a high noise level,
. . *ln thlS case to 90 CNR or more.
Clearly, these six measures of effectiveness are not unique
or compietely comprehensive. For instance, air pollution
considerations are absent. However, SOP felt the list did
inClude all the important factors (other than political
factors, prestige, etc., which we will discuss later on in
* The Composite Noise Rating, CNR, is a standard index of
noise which combines decibel level and frequency of
occurence. The 90 level was selected by the SOP Oepartment
of Airports.
this chapter) for evaluating effectiveness of the proposed
alternatives.
8.4.3. The Basic Decision Model
The basic model is illustrated by the decision tree
in Figure 8.2. An alternative is specified by defining
what classes of aircraft will operate at which site in
each of the three time epochs. As a result of the
alternative chosen and events which occur (e.g., demand
changes), a consequence (x 1 ,x2 , ... ,x6 ) will eventually
result. However, at the time the decision must be made;
uncertainties about this cdnsequence for each possible
alternative must be quantified by a probability distribution
over the consequences.
The most important point to note about this model
is that the alternatives are master plans. They are not
designed to adapt to the unfolding of critical events
(e.g., demand changes, technological changes, ｩ ｮ ｣ ｲ ･ ｡ ｳ ｩ ｮ ｾ
environmental concerns of citizens, etc.) which might
occur over the thirty-year period formally considered
in the model. Clearly such considerations are essential
to any analysis purporting to assist the Government of
Mexico in deciding which actions to take in airport develop-
ment. This was done in the dynamic artalysis of options
available in 1971 described in Section 8.8. There were
two main reasons for first completing a formal analysis
of this static problem:
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(1) ｴ ｨ ｾ original request to study the "airport
ｰ ｲ ｯ ｢ ｬ ･ ｾ Ｂ tequired identifying discrepancies
between previous studies, both of which were
static analyses, and
(2) without such a study; SOP was very vulnerable
to potential criticism of the analysis ｦ ｯ ｾ ex-
cluding the details of such considerations.
The bomplete description of the probabilistic assess-
ments are given in Section 8.5 , the preference structure
ｩ ｾ ､ ｾ ｳ ｣ ｲ ｩ ｢ ･ ､ in Section 8.6 , and the computer input-
output along with the results of the anlaysis are given
in Section 8.7.
8.5. SPECIFYING THE POSSIBLE IMPACTS OF' EACH ALTERNATIVE
The probabilistic assessments were made using the
volumes of relevant informatj.on from previous studies, the
ｲ ･ ｳ ｵ ｬ ｴ ｾ of parallel studies being conducted by SOP; and
the professional judgment of administration within the
Mexican Government connected with airport construction,
operation, and maintenance. Both reports for SOP Ｈ ｓ ｏ ｾ
[19671, Wilsey y Ham de Mexico [1967]) and SCT (Ipesa Consul toreS
and ｓ ｃ ｾ [1970]) contain many volumes including detailed
demand studies for future air travel, soil mechanics and
engineering studies at possible sites, pollution studies
considering noise effects, analysis of ground traffic and
airport access interaction, cost estimates and projedtions
for various consiiered airport alterations, etc .• To help
in the cost estimates, for each of the sixteen arrangements
for i:l ircraft ope rC1 t .i.f)fl
at the two possible sites, in each of 1975, 1985,and 1995,
general construction plans were outlined indicating where
runways, support facilities, and accesS facilities would
ｨ ｡ ｶ ｾ to be built. ｔ ｨ ･ ｳ ｾ plans were used to translate the
feasible alternatives specified in Section 8.4 into
designs meaningful to airport planners and government
officials.
To gain insight on the impacts of alternatives, various
experiments were conducted by the SOP. One, designed to
gather data on access times, involved dividinq Mexico
City into ten zones on the basis of ｲ ･ ｳ ｩ ､ ･ ｮ ｴ ｾ Ｇ pattern of
airport patronage, and then studying the driving times
to the two airport sites from each zone in different weather
conditions at different times of day, etc. This data on
travel times and usage characteristics provided the in-
formation necessary to assess reasonable distributions for
access times for the various alternatives.
In a similar way, detectors were located at various
spots in the city to determine the noise levels caused by
aircraft. By analyzing current and projected flight paths,
superimposed on aerial photos of the city, and the population
densities of the affected areas, one acquired a good indication
of ｴ ｨ ｾ noiSe impacts of various alternatives. These were used
in assessing distributions for the number of people subjected
to specified noise levels.
By superimposing the various plans for construction on
aerial photos of the city, one could easily identify the
areas in which people would have to be relocated given that
a particular alternative were adopted. The population of
those areas was tabulated providing information for assessing
the number of people who would be displaced.
The results of all the previous studies and the data
of the concurrent experiments of SOP needed to be integrated
to provide meaningful estimates of the impacts of various
plans. This integration was done using the professional
ｪ ｵ ､ ｧ ｭ ･ ｾ ｴ and experience of members of the Secretaria de
Obras Publicas, including the Director of Airports , who
is responsible for building and maintaining all the ｡ ｩ ｲ ｾ
ports in the country of Mexico, the director of the Cehter
for Computation and Statistics, and members of their staffs.
The assessments were made in group sessions, where differences
in judgments were discussed to arrive at a consenSUSi The
fact that there were no problems in reaching a consensus
can probably be attributed to a number of factors: all the
professionals had the same information available, all had
similar technical training in engineering, they were
accustomed to working with each other and knew how each other
thought, and the subordinates tended to agree with their
superiors.
Having said how in general the probabilistic assess-
ments were conducted, let us get to the specifics. First,
the single year assessments will be described, and then
the time effects will be accounted for.
8.5.1. One-Year Assessments
The probability density functions were ｡ ｳ ｾ ･ ｳ ｳ ･ ､
using the fractile method described in Raiffa [1968].
ｌ ｾ ｴ us use Figure 8.3 to illustrate the method by
example. Consider the possible 1975 noiss impact of
the operating arrangement "all classes of aircraft
at 'I'excoco." First, the maximum and minimum number of
people subjected to 90 CNR or greater was specified as
800,000 and 400,000. Next to 0.5 fractile was evaluated
as Ｖ ｬ ｾ Ｐ Ｌ Ｐ Ｐ Ｐ Ｎ This meant, in the judgment of SOP, the
probability that the number of people impacted by 90+ CNR;
denoted by ｸ ｾ Ｕ Ｌ would be less than 640,000 is ｯ ｮ ･ Ｍ ｨ ｡ ｬ ｦ ｾ
Said another way, it is equally likely that the number of
people subjected to the high noise level will be less than
or greater than 640,000. The interval between 400,000 and
640,000 was then divided into equally likely parts by
choosing the 0.25 fractile as 540,000. The 0.75 fractile
was 700,000. Finally, each of the quartiles were divided
into equally likely parts in a similar manner.
The fractiles which were assessed are indicated by
the dots on Figure B.3. and the smoothed lines are the
cumulative probability distributions describing possible
noise impacts for the "all Texcoco" option in years 1975i
1985, and 1995. For any given year, the probability that
the impact is between any two adjacent fractile points
should be the same, namely 0.125. Thus, to check ｣ ｯ ｮ ｾ
sistency of the assessments, we asked SOP if in fact their
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judgemental probabilities of falling into any of the eight
ranges of impact were the same. SOP adjusted their assess-
ments until no more discrepancies could be found. Figure
8.3 indicates the final adjusted curves.
One might ask what are the basic uncertainties which
must be considered when assessing the possible noise ｩ ｮ ｾ
fluence of each airport. First, there is the uncertainty
of the population in the flight path area. Current population
is known rather accurately, but there is more uncertainty
about the population in the future. There is uncercainty
about when noise suppressors for jet engines will become
operational and incorporated on most jets and about ｴ ｨ ｾ
level of impact of such suppressors. And there is uncertainty
about the volume of air traffic in future years. Previous
SOP and SCT studies, census figurest SOP experimentst etc.,
all provided useful information on these basic uncertainties.
'fhis informatio.n was both formally and informally used by
SOP in making their combined assessments for the possible
noise impacts.
8.5.2. Incorporating Time Effects
Each of the measures of effectiveness needed to account
for the impact over the thirty-year period to the year 2000.
Different adjustments seemed appropriate for different
measures as indicated:
Costs. The costs that were considered in the model
included building and maintenance, but excluded operating
costs since it was felt these would be approximately
the same for any alternative. As is normal practice fot
SOP, the present value of the costs was taken as the time
dependent attribute of importance. The discount rate used
was twelve percent, the standard for the Mexican ｇ ｯ ｶ ･ ｲ ｮ ｾ
ment. Sensitivity analysis indicated the choice of a
discount rate was not critical for identifying effective
strategies.
Noise. For noise, the average number of people annually
subjected to aircraft noise levels above 90 CNR was used
as the measure of effectiveness. This assumes that it is
equally undesirable to have one person subjected to these
noise levels for two years or to have two different people
subjected in the different yearS. Furthermore; it assumes
the undesirability to an individual of a certain ndise level
in any year is the Same.
safety. As previously mentioned, safety is measured
in termS of the number of people killed or seriously injured
per air crash. To adapt this, we chose the average number
of pebple killed or seriously injured per crash averaged
over the thirty-year time period. Clearly this measure does
not account for the different likelihoods of crashes with
variduS arrangements. SOP was aware of thiS and of the
need to make adjustments to account for this factor. However,
they felt it was not prudent to formally include the likeli-
hood of crasheS in the model, and chose instead, to make
adjustments of the impact per crash in the senSitivity analysis
to indicate the effect of differential crash likelihoods.
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Access Time. For access time, an average of the
possible access times in the various years weighted by
the expected number of users in those years was used. This
aSsumes each trip to or from the airport by any individual
in any year is as important as any other such trip and that
one's preferences for the various access times are stationary
over time.
Social Disruption. By reasoning that on the average it
wduld be just as undesirable for a random individual to be
moved from his home due to airport development in one year
as any other year, we chose the total number of such people
displaced to be the measure of social disruption for the
analysis.
ｃ ｡ ｰ ｾ ｣ ｩ ｴ ｹ Ｎ Capacity (maximum possible operations/hour)
could not be aggregated in any reasonable way to combine
impacts in the different years. 'This is due mainly to the
fact that the relative desirability of various levels of
capacity would be very different in different years since
demand would probably be larger in later years. Increasing
capacity from 80 to 100 in 1975 may be worth very little,
since the additional capacity would rarely be needed. How-
ever; this same change in 1995 could be extremely important.
Thus in the thirty-year model, separate measures of effective-
ness for the capacity of 1975, 1985, and 1995 were included.
8.5.3. The ｔ ｨ ｩ ｲ ｾ ｘ Ｍ ｙ ･ ｡ ｲ Assessments
By aggregating the three yearly assessed impacts for
each measure of effectiveness; ･ ｾ ｣ ･ ｰ ｴ capacity, in the
manner just described, we could calculate the probability
density functions over the measures to account for impact
over time. For instance, with noise, if we difine
(8.1)
where xi is the number of people subjected to noise levels6
over 90 CNR in year i, then by using the probability dis-
tributions assessed for the ｸ ｾ for a particular strategy,
it is straightforward to derive the probability distribution
for x 6 " This represents what we've taken to be the overall
impact of a particular strategy in terms of noise.
8.5.4. Probabilistic Independence Assumptions
In conducting the assessments over one attribute at
a time, we were explicitly assunling that for each alternative,
the six attributes were probabilistically independenti For
some of the attributes; this assumption seems appropriate.
For instance, for any given alternative, noise and access time
considerations are probably independent of the other attributes.
On the other hand, safety considerations may be dependent on
capacity, for instance. The lower the capacity, the more
often the airport will be operating under hazardous conditions.
The more important assumption with regard td these assess-
ments was that impacts in separate years were probabilistlcally
independent conditional on the given alternative. This is
700
clearly not true. For instance, for the "all Texcoco"
alternative, if we found that 800,000 people were sub-
jected to high noise levels in 1975, we would likely
feel that more people will be affected by noise in
1985 than we would have if 400,000 had high noise levels
in 1975.
Our analysis was designed in an iterative fashion.
First simplifying assumptions (eR. probabilistic inde-
pendence) were adopted with the intention at a later
stage of recycling back with more realistic assumptions.
It turned out, however, that the delicacy taken in modelling
the probabilistic part of our analysis was not a critical
factor since other considerations dominated, and if we
had more tinle, we would have dressed up the probabilistic
analysis to be more credible to the reader. But it would
have been mere "window dressing" because the action re-
commendations we finally suggested could not have been
reversGd by acknowledging the joint dependence of the
random variables involved. It would not have been too
difficult to incorporate this complexity -- if not analytically,
at least through a simulation mode of analysis. It simply
was not worth it in this case.
One could argue that given the oversimplifying probabilistic
assumptions and the insensitivities, it might have been just
as accurate and simpler to use point estimates of the im-
pacts rather than probability distributions. In retrospect,
this seems quite reasonable. However, this does not avoid any
ＷＱＨｾｬ
of the assumptions made in our analysis, and in addition,
no account is made for the possible uncertainty of impact
for the single attributes. Our approach forces an explicit
recognition of this uncertainty by the decision makers.
Also, before our analysis, the lack of sensitivity of the
types of effective strategies to the attribute levels was
not known. A sensitivity analysis using point estimates
could have indicated this, however. The strongest reason
for maintaining the detail of using probability distributions
was that SOP wanted to avoid potential criticism of the
analysis due to exclusion of the uncertainties.
8.6 •. ASSESSING THE MULTIATTRIBUTE UTILITY FUNCTION
Once we had probability assessments which adequately
described the impact of alternate strategies in terms of
our six measures of effectiveness, the next step was to
assess a utility function u(x 1 ,x2 , ••. ,x6 ) ｾ ｵＨｾＩ ｯｶｾｲ
these measures. Proceeding as suggested in Section Ｖ ｾ Ｖ ;
we began by exploring the decision maker's preference
strudture in a qualitative manner. This was to build up
Sopis and our own experience in thinking directly about
(x1 ,x2 , ..• ;X6 ) consequences, but more importantly, to
ascertain whether any of the preferential independence
br utility independence assumptions discussed in earlier
chapters were appropriate for this problem. Then ｷ ｾ formally
verified a sufficient set of such assumptions which allowed
us to define for each i, i=1,2, •.• ,6, a conditional utility
1ft
function u. over X. and then to construct u as a function
1 1
of the conditional utility functions. That is;
(S.2)
where f is ｾ ｣ ｡ ｬ ｡ ｲ valued. To specify ｵ Ｈ ｾ Ｉ Ｌ the six u. 's
1
ahd necessary scaling factors were assessed.
The utility assessments incorporated the best ｰ ｲ ｯ ｾ
fessional judgments of both the SOP Director at Airports
and the SOP Director of the Center for Computation and
Statistics, and ｭ ･ ｭ ｢ ･ ｲ ｾ of their ｳ ｾ ｡ ｦ ｦ ｳ Ｎ A ｳｾｲｩｯｵｳ ｡ｴｾ･ｭｰｴ
was made to analyze ｴ ｨ ｾ problem from the point of view bf
the Government of Mexico.
B.6.1. The Assumptions
To refresh our memory, let us briefly and informally
review the concepts of preferential independence and utility
independence. Recali that preferential independence con-
cerns only ordinal preferences and no probabilistic elements
are involved. Partition ｴ ｨ ｾ set of attributes into Y and i.
If the rankings of consequences, which differ only in the
level of attribute Y, are the same regardless of the fixed
level of attribute Z, when Y is preferentially independent
of Z.
Utility independence, on the other hand, concerns
the cardinal preferences of the decision maker. If the
rankings of all lotteries, which differ only in ｴ ｨ ｾ possible
levels of Y which may occur, are the same regardless
of the fixed levels of Z then Y is utility independent
of Z.
B.6.2. Verifying ｴ ｾ ･ ａ ｳ ｳ ｵ ｭ ｰ ｴ Ｎ Ａ ｾ ｮ ｳ
Let us illustrate how we verified the preferential
independence assumptions used in our work. As an example,
consider whether safety X4 and noise X6 are preferentially
independent of the other attributes. First, we fixed the
other attributes at a desirable level and asked what
amount of safety x 4 was such that (x4 ; 2,500) was indifferent
to (1:1;500,000). That is, x 4 people seriously injured or
killed given an accident and 2,500 people subjected to high
noise levels is indifferent to one person seriously injured
or killed and 1,500,000 subjected to a high noise leveL
After hconverginq.h the amount of x 4 was chosen as 300.
The exact number is not important for verifying the
assumptions, but our interest is in whether it changes
as the other four attributes vary. So we next set these
four attributes at undesirable levels and asked the same
question and again elicited 300 as response.
Then we asked if this would in general be true for
any Values of the bther four attributes, artd the response
was "The answer would always be the same given the other
atttibutes were in a static condition." In fact the
respondent stated this would be the case concerning any
tradeoffs between safety and noise. Hence, we concluded
safety and noise ｾ ･ ｲ ･ ｰ ｲ ･ ｦ ･ ｲ ･ ｮ ｴ ｩ ｾ ｬ ｬ ｹ independent of the
other attributes.
By going through identical procedures, we verified
that capacity and cost were preferentially independent
of the remaining attributes, as was displacement and
access time. By this time, the man answering the questions,
who was an assi 9 tant to the Director of Airports, was in
a position to state that ordinal preferences over any two
attributes did not depend on the amounts of the other
attributes. These conditions were then also verified
with other staff members of SOP, including the Director
of Airports.
The same general approach was used in verifying the
utility independence assumptions -- that X. was utility
1
independent of its complimentary set X. for all i = 1,2; ••• ;
1
6. As an example, consider whether access time X3 was
utility independent of x3 • The other five attributes
were set at desirable levels, and the conditional utility
function over access time from 12 to 90 minutes (the range
originally specified by SOP) was assessed. We found 62
minutes indifferent to a 50-50 lottery yielding either 12 or
90 minutes. Then we changed the amounts of the X3 attributes
to less preferred amounts and repeated the question. Again,
an access time of 62 minutes was indifferent to a 50·50
lottery yielding either 12 or 90 minutes. A general question
indicated this would be true for any fixed amounts of x3 .
We found that relative preferences for any consequences and
lotteries involving uncertainties only about access time
"7 7ｉｾ
,1+
ｾ ･ ｲ ･ indeed independent of the other five attributes.
This condition was verified for all six attributes
with both the Director of Airports and members of his
staff. In all of these verification procedures, an attempt
was made not to lead the respondent to answers he would
not have arrived at otherwise. Our opinion is that this
was done successfully. Since preferences may vary ｾ ｩ ｴ ｨ
time, such questioning of the same people may lead to
different conclusions at another point in time. However,
the preferences indicated by the individuals questioned
appSared to represent their ｾ ｴ ｲ ｵ ･ ｾ preferences at that ｴ ｩ ｾ ･ ｩ
and hence, the assumptions we made were deemed appropriate
for the problem.
8.6.3. Forms of the utility Function
The main theoretical results used in obtaining the
utility function were Theorems 6.1 and 6.2 given in
Section 6.3. Informally, these results state that if
each pair of attributes is preferentially independent
of its complement and if each attribute is utility ｩ ｮ ､ ･ ｾ
pendent of its complement, then u(x1,x2, .. ｾ Ｌ ｸ Ｖ Ｉ is either
an additive or a multiplicative function of the component
utility functions u 1 (x1 ) ,u2 (x2 ) ＬＮｾＮＬｵＶＨｈＶＩＮ ActuallYt
ｾ ｳ indicated in Section 6.3 , this same result is implied
by a much weaker set of assumptions - i.e. only one attribute
X. needs to be utility independent of its complement and
1
each pair of attributes including X. needs to be preferentially
1
."e;;
independent of its complement. Therefore, many of the
assumptions that were verified are redundant, and they
can be thought of as consistency checks on the appropriate-
ness of our results.
The exact form of the utility function u, scaled zero
to one, is
6
= L
i=1
k. u. (x.) + k
111
6
L
i=1
r
j>i
k.k.u. (x.)u. (x.)
1 J 1 1 J J
6
ELL
i=1 j>i n>j
k. k. k u. (x. ) u. (x. ) u . (x )
1 J n 1 1 J J n n
(8.3)
where u. is a utility function over X. scaled from zero to one,
1 1
k. is a scaling factor for u., and k is another scaling
1 1
constant. Each k. must be between zero and one and can be
1
interpreted as the utility u assigned to a consequence with
all its attributes except Xi set at their least preferable
amount and X. set at the most preferable amount.
1
The Value of k can be found from the values of the k!s.
1
When Lk. = 1, then k = 0 and (8.3) reduces to the additive
1
form
6
L
i=1
k.u. (x.).
111
(8.4)
When L k. I 1, then k I 0 so we can multiply each side of
1
(8.3) by le, add one to the results, and factor to get the
multiplicate form
6
k U(X 1 'X2 ' •.• ,x6 )+1 ....TT1=1
8.6.4. Assessing the u. 'sｾ Ｂ Ｇ Ｚ Ｚ Ｂ Ｂ Ｂ Ｚ Ｂ Ｂ Ｇ Ｚ Ｂ Ｇ Ｚ Ｚ Ｍ Ｂ Ｇ Ｚ Ｍ ］ ］ Ｍ ］ Ｂ Ｇ Ｚ Ｇ Ｍ ］ Ｍ ］ Ｂ Ｂ ］ Ｇ ［ Ｚ Ｇ ｾ Ｍ Ｍ Ｍ Ｇ Ｍ Ｍ Ｍ Ｑ Ｍ Ｍ Ｇ
rkk.u.(x.) + 1].
111
7/t.v
(8.5)
Each of the single attribute utility functions was
assessed using the techniques discussed in Chapter 4. Let
us illustrate this by assessing preferences for access time.
The first step involved obtaining maximum and miniinum
values for access time. From probabilistic assessments of
SOP, we found that the range should go from 12 minutes to
90 ininutes, where shorter access times were preferred to
longer ones. Thus, to remain consistent with our scaiing
convention where the utility functions ranged from zero
to one, we set
u 3 (90) =0
and
(a. 6)
(8.7)
From questions to check whether X3 was utility independent
of x3 ' recall that we found 62 minutes for sure was indifferent
to a lottery, which we will deriote by <12,90> , yielding
either 12 or 90 minutes, each with probability 1/2. Hence,
the utility assigned to 62 minutes, the certainty equiva1ent
for the lottery, is
u 3 (62) = 0.Su3 (12) + 0.5u3 (90) = 0.5 (g. 8)
Since 62 is greater than the expected access time 51 of the
lottery <12,90>, this original assessment indicated that
the utility function might exhibit risk aversion. In this
context, risk aversion means that the expected amount
of any lottery ＼ ｸ Ｓ Ｇ ｸ ｾ ＾ would be preferred to that
lottery. By asking a couple of questions including specific
lotteries and then one concerning the general case t we found
that the decision makers were risk averse in the attribute
access time. This implied the utility function would be
concave as indicated in Fig. 8.4.
By asking more questions to find certainty equivalents
of additional lotteries, other points on u 3 were specified.
For instance, we found 40 minutes indifferent to <12/62>
and 78 ｭ ｩ ｮ ｵ ｴ ･ ｾ indifferent to <62,90>, so
u 3 (40)-- O.5u 3 (12) + O.5u3 (62) = 0.75/
and
u 3 (78) = O.5u3 (62) + O.5u3 (90) = 0.25.
(8.9)
(0.10)
Then an exponential utility curve was fitted to the empiri-
cally asseSsed ｰ ｯ ｩ ｮ ｴ ｾ Ｎ
At this stage, we did not immediately try to ascertain
arid exploit "higher order" risk properties such as decreasing
risk aversion. Such properties represent rather fine tunings
in a multiattribute utility function relative to the scaling
donstants "weighting" the levels of the different attributes
and more basic properties such as monotonicity and risk
｡ ｶ ･ ｲ ｾ ｩ ｯ ｮ of the separate u. 'so If later in the analysis,
1
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it had turned out that the precise form of some of the
u. 's were important, we would have returned to this aspect
1
and reiterated our evaluation of alternatives. This did
not happen to be the case.
Procedures similar to those described above were
also used to assess utility functions for cost, safety,
displacement, and noise. The results are illustrated
in Figure 8.5. However, as mentioned earlier, no single
measure was found to combine capacities in different years.
Thus, it was necessary to assess the capacity utility
function u 2 differently.
Although the general shapes of the utility functions
for access time, cost, and noise seem intuitive, the fact
that the curves for safety and displacement are linear
is not. For instance, concerning safety, one might expect
that since governments usually abhor large numbers of deaths
resulting from single tragedies the utility function for
safety would be risk averse. The reason for this attitude
is usually the political impact due to such tragedies.
However, our measure of effectiveness in this problem was
not meant to capture these political factors. Roughly
speaking, if one says each life is equally important, then
alternatives with the same expected number of people killed
or seriously injured should be equally undesirable in this
respect. This was the attitude taken by SOP in the assess-
ments, and so u4 is linear.
It was important, before proceeding, to do consistency
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cheCks on the reasonableness of the exponential and linear
utility functions. This was done by asking additional
questions about the decision maker's preferences, and
comparing his responses to the implications of the rifit ri
utility function. When they were consistent. with each
other, we developed more confidence in the utility ｦ ｵ ｮ ｣ ｴ ｩ ｯ ｮ ｾ
When they were inconsistent, the inconsistencies were
､ ｩ ｾ ｣ ｵ ｳ ｳ ･ ､ Ｌ and part or all of the assessment ｲ ･ ｰ ･ ｡ ｴ ･ ､ ｾ
8.6.5. The Capacity Utility Function
75 85 95 75Capacity x 2 is a vector (x2 ' x 2 ' x 2 ), where x 2
is the capacity in 1975, etc.
The first step in assessing u 2 was to identify the
miniwLm and maximum possible airport capacities for each
year: 1975, 1985, and 1995. There were 50, 80, 100 and
130, 200, 250 operations per hour respectively. Clearly
more ｣ ｡ ｰ ｾ ｣ ｩ ｴ ｹ in any given year was preferred to less
capacity, so to scale u 2 from zero to one, we set
7/()
u 2 (50,80,100) = 0
and
U2 (130,200,250) - 1.
(8.11)
(8.12)
It was verified that each pair of capacity attributes
was preferentially independent of the third, and that each
attribute was utility independent of the other two.
Thus, we know from Theorems 6.1. and 6.2. that either
(8.13)
or
(8.14)
where the u j are the utility functions over xj assessed on a2 2
zero to one scale as illustrated in Fig. 8.5 and c and
the c. are scaling constants. Notice that the forms of
J
(8.13) and (8.14) are analogous to the utility functions
expressed in (8.4) and (8.5). Since the following ､ ｩ ｳ ｾ
cussion concerns how the k. 's and k in (8.5) are assessed;
1
we will not indicate the assessment of the c.'s and c in
J
(8.14) as the procedures are indentical.
ｾ ｾ Ｖ Ｎ Ｖ Ｎ Assessing the k i Scaling Factors
10 illustrate the technique for assessing the k i
scaling factors, let us take cost X1 as an example. We
asked the decision makers to compare a consequence with
cost at its most preferred amount, and all the attributes
at their least preferred amount, to a lottery yielding
the consequences with all attributes at their most pre-
ferred amount with probability p or the consequence with
nIl attributes at their least preferred amount with
probability l-p. The object is to find the value of Pi
call it P1' such that the decision maker is indifferent ｢ ･ ｾ
tween the lottery and the consequence. Then, as shown in
Section 6.6, by using u(x) from either (8.4) or (8.5)
and equating expected utilities, k 1 must equal P1'
Using this procedure involving questions ｣ ｯ ｮ ｾ ･ ｲ ｮ ｩ ｮ ｧ
lotteries, we arrived at an initial estimate for the ki
values. Then we used nonprobabilistic questions as
consistency checks. For example, we set all attributes
at their least desirable level and asked, "Would yoti
ｰ ｲ ･ ｦ ｾ ｲ to have capacity or cost changed to its most de-
sirable level?" Capacity was the response implying k 2 ,
the coefficient of capacity utility, had to be greater than
k 1 , the coefficient of cost utility. Then we found a
level of capacity, call it ｾ ｾ Ｌ which was indifferent to
the best level of cost, denoted by x 1*. Then using either
I(8.4) or (8.5), we see that ｫ Ｒ ｵ Ｒ Ｈ ｾ Ｒ Ｉ must equal k1 " Since
we have u 2 assessed, this gives us a relationship between
k 1 and k2 • Pairwise comparison of the kits in this manner
provided many consistency checks, ｲ ･ ､ ｾ ｮ ､ ｡ ｮ ｴ with others,
and forced a readjustment of the kivalues. After several
iterations, we ended up using the valuesof k. indicated
1
in Table 8.1.
8.6.1. Assessing Parameter k.
Since the sum of the k. is 1.89, we know the utility
1
function is multiplicative rather than additive; it is
additive only if Ek. = 1. Therefore the value of k in
1
(8.5) must be determined by evaluating (8.5) at Ｈ ｸ ｬ Ｌ ｸ ｾ Ｌ ..... ;x6)
where ｸ ｾ is the most preferred amount of x ..
1 1
This gives us
6
::: TT [kk. u. (x '!= ) + 1],
i= 1 1 1 1 (8.15)
but from our scaling conventions, we know both ｵ Ｈ ｸ ｴ Ｌ ｸ ｾ Ｌ ••• ,x6)
is 1 and the u.(x*) are all one so
1 i
k ... 1 ::: (k k1 + 1) (k k 2 + 1) .... (k k 6+1). .(8.16)
Since the k. are known, parameter k can be evaluated by
1
solving (8.16). As shown in the Appendix 6B, since Ek.>1,
1
the value which k must assume is the solution to (8.16)
such that -1<k<0. Using the k. ivalues from Table 8.1, we
1
found k ::: -0.877. Of course, if this were redone from scratch
a new k would be found. But it would probably fall cloSer
to ｾ Ｎ Ｘ Ｐ (say) than to .00 or to +.80. In the final analysis,
it is important to do sensitivity studies on k and the k. IS.
1
Table 8.1 SCALING FACTORS FOR THE MEXICO CITY AIRPORT STUDY
Attribute X. Scaling Factor k.
1 1
Xl ::: Cost 0.48
X2
::: Capacity 0.6
X3
::: Access Time 0.10
X4
... Safety 0.35
X5 = Displacement 0.18
X6 = Noise O.ia
It was found that
6.6.8. The Utility Function
Procedures identical to those just illustrated were
used to evaluate the c. and c in (8.14).
J
c l = 0.3, c 2 = 0.5, c 3 = 0.4 t and c = -0.46. These param-
eters, together with Table 8.1 and k = -0.877 and the
utility functions illustrated in Figures 8.4 and 8.5
tepresent the information necessary to specify the utility
function u(xl ,x2 , ... ,x6 ). The next section describes how
it waS used.
8.7. THE ANALYSIS
A computer was programmed to assist in evaluatil'lg the
7 ,7'-.>
alternatives. ComputationallYt the program was quite simple:
given any set of probability distributions and a utility
function, it calculated the expected utility for ｳ ｰ ･ ｣ ｩ ｦ ｩ ･ ｾ
alternatives.
To keep the calculations at a reasonable number, as
ｾ ･ ｮ ｴ ｩ ｯ ｮ ･ ､ earlier, many alternatives were eliminated before
going through expected utility calculations. For instance,
since military aircraft represent a relatively insignificant
amount of the total air traffic, most alternatives differing
only in terms of the airport for military operations were
ＷｾＴ
not considered separately. Secondly, alternatives which
shifted certain types of aircraft from the Texcoco site
to Zumpango and back again at a later date were excluded.
8.7.1. The Input-Output ｄ ｩ ｳ ｰ ｬ ｾ
Graphical input-output consoles were used as an efficient
and accessible system for sensitivity analyses and ｣ ｯ ｭ ｭ ｵ ｮ ｩ ｾ
cating results of the study. This capability was used
daily by the SOP, and could also be used by the other
ihterested parties to examine the relative merits of
alternative developmental policies. The input-output system
allowed any user to use his own probability and utility
estimates for evaluating any specified alternatives. There
were two options for doing this. Option 1 provided the
standard estimates that SOP used in evaluating the alter-
ｮ ｡ ｴ ｩ ｾ ･ ｳ on the console screen. To change these, one just
typed in the changes over the SOP estimates. This option
was particularly useful for sensibivity analyses. Optiori
2 allowed the User to enter his OWn estimates without seeing
any others.
The probabilistic estimates of possible impact could
be altered by changing the upper and lower bounds on these
impacts. For instance, as illustrated in Figure 8.3, SOpis
lower and upper bounds on the possible number of people
subjected to noise above 90 CNR in 1975 were 400,000 and
800,000, respectively. Merely by typing on the console,
one could look at the overall effect on strategy if these
were 600,000 and 1,200,000.
To alter the utility function, one changed the scaling
factors listed in Table 8.1. Because the meaning of these
constants can be easily misunderstood (as discussed in
section 5.9) and because of the difficulty in specifying
a consistent set of estimates, a short subroutine was
developed to assist the user. This routine essentially
asked the user on the screen the same questions that we
ｾ ｳ ｫ ･ ､ SOP in initially assessing the scaling constants.
ｏ ｮ ｣ ｾ a reasonable consistency was achieved among the k. ｩ ｳ ｾ
1.
the constant k in (8.3) was calculated. If k=O, the additive
form (8./0 was used, and if ktO, the mUltiplicative ut.i1ity
function was used to evaluate strategies. As was the case
with the general shape of the probability densities, the
individual utility functions u. could not be changed by
1.
graphical input-output. These changes required adjustments
in the programs. However, although important, these changes
represent fine tunings relative to the options provided
for graphically.
Another particularly useful feature of the computer
program was a routine which calculated certainty equivalents.
Using this routine, ｾ ｨ ･ overall possible impact of any
alternative could be reduced to an equivalent impact des-
cribed by a vector of certainty equivalents. Since we assumed
721cJ
*probabilistic indepencence and first-order utility
independence (i.e., each X. is utility independent of its
1
complementary set), from the marginal probability distribution
of X. and the component utility function u., it is possible
1 1
to define the certain equivalent ｾ ｩ by
ｵ Ｎ Ｈ ｾ Ｎ Ｉ =·E[u.(x.)], i = 1,2, •.• ,6.
1 1 1 1
(8.17)
Notice that the certainty equivalent x. is independent of
1
the possible impacts on other attributes. Also notice
that the ｣ ｾ ｲ ｴ ｡ ｩ ｮ ｴ ｹ equivalent vector ｾ = ＨｸＱＧＮｾＮＧｾＶＩ does
not commit one to any determination of the scaltng constants
k. 's or k.
1
If two alternatives A and B are reduced to certainty
equivalent vector impacts ｾ ａ and ｾ ｂ Ｇ it is easy to check
for dominance. Also, for example, one could investigate
exactly how large a change in the impact on attribute X.
1
of alternative A would be required before it would be less
preferred than alternative B.
* If k=O (or close to ｺ ｾ ｲ ｯ Ｉ Ｌ than u can be taken to be
(approximately) additive and only the marginal probability
distributions are of relevance. If k¥O, and joint
probabilistic dependence is ｷ ｾ ｲ ｲ ｡ ｮ ｴ ･ ､ Ｌ then ｴ ｨ ｾ analysis
by certainty equivalents must be considerably modified.
ｏ ｮ ｾ could, however, employ ｴ ｨ ｾ notion of "conditional
certainty ･ ｱ ｵ ｩ ｶ ｡ ｬ ･ ｮ ｣ ｾ Ｂ td some advantage. This was hot
done.
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8.7.2. Effective Strategies
Of the alternatives we did evaluate using expected
utility, the top ten according to SOP are indicated in
Table 8.2. In the table, the expected utilities are
calculated on a scale from zero to one-hundred, where
zero utility was assigned to a hypothetical alternative
generated by taking the least ､ ･ ｳ ｩ ｲ ｡ ｢ ｬ ｾ probability
distributibn ｦ ｯ ｾ each attribute from the set of all
alternatives. The utility value of one hundred units
was assigned to a hypothetical alternative generated by
taking the most desirable probability distribution for
each attribute from the set of all alternatives. On this
scale, the alternative of keeping all aircraft in Texcoco
in all three years has art expected utility 5.20.
By looking at Table 8.2, it is clear that two types
of strategies are effective. One type might be categorized
as the "all Zumpango" alternative and represents building
a major new airport at Zumpango as soort as ｰ ｯ ｳ ｳ ｩ ｢ ｬ ･ ｾ The
alternatives in the table involving both International
and Domestic aircraft operating at Zumpango in all three
years make up this category. The other type of effective
strategy is the "phased development at Zumpango" ｣ ｨ ｡ ｲ ｡ ｣ ｴ ･ ｾ ﾭ
ized by either International or Domestic aircraft operating
in Zumpango in 1975 and then both by 1985 and 1995. All
strategies which included keeping a part of the International
or Domestic traffic operating out of Texcoco through 1985
did not appear competitive in terms of effectiveness with
Table 8.2 THE BEST TEN ALTERNATIVES
Al ternative ,
Expected
Utility Rank
z
1975
T z
1985
T z
1995
T
IMG
DMG
MG
MG
DMG
DMI
i D ID MG ID MG 91.23 1
IDMG - IDMG - 90.90 2
ID MG ID MG 90.79 3
IID MG ID MG 89.30 4
IDMG ｾ IbMG - 88.10 5
ID MG IDMG - 86.75 6
I DMG - I pMG.... 86 . 55) 1
IG 1M IDMG ｾ IDMG ｾ 86.19 8ｾＬ｟ｉ｟ｍ｟ｇ Ｎ｟ｾＬ｟ｾ｟Ｚ｟ｾ｟Ｇ .__=_.. ｾ __ｾｾ ... :_.--!.._:_: ｾｾ｟Ｚ __ ＭＭｯＮ｟ｬ｟ｾＭＭＭＬ
II' IDMG
I
'
I ｾｾ
ID
ｾ ｯ help read the table, the alternative ranked 1 is Qomestic
aircraft at Zumpango with International, Military, and General
- - I - -
! '
ai.rcraft at Texcoco in 1975: andl International and Domestic
j
at !umpango with ｾ ｩ ｬ ｩ ｴ ｡ ｲ ｹ and ｇ ･ ｮ ｾ ｲ ｡ ｬ at Texcoco in i985 and
!
1995.
the two types of strategies outlined above. Of course,
these expected utility evaluations depend on two types
of judgmental inputs: probability and utility assessments.
The ones we used were those of officials of SOP and pre-
sumably, if the same analysis were to be made with inputs
from officials of the SCT,another ranking of strategic
alternatives would result. But more about these
reconciliation problems later.
8.7.3. Use of the Analysis
As we indicated earlier in the chapter, the original
purpose of the work described here was to identify effective
strategies - as measured by our six measures of effective-
ness - for developing the airport facilities of Mexico
City. It was not to indicate what action should be taken
by the Government of Mexico in 1971 to meet its needs.
Once the "effective strategies" had been identifiedj the
problem shifted to this second question: What action
should be initially implemented?
So far, the formal analysis has included only master
plans defining ac"tions for a thirty year period. A more
appropriate course would seem to be to make some initial
decision "and then, based on subsequent ･ ｶ ･ ｮ ｴ ｾ Ｌ to revise
strategies as necessary. Furthermore, any study which is
designed to aid in the selection of an airport development
policy for Mexico City must include factors such as
political preferences and community priorities. This was
the task undertaken in a dynamic analysis of development
ｳ ｴ ｲ ｾ ｴ ･ ｧ ｩ ･ ｳ to be discussed in the next section.
o. e. 'rHE DYNAMIC ANALYSIS
ThS purpose of the dynamic model was to decide what
governmental action should be taken in 1971 which would
best serVe the overall objective of providing quality
air service to Mexico City for the remainder of the
century. This model assumed the second step in the decision
process could be taken in 1975 or 1976; at the end of the
current President's six-year term. The adtion taken
then would depend both on the action taken now and the
critidal events which might occur in thE! interim'•. our
analysis of the dynamid model was much less formal than the
one developed for the static model, primarily because of
time pressures and the general complexity of the situation.
8.8.1. Alternatives for 1971
We first identified (using cornmon sense) the reasonable
alternatives available to the government in 1971. These
al ternatives differ'ad in the d'2grees of commitment to
immediate construction at the two sites. We chose only four
levels of comnitment (minimum, low, moderate, and high)
giving us the 16 alternatives exhibited in Figure 8.6.
Actually, each nominal case in the figure represents
a dlass of specifio alternatives. The idea was to do a
730t:...
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Figure 8.6: THE 16 NOMINAL DYNAMIC, AL'l'ERNA'1.'IVES FOR 1971
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ｦｩｲｳｴｾ｣ｵｴ analysis to decide which classes of alternatives
were sufficiently viable to be examined in more detail.
It should be noted that the two strategies defined by the
static analysis could be compatible with all the nominal
dynamic options except 11,12,15,and 16.
The next step involved defining what was ｭ ･ ｡ ｾ by the
alternatives in some greater detail. Briefly summarized,
the alternatives at Texcoco (for the period 1971-1975)
were defined as follows:
Minimum - maintenance and introduction of safety
equipment: only;
Low - extend the runways, upgrade support facilities
such as terminals, do all routine maintenance
and introduce new safety equipment;
Moderate- in addition to that done with a low strategy,
buy and ｲ ｲ ｰ ｲ ｾ ｲ ･ land for building a new runway
and expand passenger facilities;
High - build a new runway and passenger facilitiesj
improve the airport access - in short, build
a totally new airport at Texcoco.
Similarly, for Zumpango, we defined the commitment levels:
Minimum - at ｭ ｾ ｳ ｴ Ｌ buy land at Zumpango;
Low - buy land, build one jet runway and very modest
passenger facilities;
Moderate- buy land, build a first jet runway and plan
others, build major passenger facilities, and
construct an access road connection to the
main Mexico City highway;
High
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- build multiple jet runways, major passenger
ｦ ｡ ｣ ｩ ｬ ｩ ｴ ｩ ･ ｳ ｾ and access roads - that is,
build a large new airport at ｚ ｵ ｮ ｾ ｡ ｮ ｧ ｯ Ｎ
8.8.2. Objectives
We identified four major objectives that were important
in choosing a strategy for airport development: effective-
ness, political consequences, externalities, and flexibiiity
of the various alternatives. The components of the
"effectiveness" attributes are indicated by the six measures
of effectiveriess covered in the static model. The political
consequences were those important to the President - since
he was the principal decision maker - involving the political
effects which would be felt by SOP, by SCT, and by the
Presidencia. Flexibility concerned the range of options open
to the President at the second stage of the decision-making
process: what freedom would he realistically have at the
end of his tenure in modifying his earlier 1971 stance
after learning about the intervening uncertain events.
Finally, all other important considerations were lumped
together as 'iexternalities." These included the amount of
access roads needed, the distribution of federal expenditures
between the Mexico City region and the rest of the couhtry,
the distribution of expenditures for airports and other
uses, regional development away from central Mexico City,
and the national prestige associated with new airport facilities.
8.8.3. Possible Scenarios
To gain insight into the meanings and implications
of each of the classes of alternatives, detailed scenarios
Were outlined for each. These included: (1) the con-
sideration of important and critical events which could
occur in the period 1971-1976, and possibly affect the
best strategy in 1976; (2) the likelihood of their
occurrences; (3) the strategic reaction to each inter-
vening event-complex; and (4) the possible eventual
Consequences for each act-event-reaction path. The
events involved safety factors and air disasters; shifts
in demand in terms of both passengers and aircraft;
technological innovations; such as noise ｳ ｵ ｰ ｰ ｲ ･ ｾ ｳ ｯ ｲ ｳ ［
better runway construction on marshy ground; etc.; changes
in Citizen attitudes toward the environment; and changes
in priorities; such as national willingness to have
government funds used for major airport ｣ ｯ ｮ ｳ ｴ ｲ ｵ ｣ ｴ ｩ ｯ ｮ ｾ
Figure 8.7 depicts a schematic representation of ｯ ｮ ｾ possible
scenario.
In each of the scenarios, the manner in which the
1971 strategy should be altered in 1976 to aCcount for the
critical events ｬ ｩ ｾ ｴ ･ ､ above was defined. For instancel
if one originally chose strategy six, then a reasonable
response to increased numbers of landings and thus decreased
safety, in addition to increased consideration about the
impact of noise and air pollution in Mexico City, would
be to hasten the building at Zumpango and make it the
Table 8.3: PRELnIINARY EVALUATION OF PLAliSIBLE GOVERNMENTAL
OPTIOliS FOR 1911 BY RANK ORDE.R
ALTERl.'fATlVE ATl'RIBUTES
Flexibility Political Effects on Externalities due to
Presi- SOP SeT Overall Pres- Reg. Bal. of Roads Overall Effectiveness
dencia tige DeV. Fed Exp.
2 1 -1 8 2 3 4 4 1 1 3 T
3=4* 7 4 <:: 1 4 1 4 6 3 7 8, f
<: 2 3 6 4 3 3 3 2 1 ! , 3" ...
6 3 2 7 3 2 3 3 ｾ 1 I 3 1.J
I
i 9* 4 6 3 6 5 2' 2 4 2 2 4
10 5 5 4 5 1 2 2 5 2 4 5
13* 6 8 1 8 7 1 l 6 4 5 2
14* 8 7 2 7 6 1 1 7 4 " 60
*Alternatives dominated by Ｒ ｾ 51 6, or 10 on overall ranking of four major attributes
""-J
v"J
ｾ
siderations and externalities, the assessments on the
components were first carried out, and then the overall
ranking for these attributes was established. The ranking
of the alternatives according to effectiveness waS pro-
vided directly by results of the static model.
The results of the first ranking effort are shown in
Table 8.3, where the smaller numbers represent the better
rankings. From this table it can be seen that alternatives
3=4, 9, 13, and 14 are each dominated by others on the
basis of their overall rankings for the four main measures
of effectiveness. Alternative 6, for instance, is better
than alternative 14 in terms of all four of the measures.
Hence alternative 14 - and likewise alternatives 3=4, 9,
and 13 --can be dropped from further consideration. The
alternatives which were not dominated are those represented
by the nominal cases 2, ｾ Ｌ G, and 10. It is ｩ ｭ ｰ ｾ ｴ ｡ ｮ ｴ to
note here, however, that before we actually discarded
dominated alternatives we engaged in a devil's advocate
procedure: we tried to give the benefit of reasonable
doubt to the ｩ ｭ ｰ ･ ｮ ､ ｩ ｾ ｧ noncontenders to see whether they
could be resurrected to a place of contention. They could
not.
8.8.5. Final Analysis of Dynamic Options
To refine the analysis of the possible governmental
decisions, it was necessary to define the remaining con-
tending alternatives more precisely. This was done as
-7?"1·ｾＮ
ｦｯｬｬｯｷｳｾ
2 - At Zumpango, do no more than buy land for an
airport. At Texcoco, extend the two main runways
and the aircraft apron; construct freight and
parking facilities, and a new control tower. Do
not build any new passenger terminals.
SA - Build one jet runway, some terminal facilities
and a minor access road connection at Zumpango.
Buy enough land for a major international airport.
At Texcoco, perform only routine maintenance and
make safety improvements.
SB ｾ Same as alternative SA, except buy just enough
land for the current Zumpango construction.
6 - Extend one runway at Texcoco and make other
improvements enumerated in alternative 2. Buy
land for a mujol.- InLeLllational airport at Zumpango,
and construct one runway with some passenger and
access facilities.
10 - Same implications for Texcoco as alternative 6.
Build two jet runways with major passenger facilities
and access roads to Zumpango.
These five altsrnatives were ranked in the manner
previously described. The results are given irt Table 8.4.
Proceeding as before, we can quickly see that alternative 6
dominates 10, and alternatives 2, SA and 6 all dominate
5B. Thus the three remaining viable alternatives are 2, SA,
and 6"
Table 8.4: FINAL EVALUATION OF GOVERNMENTAL OPTIONS FOR 1971
Ａ ｜ ｌ Ｇ ｬ Ｇ ｅ ｒ ｎ ａ ｾ ATrRIBUTES
Flexi- Political Exter- Effec-
bility Effects nalities tiveness
----
2 1 4 4 3
5A 2 3 3 2
513* 4 5 5 4
6 3 1 1 1
10'* 5 2 2 1
*Alternatives dominated by 2, SA, or 6 on overall
ranking of four major atlLibutes.
'7'7C'
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The relative advantages of these three options were,
finally, sUbjectively weighed by the SOP personnel as
follows. Alternative 6 ranks better on effectiveness,
externalities, and political considerations than either
2 or SA. Although it is worse in terms of relative
flexibility, it does allow the President to react effectively
to all the ｣ ｲ ｩ ｴ ｩ ｣ ｡ ｾ events which might occur between 1971
ahd 1976, when the second stage of the airport decision
could be made. Hence, in the opinion of the members of
SOP ｾｯｲｫｩｮｧ on this problem, altetnative 6 was chosen as
I
the best strategy.
8.9. IMPACT OF THE RESULTS
Based on the 1965-1967 study by SOP which recommended
moving the International Airport to Zumpango as soon as
ｰ ｯ ｾ ｳ ｩ ｢ ｬ ･ Ｌ ｡ ｾ well ｡ ｾ ｩ ｮ ､ ｩ ｣ ｡ ｴ ｩ ｯ ｮ ｾ early in this study, it
was clear that some members of SOP held the opinion that
a major move to Zumpango was still the most effective
strategy, The static analysis, using SOp·s own estimates
and preferences, indicated a phased development involving
a gradual shift toward Zumpango appeared equally as good.
Once political considerations, flexibility of the policy,
and externalities were accounted for along with effectiveness
in the dynamic analysis of alternatives open to the ｧ ｯ ｶ ･ ｲ ｮ ｾ
ｾ ･ ｮ ｴ in Ｑ Ｙ Ｑ Ｑ ｾ it was evident that the "phased development
at Zumpango" policy was better than an uall Zumpango"
policy.
Looking at the implications of their evaluations,
the SOP staff was very surprised and bewildered. Using
their own preferences over measures of effectiveness
they knew were relevant for a realistic set of options,
they agreed that the two alternatives, thirteen and four-
teen, which were most consistent with their so strongly
held position, were completely dominated. Note also
that the position of SeT, being most consistent with
alternative 3=4 was also dominated.
This glaring inconsistency had a profound impact
on many individuals within SOP. They rethought their
position, analyzing in their own minds how this "strange"
implication came about. As they understood the implication
better, they gained some confidence in the result. With
the final analysis of non-dominated alternatives and
additional group ､ ｩ ｳ ｾ ｵ ｳ ｳ ｩ ｯ ｮ ｳ of the dynamic analysis; SOP
adopted a new flexible position, exemplified by an initial
choice of option six in 1971. Thus a very strange thing
happened: an analysis undertaken for unabashedly advocacy
purposes (Le., to justify going all-out to Zumpango), turned
out to convince the sponsors of the analysis that perhaps
a more flexible stance was really in the best interest of
Mexico.
8.9.1. The Ensuing Political Process
SOP recommended a "phased development" strategy to
the President in December 1971. Specifically, it was
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suggested that land be acquired at Zumpango, that a major
runway and modest terminal facilities be planned for
construction during President Echeverria's term. It was
also proposed that he reserve until 1976 a more detailed
decision on how the airport facilities for Mexico City
should be developed. This recommendation ｲ ･ ｰ ｲ ･ ｳ ･ ｮ ｴ ･ ｾ a
major change in SOP's posture from the 1967 study. The
previous recommendations of SOP were for master plans
specifying what should be done at various points in time
bver the next thirty years without regard to the unfolding
of relevant uncertain events. Thinking in terms of adaptive
dynamic strategies rather than in terms of master plans
played a pivotal role in our analysis.
As the last stage of our consulting activities, we; in
collaboration with our clients; examined in some detail
the steps that had to be taken in order to implement the
newly developed stance of SOP. This required developing
a strategy for the planning of technical documents, for
informal presentations to key government agencies, for
private meetings, and for possible announcements. Since we
were not certain of the reactions of SCT and the Presidencia
we mapped out some contingency plans which themselves were
more in the spirit of an adaptive dynamic analysis than
of a master plan. We are sure that you will understand that
this chapter, however, is not the place to discuss the
details of these politically sensitive considerations.
The analyses described in this chapter were completed
in ｾ ｡ ｲ ｬ ｹ September; 1971. In late 1971, Ing. Jauffred and
Ing. Dovali, together with Secretary Bracamontes of SOP
presented the basic ideas of this study to the President
of Mexico. Members of SCT and the Presidencia, including
the respective secretaries of these ministries, were
also present at this meeting.
The meeting, perhaps needless to say, did not
eliminate all differences of opinion concerning the two
basic points of view--remain at Texcoco or more to Zumpango-
-positions that had long been established. After the meeting,
the ｐ ｲ ･ ｳ ｩ ､ ･ ｾ requested that SOP, SCT, and the Presidencia
work out philosophical disagreements on the airport issue,
as well as technical and financial details of further
developing the airport facilit.ies of the Mexico City area.
Because of its complexity and importance, the process of
'working out the details' is very time consuming. By
mid-1974, no cone ｬ ｾ ･ ｴ ｇ <'J('..-:i:. LIlt! I.; ,,1 been made. However;
the winds seemed to blow a bit differently in 1974 than
in 1971. In ｾ ｨ ･ earlier year, the basic issue was whether
the main Mexico City Airport should be at Texcoco or
Zumpango. In 1974, the issue seemed to involve when the
Zumpango site would be the maJn airport--next year, in
five years, or twenty. Support for this came from the
fact that land for an airport at Zumpango was exappropriated
by SOP, who holds this authority, in early 1974. Presumably,
whatever decision evolves by the Government of Mexico will
be done with greater awareness of the relative influence
of the different attributes and of the dynamic issues.
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